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Does Religion Mitigate Tunneling? Evidence from Chinese Buddhism

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Abstract

In the Chinese stock market, controlling shareholders often use inter-corporate loans to expropriate a great amount of cash from listed firms, through a process called “tunneling.” Using a sample of 10,170 firm-year observations from the Chinese stock market for the period of 2001–2010, I examine whether and how Buddhism, China’s most influential religion, can mitigate tunneling. In particular, using firm-level Buddhism data, measured as the number of Buddhist monasteries within a certain radius around Chinese listed firms’ registered addresses, this study provides strong evidence that Buddhism intensity is significantly negatively associated with tunneling. This finding is consistent with the view that Buddhism has important influence on corporate behavior and can serve as a set of social norms and/or an alternative mechanism to mitigate controlling shareholders’ unethical tunneling behavior. In addition, my findings also reveal that the negative association between Buddhism intensity and tunneling is attenuated for firms that have high analyst coverage. The results are robust to various measures of Buddhism intensity and a variety of sensitivity tests.

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Notes

  1. Chinese listed firms are still forming their codes of ethics, far behind their emphasis on economic development. Felo (2001) argues that ethics programs rely heavily on good corporate governance, and thus suggests that contemporary corporations should combine codes of ethics and corporate governance to alleviate ethical conflicts. However, the execution of ethical programs in Chinese listed firms less likely dependent on weak corporate governance.

  2. Of course, controlling shareholders sometimes transfer resources to listed firms to preserve the listing or financing privileges in the Chinese stock market, namely, prop** behavior (Jian and Wong 2010).

  3. In China, 11 % are religious believers (The World Values Survey 2007, p. 59). Cultural Revolution persecutions caused many to keep their religious beliefs private. Therefore, the number of religious followers may be underestimated and may be 185–300 million (e.g., ** and Qiu 2011; Lim 2010; Yang 2010). In addition, as reported in the Chinese Luxury Consumer White Paper (China's WealthY Hurun Reports Releases, 2012), 29 % of Chinese Luxury Consumers who own 6 million Chinese Yuan believe in Buddhism. Moreover, about 60 % of Chinese Luxury Consumers who own 100 million Chinese Yuan have their respective religious beliefs, and most of them are Buddhists. The results of the Chinese Luxury Consumer White Paper (2012) suggest that Buddhism’s influence in China may be more important than that suggested by the World Values Survey (2007).

  4. Meditation is viewed as the other leg and wisdom as an emergent third element.

  5. The results remain qualitatively similar if I include these deleted firm-years based on criteria (2)–(4) and introduce three dummy variables (i.e., ST, Negative assets, and CROSS) into regressions.

  6. Results are not qualitatively changed by deleting the top and bottom 1 % of the sample, by no deletion, or by no winsorization.

  7. Please note that Confucianism has important influence on ethical philosophy in China. I thank one referee’s valuable suggestion that I should consider the influence of Confucianism on tunneling.

  8. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) mandatorily requires that the ratio of independent directors in all Chinese listed firms must reach 1/3 from July 1, 2003.

  9. This study re-estimates Eq. (4) using three dummy variables, DBUD100, DBUD200, and DBUD300, equaling to 1 if the number of Buddhist monasteries within a radius of 100, 200, and 300 km around a listed firm’s registered address is greater than or equal to 1 and 0 otherwise, respectively. Non-tabulated results show that the coefficients on DBUD100, DBUD200, and DBUD300 are negative and significant (−0.00210 with t = −1.73, −0.00541 with t = −2.63, and −0.00742 with t = −2.82, respectively), providing additional support to Hypothesis 1. Moreover, these coefficients on DBUD100, DBUD200, and DBUD300 suggest that tunneling will decrease about 0.210, 0.541, and 0.742 % when the number of Buddhist monasteries within a radius of 100, 200, and 300 km around a listed firm’s registered address switches from 0 to 1 (or greater than 1), equaling about 4.70, 12.10, and 16.60 % of the mean value of TUL (0.0447).

  10. These findings suggest the (quasi-) stickiness of Buddhism’s influence on mitigating tunneling or the asymmetric influence between increased Buddhism intensity and decreased Buddhism intensity on the range of variation in tunneling (See Anderson et al. (2003) and Kama and Weiss (2013) for the definition of “stickiness”). I believe that this finding is interesting and worthy of further study.

  11. The non-tabulated results for the robustness checks are available from the author upon request (similarly hereinafter).

  12. Note that the industry of information technology is not in the list of El Ghoul et al. (2012b), Loughran and Schultz (2005), and John et al. (2011). However, under the context of China, firms in the industry of information technology are inclined to locate in some cities or provinces such as Bei**g, Shanghai, Shenzhen, etc. These selected industries are similar to Du (2012) and Du et al (2013a).

  13. TAO is measured as the number of Taoist temples within a radius of N kilometers (N = 100, 200, 300 km) around a listed firm’s registered address.

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Acknowledgments

I am especially grateful to the section editor (Prof. Domènec Melé) and two anonymous reviewers for their many insightful and constructive suggestions. I appreciate constructive comments from Quan Zeng, Yingjie Du, Wentao Feng, Hongmei Pei, Jianhua Guo, Wei Jian, Guohua Jiang, Donghua Chen, Feng Liu, Shaojuan Lai, Yingying Chang, Jun Lu, and participants of my presentations at **amen University, Anhui University, Ocean University of China, and Shanghai University. I acknowledge the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Approval Number: 71072053), the Key Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Science in Ministry of Education (Approval Number: 13JJD790027), and the Specialized Research Fund for the Doctoral Program of Higher Education of China (Approval Number: 20120121110007) for financial support.

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Correspondence to **ngqiang Du.

Appendices

Appendix 1: Variable Definitions

Variable

Definition

Data source

TUL

the amount of tunneling, measured as other receivables deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year

CSMAR

BUD100

The number of Buddhist monasteries within a radius of 100 km around a listed firm’s registered address (Du 2012)

Author’s Calculation (A’C)

BUD200

The number of Buddhist monasteries within a radius of 200 km around a listed firm’s registered address (Du 2012)

Author’s Calculation (A’C)

BUD300

The number of Buddhist monasteries within a radius of 300 km around a listed firm’s registered address (Du 2012);

Author’s Calculation (A’C)

ANALYST

The natural log of (1 + the number of analysts following)

A’C based on CSMAR

C/V

The cash flow rights deflated by the voting rights; V is an ultimate controlling shareholder’s voting rights, equaling to the ownership stake at the weakest link along the control chains connecting the ultimate controlling shareholder (Claessens et al. 2000; Fan and Wong 2005); C is the sum of the products of the ownership stake along all the paths connecting the ultimate controlling shareholder and the listed firm (Claessens et al. 2000; Fan and Wong 2005)

A’C based on CSMAR

MANSHR

The percentage of shares owned by a firm’s managers

A’C based on CSMAR

INDR

The ratio of the number of independent directors to the number of diretors in the board of directors

CSMAR

LNBOARD

The natural log of the number of directors in the boardroom

CSMAR

DUAL

An indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the CEO and the chairman of the board are the same person, and 0 otherwise

CSMAR

SIZE

Firm size, measured by  the natural log of total assets (Jiang et al. 2010)

A’C based on CSMAR

LEV

The ratio of total liabilities to total assets (Jiang et al. 2010)

CSMAR

ROS

Returns on sales revenue, measured as net income scaled by sales revenue

CSMAR

BIG4

A dummy variable, equaling to 1 when the auditor is a Big 4 accounting firm (including affiliated firms) according to the official rank of the Chinese Institute of certified public accountants and 0 otherwise (Fan and Wong 2005)

www.cicpa.org.cn

LISTAGE

The number of years since a firm’s IPO

CSMAR

STATE

A dummy variable, equaling to 1 when the ultimate controlling shareholder of a listed firm is a (central or local) government agency or government controlled state-owned enterprises and 0 otherwise (Jiang et al. 2010).

CSMAR

FINANCE

A dummy variable, equaling to 1if the firm is located within 100 km from the nearest city center of the three financial centers (i.e., Bei**g, Shanghai, and Shenzhen) (El Ghoul et al. 2012a).

A’C based on El Ghoul et al. (2012a)

CULTURE

Business cultural variable, equaling to the distance (in thousand kilometers) between a listed firm and the nearest cultural center (Please note that China has ten well-known cultural centers, i.e., **, Hui, Yue, Min, Zhe, Yong, Su, Lu, Gan, and Qin)

Author’s calculation (A’C)

CONFUCIAN

Confucianism variable, measured as the distance (in thousand kilometers) between a listed firm and the nearest Confucianism center (Please note that China has seven well-known Confucianism centers, i.e., Lu, Luo, Shu, Min, Linchuan, Zhedong, Taizhou)

Author’s calculation (A’C)

BUD_R

The number of Buddhist monasteries within a radius of R kilometers around a listed firm’s registered address (Du 2012)

Author’s calculation (A’C)

GDP_PC

GDP per capita (in thousand RMB) in the province in which a listed firm locates

China statistical yearbook

BUD_PRO

Province-level religion intensity, equaling to the number of Buddhist monasteries in a province

Author’s calculation (A’C)

ΔTUL

The change of the amount of tunneling, measured as the change of “other receivables deflated by total assets at the beginning of the year”

A’C based on CSMAR

ΔBUD_DIS_N

The change of Buddhism intensity for a relocated firm, measured as “the average distance between the new registered address of a listed firm and the nearest N Buddhist monasteries (1 ≤ N ≤ 5)”—“the average distance between the original registered address of a listed firm and the nearest N Buddhist monasteries (1 ≤ N ≤ 5).”

Author’s calculation (A’C)

Appendix 2: A List of National Key Buddhist Monasteries in China

Name of B. M.

Province

Name of B. M.

Province

Name of B. M.

Province

Name of B. M.

Province

Name of B. M.

Province

Mingjiao Si

Anhui

Nan Putuo Si

Fujian

Zhusheng Si

Hunan

Chongshan Si

Shanxi

Baoguang Si

Sichuan

Yingjiang Si

Anhui

Guanghua Si

Fujian

Fuyan Si

Hunan

Shanghuayan Si

Shanxi

Wuyou Si

Sichuan

Qianyuan Si

Anhui

Cishou Si

Fujian

Nantai Si

Hunan

Xuanzhong Si

Shanxi

Baoguo Si

Sichuan

Langya Si

Anhui

Guangxiao Si

Fujian

Shangfeng Si

Hunan

**antong Si

Shanxi

Wangnian Si

Sichuan

Guangji Si

Anhui

Wanfu Si

Fujian

Banruo Si

Jilin

Tayuan Si

Shanxi

Hongchun **

Sichuan

Huacheng Si

Anhui

Kaiyuan Si

Fujian

Dizang Si

Jilin

Pusa Ding

Shanxi

**xiang Chi

Sichuan

Roushen Dian

Anhui

Longshan Si

Fujian

Guanyin Gusha

Jilin

Shuxiang Si

Shanxi

** Ding

Sichuan

Baisui Gong

Anhui

Nanshan Si

Fujian

Linggu Si

Jiangsu

Luohou Si

Shanxi

Dabei Yuan

Tian**

Ganlu Si

Anhui

Zhitihuayan Si

Fujian

**xia Si

Jiangsu

**ge Si

Shanxi

Yuantong Si

Yunnan

Zhiyuan Si

Anhui

Liurong Si

Guangdong

Hanshan Si

Jiangsu

Guangzong Si

Shanxi

Qiongzhu Si

Yunnan

Tiantai Si

Anhui

Nanhua Si

Guangdong

**yuan Rongdong Si

Jiangsu

Bishan Si

Shanxi

Huating Si

Yunnan

Zhantan Lin

Anhui

Yumen Si

Guangdong

Lingyanshan Si

Jiangsu

Shifang Tang

Shanxi

Zhusheng Si

Yunnan

Huiju Si

Anhui

Qingyun Si

Guangdong

Jiangtian Si

Jiangsu

Dailuo Ding

Shanxi

Tongwa Dian

Yunnan

Shangchan Tang

Anhui

Lingshan Si

Guangdong

Dinghui Si

Jiangsu

Guanyin Dong

Shanxi

Lingyin Si

Zhejiang

Guangji Si

Bei**g

Kaiyuan Si

Guangdong

Tianning Si

Jiangsu

DaciEn Si

Shaanxi

**gci Si

Zhejiang

Fayuan Si

Bei**g

**shi An

Guangxi

**ngfu Si

Jiangsu

Daxingshan Si

Shaanxi

Qita Si

Zhejiang

Foyasheli Ta

Bei**g

Hongfu Si

Guizhou

Guangjiao Si

Jiangsu

Wolong Si

Shaanxi

Tiantong Si

Zhejiang

Guanghua Si

Bei**g

Qianming Si

Guizhou

Daming Si

Jiangsu

Guangren Si

Shaanxi

Ayuwang Si

Zhejiang

Tongjiao Si

Bei**g

Jita Yuan

Hebei

Gao Si

Jiangsu

**ngjiao Si

Shaanxi

Dafo Si

Zhejiang

Yonghe Gong

Bei**g

Puning Si

Hebei

Longchang Si

Jiangsu

**angji Si

Shaanxi

Puji Si

Zhejiang

**huang Si

Bei**g

Baima Si

Henan

Nengren Si

Jiangxi

**gye Si

Shaanxi

Fayu Si

Zhejiang

Luohan Si

Chongqing

Shaolin Si

Henan

Donglin Si

Jiangxi

Caotang Si

Shaanxi

Huiji Si

Zhejiang

Ciyun Si

Chongqing

Jile Si

Heilongjiang

Zhenru Si

Jiangxi

Yufo Si

Shanghai

Guoqing Si

Zhejiang

Shuanggui Tang

Chongqing

Guiyuan Si

Hubei

**gju Si

Jiangxi

**g An Si

Shanghai

Gaoming Si

Zhejiang

Yongquan Si

Fujian

Baotong Si

Hubei

Banruo Si

Liaoning

Longhua Si

Shanghai

Fangguang Si

Zhejiang

**chan Si

Fujian

Wuzu Si

Hubei

CiEn Si

Liaoning

Chenxiang Ge

Shanghai

Jiangxin Si

Zhejiang

Linyang Si

Fujian

Yuquan Si

Hubei

Haibaota Si

Ningxia

Yuanming Tang

Shanghai

  

Dizang Si

Fujian

Yuelushan Si

Hunan

**ngguo Chansi

Shandong

Shaojue Si

Sichuan

  

Xuefeng Chongsheng Si

Fujian

Kaifu Si

Hunan

Zhanshan Si

Shandong

Wenshu Yuan

Sichuan

  

Note (1) Appendix 2 reports the list of national key Buddhist monasteries in China based on the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (1983). Moreover, Appendix 2 reports the names of national key Buddhist monasteries in Chinese pinyin rather than in English because there are not generally accepted English expressions for many Buddhist monasteries’ names. (2) Some Buddhist monasteries have the same names but they locate in different provinces (Du 2012; Du et al. 2013a, b). (3) Appendix 2 suggests that some Buddhist monasteries abut each other (e.g., Fayu Si and Huiji Si in Pu tuo Mountain in Zhejiang province), and thus this study re-estimates Eqs. (1) and (2) by merging adjacent Buddhist monasteries to define Buddhism variables (as a result, the number of most popular Buddhist monasteries is reduced to some extent). Non-tabulated results reveal that the results remain qualitatively similar

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Du, X. Does Religion Mitigate Tunneling? Evidence from Chinese Buddhism. J Bus Ethics 125, 299–327 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-013-1917-6

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