Auer as a Political Advisor

James Auer served as a political advisor to Rear Admiral Julian Burke, commander, US Naval Forces Japan, for roughly 2 years starting in August 1971. They first met when Burke was invited as a US Navy representative to a Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) exhibition exercise held in Sagami Bay in the spring of 1971. He boarded a destroyer, looked around, and a young US lieutenant commander caught his eye. A sailor can tell another’s rank with a glance at a uniform sleeve. It was an unfamiliar face in Yokosuka. Wondering why this officer had been invited to the exhibition, Rear Admiral Burke approached the lieutenant commander and asked, “Who are you?”

The naval attaché of the US embassy in Tokyo, standing nearby, had the good sense to introduce Auer to the rear admiral. Burke understood quickly, for he had heard about an officer sent by the Navy to study in Tokyo. Auer told the rear admiral about his research, saying he had been in Japan since the previous July, conducting interviews with people who were involved in the formation of the JMSDF, that he had become friends with many JMSDF personnel through his research, and that he planned to complete the research that summer and return home. After listening to Auer’s explanation and thinking about it quietly, the rear admiral said, “We have an ideal job for you. Come to Yokosuka next week.”

Soon after arriving at his post as commander, US Naval Forces Japan, the previous summer, Rear Admiral Burke had had to deal with a complicated issue, the plan to reduce the forces at the US Navy’s Fleet Activities Yokosuka, as mentioned in the last chapter. Just before he left for Japan, the naval leadership notified him of the plan and asked him to handle the matter with care. The United States, having grown weary of the Vietnam War, had decided to withdraw a considerable number of its forces in Asia. As for the naval forces in Japan, only the US Naval Forces Japan headquarters would stay in Yokosuka, whereas the flagship of the Seventh Fleet would be transferred to Sasebo. Other vessels based in Yokosuka were to return to the United States, and the ship repair and maintenance facilities, except the No. 6 Dock, were to be handed back to Japan. As commander, US Naval Forces Japan, Burke had to coordinate many issues apart from the strategic and political challenges with the Japanese, including employment on the base and moving the families of US armed personnel. However, it had to be done; reducing the defense budget was an absolute imperative under President Nixon.

The Japanese side’s adverse reaction had been unexpected, making Rear Admiral Burke keenly aware that there was a lack of mutual understanding with the Japanese, especially the JMSDF. Burke believed that situation called for a dedicated coordinator and so he requested that the Bureau of Naval Personnel in Washington send someone suitable. “I need an officer who has connections with the JMSDF and can speak directly with the Japanese side as the representative of the commander, US Naval Forces Japan. Due to the nature of the matter, the person should hold the rank of captain.” Washington consented to the request, but finding a suitable officer was easier said than done.

Just as he was beginning to lose patience, Rear Admiral Burke met Auer at sea. Here was someone who satisfied almost all of his requirements. The only problem was that Auer was a lieutenant commander, just turned 30, not the captain he wanted for the job. However, Burke did not take issue with that point, and pushed ahead with Auer’s appointment. And so, Auer the researcher became directly involved in the practical business side of Japan-US security issues as an active-duty naval officer.

Auer met Burke’s expectations very well. The biggest issue at the time was the forward deployment of an aircraft carrier at Yokosuka. Auer, still with the status of research student, started working for Rear Admiral Burke unofficially; he was soon notified of the plan. Immediately after the proposed reduction in forces at Yokosuka base was canceled due to Japanese opposition, the US naval leadership proposed to homeport a carrier in Yokosuka.

To enact this plan, Japanese reactions had to be sounded out. There had already been strong opposition to the continued existence of US bases in Japan and to US naval vessels calling there. Would the Japanese government allow the US forces to have a more prominent presence by homeporting a US carrier in Yokosuka? How could residences for naval personnel and their families coming with the homeporting be secured? There were many challenges to be tackled, and sources at the US Embassy in Tokyo were pessimistic about the possibility that Japan would welcome a carrier. On the other hand, some thought that Japan would not oppose the plan.

In fact, when former Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi visited the carrier USS Constellation with Naka Funada and a few others in 1962, they had a discussion with the US Navy about the homeporting of a carrier in Yokosuka. For Japan, which did not have its own aircraft carrier, the homeporting of a US Navy carrier in Yokosuka would support the nation’s defenses.

In any case, because Burke felt it was necessary to collect information on his own, he frequently sent Auer to Tokyo to make contact with influential people. Through Ichirō Masuoka, Auer introduced Burke to Speaker of the House of Representatives Naka Funada. As described in the previous chapter, Japan and the United States reached agreement on homeporting the carrier USS Midway in Yokosuka when Funada persuaded Kakuei Tanaka, who became prime minister in July 1972.

Auer played an important role behind the scenes in this matter, a contribution that Rear Admiral Burke valued highly. When Auer took the qualifying examination to become an executive officer of a destroyer, Burke wrote a persuasive letter of recommendation for him. In August 1973, just before Auer was relieved of his post and instructed to report to the destroyer USS Parsons of the Seventh Fleet as its new executive officer, the rear admiral left Yokosuka to take up a new assignment in Washington, D.C.

Dinner with Rear Admiral Julian Burke

For a year starting in August 1995, I lived in Charlottesville, Virginia, as a visiting scholar at the University of Virginia School of Law. Graced with plenty of free time, I thought it was an excellent opportunity to meet US Naval personnel with deep connections to the JMSDF, so I asked Auer to arrange meetings. I was thinking of writing about the ties between the JMSDF and the US Navy when the time was ripe.

The first person with whom Auer suggested I meet was Admiral Arleigh Burke, who championed the establishment of the JMSDF. Admiral Burke lived with his wife in a retirement apartment in Virginia, across the Potomac River from Washington. “He can’t recognize people well due to his old age. But he’s a symbolic person in US-Japan naval relations, so you should meet him once. You can only meet him on the condition that he’s feeling good and we obtain a doctor’s permission. Let’s visit him together.” It was December 7, 1995, the anniversary of the IJN attack on Pearl Harbor, when Auer and I rendezvoused at a military conference hall not far from Admiral Burke’s residence. It was a bitterly cold day with low-hanging clouds, the kind of day where you would likely catch a cold if you were careless.

When I arrived, Auer was just coming out of the conference hall; as soon as he saw me, he apologized: “I’ve just called Admiral Burke, but his doctor said we can’t meet him today, as his cold has gotten worse.” We had no choice but to give up that idea. It was disappointing not to be able to meet him, but we promised to find another opportunity. We had no way of knowing that the admiral would pass away in less than a month due to pneumonia. Thus, I missed the opportunity to meet the legendary Admiral Arleigh Burke forever.

Seeing that we would not be able to meet Admiral Burke, Auer and I got in a car and drove to meet another “Admiral Burke”—Rear Admiral Julian Burke. We had arranged to have a meal with him at a restaurant after our visit with Arleigh Burke. Auer called the rear admiral to tell him about the change in plans. “Then why don’t you come now?” he suggested. “I can’t offer you much, but let’s talk at my home.” And so, Auer and I decided to call on Julian Burke at his home. We bought a bottle of wine at a liquor store en route and drove to the rear admiral’s house in northern Virginia, not far from the nation’s capital.

It was getting dark, and the short winter day was ending as we reached Alexandria. We parked next to our destination, a house on a steep hill. Rear Admiral Burke, pulling on a cardigan, came out of the house to shake Auer’s hand. After introductions, I also shook hands with him. Though nearly 80, he was tall and stood upright. Whether in Japan or the United States, naval officers always have good posture.

Auer and I stayed at Burke’s house for about 4 hours. Although he had said he did not have much to offer on short notice, the dinner was very formal. At first, drinks were arranged on the bar set up on the porch next to the dining room, and the rear admiral personally offered us aperitifs. After some chatting with glass in hand, we moved to the dinner table, where we said grace, picked up our napkins, and began to eat. After the meal, dessert was served and then digestifs were offered. Through it all, Mrs. Burke took charge of everything, from cooking to laying the table. It is rare to be served such a formal dinner when invited to an American family’s home. On this point, he was indeed an old-fashioned naval officer of some standing.

Over the meal, little by little, Rear Admiral Burke told me his memories of the Navy and Japan. In the summer of 1970, when he was working at the Pentagon, CNO Zumwalt summoned him and asked which post he would prefer: commander, US Naval Forces Japan, or commander, US Naval Forces Philippines. Rear Admiral Burke consulted with Admiral Arleigh Burke, then the director of Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. Admiral Burke urged him to choose Japan. Although the rear admiral was willing to go to Japan, it was a difficult choice for his family.

His youngest son had just died from a brain tumor at the age of six while the rear admiral had been away, serving at sea. His wife wanted to stay in Washington, D.C., to quietly mourn the loss of her son; she was not ready to go to a country in the Far East where she had never been before. Being a military family, however, they had to follow orders. Only 4 days after being relieved of his previous post at the Pentagon, he hurriedly left for Japan.

As naval leadership had notified him even before he arrived at his new post, Burke’s authority as commander, US Naval Forces Japan, was to be curtailed significantly under the soon-to-be implemented base reduction plan. It was impossible for him to be excited, as he was ordered to arrange the reduction of forces himself. Furthermore, not long after his arrival at his new post, the policy was reversed, and he was instructed to make the homeporting of a carrier in Yokosuka possible instead. “Frankly, that made me pretty angry,” Rear Admiral Burke said.

War Memory

Though he did ask to go to Japan, Rear Admiral Burke might have had a shadow of a doubt in his heart. It was his memory of the war.

Julian Burke was born in 1918. He graduated from the Naval Academy in Annapolis in 1940, a year before the war broke out; he was assigned to USS West Virginia, a battleship commissioned in 1923. In March 1941 he was transferred to USS North Carolina, the latest battleship still under construction in New York’s Brooklyn Navy Yard. Nine months later, USS West Virginia was sunk by six torpedoes and two bombs in the IJN attack on Pearl Harbor. Burke’s successor died on the ship. Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, commander of Battleship Division One, also died on his flagship, USS Arizona; Kidd was the father of a friend of Burke’s, a junior schoolmate at the Naval Academy. When he still served aboard USS West Virginia, Burke had asked to take 2 weeks’ leave to see his girlfriend in New Orleans. Whereas the executive officer had turned down his request, Rear Admiral Kidd had allowed it; that kind admiral was dead. In addition, some of Burke’s friends died aboard the battleship USS Oklahoma, which capsized in the attack.

In July 1942 the battleship USS North Carolina entered Pearl Harbor to rebuild the Pacific Fleet. On seeing the wreckage of sunken battleships in the harbor, Burke swore to seek revenge on the Japanese forces. He was also angry as he learned, after the war broke out, of the reports of Japanese forces torturing prisoners.

That autumn, as it was escorting a fleet of transports with Guadalcanal landing forces onboard, USS North Carolina was hit by a torpedo fired by a Japanese submarine. The carrier USS Wasp, which was accompanying the fleet, was sunk by the torpedo attack.

After returning to Pearl Harbor, Julian Burke became the executive officer and navigator of the submarine USS Flying Fish in July 1943. During the Pacific War, the US Navy’s submarines rendered distinguished service. Japan lost merchant ships representing a total of roughly 8,430,000 tons, of which 57%—roughly 4,770,000 tons, or 1150 vessels—were lost to submarine attacks. With its sea lanes disrupted by enemy submarines, Japan was defeated. The IJN itself also lost more than 200 vessels to US submarine attacks, including a battleship, eight carriers, three heavy cruisers, nine light cruisers, 42 destroyers, and 20 submarines. However, the US Navy’s sacrifice was similarly huge: according to Rear Admiral Burke, 52 submarines were sunk, with 3300 lives lost.

USS Flying Fish, with the future rear admiral onboard, was twice attacked by Japanese submarines and bombed by aircraft once, but fortunately, all missed their target. On one occasion, one of the six torpedoes the Flying Fish launched changed its course for some reason and headed straight back to the submarine, which narrowly escaped. The line between life and death was a very fine one. His submarine circumnavigated the vast Pacific, including the waters off Palau, Taiwan, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Indonesia, sinking a total of ten Japanese ships.

In July 1945 he was transferred to the submarine USS Guardfish and participated in Operation Barney, which penetrated the Sea of Japan through the Strait of Tsushima. Mines had been laid every 100 yards in the strait, and the 10-yard-wide submarines had to slip between them. A submarine could not survive if it struck a mine. Crews prayed hard to stay safe until they had passed through the strait. One of the nine US submarines that sneaked into the Sea of Japan never came back.

After the war, Burke mainly served on the US mainland. He had little contact with Japanese people outside of his visit to Yokosuka during the Vietnam War. Hence, his appointment as commander, US Naval Forces Japan, in 1970 was his first opportunity to get to know Japan. There was no time to be sentimental—soon after his arrival, he had to deal with momentous issues such as the reduction of the forces on the Yokosuka base and the homeporting of the carrier USS Midway in Yokosuka.

In dealing with these issues, he frequently met with influential Japanese figures. The chief of maritime staff (CMS) at the time was Admiral Kazuomi Uchida. Burke often visited Uchida at the Defense Agency. Uchida was always cooperative and supported Burke’s position. They played golf together. Uchida once disclosed that he had many painful memories from before and during the war, a feeling with which Burke concurred. Burke respected and liked Uchida.

He often met with Vice CMS Suteo Ishida and the Director General of the Operations and Plans Department Teiji Nakamura, as well. Burke’s former classmate at the Naval War College in Newport, Admiral Takaichi Itaya, was then serving as the chairman of the Joint Staff Council. They were all naval officers of the same generation who had fought as enemies during the war. Although they did not say it, they must have had mixed feelings for one another.

Through Auer and Masuoka, Burke met Speaker Funada several times. Also, the former IJN Vice Admiral Zenshirō Hoshina, who was involved in the formation of the Coastal Safety Force in cooperation with Arleigh Burke, came to see him to discuss the issue of carrier deployment. “He was convinced that I was the son or brother of Arleigh Burke,” Burke laughed. The two Burkes are, in fact, completely unrelated. However, the name of Burke had a magic effect of opening doors among the JMSDF personnel. Admiral Arleigh Burke himself visited Tokyo while the rear admiral was serving as commander, US Naval Forces Japan. Rear Admiral Julian Burke witnessed the gratitude and respect that JMSDF personnel showed to the old admiral.

All these experiences gradually changed Burke’s perspective on Japan. “After I served in Japan, my views toward Japan underwent a big change,” he confirmed, without going into detail. His wife, who was sitting next to him, smiled as if to agree. Initially reluctant to move there, the couple who had just lost a young son found that life in Japan was good enough to heal their trauma. In the end, Mrs. Burke, who had not wanted to go to Japan, did not want to leave.

Burke as a Southerner

In the living room of Julian Burke’s house, there was a drawing depicting the Port of Alexandria as it appeared sometime around the early nineteenth century. While we were chatting after dinner, he noticed me looking at the drawing, and told me about it and his family. Alexandria had prospered as a port for ship** tobacco since long before it was ever decided to locate the capital of the federal government in the District of Columbia. Tobacco-laden ships sailed down the Potomac River to the Chesapeake Bay, then headed across the Atlantic Ocean bound for Europe. The Burke family had been bankers in the city for generations. Following Southern tradition, many in the family had served in the military. In the Civil War, they naturally fought on the Confederate side. General Robert E. Lee, the supreme commander of Confederate forces, was a relative.

The Civil War tends to be perceived as a rebellion of the stubborn Southern States clinging to slavery, but Southerners don’t think like that. Many people still believe that they stood up to defend the states’ own rights, being fed up with the tyranny of the federal government taken over by the Northerners. It was a war that had to be fought.

Every Sunday, the Burke family has always gone to the church attended by the first US president, General George Washington. The rear admiral still served as an official at that church. Old families keep their bonds and maintain tradition, centered around their church. Alexandria has transformed into a commuter city for Washington, D.C., yet it retains traces of the aristocratic culture of the South. During his youth, Rear Admiral Burke had only one Catholic friend. Naturally, black people lived in an entirely different world. There was a clear distinction between the family you could interact with and the family you could not. That was the kind of place the South was.

“There is one thing in the United States that happened thanks to World War II,” said Rear Admiral Burke, looking at the drawing. “The scars of the Civil War finally healed.” There was large-scale migration as the military mobilization scheme was put in place. Northerners moved to the South, while Southerners moved to the areas around military bases in the North and the West. They remained there after the war.

As the Northerners and Southerners worked shoulder to shoulder and lived next to each other, the hostility and ill feelings were finally dispelled. Through the fight against the common enemies, Germany and Japan, the awareness of America as one came into being for the first time.

A major war had been fought within the United States, and it took almost 80 years to heal the scars, even though the two sides were from the same nation. It might take another 30 years of working hard together until the scars of the Japan-US war completely disappear.

Ebullient with food and drink, the old rear admiral stepped out of his house to send us off into the night. Before we got into the car, he stretched out his long arm to shake our hands; he spoke some parting words, his breath white in the air: “I’m too old. I’ll leave the future to you.” Through the rear window, I saw him wave farewell at the departing car, slowly go into the house, and close the door.

Admiral Holloway, Auer’s Benefactor

Another admiral Auer introduced me to was former CNO James L. Holloway III. As a political advisor to the commander, US Naval Forces Japan, Auer was officially tasked with promoting closer cooperation between the US Navy and the JMSDF. This also reflected the firm intention of CNO Zumwalt, who valued the relationships with allied navies. In line with this policy, Auer routinely briefed US flag officers visiting Japan on the state of the Navy’s relationship with the JMSDF. Auer proposed that, in the short term, US naval officers should be sent to the JMSDF Command and Staff College, the institution for training JMSDF leaders; in the long term, a joint US Navy-JMSDF task force should be established and conduct joint operations.

Vice Admiral Holloway, then commander of the Seventh Fleet, showed the most positive reaction to the proposal. Holloway even told Auer to let him know if he could help, should Auer’s proposal be implemented in the future.

Some 3 years later, while serving as the executive officer of the guided-missile destroyer USS Parsons, Auer learned that the Department of the Navy in Washington, D.C. had decided to send an officer to the JMSDF Command and Staff College. It turned out that the officer chosen was an aviator who knew nothing about Japan. Apparently, he was supposed to be able to get along in Japan after a year-long language course. Dissatisfied, Auer wrote a private letter to Admiral Holloway, who had become the CNO, pointing out that it would be wrong to send an officer who had never been to Japan before to the college, and that a year-long language course was not sufficient to understand Japan.

Less than 10 days later, he got a reply. “I’ve discussed the matter with the chief of naval personnel. We’ve agreed that you should be chosen to be sent to the staff college. So, find a suitable language school and inform the Bureau of Naval Personnel, which will issue orders accordingly.” Admiral Holloway was surprisingly understanding.

Hence, Auer studied Japanese at the Jesuit Language School in Kamakura from September 1975 to December 1976. Then he studied for a year at the JMSDF Command and Staff College, the first student that the US Navy sent to the college. Auer humbly claims that his Japanese did not reach the level the US Navy and the JMSDF expected, as he was busy dating an American girl (his future wife, Judy) while he was studying at the language school. All the same, Auer’s connection with the JMSDF was further deepened thanks to his study abroad. In this way, Admiral Holloway, along with Rear Admiral Julian Burke, was a benefactor to Auer.

Annapolis in the Snow

On December 9, 1995, 2 days after meeting Rear Admiral Julian Burke, I visited Admiral Holloway at his house. Auer had contacted him in advance, so when I called him directly to explain the purpose of the visit, he readily accepted. It takes about an hour to drive from Washington to Annapolis. It had been snowing since the morning that day, so I left early from the friend’s house where I was staying. In one hand, I held the map that Admiral Holloway had sent to me by post. As soon as the falling snow touched the front windshield, it streaked across the glass. Driving down the highway, I realized that the gas tank was almost empty. I should have fueled up in the city, but now it was too late. Unfortunately, there seemed to be no service stations along the highway, so taking a risk, I decided to exit the highway and started driving on local roads. I found myself in the middle of a snowy wooded area, with no gas station or even a house in sight. Eventually I happened upon an emergency hospital in the woods where I was able to ask for directions to a gas station. After filling the tank, I got back on the highway.

Turning off the freeway at the Annapolis exit, I drove on a state highway with the map in my hand, checking street names. I took a left turn and slowly drove down a private road in the woods. The trees stood leafless as if they had been thrust naked into a snowy white world. In this silent world where no one could be seen, I suddenly noticed a large Land Rover parked by the side of the road. As I passed the car, wondering why it was parked there, the driver rolled down the window to ask, “Are you Mr. Agawa?”

“Yes, that’s me, sir,” I replied.

“I’m Holloway. Nice to meet you. The road is slippery, so it’s dangerous for you to drive your own car downhill from here. Why don’t you park your car here, and come with me in mine?” It turned out that the admiral himself, concerned that my car would slide in the deep snow, was waiting for me at the top of the hill. And with those few words, he drove me down the hill to his home.

Whether Japanese or American, naval officers, regardless of rank, tend to prepare for any contingency, even when inviting guests to their homes. I don’t know how long he waited there for me. When I looked at my watch, it was 10 o’clock in the morning, exactly as we had agreed. I was secretly relieved, thinking how fortunate it was that I had decided to leave Washington early and that refueling had not taken me any more time.

Admiral Holloway’s house was situated in a quiet wood; the window of the large living room had a view of the Chesapeake Bay below. A large oil painting of the carrier USS Enterprise hung on the living room wall. After removing my coat, I exchanged greetings with the admiral once again. Though not as tall as Julian Burke, he looked masculine and youthful; he did not look like a man in his late seventies. The admiral talked to me one-on-one for 4 hours; we shared lunch between interviews.

The Formidable Imperial Japanese Navy

Admiral Holloway was born in 1922 in Charleston, South Carolina. He came from a military family: his father was an admiral, his maternal grandfather a general. One of his brothers graduated from the Military Academy at West Point, and a cousin joined the Navy. His father-in-law was also an admiral. The United States is a democratic country, yet it is not rare to find families that have been in the military for generations. The Navy, in particular, had an aristocratic atmosphere of sorts, up to a point. It was natural in such an environment that a boy who had grown up being taught by his father that Japan was the potential enemy of the United States would aspire to join the Navy.

As he had hoped, he entered the Naval Academy in Annapolis in 1939. He was out with his future wife on December 7, 1941, and so learned of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor when he returned to the gates of the academy. He did not know where Pearl Harbor was, in fact. His first thought on hearing the news was, “Great! Japan is completely beaten.” Back then, most Americans thought Japan was just a country that made cheap, low-quality goods. If the Japs attack the US Pacific Fleet in Hawaii with outdated biplanes, they’ll easily be shot down, one by one, he thought. As the details came out, however, the gravity of the situation became clear. His fiancée’s father, who was serving in the Bureau of Ships in the Department of the Navy in Washington, D.C., told him that they were “badly beaten.” Discovering the truth, Holloway and other midshipmen thought: The Japanese Navy has sound skills. The Japanese launched a successful surprise attack, just as we were taught in the Naval Academy. They would make a formidable enemy.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt thoroughly condemned the attack on Pearl Harbor as a sneak attack, a view many Americans shared. But Admiral Holloway says this was just propaganda to whip up the nation’s appetite for war. According to him, US sailors even came to have a kind of respect for the IJN’s competence.

He graduated from the Naval Academy in June 1942; his graduation was moved up by a year due to the outbreak of the war. The war situation was dire. One day, the surviving crewmembers of cruisers that had been sunk in the southern Pacific returned to Washington, D.C. They were all in a state of shock. A strict news blackout was imposed, and the general public was not informed that US naval ships had been sunk. The US Navy was unable to prevail against the IJN for a long while, with only a handful of commanders achieving remarkable results. Among those were Captain Arleigh Burke and Captain Frederick Moosbrugger, who led destroyer forces in the Solomon Sea.

Admiral Holloway says that, in the end, the US Navy was able to win the war due to the massive gap in resources; without that, Japan would have won. Phrases like “Little Jap” were only propaganda for noncombatants, and most sailors thought highly of the ability of the IJN, their enemy.

After graduating from the Naval Academy and being commissioned as an ensign, Holloway first joined the destroyer USS Ringgold, which was operating in the Atlantic and North African waters. In December 1942 he was transferred to the destroyer USS Bennion in Boston, which moved to the Pacific via the Panama Canal and fought in Saipan, Palau, and Tinian for 2 years. The ship rendered the most distinguished service on October 25, 1944, during the Battle of Surigao Strait, which was fought coincident to the Leyte landing operation in the Philippines. USS Bennion was in the Seventh Fleet, which was led by Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf.

After assisting with the landing by offering bombardment, Seventh Fleet vessels received notification of the approaching enemy fleet, so they moved to the exit of the strait to wait. US forces launched a frontal attack on Vice Admiral Shōji Nishimura’s Third Group (part of the First Raid Force,Footnote 1 dubbed the “Southern Force” by the Americans) that was heading north; a major torpedo and gunnery battle ensued at dawn on October 25. US torpedo boats attacked the Japanese vessels, after which destroyer squadrons on both sides of the strait headed south in columns, launching torpedo attacks in turn. At that moment, Japanese and US forces began firing simultaneously. USS Bennion also launched five torpedoes toward the battleship HIJMS Yamashiro while turning around, and then withdrew northward at full speed. As it was on its way north, Bennion sighted an enemy ship firing off the starboard bow, so it launched its remaining five torpedoes at that vessel.

Changing course again, USS Bennion returned to the strait at daybreak where it found the surface of the sea covered with oil, remnants of sunken ships, as well as many Japanese survivors. USS Bennion finished off the damaged destroyer HIJMS Asagumo, which was attempting to escape southward. Almost the entire Japanese fleet was lost in this battle, including Nishimura’s flagship HIJMS Yamashiro and another battleship, HIJMS Fusō. And thus ended the most dramatic battle at sea for the young lieutenant Holloway. A week later, Holloway left the destroyer to return home for aviator training and went on to witness the end of the war.

Despite his experience on the battlefield, Admiral Holloway says he never felt hatred toward the Japanese enemy. Instead, he was strongly impressed that the Japanese Navy was an honorable adversary. His friends were killed at Pearl Harbor, and a roommate at the Naval Academy lost his life at sea. However, his view was that it could not be helped that so many died in war. One of his cousins was captured by the Japanese forces in Corregidor and underwent the Bataan Death March, later surprising those around him by not entertaining hatred after the war. “We lost the battle. The Japanese were stern, but they were also stern toward their own people,” he said. A friend who was captured in Vietnam much later was not trapped in hatred for long, either. Holloway says this is a characteristic of armed forces personnel. He does know an admiral who hated the Japanese until the day he died, but such cases were rare.

During the Battle of Surigao Strait, a sailor under his command had asked permission to shoot the Japanese sailors floating at sea. “No,” Holloway replied. “But they shot my friend Robbie,” the sailor insisted; he wanted to take revenge on the Japanese survivors for the severe wounds his fellow sailor had suffered by enemy bombardment while assisting the landing operation. Nonetheless, Holloway did not allow it.

Encounters with Japan

Holloway first visited Japan in the fall of 1951. He was serving as a jet fighter pilot based on the carrier USS Valley Forge when it entered Yokosuka port. The purpose of the call was to install a reinforced net to catch jet fighters as they landed on the flight deck. It was a cold, dark day. Watching the Japanese working in the dock, Holloway felt that it was strange that they had once been the enemy. The work performed by the Yokosuka Ship Repair Facility was excellent and beyond reproach. The workers were diligent, their work thorough. Holloway respected the Japanese.

During the Korean War, pilots of carrier-launched jets could take 10 days’ leave after every 30-day period of flying combat missions. Holloway was an outstanding aviator, it appears. He was the model for the main character of a film about a pilot who bombed a dam in North Korea. He spent most of his holidays in Japan and gradually became attached to the country. In 1958, when a crisis arose over the Kinmen and the Matsu islands (Second Taiwan Strait Crisis), he was dispatched to the Taiwan Strait as commander of the A-4 Skyhawk carrier-based fighter squadron on the carrier USS Essex, and visited Japan on the way home. Later, he became the commanding officer of the nuclear-powered carrier USS Enterprise in 1965 and served in operations off Vietnam. When USS Enterprise entered Sasebo port in 1968 and met the intense opposition to the first visit there by a nuclear-powered carrier amid the general anti-war sentiment of the times, Holloway coordinated the US Navy’s response from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington, D.C. He received the JMSDF’s full cooperation. He was confident of the nuclear reactor’s safety but was relieved when the port call ended without problems.

In May 1972 Holloway returned to Yokosuka to assume the position of commander, US Seventh Fleet. Soon he flew south, piloting an A-4 Skyhawk himself to land on a carrier, and then performed the change of command ceremony in the Gulf of Tonkin aboard the flagship USS Oklahoma City, which was bombarding North Vietnam. When he came back to Yokosuka a month later, he called on CMS Suteo Ishida. Although he was often at sea because of the ongoing Vietnam War, he endeavored to meet the JMSDF leaders while he was in Japan. He visited the JMSDF ships and was impressed with their thorough training. The Seventh Fleet and the JMSDF conducted combined antisubmarine warfare exercises that also involved aircraft.

Holloway, the Chief of Naval Operations

After these assignments, Admiral Holloway assumed office as the 20th CNO in July 1974. Like his predecessor, Admiral Zumwalt, Holloway valued the relationship with the JMSDF. Admiral Teiji Nakamura was the CMS at the time. Nakamura invited Holloway to Japan, and in turn, Holloway invited Nakamura to the United States; during these visits the two naval leaders would exchange opinions on various matters. Holloway told Nakamura: “The pressure to reduce the US defense budget will continue. The US Navy can’t secure safety in the Far East by itself. So, the US Navy and the JMSDF should divide strategic roles in the future. The Seventh Fleet will protect Japan from the Soviet Tupolev Tu-22M [NATO codename “Backfire”] strategic bombers. Meanwhile, the JMSDF should monitor the three straits—Sōya, Tsugaru, and Tsushima—and prevent the passage of the Soviet Navy. Also, as a country completely dependent on oil imports from the Middle East, Japan should protect the approximately 1000 miles of sea lanes by itself. As the Mayaguez IncidentFootnote 2 revealed, a small country could effectively disrupt Japanese commercial activities by interfering with its sea lanes.”

To this, Nakamura replied: “I agree with you entirely, but to do that, the JMSDF must first obtain the operational capability to protect the sea lanes.” Unfortunately, the JMSDF at the time did not have this strength.

These were informal, not official, exchanges, of course. However, the division of missions and roles between the JMSDF and the US Navy that was put into practice during the Reagan administration was almost exactly as they had discussed. More than 5 years before its actual implementation, Holloway and Nakamura had been discussing the future path of the Japanese and US maritime forces.

The two men were able to discuss anything frankly, and never shared what they talked about with others. Also, Nakamura refrained from asking delicate questions that Holloway would have found difficult to answer. Holloway had complete trust in him.

“How were you able to build such a relationship of mutual trust?” I asked Holloway over a meal at a coastal restaurant in Annapolis. He thought for a bit before he answered:

I believe it was because Admiral Nakamura was an excellent leader. He was very intelligent, and he thought just like me, so there was no need to talk much. It wasn’t like that with other countries or other leaders.

The JMSDF and the US Navy share the tradition inherited from the Royal Navy. The JMSDF is not legally a navy, but it is a first-class navy in all ways, including skillfulness, professionalism, sense of humor, dignity, finesse. When faced with the same situation, they are trained to think and deal with it in the same way as us. Without much talk, we can work together. In that sense, they were very easy to work with.

Before I took my leave, I asked him: “Is there a deep relationship of mutual trust between the JMSDF leaders and the US Navy leaders today, 20 years later, just like the one that existed between you and Nakamura?” Holloway was absorbed in thought for a moment as he drove.

Hmm, I’m not sure. Naturally, it’s partly an individual matter, so I can’t make a swee** observation. But our juniors don’t appear to see each other as often as we did. They’re too busy with other duties. My concern is that the US Navy has become a bit too bureaucratic. However, in any case, I believe that the leaders of the JMSDF and the US Navy will maintain a relationship of strong mutual trust. Of course, they need to make an effort.

Toward the end of Admiral Holloway’s term as CNO, Jimmy Carter had become the new president. The Carter administration set forth a new plan to reduce the size of US forces overseas. However, it had to retract plans to withdraw US forces stationed in South Korea in the face of strong opposition from Seoul and Tokyo, but it did not end there. Around the same time, there was a policy discussion led by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to reduce the size of the fleet, according to Holloway, even though the president had served in the Navy. Holloway says that Brown tended to neglect the importance of naval power, as he had previously served as the secretary of the Air Force. Feeling alarmed, Holloway frankly stated his opinion when he was asked to testify as CNO in the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Although CNOs, as heads of uniformed personnel, must follow orders issued by the civilian secretaries of defense and the Navy, they are allowed to state their opinion directly to the Congress and the president if asked. That is an American tradition.

Holloway expressed his thoughts thus: “If the fleet size is reduced as planned, the US Navy can’t fight two wars in the Atlantic and the Pacific at the same time. Hence, it can’t fulfill its duty to defend Japan. If the United States were to demand that Japan support and cooperate with the US forces in case of a Soviet attack, Japan would naturally expect the United States to defend Japan. Without such assurances, the US-Japan Security Treaty is meaningless for Japan. An alliance can’t be unilateral.”

Following Admiral Holloway’s testimony, Secretary of Defense Brown visited Japan. After listening to the Japanese opinion, the Carter administration’s plan to reduce the size of the Pacific Fleet was also retracted. As the first Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation was agreed upon in 1978, Admiral Holloway may have been a secret contributor with distinguished service in supporting the Japan-US security arrangements.

Two Naval Academies

After saying my goodbyes, I got out of Admiral Holloway’s car and back into my own; on my drive back to Washington, I decided to stop by Annapolis. I cannot remember how many times I have visited the Naval Academy since my first visit as a foreign exchange student at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. On the Naval Academy’s expansive campus, which, like Etajima’s, faces the sea, there are many historic buildings lined up in orderly rows. In an ice-skating rink in the gymnasium, young midshipmen were playing ice hockey, throwing their weight against each other furiously as they vied for the puck. Despite the cold air emanating from the ice rink, one felt the heat of the competition.

Young ensigns like Julian Burke and James Holloway had graduated from this academy and fought in the Pacific. Many of them never came back. Likewise, the ensigns of the IJN, including Kazuomi Uchida and Teiji Nakamura, graduated from Etajima and set sail for overseas training cruises and for the battlefields. Many of them, too, never set foot in their home country again.

Those who survived the war, carrying on the spirit of those who lost their lives, have nurtured a friendship between Japan and the United States that spans the Pacific. Nowadays, JMSDF senior officers teach US Naval midshipmen in Annapolis as exchange instructors, while US naval officers likewise teach JMSDF officer candidates in Etajima. This tradition must be cherished. These were my thoughts as I departed Annapolis (Fig. 7.1).

Fig. 7.1
A group photo of J M S D F's officers in 2 rows. The uniform of the officers sitting in the first row is different from that of the officers standing in the second row.

Japanese and US navy midshipmen pose for a photo on a Japanese destroyer’s flight deck during a cadet exchange event. (Photo credit: JMSDF)

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