Cryptanalysis of Human Identification Protocol with Human-Computable Passwords

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Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2023)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 14341))

Abstract

In this paper we demonstrate effective attacks on Human Identification Protocol with Human-Computable Passwords (HIPHCP) presented in ISPEC’22. The protocol, which was designed to allow fast user identification, is vulnerable to both the active and the passive attacks, where the significant amount of the secret key can be learned by the adversary. This subsequently allow to compromise the full secret key via brute-forcing the remaining secret bits.

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Acknowledgment

The research was partially financed from the internal funds of the Department of Fundamentals of Computer Science of the Wrocław University of Science and Technology for conducting research.

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Grześkowiak, M., Krzywiecki, Ł., Niczyj, K. (2023). Cryptanalysis of Human Identification Protocol with Human-Computable Passwords. In: Meng, W., Yan, Z., Piuri, V. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2023. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 14341. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7032-2_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-7032-2_21

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