Abstract
The meaning of the concept “culture” as used in American sociology is incoherent. Despite the advances and maturing of cultural sociology, the central idea of “culture” itself remains conceptually muddled. This article demonstrates this critical point by analyzing the definitions, meanings, and uses of the word “culture” in the field of cultural sociology’s most significant, recent edited volumes, handbooks, readers, companions, annual review chapters, and award-winning books and journal articles. Arguing for the scholarly importance of conceptual coherence, this article calls for more disciplined and cooperative theoretical work to clarify and move toward a more standardized meaning of “culture” in American sociology.
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Notes
The key concepts being “fields,” “cultural capital,” “cultural tool-kits,” “repertoires,” “cultural diamond,” “cultural resonance,” “idioculture,” and “cultural structures.”
Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University Vol. 47, No. 1; subsequently published in 1963 by Vintage Books.
From
I specifically mean “incoherent” here, not confused or contested, and at a collective scholarly, mostly not individual-author level. Individual culture scholars seem rarely confused, but often clear in their own minds—so it is not particular thinkers but the sum of their collective conceptualizations of “culture” that are disjointed and unclear. Also, scholars simply disagreeing about the nature of culture would not be problematic if the reasons for their disagreements were clear and their perspectives internally coherent, which they sometimes are not.
Referenced below in individual footnotes not reflecting the works cited above.
Which is why most of the works I studied for this paper are not quoted below.
Go 2008, pp. 12–18. Go’s approach is intelligent, complex, and synthetic, but I think still inadequate, for reasons I explain in following chapters.
Edgell’s chapter (like many pieces we will see below) speaks of many things that are “cultural;” and she does mention concepts that seem related to culture, such as “shared…symbols,” “moral order,” “ideas in history,” “discursive traditions,” “legitimation,” “symbol systems,” “identification,” “meaning making,” “normative and nonrational pressures,” “logics,” “language,” “practices,” “symbolic struggles,” “the habitus,” “ideas,” “boundaries,” “metaphors” (pp. 250–251, 254, 255), but Edgell never clearly defines culture itself. The same is true of the Kaufman and the Peterson and Anand chapters, which seem to take whatever culture is for granted and focus on other concerns, only mentioning things like its “expressive-symbol elements” (Peterson and Anand, p. 311); Kaufman does note other scholars’ definitions of culture, however (344, 345). DiMaggio is explicit that his chapter’s focus is not on what culture is but on “how people use culture” (264), although he does note (and seems to endorse) the widespread contemporary view of “culture as complex rule-like structures that constitute resources that can be put to strategic use” (265). “Structures” of what exactly remains unspecified by DiMaggio, although whatever is structured is “complex,” “rule-like,” and able to “constitute resources.” He clearly rejects the view of culture as a “seamless web” or “latent variable” (264), and suggests that culture involves “shared symbols,” “frames,” “toolkits,” “schemata,” “logics,” “and that “culture exists, sui generis, at the collective level” as well as “is manifest in people’s heads” (267, 269, 272,).
Weber et al. 2008.
Spillman 2002; the five are by Spillman, Bourdieu, Schudson, Zarubavel, and Alexander and Smith; the other one is by Swidler.
Kaufman notes: “Many…[culture] scholars…show tacit disregard for the content of culture…tend[ing] to show more interest in the structure of culture than the content thereof” (2004, p. 353).
Bonnell and Hunt 1999, pp. 12, 26, italics added.
Ann Swidler, 2002, “Cultural Power and Social Movements,” p. 315 in Spillman, italics added. Exactly how “socially organized practices” are “located” in public symbols, however, is unclear.
Pierre Bourdieu, 2002, “Cultural Power,” p. 69, in Spillman, italics added.
italics added.
Morawska and Spohn, 1995, “‘Cultural Pluralism:’ in Historical Sociology,” p. 45, in Crane, italics added.
Berezin, 1995, “Fissured Terrain,” p. 102, in Crane, italics added.
for just a few examples.
Greenfeld and Malczewski, 2010, “Nationalism as the Cultural Foundation of Modern Experience,” pp. 526–27, in Hall et al., italics added.
italics added.
Spillman 2002, p. 2, italics in original, italics added.
Morawska and Spohn, 1995, p. 81, in Crane, italics added.
italics added.
Archer 1996, p. xviii, italics added. Archer thus moves experiences, myths, symbols, and so on—which other scholars consider central to the idea of culture—out of the cultural realm and into the world of interpersonal relations: “Obviously we do not live by propositions alone…. In addition, we generate myths, are moved by mysteries, become rich in symbolics and ruthless in manipulating hidden persuaders. But all of these elements are precisely the stuff of Socio-Cultural interaction. For they are all matters of interpersonal influence” (pp. xviii–xix). Archer quotes Popper, who fits her categories: “So we have these two different worlds, the world of thought-processes, and the world of the products of thought-processes…. The latter stand in logical relationships” (1996, p. 105).
Archer 1996, p. 104, italics added.
Schudson, 2002, “How Culture Works,” p. 141 in Spillman, italics added.
Berger 1995, p. 63, italics added.
Alexander and Smith, 2002, p. 234, in Spillman, italics added.
Alexander 1992: pp. 296, 297, in Münch and Smelser, italics added.
italics added.
Lichterman, 2012, “Reinventing the Concept of Civic Culture,” p. 212–213 in Alexander, Jacobs, and Smith, italics added.
Somers, 1999, “The Privatization of Citizenship,” p. 125, in Bonnell and Hunt, italics added.
Schwartz 2010, “Culture and Collective Memory,” p. 620, in Hall et al., italics added.
Go 2008, p. 16, italics added; Go calls this a “seminotic system-in-practice” approach.
Schweder, 2000, “Moral Maps, ‘First World’ Conceits, and the New Evangelists,” p. 163, in Harrison and Huntington, italics added.
italics added.
Patterson, 2000, “Taking Culture Seriously,” p. 208, in Harrison and Huntington, italics added.
Schneider (p. 202–203) quoted approvingly in Steve Derné, 1995, “Cultural Conceptions of Human Motivation and Their Significance for Cultural Theory,” p. 269, in Crane, italics added.
Bergesen, 2005, “Culture and Cognition,” pp. 37, 38, 39, in Jacobs and Hanrahan.
Steensland, 2008, pp. 27, 28, 30, 250, italics added.
Derné, 1995, pp. 267, 269, 271, 272, 276, in Crane, italics added.
Mukerji, 1995, “Toward a Sociology of Material Culture,” pp. 143–145, in Crane, italics added; she also refers, however, to “a symbolic world of meanings embedded in language,” “word meanings,” and “symbols.”
first italics added.
Fourcade 2010, pp. 15, 270, italics added. At the same time, Fourcade also refers in discussions of culture to “meanings,” “styles of reasoning,” “constellations of practice,” “ideational elements,” “knowledge,” and “representations” (p. 3, 15, 17, 22, 239, 261).
Sewell, 1999, “The Concept(s) of Culture,” pp. 48, 49, in Bonnell and Hunt, italics added.
Somers, 1999, p. 125, in Bonnell and Hunt, italics added.
italics added.
Griswold 1994, p. 11, italics added. For Griswold, a “cultural object” is thus “shared significance embodied in form, i.e.,…an expression of meanings that is tangible or can be put into words…[such as] a religious doctrine, a belief…a sonnet, a hairstyle, and a quilt” (described by Berezin, 2002, p. 246, in Spillman, italics added).
Berezin, 1995, p. 92, in Crane, italics added.
Feierman, 1999, “Colonizers, Scholars, and the Creation of Invisible Histories,” pp. 206, 208, in Bonnell and Hunt, italics added.
Halttunen, 1999, “Cultural History and the Challenge of Narrativity,” pp. 177–178, in Bonnell and Hunt, italics added.
Alasuutari 1995, p. 25, italics added.
Berger 1995, p. 8, italics added.
Biernacki, 1999, “Method and Metaphor after the New Cultural History,” p. 65, in Bonnell and Hunt, italics added.
Jacobs and Hanrahan 2005, “Introduction,” p. 1.
John Mohr and Craig Rawlings, 2012, “Four Ways to Measure Culture,” p. 75 in Alexander, Jacobs, and Smith.
italics added.
Chai, 1997, “Rational Choice and Culture,” pp. 45, 49, in Ellis and Thompson.
Hanrahan, 2005, p. 50, in Jacobs and Hanrahan.
italics added.
Respectively, Gary Gregg, 2010, “Culture and Self,” p. 224, in Hall et al.; Mark Poster, 2010, “The Cultural Turn,” p. 46, in Hall et al.; Eugene Halton, 1992, p. 40 in Münch and Smelser; Sewell, 1999, p. 52, in Bonnell and Hunt; Susan Silbey 2010, “Legal Cultures and the Culture of Legality,” p. 470, in Hall et al.; Patterson, 2010, pp. 139, 140, in Hall et al., italics added to all; Ellis and Thompson also allude to “values and beliefs” as constituting the heart of culture (1997, p. 4).
Respectively, Gary Allen Fine, 2010, “Group Cultures and Subcultures,” p. 213, in Hall et al.; Schweder, 2000, p. 163, in Harrison and Huntington; Silbey 2010, p. 471, in Hall et al.; Michael Schmid, 1992, “The Concept of Culture and Its Place in a Theory of Social Action,” p. 98, in Münch and Smelser; Schudson, 1995, p. 23, in Crane; Hall, Grindstaff, and Lo, 2010, p. 5; Seigel, 1999, “Problematizing the Self,” p. 296, in Bonnell and Hunt, italics added to all.
Respectively, Morawska and Spohn, 1995, pp. 54–55, in Crane; Bonnell and Hunt 1999, p. 8; Schudson 1995, p. 22, in Crane; Biernacki 1999, pp. 75, 76, in Bonnell and Hunt, italics added to all.
Respectively, Lamont 1992: 1–9; Eviatar Zerubavel, 2002, “The Fine Line,” pp. 223, 224, 228, 230, in Spillman; Frank Dobbin, 1995, “Cultural Models of Organization,” in Crane, throughout chapter; Hays, 1996, pp. 14, 21, 45, 69, 95, 198; Kalberg 1992, throughout chapter, in Münch and Smelser; Eder, 1992, throughout chapter, in Münch and Smelser. Geneviève Zubrzycki works with a Victor Turneresque view of culture involving “cultural goals, means, ideas, outlooks, currents of thought, [and] patterns of belief which enter into those relationships, interpret them, and incline them to alliance or divisiveness” (2011, p. 28).
Garland pp. 26, 68, 147, 149, 151, 169, 174, 175, 176, 178, 180, 181, 182, 190, 198, 222, 252, 254, 268.
Garland pp. 26, 60, 84, 89, 144, 188, 189, 235, 244, 253, 287.
Garland, pp. 32, 50, 55, 56, 96, 97, 130, 144, 145, 146, 148, 183, 189, 190, 203, 209, 222, 251, 256, 288, 300.
Smith 2000, p. 83.
Spillman 2002, p. 4.
Sewell, 1999, pp. 340–46, in Bonnell and Hunt.
Mayntz 1992, pp. 219, in Münch and Smelser.
Jacobs and Hanrahan 2005, p. 1, in Jacobs and Hanrahan.
Hall et al. 2010; Spillman 2002; Alexander and Smith 1993; Bourdieu 2002; Zerubavel 2002; Halton 1992; Mayntz 1992; Richard Münch, 1992, “The Production and Reproduction of Inequality: A Theoretical Cultural Analysis,” in Münch and Smelser; Alexander 1992; Berezin 1995; David Brain, 1995, “Cultural Production as ‘Society in the Making,’” in Crane.
A brief review of select definitions of “culture” theorized by sociologists after Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s 1952 paper, mentioned above, and before the “cultural turn” of the 1980s and 90s, shows that the conceptual incoherence I describe here ran continuously across these decades too. For instance, Herbert Gans’ discussion of various forms of culture make clear that underlying them all in his mind is “values,” a word which he uses 19 times in five pages of discussion of definitions, joined by adjunct concepts like “symbolic products,” “standards of taste and aesthetics,” “cultural forms which express…values,” “attitudes and activities,” “products,” “contents or products or cultural items,” and “standards of beauty and taste” (1974: 10–14). In 1976, Daniel Bell wrote that, “Culture, for me, is the effort to provide a coherent set of answers to the existential predicaments that confront all human beings in the passage of their lives;” it is “the realm of meanings, the effort in some imaginative form to make sense of the world through the expressiveness of art and ritual, particularly those ‘incomprehensions’ such as tragedy and death that arise out of the existential predicaments which every self-conscious human being must confront at some point in his life;” that “I mean by culture…the realm of symbolic forms and…the arena of expressive symbolism…which seek to explore and express the meaning of human existence in some imaginative form;” and that “culture…is a continual process of sustaining an identity through the coherence gained by a consistent aesthetic point of view, the moral conception of the self, and a style of life which exhibits those conceptions in the objects that adorn one’s home and oneself and in the taste which expresses those points of view. Culture is thus the realm of sensibility, of emotion and moral temper, and of the intelligence, which seeks to order these feelings” (1976: xv, xx–xxi, 12, 36). This definition, Bell said, “means less than the anthropological catchall which defines any ‘patterned way of life’ as a culture, and more than the aristocratic tradition which restricts culture to refinement and to the high arts” (xv). Then again, “culture [consists of] meanings shared in common by large groups,” wrote Daniel Yankelovich in 1981 (12). Milton Yinger said, “among the numerous definitions, I prefer those that focus on culture as a blueprint, a system of normative guidelines” (1982: 39). Edward Shils defined culture in 1982 as “the realm of values and beliefs…the orders and symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern the society…. [involving] general standards of judgment and action, and certain concrete values…the central value system of society…intimately connected with what the society holds to be sacred” (2002 [1982]: 47, 48, quoted in Spillman). “Culture may be…defined as the symbolic-expressive aspect of human behavior,” wrote Robert Wuthnow, James D. Hunter, Albert Bergesen, and Edith Kurzweil (1984: 3). Finally, writing near the start and as a partial cause of the “cultural turn,” Robert Bellah and colleagues defined culture as, “those patterns of meaning that any group or society uses to interpret and evaluate itself and its situation…. Since culture always has a history, it frequently takes the form of tradition…. We take culture to be a constitutive dimension of all human action” (1985: 333).
Trevor Hogan, Divya Anand, and Kirsten Henderson, 2010, “Environment and Culture,” p. 341, in Hall et al., italics in original.
Fourcade 2011, pp. 1725, 1728, 1729, 1730, 1731, 1734, 1735, 1736, 1737, 1739, 1740, 1751, 1766, 1768, 1769, 1770; Fourcade also refers in her discussions of culture to “views,” “attitudes,” “symbolic boundaries,” “values,” “assumptions,” “ideas,” and “sensibilities,” pp. 1729, 1730, 1735, 1770.
A common variant of the practice (also noted above in Garland) just described is adding modifying adjectives to the noun “culture” in a way that specifies the kind of culture in question, yet, again, without necessarily explaining culture in the first place—including, for instance, “audit culture,” “modern culture” “visual and material culture,” “Polish culture,” “popular culture,” “folk culture,” “Catholic culture,” “movement-relevant culture,” “cooperative culture,” and “American culture” (Espeland and Sauder, 2011, pp. 2, 4; Zubrzycki 2011, pp. 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 29, 32, 48; and Isaac 2009, pp. 942, 943, 950, 958).
Lamont 2000, p. 606, italics added.
Spillman 2002, pp. 1, 2.
Alexander et al. 2012, pp. 4–6.
Alasuutari, 1995, p. 26.
Alasuutari, 1995, p. 26.
Alasuutari 1995, p. 27.
Maines 2000, p. 578.
For a recent attempt by a cognitive scientist to explain meaning.
The problem here is social science being captive to an impossible doctrine of empiricism, which states that only that which can be directly observed may count as evidence forming knowledge—see Christian Smith 2010.
Swidler, 2002, pp. 313, 315, in Spillman, italics added.
Alexander 1992, p. 296, in Münch and Smelser, italics added.
Go 2008, p. 16, this after having critiqued the structural functionalist view of culture that locates “values” “inside” of people.
Hays 2000, p. 596.
Bonnell and Hunt correctly note that numerous scholars “advocate a cultural approach that is less intellectualist and mentalist and more corporeal” (1999: 13).
Thus we observe sneaking back into Hays’ account the observation that, “culture encompasses language, symbols, rituals, everyday practices, values, norms, ideas, the categories of thought and knowledge, and the material products, institutional practices, and ways of life established by these” (2000, p. 597)—how, we might ask, could values, norms, ideas, thought, knowledge, and even rituals operate apart from human subjectivity?
Genealogically, the crucial mistake which led cultural theorists to think otherwise is traceable to Ferdinand Saussure’s misguided insistence that signs are not externally referencing, but instead obtain their meaning by virtue of their internal structures of relations; to correct our course we need to recapture a critical realist understanding of signs as externally referencing, which is what makes their structured internal oppositions also meaningful—see Christian Smith 2010, pp. 119–205.
Alexander and Smith, after stressing the objective, public nature of cultural codes also must end up acknowledging that they indeed “are internalized, and hence provide the foundation for a strong moral imperative” (2002, p. 234, in Spillman).
Spillman 2002, p. 5.
White, 1999, “Afterword,” pp. 318, 319, in Bonnell and Hunt.
Feirerman, 1999, p. 208, in Bonnell and Hunt; also see Poster, 2010, p. 46, in Hall et al.; Greenfeld and Malczewski, 2010, pp. 526–27, in Hall et al.; Sewell, 1999, p. 40, in Bonnell and Hunt.
Bonnell and Hunt 1999, p. 8; Sewell, 1999, p. 36, in Bonnell and Hunt.
Alexander et al. 2012, p. 4.
Mohr and Rawlings, 2012, pp. 75, 76.
Thompson and Ellis, 1997, “Introduction,” p. 1, in Ellis and Thompson.
Isaac 2009, p. 939.
Spillman 2002, p. 5, italics added. See, for example, Archer, 2005, in Jacobs and Hanrahan.
Lichterman, 2012, p. 213.
Fourcade 2010, p. 29; 2011, p. 1727.
Alexander and Gao, 2012, “Remembrance of Things Past,” p. 584, in Alexander, Jacobs, and Smith.
Garland, pp. 147, 308.
See Sewell, 1999, pp. 54–55.
Schneider (p. 203), quoted in Derné, 1995, p. 269, in Crane.
Sewell, 1999, p. 35, in Bonnell and Hunt.
Halton, 1992, p. 30, in Münch and Smelser.
Alexander et al. 2012, p. 12; Lichterman, 2012, p. 212; Isaac Reed, 2012, “Cultural Sociology as Research Program,” in Alexander, Jacobs, and Smith.
For example: “We can distinguish three basic approaches. The first conceives of culture as a kind of grammar, as the ‘code’ that underlies and structures language and ritual…. The second approach conceives of culture as “values”…. There is also an intermediate view, which understands culture as a ‘map’ or a ‘script,’ which people use to orient themselves” (Xu and Gorski, 2010, p. 539, in Hall et al.); and “Sometimes we think of culture as something that connects us to other people in our groups, by contrast with outsiders….[involving] certain ways of seeing the world, or habits, or shorthand codes and assumptions…an attribute of an entire group of society…. The entire way of life of a people is thought to be embedded in, and expressed by, its culture…. Another way we often think of culture…[is as] a separate realm of human expression [and] special activities or material artifacts characteristic of particular groups, like opera, rap music, folk song, novels or haiku, quilts or masks or building styles” (Spillman 2002, pp. 2–3).
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