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The key party in the Catalan government

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Spanish Economic Review

Abstract

This paper analyzes the different compositions of the Catalan governing coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some predictions about the coalitions that can be expected in the future. During this period, in Catalan politics, there have been two main political issues over which the different parties have taken positions: rightist versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus centralist with respect to the power distribution within the state. I find that for any allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a party that has a clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the composition of the governing coalition. I show the features that allow a party to become the key party and those that affect the size of the advantage of the key party.

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Correspondence to Enriqueta Aragonès.

Additional information

Thanks are due to Andreu Ferré, Marta Guspí, Larry Kranich, Angel Solano and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The author acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant number SEC2003-01961 and CREA-Barcelona Economics. This paper is part of the Polarization and Conflict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. This article reflects only the author’s views and the Community is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.

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Aragonès, E. The key party in the Catalan government. SpanEconRev 9, 249–271 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-007-9029-z

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10108-007-9029-z

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