Libya After Qaddafi: Are Tribes Always Rebels?

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Rebel Governance in the Middle East
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Abstract

The relationships between tribes and rebel groups become complicated when a country experiences conditions of political fragmentation, a weak central government, and tribal and ethnic divisions, such as in Libya after 2011. The collapse of Muammar al-Qaddafi’s regime in that year created ideal conditions for the tribes and rebel groups to become influential domestic actors. However, the relationships between these actors have been different across the country. This chapter seeks to find why (and how) tribe–rebel relationships have varied in Libya since 2011. That variation, as this chapter contends, can be conditioned by factors of communal cohesiveness, geographic location, and power of the political actor. That is, when there is a strong tribal control of the community, members turn to be rebels as a response to the communal needs for protection and services provision. Additionally, tribal–rebellion integration increases in remote areas in which self-sufficiency has been the status quo for many communities even during Qaddafi’s era, such as Tabu and Tuareg tribes in southern Libya. Additionally, tribe–rebel relationships vary considerably given the strength of the political actor discussed. Thus, the presence of a weak political actor—e.g., in Tripoli—may increase competition between the tribes and rebels for power and resources more than with a strong political actor—i.e., Field Marshal Khalil Haftar. This chapter uses a first-hand data (interviews) and a second-hand dataset (ANARD) for explaining such variation.

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Notes

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  2. 2.

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  3. 3.

    Arjona et al., Rebel Governance in Civil War, 24.

  4. 4.

    Cunningham and Loyle, 5.

  5. 5.

    Ana Arjona, Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016): 24–25. In this chapter, these terms will also be used in the same way.

  6. 6.

    Päivi Lujala, “Valuable Natural Resources,” in Routledge Handbook of Civil Wars, eds. Edward Newman and Karl DeRouen, Jr. (London: Routledge, 2014): 135–146.

  7. 7.

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    Also see Mancur Olson, “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political Science Review 87, no. 3 (1993): 567–576.

  12. 12.

    Arjona et al., Rebel Governance in Civil War.

  13. 13.

    Virginie Collombier, Maria-Louise Clausen, Hiba Hassan, Helle Malmvig, and Jan Pêt Khorto. “Armed Conflicts and the Erosion of the State: The Cases of Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria,” MENARA Working Papers, no. 22 (November 2018), https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/project_papers/menara_papers/working_papers/armed_conflicts_and_the_erosion_of_the_state_the_cases_of_iraq_libya_yemen_and_syria.

  14. 14.

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  15. 15.

    Wolfgang Mommsen, Max Weber and German Politics, 18901920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

  16. 16.

    Klaus Schlichte and Ulrich Schneckener, “Armed Groups and the Politics of Legitimacy,” Civil Wars 17, no. 4 (2015): 413.

  17. 17.

    “Lujala,” 135–146.

  18. 18.

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  19. 19.

    Arjona, Rebelocracy, 67.

  20. 20.

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  21. 21.

    Zürcher, 55.

  22. 22.

    Risse and Stollenwerk, 406.

  23. 23.

    Stephen Krasner and Thomas Risse, “External Actors, State-building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood,” in Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations, ed. Thomas Risse (London: Routledge, 2016): 197–217.

  24. 24.

    Risse and Stollenwerk, 406.

  25. 25.

    Collombier et al., “Armed Conflicts and the Erosion of the State: The Cases of Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria.”

  26. 26.

    Stathis Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

  27. 27.

    Cunningham and Loyle, 5.

  28. 28.

    Arjona et al., Rebel Governance in Civil War, 24.

  29. 29.

    Weinstein, 164.

  30. 30.

    Arjona, Rebelocracy, 24.

  31. 31.

    Belgin San-Akc, States in Disguise: Causes of State Support for Rebel Groups (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 13.

  32. 32.

    Collombier et al., “Armed Conflicts and the Erosion of the State: The Cases of Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria;” Federico Varese. “Protection and Extortion,” in The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime, ed. Letizia Paoli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 343–358.

  33. 33.

    Arjona, Rebelocracy.

  34. 34.

    Zachariah Mampilly and Megan Stewart, “A Typology of Rebel Political Institutional Arrangements,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, no. 1 (2021): 15–45.

  35. 35.

    Arjona, Rebelocracy.

  36. 36.

    Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers 56, no. 4 (2004): 563–595.

  37. 37.

    Paul Collier, “Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 6 (2000): 839–853.

  38. 38.

    Jonathan Winer, “Origins of the Libyan Conflict and Options for Its Resolution,” The Middle East Institute, last modified May 2019, https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2019-05/Libya_Winer_May%202019%20update_0.pdf; Collombier et al., “Armed Conflicts and the Erosion of the State: The Cases of Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria.”

  39. 39.

    San-Akca.

  40. 40.

    Karl DeRouen, “The Duration and Recurrence of Civil War,” 135–146.

  41. 41.

    Dale Eickelman, “Introduction: Print, Writing, and the Politics of Religious Identity in the Middle East,” Anthropological Quarterly 68, no. 3 (1995): 133–138.

  42. 42.

    Lisa Anderson, “Tribe and State: Libyan Anomalies,” in Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East, eds. Shukry Khoury, Philip Khoury, and Joseph Kostiner (California: University of California Press, 1990): 289.

  43. 43.

    Fraihat.

  44. 44.

    Daniel Corstange, “Tribes and the Rule of Law in Yemen,” Annual Conference of the Middle East Studies Association, Washington, November 2008, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.554.568&rep=rep1&type=pdf; Ulf Laessing, Understanding Libya Since Gaddafi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

  45. 45.

    Jean-Louis Romanet Perroux, “The Deep Roots of Libya’s Security Fragmentation,” Middle Eastern Studies 55, no. 2 (2019): 200–224.

  46. 46.

    Al-Hamzeh Al-Shadeedi and Nancy Ezzeddine, “Libyan Tribes in the Shadows of War and Peace,” Clingendael, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 18 February 2019, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/libyan-tribes-shadow-war-and-peace.

  47. 47.

    William Taylor, Military Responses to the Arab Uprisings and the Future of Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East: Analysis from Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria (New York City: Springer, 2014).

  48. 48.

    Ahmed Salah and Sherine N. El Taraboulsi, “Libya,” in Giving in Transition and Transitions in Giving: Philanthropy in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, eds. Sherine El Taraboulsi, Ahmed Slah Eldin, Naila Taji Farouky, Mahi Khallaf, and Almongi Zidi (Cairo: The American University of Cairo, 2013): 211–213.

  49. 49.

    Emanuela Paoletti, “Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict,” Mediterranean Politics 16, no. 2 (2011): 313–319.

  50. 50.

    Wolfram Lacher, Libya's Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020).

  51. 51.

    Author’s interview with Nazar al-Firtas—Libyan writer, 2 January 2022.

  52. 52.

    Paoletti, “Libya: Roots of a Civil Conflict.”

  53. 53.

    Author’s interview with Ismail al-Qeretly, Libyan Journalist, 28 December 2021.

  54. 54.

    Hanspeter Mattes, “Formal and Informal Authority in Libya Since 1969,” in Libya Since 1969, ed. Dirk Vandewalle (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008): 55–81.

  55. 55.

    Florence Gaub, “Libya: The Struggle for Security,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, 24 June 2013, https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/libya-struggle-security; Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, “Libya: The Politics of Power, Protection, Identity and Illicit Trade,” United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, May 2017, http://collections.unu.edu/eserv/unu:6427/Libya_politics.pdf.

  56. 56.

    Nadine Schnelzer, Libya in the Arab spring: The Constitutional Discourse Since the Fall of Gaddafi (New York: Springer, 2015); Al-Shadeedi and Ezzeddine.

  57. 57.

    Taylor.

  58. 58.

    Floor El Kamouni-Janssen, Hamzeh Shadeedi, and Nancy Ezzeddine, “Local Security Governance in Libya,” The Clingendael Institute, October 2018, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/diversity_security_Libya.pdf.

  59. 59.

    Schlichte and Schneckener, 409–424.

  60. 60.

    Collombier et al., “Armed Conflicts and the Erosion of the State: The Cases of Iraq, Libya, Yemen and Syria.”

  61. 61.

    In general, Qaddafi was marginalizing the non-Arab Libyan tribes, such as Amazigh, Tebu, and Tuareg under his policy of Arabism, which had been adopted since the late of 1980s until 2011 (Schnelzer).

  62. 62.

    Anderson, “Tribe and State: Libyan Anomalies.”

  63. 63.

    Al-Shadeedi and Ezzeddine.

  64. 64.

    Perroux.

  65. 65.

    That marginalisation came as an outcome of a lack of support for Qaddafi by Tabu against Chad in 1970s. Qaddafi’s promises for this tribe to give them the privilege of Libyan citizenship and other benefits did not go through. Additionally, Qaddafi worked on his policy of Arabization of south Libya as a retaliation against that tribe (Mark Shaw and Tuesday Reitano, “The Political Economy of Trafficking and Trade in the Sahara: Instability and Opportunities,” World Bank, December 2014, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Shaw-Reitano-–-The-Political-Economy-of-Trafficking-and-Trade-in-the-Sahara-December-2014.pdf).

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Perroux, 200–224.

  68. 68.

    France, the UK, and the US engaged directly in ousting Qaddafi’s regime in order to prevent weakening the revolution (Winer).

  69. 69.

    The indicators in Fig. 1 were collected from Fragile State Indicator by the Fund for Peace project. The four indicators—ranged from “0” the best to “10”—were selected to explain how Libya’s fragility has looked like since 2011. Those indicators are the threat to the state by none state actors, competition among the elites, how the public feel towards the governments’ legitimacy, and the role of governments in providing services.

  70. 70.

    Author’s interview with Yaseen Khattab, Libyan Political Analyst, 28 December 2021.

  71. 71.

    Cunningham and Loyle.

  72. 72.

    Mieczyslaw Boduszynski and Kristin Fabbe, “What Libya’s Militia Problem Means for the Middle East, and the US,” Los Angeles Times, 23 September 23.

  73. 73.

    Jentzsch et al., “Militias in Civil Wars.”

  74. 74.

    DeRouen.

  75. 75.

    El Kamouni-Janssen, Shadeedi, and Ezzeddine.

  76. 76.

    Wolfram Lacher. “Libya: Getting Serious About Negotiations: How a New Political Process Could Help Tackle Security Challenges,” Social Science Open Access Repository, October 2018, https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/60101/ssoar-2018-lacher-Libya_getting_serious_about_negotiations.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2018-lacher-Libya_getting_serious_about_negotiations.pdf.

  77. 77.

    Author’s interview with Libyan writer Nazar al-Firtas.

  78. 78.

    Author’s interview with Libyan political analyst Yaseen Khattab.

  79. 79.

    Lacher.

  80. 80.

    Perroux.

  81. 81.

    Fraihat.

  82. 82.

    Reitano and Shaw.

  83. 83.

    Frederic Wehrey and Ariel Ahram, “Taming the Militias: Building National Guards in Fractured Arab States,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 7 May 2015, https://carnegieendowment.org/2015/05/07/taming-militias-building-national-guards-in-fractured-arab-states-pub-60005.

  84. 84.

    Al-Shadeedi and Ezzeddine.

  85. 85.

    Mark Micallef and Tuesday Reitano, “The Anti-human Smuggling Business and Libya’s Political End Game,” Institute for Security Studies, December 2017, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/Libya_ISS_Smuggling.pdf.

  86. 86.

    Shaw and Reitano.

  87. 87.

    Author’s interview with Libyan journalist Ismail al-Qeretly.

  88. 88.

    Fraihat.

  89. 89.

    Fransje Molenaar, “Conflict-Sensitive and Humane Migration Management in the Sahel,” Netherland Institute of International Relations, December 2018, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-12/PB_Conflict-sensitive_and_humane_migration_management_in_the_Sahel.pdf.

  90. 90.

    Pinar Bilgin, Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective (London: Routledge, 2019).

  91. 91.

    Perroux.

  92. 92.

    Author’s interview with Libyan journalist Ismail al-Qeretly.

  93. 93.

    Ibid.

  94. 94.

    Shaw and Reitano, “The Political Economy of Trafficking and Trade in the Sahara: Instability and Opportunities.”

  95. 95.

    Reitano and Sha, “Libya: The Politics of Power, Protection, Identity and Illicit Trade.”

  96. 96.

    “Libya: A Growing Hub for Criminal Economies and Terrorist Financing in the Trans-Sahara,” GITOC Policy Brief, 11 May 2015, https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/TGIATOC-Libya_-a-growing-hub-for-Criminal-Economies-and-Terrorist-Financing-in-the-Trans-Sahara-web.pdf.

  97. 97.

    Micallef and Reitano.

  98. 98.

    Lacher, Libya’s Fragmentation: Structure and Process in Violent Conflict.

  99. 99.

    Lacher, “Libya: Getting Serious About Negotiations: How a New Political Process Could Help Tackle Security Challenges.”

  100. 100.

    Al-Shadeedi and Ezzeddine.

  101. 101.

    Laessing.

  102. 102.

    More information about this dataset can be found at https://stephenrpowell.wordpress.com.

  103. 103.

    Author’s interview with Libyan journalist Ismail al-Qeretly.

  104. 104.

    Cunningham and Loyle.

  105. 105.

    Author’s interview with Libyan writer Nazar al-Firtas; Author’s interview with Libyan political analyst Yaseen Khattab.

  106. 106.

    Author’s interview with Libyan writer Nazar al-Firtas.

  107. 107.

    Author’s interview with Libyan political analyst Yaseen Khattab.

  108. 108.

    Ibid.

  109. 109.

    Author’s interview with Libyan writer Nazar al-Firtas.

  110. 110.

    Krasner.

  111. 111.

    Author’s interview with Libyan writer Nazar al-Firtas.

  112. 112.

    Collombier et al.

  113. 113.

    Interview 1.

  114. 114.

    Alaa Al-Idrissi and Wolfram Lacher, “Capital of Militias, Tripoli’s Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State,” Small Arms Survey, June 2018, https://www.smallarmssurvey.org/sites/default/files/resources/SAS-SANA-BP-Tripoli-armed-groups.pdf.

  115. 115.

    Author’s interview with Libyan writer Nazar al-Firtas.

  116. 116.

    Karim Mezran. “Unsustainable Instability in Libya,” Istituto Affari Internazionali, 3 June 2018, https://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iaicom1813.pdf.

  117. 117.

    El Kamouni-Janssen, Shadeedi, and Ezzeddine.

  118. 118.

    Lacher.

  119. 119.

    Shaw and Reitano, “The Political Economy of Trafficking and Trade in the Sahara: Instability and Opportunities.”

  120. 120.

    Ibid.

  121. 121.

    Fraihat.

  122. 122.

    Arjona, Rebelocracy; Arjona et al., Rebel governance in Civil War, 24; Cunningham and Loyle; Jentzsch et al.; Weinstein.

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Ahmed, R. (2023). Libya After Qaddafi: Are Tribes Always Rebels?. In: Fraihat, I., Alijla, A. (eds) Rebel Governance in the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-1335-0_9

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