Abstract
The invention of the computer has revolutionized science. With respect to finding the essential structures of life, for example, it has enabled scientists not only to investigate empirical examples, but also to create and study novel hypothetical variations by means of simulation: ‘life as it could be’. We argue that this kind of research in the field of artificial life, namely the specification, implementation and evaluation of artificial systems, is akin to Husserl’s method of free imaginative variation as applied to the specific regional ontology of biology. Thus, at a time when the clarification of the essence of our biological embodiment is of growing interest for phenomenology, we suggest that artificial life should be seen as a method of externalizing some of the insurmountable complexity of imaginatively varying the phenomenon of life.
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Notes
For further enlightened discussion of the Schneider case along these lines, see Jensen (2009).
In fact, the field of artificial life also includes methods that rely exclusively on organic and chemical building materials (e.g. Luisi 2003). However, the difference between these methods and those of synthetic biology are not well defined. Here we only focus on those examples of artificial life that involve some form of digital computer component in their realization. These we will broadly refer to as ‘simulation models’.
These differences in the choice of medium typically have a lot to do with the goal of the Alife project (e.g. scientific, engineering, commercial, artistic, etc.), but even within scientific circles there are pros and cons associated with software, hardware and chemical implementations Cf. Webb (2009), and the commentaries in that same journal issue for an extensive discussion. This is an area where phenomenologists could help to determine the essential similarities and differences of these ontological regions. However, we will not go into this analysis here because the arguments that we wish to convey in this paper have to do precisely with a general style of research that is not limited to any of those regions.
The fact that the systems we create embody our presuppositions has been exploited to great effect by Dreyfus, who traces the limited success of traditional AI to its underlying Cartesian philosophy (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1988). More recently it has been argued by Wheeler (2005) that the field’s subsequent turn toward embodied-embedded AI coincides with an underlying shift to a more Heideggerian philosophy. For example, the focus on designing robotic systems that can robustly adapt to dynamic environments in real-time, Wheeler suggests, can possibly be viewed as a scientific investigation into Dasein’s mode of ongoing co** (cf. Heidegger 1927). In on-going debates, Dreyfus (2007b) has raised additional phenomenologically informed criticisms against this notion of ‘Heideggerian AI’, and Froese and Ziemke (2009) have proposed a biologically informed response toward more appropriate forms of AI.
“Da zeigt sich nun das Merkwürdige, daß materielle Dinge ausschließlich von außen her bedingt sind und nicht bedingt sind durch ihre eigene Vergangenheit; sie sind geschichtslose Realitäten. […] Demgegenüber gehört es zum Wesen seelischer Realität, daß sie prinzipiell in denselben Gesamtzustand nicht zurrückkehren kann: seelische Realitäten haben eben eine Geschichte. […], weil der frühere Zustand den späteren funktionell bestimmt.” (Hua IV, Sect. 33)
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Acknowledgements
This paper was financially supported by EUCogII, the 2nd European Network for the Advancement of Artificial Cognitive Systems, Interaction and Robotics. Froese wishes to thank John Stewart for a detailed discussion of an earlier version of this manuscript, and Christine Aicardi for her helpful comments on the concept of simulation in Alife. Gallagher benefited from a CNRS Research Grant that supported his research at the Centre de Recherche en Epistémelogie Appliquée (CREA), Paris, and from sabbatical support from the Philosophy Department and the Institute of Simulation and Training at the University of Central Florida.
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Froese, T., Gallagher, S. Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological Methodology. Husserl Stud 26, 83–106 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-010-9071-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-010-9071-9