Abstract
Since 2012, it is publicly known that the bitstream encryption feature of modern **linx FPGAs can be broken by side-channel analysis. Presented at CT-RSA 2012, using graphics processing units (GPUs) the authors demonstrated power analysis attacks mounted on side-channel evaluation boards optimized for power measurements. In this work, we extend such attacks by moving to the EM side channel to examine their practical relevance in real-world scenarios. Furthermore, by following a certain measurement procedure we reduce the search space of each part of the attack from \(2^{32}\) to \(2^8\), which allows mounting the attacks on ordinary workstations. Several **linx FPGAs from different families – including the 7 series devices – are susceptible to the attacks presented here.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
- 1.
MC: MixColumns, SR: ShiftRows, SB: SubBytes.
- 2.
As a side note, we found this leakage model by coincidence, and it is valid for all considered FPGAs and for both power and EM leakages.
- 3.
We have also followed the suggestions of [8] to examine the squared error between the measured leakages l and estimated leakages \(\hat{l}\), but our analyses showed better distinguishability when correlation is estimated instead.
- 4.
We realized that other components on the PCB (BASYS 3 from www.digilentinc.com) introduce noise into the EM measurements.
- 5.
It is done in two parts since the second part can be started when \(k_{14}\) has already been recovered.
References
Balasch, J., Gierlichs, B., Verdult, R., Batina, L., Verbauwhede, I.: Power analysis of Atmel CryptoMemory – recovering keys from secure EEPROMs. In: Dunkelman, O. (ed.) CT-RSA 2012. LNCS, vol. 7178, pp. 19–34. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Brier, E., Clavier, C., Olivier, F.: Correlation power analysis with a leakage model. In: Joye, M., Quisquater, J.-J. (eds.) CHES 2004. LNCS, vol. 3156, pp. 16–29. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Doget, J., Prouff, E., Rivain, M., Standaert, F.: Univariate side channel attacks and leakage modeling. J. Crypt. Eng. 1(2), 123–144 (2011)
Durvaux, F., Standaert, F.: From Improved Leakage Detection to the Detection of Points of Interests in Leakage Traces. IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report/536 (2015)
Eisenbarth, T., Kasper, T., Moradi, A., Paar, C., Salmasizadeh, M., Shalmani, M.T.M.: On the power of power analysis in the real world: a complete break of the KeeLoq code hop** scheme. In: Wagner, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2008. LNCS, vol. 5157, pp. 203–220. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Heyszl, J., Mangard, S., Heinz, B., Stumpf, F., Sigl, G.: Localized electromagnetic analysis of cryptographic implementations. In: Dunkelman, O. (ed.) CT-RSA 2012. LNCS, vol. 7178, pp. 231–244. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Kocher, P.C., Jaffe, J., Jun, B.: Differential power analysis. In: Wiener, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 1999. LNCS, vol. 1666, p. 388. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Lemke-Rust, K.: Models and algorithms for physical cryptanalysis. Ph.D. thesis, Ruhr University Bochum, January 2007
Liu, J., Yu, Y., Standaert, F.-X., Guo, Z., Gu, D., Sun, W., Ge, Y., **e, X.: Small tweaks do not help: differential power analysis of MILENAGE implementations in 3G/4G USIM cards. In: Pernul, G., Y A Ryan, P., Weippl, E. (eds.) ESORICS. LNCS, vol. 9326, pp. 468–480. Springer, Heidelberg (2015). doi:10.1007/978-3-319-24174-6_24
Mangard, S., Oswald, E., Popp, T.: Power Analysis Attacks - Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards. Springer, New York (2007)
Moradi, A., Barenghi, A., Kasper, T., Paar, C.: On the vulnerability of FPGA bitstream encryption against power analysis attacks: extracting keys from **linx Virtex-II FPGAs. In: Computer and Communications Security, CCS, pp. 111–124. ACM (2011)
Moradi, A., Kasper, M., Paar, C.: Black-box side-channel attacks highlight the importance of countermeasures. In: Dunkelman, O. (ed.) CT-RSA 2012. LNCS, vol. 7178, pp. 1–18. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)
Moradi, A., Oswald, D., Paar, C., Swierczynski, P.: Side-channel attacks on the bitstream encryption mechanism of AlteraStratix II: facilitating black-box analysis using software reverse-engineering. In: FPGA, pp. 91–100. ACM (2013)
Oswald, D., Paar, C.: Breaking Mifare DESFire MF3ICD40: power analysis and templates in the real world. In: Preneel, B., Takagi, T. (eds.) CHES 2011. LNCS, vol. 6917, pp. 207–222. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Rao, J.R., Rohatgi, P., Scherzer, H., Tinguely, S., Attacks, P.: Or how to rapidly clone some GSM cards. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 31–41. IEEE Computer Society (2002)
Schindler, W., Lemke, K., Paar, C.: A stochastic model for differential side channel cryptanalysis. In: Rao, J.R., Sunar, B. (eds.) CHES 2005. LNCS, vol. 3659, pp. 30–46. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Swierczynski, P., Moradi, A., Oswald, D., Paar, C.: Physical security evaluation of the bitstream encryption mechanism of Altera Stratix II and Stratix III FPGAs. TRETS 7(4), 34:1–34:23 (2015)
**linx (Kyle Wilkinson): 7 Series FPGAs Configuration User Guide (2015). http://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/user_guides/ug470_7Series_Config.pdf
**linx (Kyle Wilkinson): Using Encryption to Secure a 7 Series FPGA Bitstream (2015). http://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/application_notes/xapp1239-fpga-bitstream-encryption.pdf
Zhou, Y., Yu, Y., Standaert, F.-X., Quisquater, J.-J.: On the need of physical security for small embedded devices: a case study with COMP128-1 implementations in SIM cards. In: Sadeghi, A.-R. (ed.) FC 2013. LNCS, vol. 7859, pp. 230–238. Springer, Heidelberg (2013)
Acknowledgment
The authors would like to acknowledge Alexander Jakimowic and Oliver Mischke for their help with development of the setup. The research in this work was supported in part by the DFG Research Training Group GRK 1817/1.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2016 Springer International Publishing Switzerland
About this paper
Cite this paper
Moradi, A., Schneider, T. (2016). Improved Side-Channel Analysis Attacks on **linx Bitstream Encryption of 5, 6, and 7 Series. In: Standaert, FX., Oswald, E. (eds) Constructive Side-Channel Analysis and Secure Design. COSADE 2016. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 9689. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-43283-0_5
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-43282-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-319-43283-0
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)