SpringerLink
Log in

Emotional Knowing: the Role of Embodied Feelings in Affective Cognition

  • Published:
Philosophia Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The emotions play a crucial role in our apprehension of meaning, value, or significance — and their felt quality is intimately related to the sort of awareness they provide. This is exemplified most clearly by cases in which dispassionate cognition is cognitively insufficient, because we need to be emotionally agitated in order to grasp that something is true. In this type of affective experience, it is through a feeling of being moved that we recognize or apprehend that something is the case. And that is why our emotions are epistemically indispensable: namely, because they give us access to significant truths. In this essay, I explain how the phenomenally felt character of an emotion is intimately linked with its intentionality. Intellectual activity divorced from affective feeling is profoundly lacking — not only in its qualitative feel, but also in its epistemic import, or its ability to inform us about matters of significance. A better appreciation of how the living body is involved in affective experience should help us to understand the distinctive kind of embodied cognition that emotional responses involve. It also ought to resolve confusions about phobic responses and other “recalcitrant” emotions, which are not divorced from cognition as many have claimed.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price includes VAT (Thailand)

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Max Scheler (1973, 62-63).

  2. As Jon Elster does: see (1999, 248).

  3. On the way in which “bodily feelings” can be “themselves world-directed, or at least intimately caught up into a world-directed state of mind,” see Mark Wynn (2013, 31-32).

  4. Contra Jesse Prinz’s contention that only a “non-cognitive theory of the emotions” can explain why a “bodily disruption” would be involved in feeling guilt, his own formulation in an informal study asks subjects to imagine “the feeling you have when you think about the fact that you haven’t written back” to an old friend: see Prinz (2007, 59-60).

  5. Cf. Linda Zagzebski (2003, 117): “it is possible that there are psychic states that are both cognitive and affective,” in such a manner that “the cognitive aspect of the state cannot exist apart from the affective aspect,” and vice versa. Here, I am claiming that this is indeed the case.

  6. William James (1884, 201).

  7. James (1884, 195).

  8. Jenefer Robinson (2004, 41-42).

  9. Peter Goldie (2000, 22-37 & 76-78); David Hume (1978, 148).

  10. Robert C. Roberts (2003, 90). See also Michael Stocker (1996, 38-39).

  11. Prinz (2004, 23). The passage about fear of spiders is from Deonna and Teroni (2012, 54). Arguments of this kind are frequently connected with dubious appeals to evidence from neuroscientific research, in particular Joseph LeDoux’s previous contention that cognition and emotion ought to be classified as separate functions, based on the “quick and dirty” nature of an affective reaction such as being startled by a loud noise, and other fairly unintelligent reflex-like responses: see, e.g., LeDoux (1996, 68-69). Yet see LeDoux’s more recent work (2014, 318–319): here, he notes that his work has been widely misunderstood and aligns it with “cognitive theories of emotion” rather than with non-cognitive accounts.

  12. On knowing “perfectly well,” see Patricia Greenspan (1988, 23) and Roberts (2003, 89-91). On the evidence indicating that phobics often hold “idiosyncratic cognitions” or beliefs, see Thorpe and Salkovskis (1995, 805).

  13. See André T. Miller et al. (1998); Bethany A. Teachman et al. (2008); and, Mairwen K. Jones and Menzies (2000). It seems that Cheshire Calhoun is right to find problematic the alleged “belief that spiders are harmless” in someone who fears spiders (1984, 335). The empirical literature showing that phobias involve an increased expectancy of harm is surveyed in Stefan Hofmann (2008).

  14. Roberts (1988, 195-197). On the “cognitive aspect” of our perceptual and affective experience, and on its phenomenology, see Raja Bahlul (2015, 118).

  15. Jenefer Robinson (2005, 23).

  16. Roberts (2003, 84-85). By contrast, Matthew Ratcliffe notes that “accepting a proposition” is “not sufficient for a sense of conviction” (2008, 184).

  17. See, e.g., Sabine Döring (2014, 125): she can see no reason why anyone would hold “that the judgment which supposedly defines the emotion is somehow unconsciously held and thus not acknowledged by the subject,” in cases where conscious beliefs conflict with felt emotions.

  18. Calhoun (1984, 338). Cf. Martha C. Nussbaum (2001, 36): “The mind has a complex archaeology, and false beliefs, especially about matters of value, are hard to shake.”

  19. Eugene Gendlin has observed that embodied “felt meanings,” or affective feelings, can be quite precise: they are “not indeterminate,” only “capable of further symbolization.” (1997, 145–146).

  20. The phrase “full blooded belief” is from Michael Stocker (1987, 59-60). As he points out, some instances of fear involve uncertainty, or the thought that something might be a threat. See also Nussbaum (2001, 40-41): a person for whom the significance of a loved one’s death “sink[s] in” will feel “disturbed”; thus, not to feel moved would indicate that this death has not entirely registered in one’s awareness.

  21. This is what distinguishes “the emotional commotion of real fear” from dispassionate acceptance of the fact that danger looms, as Richard Shusterman points out (2008, 149). On the intentionality of somatic feeling in such cases, see also Peter Goldie (2000, 58-60): he describes this in terms of “feeling towards.”

  22. Shakespeare, Othello, III.iii.384.

  23. See, e.g., Uhlmann and Cohen (2007).

  24. Quite sensibly, LeDoux makes the observation that “phobic objects” such as “snakes, spiders, heights,” and so on, “are often legitimately threatening, but not to the extent believed by the phobic person.” (1996, 130).

  25. Rainer Reisenzein (2009, 220).‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬ ‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬‬

  26. Richard Lazarus, for instance, stipulates that “certain patterns of appraisal cause particular emotions” (1991, 172–173). William Lyons makes a similarly misleading claim, viz., that an emotional state involves “an evaluation which causes abnormal physiological changes.” (1980, 57–58 & 88). Prinz concedes that “a judgment [that] one’s lover has been unfaithful” may provoke the “embodied appraisal” of jealousy (2004, 98–99). Yet typically, he thinks, the causal sequence is the other way around, and cognitions occur after feelings of bodily responses. He assumes that one or the other must come first. So does Robinson, who argues that “cognitive monitoring and labelling of emotions occurs subsequent to an initial gut reaction,” which itself involves only “non-cognitive” physiological changes (2005, 414). Similar problems exist with multi-component and “hybrid” theories, in my opinion: namely, they tend to assume that emotions incorporate discrete aspects that are not unified, and a form of intentional awareness which itself falls short of rational cognition. However, research by Klaus R. Scherer provides some evidence in favor of component process models, or componential appraisal theories, of emotion: see, e.g., Scherer and Ellgring (2007). Their emphasis on appraisal is consistent with my account.

  27. Prinz (2012, 8). On “attributing irritability [or] edginess” to a sensation in the chest or gut, although such states are “attributable to a whole person” only, not to parts of a body, see Bahlul’s helpful analysis (2015, 106–107).

  28. Husserl (2001, 66-68). On the ways in which emotions involve “cognitive interpretation” or “seeing-as,” see also Nussbaum (2001, 5 & 127-129).

  29. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008, 663).

  30. Marcel Proust (1982, 783-787).

  31. Samuel Beckett (1957, 26-28). Emphasis in original.

  32. Ratcliffe (2008, 132). Following James, Prinz argues that emotions are perceptions of “bodily states” that are “reliably caused” by things in the environment (2004, 68–69). However, reliable causation does not amount to intentionality. A state that is caused need not carry any information about what has caused it.

  33. Fiumara writes (2001, 79–80) that, if we had not realized this before, “we learn from anger that someone has offended us, and we even learn about [our] vulnerability” too.

  34. Jean-Paul Sartre (2004, 72-73). See Ratcliffe (2008, 27): characteristically, the feeling of somatic agitation “is the emotional apprehension of a situation; the intentionality and bodily nature of the emotion are entangled.”

References

  • Bahlul, R. (2015). Emotion as Patheception. Philosophical Explorations, 18, 104–122.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beckett, S. (1957). Proust. New York: Grove Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Calhoun, C. (1984). Cognitive emotions? In R. C. Solomon & C. Calhoun (Eds.), What is an emotion?: Classic readings in philosophical psychology (1st ed., pp. 327–342). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deonna, J. A., & Teroni, F. (2012). The emotions: A philosophical introduction. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Döring, S. A. (2014). Why recalcitrant emotions are not irrational. In S. Roeser & C. Todd (Eds.), Emotion and value (pp. 124–136). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elster, J. (1999). Alchemies of the mind: Rationality and the emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fiumara, G. C. (2001). The Mind’s affective life: A psychoanalytic and philosophical inquiry. Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gendler, T. S. (2008). Alief and Belief. In The journal of philosophy (Vol. 105, pp. 634–663).

    Google Scholar 

  • Gendlin, E. T. (1997). Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

  • Goldie, P. (2000). The emotions: A philosophical exploration. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Greenspan, P. (1988). Emotions and reasons. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hofmann, S. G. (2008). Cognitive processes during fear acquisition and extinction in animals and humans. Clinical Psychology Review, 28, 199–210.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hume, D. (1978). A Treatise of Human Nature, 2nd edition, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge and revised by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Husserl, E. (2001). Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis (trans: A. J. Steinbock). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • James, W. (1884). What is an emotion? Mind, 9, 188–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, M. K., & Menzies, R. G. (2000). Danger expectancies, self-efficacy, and insight in spider phobia. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38, 585–600.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazarus, R. S. (1991). Emotion and adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • LeDoux, J. (1996). The emotional brain. New York: Simon and Schuster.

    Google Scholar 

  • LeDoux, J. (2014). Comment: What’s basic about the brain mechanisms of emotion? Emotion Review, 6, 318–320.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lyons, W. E. (1980). Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Miller, A. T., et al. (1998). Irrational cognitions and the fear of flying. Journal of Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy, 16, 135–148.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nussbaum, M. C. (2001). Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. J. (2004). Gut reactions: A perceptual theory of emotion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. J. (2007). The emotional construction of morals. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prinz, J. J. (2012). Sensational Judgmentalism: Reconciling Solomon and James. In K. Higgins & D. Sherman (Eds.), Passion, death, and spirituality: The philosophy of Robert C. Solomon (pp. 3–14). Dordrecht: Springer.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Proust, M. (1982). Cities of the plain, in one volume with The Guermantes Way (trans: Moncrieff, C.K.S. And Kilmartin, T. New York: Vintage Books.

  • Ratcliffe, M. (2008). Feelings of being: Phenomenology, psychiatry, and the sense of reality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Reisenzein, R. (2009). Emotional experience in the computational belief-desire theory of emotion. Emotion Review, 1, 214–222.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roberts, R. C. (1988). What an emotion is: A sketch. Philosophical Review, 97, 183–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roberts, R. C. (2003). Emotions: An essay in aid of moral psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Robinson, J. (2004). Emotion: Biological fact or social construction? In R. C. Solomon (Ed.), Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers on emotions (pp. 28–43). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Robinson, J. (2005). Deeper than reason: Emotion and its role in literature, music, and art. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sartre, J.-P. (2004). The Imaginary: A Phenomenological Psychology of the Imagination (trans: Webber, J.). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scheler, M. (1973). Selected Philosophical Essays (trans: Lachterman, D. R.). Evanston: Northwestern University Press.

  • Scherer, K. R., & Ellgring, H. (2007). Multimodal expression of emotion: Affect programs or componential appraisal patterns? Emotion, 7, 158–171.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shusterman, R. (2008). Body consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Stocker, M. (1987). Emotional thoughts. American Philosophical Quarterly, 24, 59–69.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stocker, M. (1996). Valuing Emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Teachman, B. A., et al. (2008). A new mode of fear expression: Perceptual bias in height fear. Emotion, 8, 296–301.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thorpe, S. J., & Salkovskis, P. M. (1995). Phobic beliefs: Do cognitive factors play a role in specific phobias? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33, 805–816.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Uhlmann, E. L., & Cohen, G. L. (2007). I think it, therefore it’s true: Effects of self-perceived objectivity on hiring discrimination. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 104, 207–233.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wynn, M. R. (2013). Renewing the senses. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Zagzebski, L. T. (2003). Emotion and moral judgment. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66, 104–124.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Colorado College, Colorado Springs, CO, USA

    Rick Anthony Furtak

Authors
  1. Rick Anthony Furtak
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Rick Anthony Furtak.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Furtak, R.A. Emotional Knowing: the Role of Embodied Feelings in Affective Cognition. Philosophia 46, 575–587 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9936-7

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9936-7

Keywords

Search

Navigation