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A Kelsenian model of constitutional adjudication

The Austrian Constitutional Court

  • Published:
Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht

Abstract

For more than hundred years the “American system” of adjudication, mastered by one Supreme Court vested with the power to review not only judicial, but also administrative as well as legislative acts enjoyed the virtual monopoly to serve as the role-model of Constitutional review. When the Austrian Constitution was enacted in 1920, however, it was supplemented by an “Austrian system” of adjudication essentially designed byHans Kelsen; creating a specialized body to review the constitutionality of legislative acts; the first Constitutional Court. This article provides an introduction to the Court’s organization and proceedings.

Zusammenfassung

Mehr als hundert Jahre lang war das „amerikanische System“, in dem ein Supreme Court befugt ist auch administrative und legislative Akte auf ihre Verfassungsmäßigkeit zu überprüfen das alleinige Vorbild für die Organisation von Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit. Mit der österreichischen Bundesverfassung von 1920 wurde es durch ein wesentlich vonHans Kelsen geprägtes „österreichisches System“ ergänzt, in dem eine spezialisierte Institution zur gerichtlichen Überprüfung der Verfassungsmäßigkeit administrativer und legislativer Akte vorgesehen war – der Verfassungsgerichtshof. Dieser Beitrag soll einen Überblick über die Struktur und die Verfahren des Verfassungsgerichtshofs bieten.

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Notes

  1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803).

  2. Ibidem 177. There, of course, exists a vast (introductory) literature on this judgment which makes it virtually, if not factually impossible to refer to select pieces of scholarship in English at this point. For a German introduction see e.g.Winfried Brugger, Kampf um die Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit: 200 Jahre Marbury v. Madison, JuS 2003, 320; orWerner Heun, Die Geburt der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit—200 Jahre Marbury v. Madison, Der Staat 2003, 267.

  3. Marbury v. Madison, of course, wasper se essential for the determination of judicial review in the US on the federal level. For the historical development of judicial review on the State Court level seeWilliam Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review, U Pa L Rev 1972, 1166.

  4. For the role-model function of the US model of Judicial Review and a comparison of this system to different approaches seeMark Tushnet, Marbury v. Madison Around the World, Tenn L Rev 2004, 251.

  5. Which is, however, structured in a rather centralized manner when compared to its US archetype, as the Supreme Court is according to Art 81 of the Japanese Constitution the only Japanese court explicitly empowered to review the constitutionality of legislation. For the lower courts’ powers to interpret the constitution in the Japanese legal system see the Food Staple Management, Minshu 1950, 73.

  6. Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz [B-VG] [Constitution] BGBl No. 1/1920, 10.11.1920.

  7. It has to be taken into account that the Austrian Constitutional courtde iure is not to be considered as the first example of a judicial body entrusted with the singular power of constitutional review. The Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic had established a comparable system already by March 1920—seeHerbert Haller, Die Prüfung von Gesetzen (1979), 67. However, this court never ruled on the constitutionality of a statute; its competence thus remained theoretical—seeLudwig Adamovich, Der Verfassungsgerichtshof der Republik Österreich—Geschichte—Gegenwart—Visionen, JRP 1997, 1.

  8. Georg Jellinek, Ein Verfassungsgerichtshof für Österreich (1885).

  9. Carl Schmitt, Das Reichgericht als Hüter der Verfassung, in Verfassungsrechtliche Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1924–19544 (2003) 98.

  10. Felix Ermacora, in a Review of Georg Schmitz, Karl Renners Briefe aus Saint Germain mit ihren rechtspolitischen Folgen, ÖJZ 1992, however, attributes the idea of creating an Austrian System of constitutional adjudication not toHans Kelsen but toKarl Renner, then Chancellor of the First Austrian Republic.

  11. Robert Van Ooyen, Die Funktion der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in der pluralistischen Demokratie und die Kontroverse um den “Hüter der Verfassung”, in Van Ooyen (ed), Wer soll der Hüter der Verfassung sein?, (2008) I, XVIII–XX.

  12. SeePeter Häberle, Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit XIV (1976); for additional references see, for example,Claudia Fuchs, Verfassungsvergleichung durch den Verfassungsgerichtshof, JRP 2010, 176 (177).

  13. Theo Öhlinger, Die Entstehung und Entfaltung des österreichischen Modells der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit, in Funk ea (eds), Der Rechtsstaat vor neuen Herausforderungen. Festschrift für Ludwig Adamovich (2002) 581 (585).

  14. See the Court’s activity report 2009, 18 <vfgh.at/cms/vfgh-site/vfgh/taetigkeit.html>.

  15. CfHans Kelsen, Wesen und Entwicklung der Staatsgerichtsbarkeit, 5 VVDStRL (1929) 30, 53–56, 80–81.

    To make clear how widely accepted this function is, it may be necessary to emphasize that the Constitutional Court’s capacity to repeal decisions by the legislator has never caused as heated debates against the backdrop of a so called “counter-majoritarian difficulty” (seeAlexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch [1962]) in Austria—as it did in the US, for example. Quite on the contrary, academic critique often gives the impression the Austrian legislator had to justify the enactment of constitutional provisions (substantively) overturning decisions by the Constitutional Court—seeChristoph Bezemek, Materielle Perspektiven eines formellen Verfassungsverständnisses, in Holoubek/Martin/Schwarzer (eds), Die Zukunft der Verfassung—Die Verfassung der Zukunft. Festschrift für Karl Korinek (2010) 437 (447 f).

  16. Administrative officials on active service who are appointed members are to be exempted from all official duties (Art 147 para 2 B-VG).

  17. Members of the Federal Government, or a State Government, members of a representative body or of the European Parliament, and finally persons who are employed by or hold office in a political party are not eligible for appointment to the Constitutional Court (Art 147 para 4 B-VG). Persons who held such positions in the past five years are not eligible for appointment to president or vice president of the Court (Art 147 para 5 B-VG).

  18. For the Constitutional Court’s case law concerning this obligation see Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 8552/1979.

  19. Oberster Gerichtshof [Supreme Court] 02.06.2001, docket No. 4 Ob 88/06d.

  20. See, for example, the Austrian Supreme Court’s decision Oberster Gerichtshof [ [Supreme Court] 16.12.1992, docket No. 9 Ob S 20/92, not to file an application with the Constitutional Court upon request of a party for repeal of a provision which had by then been subject toex officio proceedings by the Constitutional Court for 13 days and was eventually repealed—Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 13.498/1993.

  21. See, for example,Harald Eberhard/Konrad Lachmayer, Constitutional Reform in Austria—Analysis and Perspectives, ICL—Journal 2008, 112.

  22. In order to respond to the problem that courts may refrain from addressing the Constitutional Court when the legality of the provision applied in a case is doubted by one of the parties, proposals for a so called “subsidiary complaint” (filing a complaint with the Constitutional Court regarding the legality of a provision applied by the courts) have been drafted—seeChristoph Bezemek, Der Subsidiarantrag, JRP 2007, 303.

  23. As mentioned above, the Constitutional Court also rules on the jurisdiction of the Court of Auditors and the Ombudsman (Art 126a B-Vg and Art 148f B-VG); these issues, however, will not be discussed in this paper.

  24. The problem whether a matter has to be regarded as the “same cause” may not be easily resolved; basically the question has to be raised whether a certain legal provision is to be applied to the same facts of a case—see [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 1643/1948.

  25. See, for example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] Vflsg 13.337/1993.

  26. See, for example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 16.682/2002.

  27. SeeTheo Öhlinger, Verfassungsrecht8 (2009) 459.

  28. Above III.B.1.

  29. Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 3055/1956.

  30. Even though the two remedies technically differ from another, their basic structure and aim is the same as the court’s special administrative jurisdiction (Art 144 B-VG) served as a role-model for sha** the prerequisites of complaints against judgments of the Asylum Court (Art 144a B-VG).

  31. See the Courts activity report 2009 (Fn 14) 13.

  32. The Court may also reject a complaint on formal grounds—this rather technical option will not be discussed in this paper.

  33. SeeChristoph Grabenwarter/Michael Holoubek, Verfassungsrecht—Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (2009) 281.

  34. However, the court mostly does not examine the question of an infringement rights too thoroughly but rather confines itself to state it is not certain that the applicants rights were not infringed by the act found to be unlawful—see, for example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court][Constitutional Court] 08.10.2010, docket No. B 2023/08.

  35. See Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 16.327/2001.

  36. The Court’s legislative powers are purely negative, indeed as the court is not empowered to positively create laws to make up for the legislator’s inactivity—Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 14.453/1996.

  37. Abstract review of ordinances (Art 139 para 1 B-VG) is to be carried out upon appeal of the Federal Government (ordinance decreed by state authority) or upon appeal of a State Government (ordinance decreed by federal authority).

  38. CfStelzer, Introduction (before n. 1) 78.

  39. Concrete review of ordinances may also be initiated by district courts.

  40. For the Individual Complaint see below III.B.5.c.

  41. Above III.B.4.

  42. Above III.B.1.

  43. Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 17.135/2004.

  44. See for the Court’s Special Administrative Jurisdiction above III.B.4.

  45. See, for example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 11.282/1987.

  46. According to § 209 of the Austrian Penal Code (StGB), for example, certain homosexual conduct between adults and minors was punishable by law. The Court reviewed the provision twice against the backdrop of different legal arguments; dismissed an application for repeal in 1989 (Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 12.182/1989) and eventually repealed the provision on different grounds in 2002 (Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 16.565/2002).

  47. Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 8155/1977.

  48. See, for example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 18.159/2007.

  49. See for the manifold questions arising in this regard,Kerstin Holzinger, Das Verfahren der Gesetzes- und Verordnungsprüfung, in Holoubek/Lang (eds), Das verfassungsgerichtliche Verfahren in Steuersachen (2010) 225 (232–234).

  50. See, for example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 17.731/2005.

  51. Thus the owner of a hot dog stand may only be economically but not legally affected by an ordinance declaring a ban on turns which, again, hinders the access to the stand—Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 8060/1977.

  52. A merely potential infliction is not considered to be sufficient—see, for example, Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 16.806/2003.

  53. Verfassungsgerichtshof [Constitutional Court] VfSlg 8187/1977.

  54. Above III.B.4.

  55. Schmitt, Das Reichsgericht (Fn 9) 6 Fn 1.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Austrian and European Public Law (IOER), Vienna University of Economics and Business, Althanstrasse 39, 1090, Vienna, Austria

    Christoph Bezemek BA, LL.M. (Yale)

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  1. Christoph Bezemek BA, LL.M. (Yale)
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Correspondence to Christoph Bezemek BA, LL.M. (Yale).

Additional information

This paper is based on a lecture delivered at Waseda University, Tokyo in November 2010. Many thanks, once again, to ProfessorKoji Tonami and ProfessorKaoru Obata for their kind invitation and their outstanding hospitality, toClaudia Fuchs for reviewing this manuscript, and to ProfessorMichael Holoubek for his willingness to discuss select aspects of this paper.

For a general introduction to Austrian Constitutional Law in English seeManfred Stelzer, An Introduction to Austrian Constitutional Law2 (2009) and, more recently,Manfred Stelzer, The Constitution of the Republic of Austria: A Contextual Analysis (2011); for a brief summary of the most important proceedings before the Austrian Constitutional Court seeRonald Faber, The Austrian Constitutional Court—An Overview, ICL-journal 2008, No. 1, 49.

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Bezemek, C. A Kelsenian model of constitutional adjudication. Z öffentl Recht 67, 115–128 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00708-012-0127-5

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