Abstract
In recent years the view that the non-instrumental value of democracy is a relational value, particularly relational equality, gained prominence. In this paper I challenge this relational egalitarian version of non-instrumentalism about democracy’s value by arguing that it is unable to establish a strong enough commitment to democracy. I offer an alternative view according to which democracy is non-instrumentally valuable for it establishes relationships of mutual service among citizens by enlisting them in the collective project of ruling the polity justly together which is a self-standing source of value for them. Relating in the mode of mutual service is not a species of relating as equals; it is a distinct relational value. Democracy is uniquely suited to realize this relational value, for it renders citizens co-authors of the fundamental rules of the system of social cooperation under which they live, and only as co-authors of these rules are they able to mutually serve each other in a way that is appropriate within their relationship as citizens of the same polity. For this reason, a strong commitment to democracy can be based on the relational value of mutual service, which therefore better fits the theoretical purposes of non-instrumentalism than relational equality.
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Notes
In this discussion I will remain neutral as to who citizens are and how the so-called ‘democratic boundary problem’ should be resolved (see Arrhenius 2005).
A definition along these lines is given in (Shiffrin 2017, 145).
This definition excludes Mill-type plural voting scheme and proportional systems, e.g., that of Brighouse and Fleurbaey (2010), as forms of democracy.
Some might label this position ‘pure instrumentalism’ to distinguish it from other variants (Arneson 2003).
Acknowledging this does not mean endorsing Raz’s service conception of authority. This claim merely affirms the more general fact that rulers are meant to further the good of their subjects, not themselves.
On citizens’ responsibility for justice, see Beerbohm (2012).
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Acknowledgements
Previous versions of this paper were presented at the Princeton-CEU Workshop in Political and Legal Theory in 2020, the Geneva Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy and the Duke Graduate Conference in Political Theory in 2021. The paper is based on chapters of my doctoral dissertation submitted to Central European University in 2021. I am indebted to all those who previously commented on the paper, including Zoltán Miklósi, Daniel Viehoff, Anna Stilz, Emanuela Ceva, Jack Knight and the two anonymous reviewers of Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
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Kapelner, Z. Mutual Service as the Relational Value of Democracy. Ethic Theory Moral Prac 25, 651–665 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10271-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-022-10271-2