The ability to think conditional thoughts is a basic part of our mental equipment. A view of the world would be an idle, ineffectual affair without them. There’s not much point in recognising that there’s a predator in your path unless you also realise that if you don’t change direction pretty quickly you will be eaten.
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Edgington, D. (2007). On Conditionals. In: Gabbay, D., Guenthner, F. (eds) Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-6324-4_3
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