Abstract
A large part of Husserl’s philosophical work bears on the investigation, description and analysis of the life of consciousness, of its various forms and contexts. Hence, it is a non-experimental, reflective investigation of consciousness. As Husserl says, consciousness is an autonomous field of being, a field of investigation and work; he even speaks of it metaphorically as a land, and because of the immense complexity of the structures of consciousness, he speaks of it as a jungle. One is in need of great effort and thousands of points of reference in order to clearly distinguish the phenomena in this jungle and to grasp them in their essential determinations and their manifold and tangled connections. Husserl sees this with a truly impressive acuity. He recorded the results of his investigative journey into the innermost reaches of consciousness in thousands of manuscript pages.
This text was originally given in English in 1990 as part of the program for the “Touring Scholar in Continental Thought” sponsored by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology. For this I would like to thank Professor William McKenna who organized the tour.
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References
Landgrebe’s typescript is to be found in the Husserl-Archives in Leuven under the signature M III 3 I-III.
See Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zuer Genealogie der Logik, edited and published by Ludwig Landgrebe (Hamburg: Claassen Verlag, 1964 ); Experience and Judgment, ed. Ludwig Landgrebe, trans., by James Churchill and Karl Ameriks ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973 ).
Ms F I 40, 113a. Here I would like to expreess my thanks to the Director of the Husserl Archives in Louvain, Professor Samuel IJsseling for permission to quote from the unpublished manuscripts.
Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Zweites Buch, ed. Marly Biemel, Hua IV ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952 ), p. 27.
See Edmund Husserl, Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre (1908–1914), ed. Ullrich Melle, Hua XXVIII (Dordrecht, 1988 ).
Hua XXVIII, p. 205.
Hua XXVIII, pp. 102–125.
Needless to say with regard to my presentation of Husserl’s analyses of emotional consciousness I have not been in any way exhaustive. For more detail cf. my “Objektivierende und nichtobjektivierende Akte,” in Husserl-Ausgabe und Husserl-Forschung, ed. Samuel Usseling, Phaenomenologica 115 ( Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990 ), pp. 25–49.
At the top of the margin of the title sheet (Ms. A VI 7, 2a) there is to be found in blue pencil the Husserlian signature “Ph.” The Ph-sheets were later paginated consecutively by Landgrebe. At. present time we have been able to retrieve about about one-hundred Ph-sheets. Nevertheless the proper place of several sheets is not clear. Originally there may have been well over one-hundred manuscript sheets. Most of the Ph-sheets are to be found in Mss. A VI 7 and A VI 12 I I.
This research manuscript bears the Husserl signature Q II. It encompasses exclusively appendix sheets and one sheet with a partial table of contents for thirty-six sheets. With the exception of the last and of the appended sheets all the sheets are to be found in Mss. A VI 7 and A VI 30.
ZAlexander Pfänder, “Motive and Motivation,” in Münchener Philosophische Abhandlung: Theodor Lipps zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet (Leipzig: 1911); for the English, see Alexander Pfänder, Phenomenology of Willing and Motivation, trans. by Herbert Spiegelberg ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967 ), pp. 3–40.
Of this Pfänder-Folder, which encompassed probably about sixty sheets, only forty sheets could be retrieved. As a result, of course, the proper ordering of some pages is questionable. The pages are to be found in the three Mss. A VI 3, A VI 30 and A VI 12 L With regard to the PPdnder Folder, see Karl Schuhmann, Die Dialektik der Phänomenologie 1: Husserl über Pfänder, Phaenomenologica 56 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), pp. 94 ff.
Of the estimated fifty sheets of this collection (Konvoluts) at the present only about half of them have been retrieved in Ms. A VI 12 I.
For the classification of psychic phenomena see the rich explications in Franz Brentano, Vorn Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis, ed. Oskar Kraus ( Hamburg: Meiner, 1969 ), pp. 17–19.
See Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II., Part I, ed. Ursula Panzer, Hua XIX/1 (The Hague: Martins Nijhoff, pp. 513 ff.
This last point is often overlooked. See for this Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vol. II, Part II, ed. Ursula Panzer, Hua XIX/2 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), p. 737 and 781. 19Hua XXVIII, p. 347.
William James, Principles of Psychology in two volumes (London, 1890 ). In Husserl’s library there can be found also the German translation of Principles of Psychology: William James, Psychologie, trans. Marie Darr (Leipzig, 1909). The translation has no traces of having been read. Husserl had read carefully the comprehensive review of Anton Marty in Zeitschrift far Psychologie and Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, Vol. III, No. 4, 1892, pp. 297–333. In Husserl’s library there is an annotated offprint of this review. In Husserl’s copy of Principles of Psychology one minds numerous references to the review by Marty.
Christian von Ehrenfels, Über Fühlen und Wollen: Eine psychologische Studie (Vienna, 1887). ‘DIbid. p. 75.
For a discussion of the impossibility of willing the ideal, see the nuanced analyses in Hua XXVIII, p. 106.
The will is the will’s certainty of the creating of the future.“ See the Pfänder Folder, A VI, 3, 19a.
Hua XXVIII, p. 103.
In the PPander folder we find in one place the following determination of desire: “Desiring is a longing, a yearning, for something futural, indeed a wish that I have something, that something pleasant or good might occur for me.” (A VI 3, 31a)
Mit dem fiat setzt die Handlung ein und in seinem Sinn läuft sie ab, immerfort von dem sich forterstreckenden und erfüllenden Willen getragen.“ (A VI 12 II, 159a)
For an analysis of the will-action (Handlungswillens) see Hua XXVIII, p. 109–112. 41See A VI 12 II, 199b. See also Hua XXVIII, p. 110.
Das Wollen ist in jedem Moment des Tuns Willensintention: Dasselbe sagt das Wort Streben. Das Streben ist die leere Willensintention; das kreative Wollen, das praktisch-schöpferisch setzende, ist das volle -Wollen-, der blossen Intention im stetig vorangeneden Moment and der stetig vorangehenden voluntären Form überhaupt. Die Willensintention erhält sich stetig (sofern sie (continuedchwr(133))
From the Folder, “Tendenz,” A VI 12 I, p. 230a.
In each act-achievement there lies an achievement, a tendency is released.“ (”Tendenz“ Folder, A VI 12 I, p. 208a)
We have therefore intention as position-taking and intention as tendency, a tension to be released [Spannung zu scheiden]. (“Tendenz”-Folder, A VI 12 1, p. 29b.)
Pfldnder-Folder, A VI 12 I, 152b.
Tendenz“ Folder, A VI 12 I, 206b.
Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urtiel, p. 235; trans., Experience and Judgment, 200–201.
Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologishcen Philosophie, Erstes Buch, new ed. Karl Schuhman, Hua III.1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 281 ff
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Melle, U. (1997). Husserl’s Phenomenology of Willing. In: Hart, J.G., Embree, L. (eds) Phenomenology of Values and Valuing. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2608-5_11
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