Abstract
Tournament solutions, i.e., functions that associate with each complete and asymmetric relation on a set of alternatives a nonempty subset of the alternatives, play an important role in the mathematical social sciences at large. For any given tournament solution \(S\), there is another tournament solution which returns the union of all inclusion-minimal sets that satisfy \(S\)-retentiveness, a natural stability criterion with respect to \(S\). Schwartz’s tournament equilibrium set (\({ TEQ }\)) is defined recursively as
. In this article, we study under which circumstances a number of important and desirable properties are inherited from \(S\) to
. We thus obtain a hierarchy of attractive and efficiently computable tournament solutions that “approximate” \({ TEQ }\), which itself is computationally intractable. We further prove a weaker version of a recently disproved conjecture surrounding \({ TEQ }\), which establishes
—a refinement of the top cycle—as an interesting new tournament solution.
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Notes
This definition slightly diverges from the common graph-theoretic definition where \(\succ \) is defined on \(A\) rather than \(X\). However, it facilitates the sound definition of tournament solutions.
\({\widehat{\gamma }}\) is a variant of the better-known expansion property \(\gamma \), which, together with Sen’s \(\alpha \), figures prominently in the characterization of rationalizable choice functions (Brandt and Harrenstein 2011).
Our terminology differs slightly from those of Laslier (1997) and others. Independence of unchosen alternatives is also called independence of the losers or independence of non-winners. The weak superset property has been referred to as \(\epsilon ^+\) or as the Aïzerman property.
See, e.g., Laslier (1997) for definitions of these tournament solutions.
It can easily be shown that \(S^{(\ell )}(T) = { TEQ }(T)\) for all \(T \in \mathcal T _n\) and \(\ell \ge k_{S}(n)\).
A set \(B \subseteq A\) is \(R\)-undominated if \((a,b) \in R\) for no \(b \in B\) and \(a \in A \setminus B\).
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Acknowledgments
This material is based on work supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft under grants BR 2312/3-3, BR 2312/6-1, BR 2312/7-1, and FI 1664/1-1. Preliminary versions of the results were presented at the Workshop on Algorithmic Aspects of Game Theory and Social Choice (Auckland, February 2010), the Dagstuhl Seminar on Computational Foundations of Social Choice (Dagstuhl, March 2010), the Doctoral School on Computational Social Choice (Estoril, April 2010), and the 9th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (Toronto, May 2010).
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Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3
Let \(S\) be a tournament solution such that \(\mathcal R _S\) is pairwise intersecting, and let \(\mathsf{{P}}\) be any of the properties \(\mathsf{SSP }, \mathsf{WSP }, \mathsf{IUA }, \mathsf{MON } \wedge \mathsf{SSP },\) or \({\widehat{\gamma }}\wedge \mathsf{SSP } \). Then, \(\mathsf P\) is satisfied by \(S\) if and only if it is satisfied by .
Proof
Assume that \(\mathcal R _S\) is pairwise intersecting. We need to show that each of the properties \(\mathsf{SSP }, \mathsf{WSP }, \mathsf{IUA }, \mathsf{MON } \wedge \mathsf{SSP } \), and \({\widehat{\gamma }}\wedge \mathsf{SSP } \) is satisfied by \(S\) if and only if it is satisfied by . The direction from right to left follows from Theorem 2. We now show that the properties are inherited from \(S\) to
.
Assume that \(S\) satisfies SSP. Let \(T=(A,\succ )\) be a tournament, and consider an alternative . We need to show that
, where \(T^{\prime }={(A\setminus \{x\},\succ )}\). We will show that
![](http://media.springernature.com/full/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs00355-013-0740-4/MediaObjects/355_2013_740_Equ1_HTML.gif)
This implies that is a minimal \(S\)-retentive set in \(T^{\prime }\). Since \(\mathcal R _S\) is assumed to be pairwise intersecting,
is indeed the unique minimal \(S\)-retentive set in \(T^{\prime }\), i.e.,
.
To show (1), consider an arbitrary . If \(x\notin \overline{D}_A(a)\), then obviously \(\overline{D}_A(a)=\overline{D}_{A\setminus \{x\}}(a)\) and thus \(S(\overline{D}_A(a))=S(\overline{D}_{A\setminus \{x\}}(a))\). Assume on the other hand that \(x\in \overline{D}_A(a)\). Since
and
, it follows that \(x\notin {S}(\overline{D}_A(a))\), as otherwise
would not be \(S\)-retentive. Now, since \(S\) satisfies \(\mathsf{SSP } \), we obtain \(S(\overline{D}_A(a))=S(\overline{D}_{A\setminus \{x\}}(a))\) as desired.
Assume that \(S\) satisfies WSP. Let \(T=(A,\succ )\) be a tournament, and consider an alternative . We need to show that
, where \(T^{\prime }=(A\setminus \{x\},{\succ })\). Since \(\mathcal R _S\) is assumed to be pairwise intersecting, it suffices to show that
is also \(S\)-retentive in \(T^{\prime }\). To this end, consider an arbitrary
. Since \(S\) satisfies WSP, we have that \(S(\overline{D}_{A\setminus \{x\}}(a))\subseteq S(\overline{D}_A(a))\). Furthermore, by \(S\)-retentiveness of
,
and thus
.
Assume that \(S\) satisfies IUA. Let \(T=(A,\succ )\) and \(T^{\prime }=(A,{\succ ^{\prime }})\) be tournaments such that for all \(a\in A\). We need to show that
. We will show that
![](http://media.springernature.com/full/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs00355-013-0740-4/MediaObjects/355_2013_740_Equ2_HTML.gif)
This implies that is a minimal \(S\)-retentive set in \(T^{\prime }\). Since \(\mathcal R _S\) is assumed to be pairwise intersecting, we have
.
To show (2), consider an arbitrary . \(S\)-retentiveness of
in \(T\) implies that
. Therefore, it follows from the definition of \(T\) and \(T^{\prime }\) that \(T|_{S(\overline{D}_{\succ }(a),\succ )\cup \{b\}}=T^{\prime }|_{S(\overline{D}_{\succ }(a),\succ )\cup \{b\}}\) for all \(b \in \overline{D}(a)\). Now, since \(S\) satisfies \(\mathsf{IUA } \), we obtain \(S(\overline{D}_{\succ }(a),\succ ) = S(\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(a),\succ ^{\prime })\) as desired.
Assume that \(S\) satisfies \(\mathsf{MON } \) and \(\mathsf{SSP } \). We have already seen that \(\mathsf{SSP } \) is inherited, so it remains to be shown that satisfies \(\mathsf{MON } \). The following argument is adapted from the proof of Proposition 3.6 in Laffond et al. (1993). Let \(T=(A,{\succ })\) be a tournament, and consider two alternatives \(a,b\in A\) such that
and \(b\succ a\). Let \(T^{\prime }=(A,\succ ^{\prime })\) be the tournament with \(T|_{A\setminus \{a\}}=T^{\prime }|_{A\setminus \{a\}}\) and \(D_{\succ ^{\prime }}(a) = D_{\succ }(a) \cup \{b\}\).
We have to show that . To this end, we claim that for all \(c\in A\setminus \{a\}\),
Consider the case when \(c\ne b\) and assume that \(a\notin S(\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(c),\succ ^{\prime })\). It follows from monotonicity of \(S\) that \(a \notin S(\overline{D}_{\succ }(c),\succ )\). To see this, observe that monotonicity of \(S\) implies that \(a\in S(\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(c),\succ ^{\prime })\) whenever \(a\in S(\overline{D}_{\succ }(c),\succ )\).
Now, since \(S\) satisfies \(\mathsf{SSP } \),
It is easily verified that \((\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(c)\setminus \{a\},\succ ^{\prime }) = (\overline{D}_{\succ }(c)\setminus \{a\},\succ )\), thus we have \({S(\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(c),\succ ^{\prime })}=S(\overline{D}_{\succ }(c),\succ )\).
If \(c=b\), then \(a\notin S(\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(b),{\succ ^{\prime }})\) together with \(\mathsf{SSP } \) of \(S\) implies \({S(\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(b),\succ ^{\prime })}=S(\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(b)\setminus \{a\},\succ ^{\prime })\). Furthermore, by definition of \(T\) and \(T^{\prime }\), \((\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(b)\setminus \{a\},\succ ^{\prime }) = (\overline{D}_{\succ }(b),\succ )\) and thus \(S(\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(b),\succ ^{\prime })= S(\overline{D}_{\succ }(b),{\succ })\). This proves (3).
We proceed to show that . Assume for contradiction that this is not the case. We claim that this implies that
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To see this, consider . We have to show that
. Since, by assumption,
, we have that \(a \!\notin \! S(\overline{D}_{\succ ^{\prime }}(c),\succ ^{\prime })\). We can thus apply (3) and get
![](http://media.springernature.com/full/springer-static/image/art%3A10.1007%2Fs00355-013-0740-4/MediaObjects/355_2013_740_Equ26_HTML.gif)
which, together with the \(S\)-retentiveness of in \(T^{\prime }\), implies (4).
Having assumed that \(\mathcal R _S\) is pairwise intersecting, it follows from (4) that . Hence,
, a contradiction. This shows that
satisfies \(\mathsf{MON } \).
Finally assume that \(S\) satisfies \({\widehat{\gamma }}\) and SSP. We already know from the above that satisfies SSP, so it remains to be shown that
satisfies \({\widehat{\gamma }}\). Let \(T=(A,\succ )\) be a tournament, and consider two subsets \(B_1, B_2 \subseteq A\) such that
. We have to show that
. We will show that
This implies that \(C\) is a minimal \(S\)-retentive set in \(T|_{B_1 \cup B_2}\). Since \(\mathcal R _S\) is assumed to be pairwise intersecting, we have .
To show (5), consider an arbitrary \(c \in C\). Since and
are \(S\)-retentive in \(T|_{B_1}\) and \(T|_{B_2}\), respectively, we have \(S(\overline{D}_{B_i}(c))\subseteq C \subseteq B_1 \cap B_2\) for \(i \in \{1,2\}\). The fact that \(S\) satisfies SSP now implies \(S(\overline{D}_{B_1 \cap B_2}(c)) = S(\overline{D}_{B_1}(c))\) and \(S(\overline{D}_{B_1 \cap B_2}(c)) = S(\overline{D}_{B_2}(c))\), and thus \(S(\overline{D}_{B_1}(c)) = S(\overline{D}_{B_2}(c))\). Since \(S\) satisfies \({\widehat{\gamma }}\), we have \(S(\overline{D}_{B_1 \cup B_2}(c))=S(\overline{D}_{B_1}(c) \cup \overline{D}_{B_2}(c))=S(\overline{D}_{B_1}(c))\), as desired. \(\square \)
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Brandt, F., Brill, M., Fischer, F. et al. Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. Soc Choice Welf 42, 551–574 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0740-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0740-4