Abstract
A “conceptual spaces” approach is used to formalize Aristotle’s main intuitions about time and change, and other ideas about temporal points of view. That approach has been used in earlier studies about points of view. Properties of entities are represented by locations in multidimensional conceptual spaces; and concepts of entities are identified with subsets or regions of conceptual spaces. The dimensions of the spaces, called “determinables”, are qualities in a very general sense. A temporal element is introduced by adding a time variable to state functions that map entities into conceptual spaces. That way, states may have some permanency or stability around time instances. Following Aristotle’s intuitions, changes and events will not be necessarily instant phenomena, instead they could be processual and interval dependent. Change is defined relatively to the interval during which the change is taking place. Time intervals themselves are taken to represent points of view. To have a point of view is to look at the world as it is in the selected interval. Many important concepts are relativized to intervals, for instance change, events, identity, ontology, potentiality, etc. The definition of points of view as intervals allows to compare points of view in relation to all these concepts. The conceptual space approach has an immediate semantic and structural character, but it is tempting to develop also logics to describe them. A formal language is introduced to show how this could be done.
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Notes
- 1.
http://peenef2.republika.pl/angielski/hasla/a/accident.html, accessible 6.10.2014.
- 2.
The concepts of enduratism and perdurantism was introduce to me by Manuel Liz. I would like to thank him for many valuable comments.
- 3.
The concept of change is relevant when one studies the traditional doctrine of essentialism. There is the distinction between essential properties and accidental properties, where essential properties are those that survive change and accidental properties are those that do not (see Aristotle De Int 4a10, Met. 1028a31–33; [7]. In my system, fundamental determinables correspond to essential properties, whereas supplementary determinables might be called accidental.
- 4.
- 5.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/events/, read on 9.9.2014.
- 6.
I leave the set of fundamental determinables away in this definition.
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Hautamäki, A. (2015). Change, Event, and Temporal Points of View. In: Vázquez Campos, M., Liz Gutiérrez, A. (eds) Temporal Points of View. Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-19815-6_6
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