The Functioning Mechanism of Contracts in the Society

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Social Order through Contracts

Abstract

This chapter tries to unveil the functioning mechanism of contracts in the society of the Qingshui River region during the Qing period, interpreting and rationalizing why contracts should be observed. It aims to present a tentative answer of the long-lasting question of why people honor the contract in the region, by investigating the mechanism which guarantees the contract to be a container of tamper-resistant provable recognition. A blockchain-like noncentral trust network is introduced to explain the protection mechanism of the authenticity of contracts. This trust network is constructed by the effective operation of the broadcasting and chaining mechanism of contracts as well as the technical barrier of literacy. This chapter further discusses how contracts function in the restoration of social order when facing challenges from breaches and forgeries. Finally, special attention is paid to contracts that created social relationships in public respects, and a possible limitation of the theorization of the findings will be discussed in a larger context.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See Tuomela [149].

  2. 2.

    See Mielke et al. [110].

  3. 3.

    This issue has attracted a lot of scholarly attention. One explanation of the functioning mechanism of contracts in Wendou Village is offered in three parts, focusing on the middleman, the institution of guarantee, and the influence of human relationships, customs, and moral pressure from public opinion in the village society, respectively. See Liang [86].

  4. 4.

    Instead of “legitimacy,” the term “rightfulness” is chosen in this study, for those contracts in question had little relation with “legal/law” but a norm concerning whether the issue involved was rightful or not.

  5. 5.

    See, e.g., Zhu and Su [216], Zhong [213]. For a study of the spirit of contract in the general context of ancient China, see Huo [67].

  6. 6.

    See, e.g., Speidel [143].

  7. 7.

    See Wehberg [164], Sharp [139].

  8. 8.

    See Zhong Yiwei, “Zhongguo chuantong qiyue zhong de ‘qiyue ziyou’ yu ‘zhuti **deng’,” 43.

  9. 9.

    See Hume [66].

  10. 10.

    For the preservation of a family’s contract manuscripts in Wendou Village, as well as its damage throughout history, see Wang [159].

  11. 11.

    During an archival research conducted on April 11, 2018, at the **** County Archives, Guizhou, the author personally participated in the negotiation concerning a dispute of forestry property rights as one of the mediators. The two elders, as representatives of the two disputing parties, came to the archives to inquire about their contracts of the forest land in question, which were previously collected by the government as historical documentation and thus preserved at the archives. In the eyes of contemporary people of the region, though not necessarily accepted by the law in force, contracts that were stipulated in older times are still deemed incontrovertible proof of their current property rights.

  12. 12.

    See, e.g. Wu [172], Zhang [191], Zhong [212], Wu [168], Deng and Qiu [32].

  13. 13.

    Chronologically, the development of contract theory (which is mostly but not necessarily law-related) in modern times can be summarized into three phases: the era of classical contract law, the era of neo-classical contract law, and the rising of relational contract theory, which is considered as “one of the latest steps in the scholarly project of responding to the inadequacies of classical contract law.” See Feinman [40]. For three eye-catching monographs in the developmental trajectory of contract theory, see Gilmore [45], Macneil [105], Uchida [150]. As a summary, the so-called “meta-theories” of contract, compared to the classical contract theory as a general theory, are concluded as falling into three groups, namely promissory theories, reliance theories, and transfer theories. The neo-classical contract theory lays more emphasis on “reliance” than “promise” as the motivation of contract enforcement. See Austen-Baker and Zhou [6].

  14. 14.

    For a critical overview of theories of contract under the background of contract law, see Hogg [61].

  15. 15.

    When facing the state coercion, the question of “why the state should enforce a contract against the wishes of a party to it” arises. This is considered as “[a] perennial question in contract law.” See Schwartz and Scott [137].

  16. 16.

    See, e.g., Farnsworth [37].

  17. 17.

    For a summary of the theory, see Linzer [93].

  18. 18.

    An impressive remark on this point from Justice Holmes is that “[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it—and nothing else.” See Holmes [62].

  19. 19.

    Ian Roderick Macneil, The New Social Contract, 4. The “awareness of future,” along with “society,” “specialization of labor and exchange,” and “choice,” are listed by Macneil as the “four primal roots of contract” in exploring the nature of contract. See ibid., 1–4.

  20. 20.

    It is believed that the situation or ratio of people honoring contracts can be seen as a matter of specific social conditioning. See Kato [78].

  21. 21.

    From the perspective of social psychology, the starting points as to why people abide by the law and why they keep the contract may be similar, for contracts have long been regarded as having the same effect as law, although they are only binding on the parties to the contract. They are also regarded as the cornerstone of the birth of national law in social contract theory.

  22. 22.

    See ** wenshu yu fawenhua yanjiu [**** manuscripts and the studies of legal culture], ed. Qicai Gao and Kui Wang, 19. Bei**g: Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe." href="#ref-CR182" id="ref-link-section-d12753337e608">182].

  23. 27.

    See ibid., 20–22.

  24. 28.

    See Xu [144].

  25. 41.

    This phenomenon can be found as a result of field research conducted in the 1930s, see Shi [141]. For a much later example of field research which illustrates the doctrine of good faith in contracting, see Xu [178].

  26. 42.

    See Takeuchi [145].

  27. 43.

    H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 89.

  28. 44.

    See, e.g., Tianzhu xian minzu shiwu weiyuanhui and Tianzhu xian wenhuaguan [148], Wang [158].

  29. 45.

    Multiple versions of this story can be seen in collections of folk literature, see, e.g., Yan [181], Miaozu wenxueshi bianxiezu [109], Miaozu wenxueshi bianxiezu [108].

  30. 46.

    To a certain extent, it can also be said that the wealthy man still performed a certain degree of measuring his own benefits, albeit of a different kind. It is believed that the decision pattern of a good man should be differentiated from that of a “bad man,” since the good man “is willing to pay something to perform his legal obligation.” In order to “find out how much a citizen is willing to pay,” one “must look inward and consult his intrinsic values,” which is “the internal point of view.” See Cooter [27]. In this story, the wealthy man was willing to pay double wages in exchange for fully performing his obligation in the contract.

  31. 47.

    Hart believes that one important character of “social rules,” which can be likened to “contract” here, is that “where there are such rules, not only is such criticism in fact made but deviation from the standard is generally accepted as a good reason for making it.” See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 55.

  32. 48.

    Rousseau [133]. For the English translation, see Rousseau [134].

  33. 49.

    Fried [43].

  34. 50.

    It is believed that the question of why a contract must be kept is also a question of where the validity of the contract comes from, see Sang Benqian, “Qiyue weihe bixu zunshou,” 22. Many theories answer this question by referring to some more fundamental principles. A critical summary of related theories can be found in Li [84].

  35. 51.

    See Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 121.

  36. 52.

    On the debate about the existence of the “public sphere” in China before the nineteenth century, see Chow [25].

  37. 53.

    In the Qingshui River region, the methods of property transfer include not only sale, though it was the most popular one, but also conditional sale (dian), mortgage, household division, etc. See Zhu [215].

  38. 54.

    It is believed that “the existence of a contract exemplifies event-based institutional facts.” See Hage [48].

  39. 55.

    Though some may argue that these reasons might not be the reality but merely a formulaic excuse, evidence shows that, at least under certain circumstances, the shortage of living expenses was the real cause for transferring properties. See Qu [125]. Sometimes the reason written in the contract would be specific, such as the lack of legal costs at yamen, see Chen and Du [20]. Therefore, even if the contract text should not be treated as entirely true records, it should be considered as a narrative of fact; in a certain sense, the way the fact is narrated may be more important than the fact itself.

  40. 56.

    The formatted description is commonly seen in contracts of sale in the Qingshui River region. For an example using the above-mentioned style of description, see Chen and Du [21].

  41. 57.

    In the theory of legal transaction (Rechtsgeschäft), which derived from “the more specific notion of a contract,” the individual will or intention is of crucial importance. Arguably, it is observable that “a contract is normally formed on the basis of will (intention) and declaration of it.” See Jaap Hage, “What is a Legal Transaction?,” 103. Therefore, it is essential to distinguish between pure descriptions of events and expressions of intention in the contract text, since the latter implies the justification of the contract at the normative level.

  42. 58.

    A study on contracts from Zigong, Sichuan province also notes the importance of expressing the willingness of contracting parties in contract text, see Zhang [193].

  43. 59.

    These contracts can be found in Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Qigui jiacang qiyue wenshu, 3–57. In this corpus, page 9 includes two contracts, and of which six are not contracts of sale, see ibid., 16, 31, 44, 49, 52–53. Therefore, 50 contracts of sale remained after eliminating the six.

  44. 60.

    See ibid., 35, 38.

  45. 61.

    See ibid., 3, 8, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20–21, 24–25, 27–30, 32–34, 36, 39, 40, 42–43, 45–47, 50–51, 54, 56–57.

  46. 62.

    See ibid., 4, 6, 12, 15, 18, 23, 41, 48, 55.

  47. 63.

    See ibid., 7, 11, 26.

  48. 64.

    See ibid., 5.

  49. 65.

    See ibid., 9, 10, 22, 37.

  50. 66.

    See ibid., 9.

  51. 67.

    See Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 120; Chen [22].

  52. 68.

    See Daniels et al. [31].

  53. 69.

    For a detailed study on the willingness and the erosion of contract effectiveness when it is lacking in the Song dynasty, see Gao [44].

  54. 70.

    For the record of the case, including testimonies, see Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an guan and Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan lishi yanjiusuo [214]. A discussion of this case can be found in Lin [90].

  55. 71.

    See Kötz [80], Peel [121], Feinman [39], Henderson [58].

  56. 72.

    It is broadly accepted that laying down the rules of estoppel, and especially promissory estoppel, represented a diminishment of the force of the doctrine of consideration in the theory of contract law, and that the major purpose of promissory estoppel is “a vehicle for protecting the expectation interest” as well as reliance. See Hein Kötz, European Contract Law, 64; Stanley D. Henderson, “Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine,” 379.

  57. 73.

    The conclusion of an experimental study suggests that people, in general, have a preference for word kee**, and the commitment-based account for promise kee** could have a stronger explanatory power than the expectation-based account. See Vanberg [151].

  58. 74.

    Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 349, 350(2), 352, 353(1, 2), 354, 355(1, 2), 356, 357(1, 2), 358, 359(2), 360, 361(1, 2), 362, 363(1, 2), 364, 367, 371–374, 375(1), 376–380, 382–386, 388, 390–393, 394(1, 2), 395, 396(1, 2),397–399, 401–405, 406(2), 407, 408, 410(2), 414–415, 417, 419, 420(1), 421–422, 425(1), 426 (1), 428(2), 437(2), 438, 441, 448, 451–453, 455(1, 2), 456–457, 459(1), 460(2), 463(1, 2), 464(1, 2), 465–467, 484–485, 487, 492, 494, 497–498, 500, 503–505, 510. Since there might be more than one manuscripts on one page, the numbers in parentheses are used to indicate the corresponding contract.

  59. 75.

    For exceptions, see ibid., 353(1), 408, 410(2), 426 (1), 441, 457, 463(1).

  60. 76.

    See ibid., 358, 378.

  61. 77.

    See ibid., 415.

  62. 78.

    See, e.g., ibid., 27.

  63. 79.

    It is admitted that, in the practice of traditional land laws of Qing China, ownership might not be a precise term to indicate the rights that one could have over one’s property, which, in its Chinese context, was often expressed as “ye.” Here the term “ownership” is used to refer to the free rights that one could have in utilizing one’s property (such as the field). For studies on the issue of “ye,” see Terada [147], Li [85]. In addition, it should be noted that the controversial issue of whether the true “property rights” or absolute “ownership” existed in the traditional Chinese context or not is avoided here. For a similar attitude on this debate, see Zhao and Liu [210]. In regard to this issue, see also Aihara [2].

  64. 80.

    See, e.g., Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 27.

  65. 81.

    See, e.g., ibid., 500.

  66. 82.

    For a discussion of the sequence of listing the following figures, see Qu Jian, “Qing zhonghouqi Qiandongnan Wendou zhai Miaozu dianzhi yanjiu,” 203.

  67. 83.

    See, e.g., Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 505.

  68. 84.

    See, e.g., ibid., 496.

  69. 85.

    See, e.g., ibid., 503.

  70. 86.

    See, e.g., ibid., 27.

  71. 87.

    This means that, theoretically speaking, other circumstances would not be considered as rightful, such as those who wished to retract their recognition in the contract, or an unlisted claimer who disputed the property without rightful grounds.

  72. 88.

    This is similar to the device of security for defects of right in modern contract law, see Qu Jian, “Qing zhonghouqi Qiandongnan Wendou zhai Miaozu dianzhi yanjiu,” 203.

  73. 89.

    Bridge [10].

  74. 90.

    See Smith [142].

  75. 91.

    Michael Bridge, Personal Property Law, 1–2.

  76. 92.

    See Zhang [192], Lawson and Rudden [81].

  77. 93.

    “All those affected should be heard and agree (Mike Robert Horenstein’s translation in Luhmann’s article).” This was originally a rule in Roman law dealing with the situation of plural legal guardians (tutores) over the same single ward, and the rule is that “their joint administration could not be dissolved without the consent of all.” See Berman [8], Luhmann [101]. The maxim of Roman law was later “raised to the level of a constitutional principle.” See Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution, 221. After showing its possibility of being “extended to maxims of legal rationality,” however, people still clearly notice that “it is not possible for all those concerned (including the unborn generations) to be heard and agree.” See Niklas Luhmann, “Quod Omnes Tangit,” 884.

  78. 94.

    For re-examinations of this rule and its origins, see Walker [152], Kent [79].

  79. 95.

    It should be noted that the term “neighbors” sometimes referred to those who own the property neighboring the contractor’s property, rather than those who lived near the living place of the contractor. The latter situation has been discussed in the sub-section of witnessing in Chap. 3.

  80. 96.

    See Wu [170], Han [50].

  81. 97.

    See Shi [140].

  82. 98.

    See Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 81–82.

  83. 99.

    A detailed description based on field investigations in southeastern Guizhou on this point can be seen in Zhongguo shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao congkan xiuding bianji weiyuanhui [1].

  84. 100.

    See Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’an guan and Zhongguo shehui kexue yuan lishi yanjiusuo, Qing dai tudi zhanyou guanxi yu diannong kangzu douzheng, 454–456; Lin Qian, Tudong sancun, 393.

  85. 101.

    See Shi Jianyun, “**dai huabei tudi maimai de jige wenti,” 129.

  86. 102.

    In this case, other co-owners of the selling property should be included in the transaction unless there are “several co-owners” who, distinctly rather than jointly, possess interests over the property. However, a planter of the forest would normally first ask the landlord, sometimes as one of several co-owners of the forest, about his intention of purchasing the planter’s shares before selling them to others. See Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 81–82. For the disposition of jointly-owned property in the Qingshui River region, see Qu [128].

  87. 103.

    See Hu and Chen [63]. In addition to recognition from neighbors, the study suggests that it is also necessary to include the recognition of the community represented by the local leader. In other words, the practical experience has somewhat proven that land rights can be established on the basis of recognition, including that of neighbors and the community.

  88. 104.

    An example can be found in Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 81–82.

  89. 105.

    Chen and Guo [19].

  90. 106.

    Raising dissenting voices is also an action in this regard.

  91. 107.

    Compared to the term “promise” that is commonly seen in contracts and contract theories, the term “recognition” is chosen because it seems to have a slightly more passive sense. In contracts of the Qingshui River region, what was originally presented is more of a negative obligation than an active promise, while, for the outsiders to a contract, they do not have to actively make any promise, but only need to recognize the effectiveness of the proof of property rights when facing it.

  92. 108.

    Local knowledge is especially stressed in the land disputes; therefore, it would be technically impossible for a complete outsider to interfere in matters of local property issues. See Lin [91].

  93. 109.

    An example of a foreign purchaser in the village may shed some light on this point. The non-native vendee was asked to hire a local middleman and a scribe according to the instruction of the vendor, which was obviously an expression of recognition to the property order and transaction rules of the local society. See “Appendix 2: Field Research Report,” He [55].

  94. 110.

    A renowned theoretical elaboration of the process of disposing property through contract can be found in Hegel [56]. A English translation can be found in Hegel [57].

  95. 111.

    See Niklas Luhmann, “Quod Omnes Tangit,” 884.

  96. 112.

    Harold J. Berman, Law and Revolution, 608.

  97. 113.

    Zelin et al. [190].

  98. 114.

    Zelin [188]. It is widely believed that most social and economic transactions in Qing China must have been based on written materials including contracts, see Hayes [54].

  99. 115.

    For the relation of contract and **, see Qu [126].

  100. 116.

    An extended meaning of “lean on” or “count on” can be used in a contract with reference to the boundary of the land parcel, as this parcel of land is “leaning on” the edge of the next parcel. See, e.g., Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 116.

  101. 117.

    See Luo [103]. The word can also be used as a conjunction meaning “no matter (what, how, etc.).” In the context of a contract, this meaning can be used to ensure the vendee’s rights over the sold property that, “no matter what” the vendee wants to do in managing the property, he or she can do so at will. See, e.g., An and Pan [4].

  102. 118.

    Here it needs to be noted that, although contract is a complex term, this term is used to solely refer to the physical and normally paper-based manuscript, excluding its institutional and social implications.

  103. 119.

    Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 27.

  104. 120.

    Daniels et al. [29].

  105. 121.

    An Zunhua and Pan Zhicheng, Tudi qiyue wenshu jiaoshi, vol. 1, 293.

  106. 122.

    Ibid., 287.

  107. 123.

    Ibid., 307.

  108. 124.

    In the disputes heard by the government, judging based on the contract was the basic principle for determining the ownership of property, but there were surely some exceptions. See Wen-kai Lin, “‘Ye ** qi guan’?,” 1–52. Also, although it was written in the Ming dynasty, a fiction vividly described the importance of having a written contract. The judge in a loan dispute made it clear that the official only recognized contracts, and it was assumed that, where there was no contract, there was no loan. But in the underworld, officials ignored the superficies of whether one has a contract or not but focused on the conscience of the person instead. Thus, though the protagonist’s prosecution failed in the upper world in the tale, it ultimately succeeded in the underworld. See Ling [92].

  109. 125.

    The vagueness in a normative text also has an exceptive meaning in modern law and needs to be specially treated. For the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see Hessick [59], Goldsmith [46], Beck [7].

  110. 126.

    See Jaap Hage, “What is a Legal Transaction?,” 103.

  111. 127.

    See, e.g., Zhang and Wang [205].

  112. 128.

    Examples of **zhong and **zhongren can be seen in Kang [77].

  113. 129.

    See An Zunhua and Pan Zhicheng, Tudi qiyue wenshu jiaoshi, vol. 1, 293.

  114. 130.

    It is asserted that here ** could mean “asking” or “requesting someone’s help,” though no reference is provided, see Kang Caiyun, “Gudai qiyue wenshu de zhongbaoren chengwei yuci yanbian yanjiu,” 33.

  115. 131.

    It should be noted that the middleman here should be understood in a broader sense as incorporating all third parties to a contract.

  116. 132.

    See Zhang [194].

  117. 133.

    See, e.g., Zhang and Wang [202], Zhang and Wang [206].

  118. 134.

    See Zhang Wuwei, Weinengxin lu, 516–517.

  119. 135.

    Hase [53].

  120. 136.

    Zelin [189]; Madeleine Zelin, “Merchant Dispute Mediation in Twentieth-Century Zigong, Sichuan,” 253–254. Similar arguments can also be seen in Patrick H. Hase, Custom, Land and Livelihood in Rural South China, 151; Hansen [51]. 

  121. 137.

    When speaking of possession, peacefulness has a strong implication of rightfulness. As the ancient doctrine of “acquisitive prescription” suggests, a continuous (uninterrupted), public, and peaceful possession can lead to ownership under certain situations. For the emphasis of peacefulness in acquisitive prescription, see Johnson [76].

  122. 138.

    In a key formula raised by Habermas— “Those norms for action are valid, to which all potentially affected persons could agree as participants in a rational discourse (Gültig sind genau die Handlungsnormen, denen alle möglicherweise Betroffenen als Teilnehmer an rationalen Diskursen zustimmen könnten)”—the modal concept “could (könnten)” is specially singled out by Luhmann, signifying the importance, at least from the viewpoint of a reader, of the “possibility” in the argument of validity. See Niklas Luhmann, “Quod Omnes Tangit,” 891; Habermas [47].

  123. 139.

    See Qu Jian, “Qing dai Wendou zhai zhongren zhidu,” 273.

  124. 140.

    The local identity of a middleman was specially stressed in contracting activities. See Wen-kai Lin, “‘Ye ** qi guan’?,” 18–19; He Yumei, “Qing dai Minguo shiqi Qiandongnan Wendou zhai de linye **gji xisu yanjiu,” 57.

  125. 141.

    As the field investigation suggests, no retraction would be allowed after the feast. See Zhongguo shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao congkan xiuding bianji weiyuanhui, Miaozu shehui lishi diaocha, vol. 1, 57.

  126. 142.

    A similar situation arose in a modern forestry dispute which occurred in De’an county, Jiangxi province, in which the author personally participated in mediation as the deputy director of the legislative affairs office of the local government. Some agreements were concluded when the interested parties were not in the village, and disputes certainly arose when those parties returned home.

  127. 143.

    See Li [83].

  128. 144.

    The agency here refers to the hanzhong or zhujia, as mentioned previously in the discussion of middlemen.

  129. 145.

    See Pan et al. [116].

  130. 146.

    See Chen [15].

  131. 147.

    See Wang [157].

  132. 148.

    See Fang [171], Wu [169].

  133. 149.

    See Wu Fang, “Lun Qingshuijiang wenshu zhong de wu zhongren xianxiang,” 4–10.

  134. 150.

    See Wang and Zhao [155].

  135. 151.

    In Wendou Village there are many contracts that are organized in the form of a list of profit allocation, and some of them have no middleman. The reason for this could also be that there are already many participants in the transaction, which means that the public could know the issue since it is actually not a private relation. In many situations there can be more than ten people involved, see, e.g., Zhang and Wang [200].

  136. 152.

    Middlemen would normally act as witnesses or guarantors in loan contracts, see Duara [35].

  137. 153.

    See Zhongguo shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao congkan xiuding bianji weiyuanhui, Miaozu shehui lishi diaocha, vol. 1, 62. Also, an investigation on villages in north China suggests that “guarantors were not usually required for rental contracts,” see Prasenjit Duara, “Elites and the Structures of Authority in the Villages of North China, 1900–1949,” 266.

  138. 154.

    Zhongguo shaoshu minzu shehui lishi diaocha ziliao congkan xiuding bianji weiyuanhui, Miaozu shehui lishi diaocha, vol. 1, 65.

  139. 155.

    See, e.g., Zhang and Wang [201].

  140. 156.

    It is believed that the middleman has almost unlimited liability in time for the transactions they participate in. See Liang [87].

  141. 157.

    See, e.g., Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Qigui jiacang qiyue wenshu, 296.

  142. 158.

    See An Zunhua and Pan Zhicheng, Tudi qiyue wenshu jiaoshi, vol. 1, 7.

  143. 159.

    See Li Bo, “Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou beiming zhong de shehui zhixu,” 56.

  144. 160.

    See Liang [88].

  145. 161.

    Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du Contrat Social; ou Principes du Droit Politique, 7. For an English translation, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy and The Social Contract, 48.

  146. 162.

    In dispute documentation, it is an important accusation that one improperly uses his or her superiority in power or wealth to seize the property of others. An example in Wendou Village can be seen in Chen **quan and Guo Liang, Yi Zunfa Jiang Qicheng deng jiacang susong wenshu, 61.

  147. 163.

    See Long [96]. An interesting, more modern, example regarding this point is the provisions in the “Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong.” One of the three annexes and one of the eight articles of the Joint Declaration is devoted to the issue of land leases in Hong Kong. Article 6 states that “land leases in Hong Kong and other related matters will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Annex III to this Joint Declaration.” The Annex III stipulates that “[a]ll leases of land granted or decided upon before the entry into force of the Joint Declaration and those granted thereafter in accordance with paragraph 2 or 3 of this Annex, and which extend beyond 30 June 1997, and all rights in relation to such leases shall continue to be recognised and protected under the law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.” At least in the legal and later judicial sense, contracts concluded long ago “shall continue to be recognised and protected.” For a review of a modern case in Hong Kong but which was judged jointly by modern law and the customs of the Qing dynasty, see ** [73]. Also, for the discussion of the phenomenon of inviting experts in legal history to the courts in Hong Kong, see Bourgon [9].

  148. 164.

    See Long [98].

  149. 165.

    Christian Daniels, Yang Yougeng, and Takeuchi Fusaji, Kishū Myaozoku ringyō keiyaku monjo kaihen (1736–1950-nen), vol. 3, E-0001.

  150. 166.

    This line of words was written at the junction of the edges of two sheets of paper, so only the right part was written on this manuscript.

  151. 167.

    It is “a clause in a contract that integrates all prior agreements into the contract with any prior contradictory terms or conditions excluded from the final contract of the parties.” See Tepper [146].

  152. 168.

    It is noteworthy that the similar custom seems to exist widely, as it is also reported in, for example, **, as it is shown in a Kangxi-era contract. See Shan [138]. This could also provide the major premise of a syllogistic argument of contract performance. An example of such an argument is: according to the requirements of natural justice (** tianli), a debt must be paid; according to the contract as the proof, A owes B the money; therefore, the conclusion is that A should repay the money to B.

  153. 173.

    This is also the most basic conceptual principle used by the contract authors at that time when conducting self-justification arguments in the contract text, whether in the expression of the willingness or estoppel.

  154. 174.

    Charles Fried, Contract as Promise, ix.

  155. 175.

    Madeleine Zelin, “Merchant Dispute Mediation in Twentieth-Century Zigong, Sichuan,” 252–253.

  156. 176.

    For studies on the anti-counterfeiting technology in the writing of contracts, see Feng [42], Feng [41], Jiang [71].

  157. 177.

    See Zheng [106].

  158. 191.

    For the basic workings of the DLT, see Walport [153], Rauchs et al. [130].

  159. 192.

    See Henri Massias, X Serret Avila, and J-J Quisquater, “Design of A Secure Timestam** Service with Minimal Trust Requirement,” 1.

  160. 193.

    In theory, a successful attacker only needs to control more than 50% of the computing power or mining hash rate of the entire network, which is still considered a mission impossible. This is called a 51% attack. The attack can be in various means, such as direct tampering or indirect manipulation. For assessments of the 51% attack, see Ye et al. [184], Sayeed and Macro-Gisbert [136].

  161. 194.

    See Hofmann et al. [60], Williams [167].

  162. 195.

    To a large extent, both the decentralized design and the DLT ultimately serve to achieve the immutability of the data. The advantage of not putting all one’s eggs in one basket is that these “synchronized digital eggs” will not be easily changed, for even if one of the eggs has been attacked, there are still a large number of eggs that have not been tampered with and which are stored all over the world. This makes the modification of less than 50% of the eggs meaningless.

  163. 196.

    Kevin Werbach, “Trust, but Verify,” 516.

  164. 197.

    Ibid., 494.

  165. 198.

    It is summarily described in the white paper as “a peer-to-peer network using proof-of-work to record a public history of transactions that quickly becomes computationally impractical for an attacker to change if honest nodes control a majority of CPU power.” See Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin,” 8.

  166. 199.

    Ibid., 1.

  167. 200.

    See Chen and Long [18], Huang and Zhang [65].

  168. 201.

    For a thorough study on trust construed as a mechanism for the reduction of social complexity, see Luhmann [102].Also, see Qu [203.

    Kevin Werbach, “Trust, but Verify,” 494.

  169. 204.

    Instead of using the term “architecture,” this study chooses “network” on the grounds that it better presents both the dynamic and static aspects of how the trust in contracts is organized in the society. Also, it implies that there could be no specific “architect” or “designer” in the formation of this network. For the explanation of using the term “architecture” in a blockchain context, see Kevin Werbach, The Blockchain and the New Architecture of Trust, 25–28.

  170. 205.

    See Michel Rauchs et al., Distributed Ledger Technology Systems: A Conceptual Framework, 24, 59–60.

  171. 206.

    See Satoshi Nakamoto, “Bitcoin,” 3. The “timestamp,” in general, is used to identify the occurrence time of a certain event.

  172. 207.

    See ibid., 4.

  173. 208.

    Analogously, in the theory of blockchain, messages also “need to be delivered on a best effort basis.” See ibid., 8.

  174. 209.

    See ibid., 2.

  175. 210.

    In the field investigation conducted by the author in Wendou Village in 2011, though as a personal and modern experience, the speed of the information transmission in the local society was extremely impressive. For a brief record of the fieldwork, see Qu Jian, “Qing zhonghouqi Qiandongnan Wendou zhai Miaozu dianzhi yanjiu,” 204.

  176. 211.

    See Chen **quan and Guo Liang, Yi Zunfa Jiang Qicheng deng jiacang susong wenshu, 45. A similar expression can also be seen in Pan and Wu [118].

  177. 212.

    Chen **quan and Guo Liang, Yi Zunfa Jiang Qicheng deng jiacang susong wenshu, 49.

  178. 213.

    See Wang [154].

  179. 214.

    See, e.g., Zhang and Wang [208]. In some villages, there could have been an unified account book regarding the land of the village, as was certainly conducted in a much later time. See Shan Honggen, **** wenshu yu Qingshuijiang linye shihua, 103.

  180. 215.

    See, e.g., Long [97].

  181. 216.

    See Zhang et al. [199], Qian [122].

  182. 217.

    Aniello et al. [5].

  183. 218.

    In the case that there existed no former contracts, the source of the property shall be declared by the vendor in the new contract. See Yang [183], Chen [17]; Wu Dahua, Qian fa tanyuan, 205–206. Normally, original acquisition and derivative acquisition were the two kinds of modes of acquiring ownership; only in the case of original acquisition (reclamation or pre-empting) will there also be no contract. Sometimes a certificate was issued by the government as the proof of one’s rights over his reclaimed land. For a discussion of certificate manuscripts in the Qingshui River region, see Xu [175].

  184. 219.

    If the former contract has not been handed over on the spot, it is necessary to specify this matter in the postscript of the contract and guarantee that it will be sent out in person later. See Christian Daniels, Yang Yougeng, and Takeuchi Fusaji, Kishū Myaozoku ringyō keiyaku monjo kaihen (1736–1950-nen), vol. 1, A-0234. Also, if the property was originally inherited from ancestors and thus a former contract did not exist a former contract, the situation would be specifically stated in the contract too. See Zhang Yingqiang and Wang Zongxun, Qingshuijiang wenshu, vol. 3 (7), 104.

  185. 220.

    See Wang [160]; Wang Zongxun, Qingshuijiang lishi wenhua tanwei, 108.

  186. 221.

    See Zhonghua renmin gongheguo piaoju fa [Negotiable instruments law of the People’s Republic of China], Art. 31 (2004).

  187. 222.

    See Terada Hiroaki, “Quanli yu yuanyi,” 217–220; Xu [162].

  188. 224.

    See ibid.; **** xian difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui [74].

  189. 225.

    See Zhang [195].

  190. 226.

    There are three documents related to the case, see Pan Zhicheng and Wu Dahua, Tudi guanxi ji qita shiwu wenshu, vol. 1, 227–229. It must be noted that only the documents from one side of the dispute survives. According to the requirement that both sides of a dispute should be heard, it would be hard to confirm whether the statements in these documents are completely true or not. All subsequent descriptions and discussions are based on this prudent understanding. However, these documents at least shed some light on some of the facts and their expression.

  191. 227.

    An analysis of this case can also be found in Pan [117].

  192. 228.

    See Pan Zhicheng and Wu Dahua, Tudi guanxi ji qita shiwu wenshu, vol. 1, 227.

  193. 229.

    A similar case of forgery with regard to the coincidence of the names can be found in a record of fieldwork, see Wang [161]. However, it was not the case that two places shared the same name but one place had two names, and therefore some tried to forge a contract bearing the other name of the property.

  194. 230.

    See Pan Zhicheng and Wu Dahua, Tudi guanxi ji qita shiwu wenshu, vol. 1, 228.

  195. 231.

    See Rawski [131], Liu [95], Xu and van Leeuwen [179].

  196. 232.

    Studies have shown that the literacy varied greatly among regions in the Qing dynasty. See Xu Yi and Bas van Leeuwen, “19 shiji Zhongguo dazhong shizilü de zai gusuan,” 240–247.

  197. 233.

    As noted previously, a report from a missionary living in the Miao area during the late Qing period shows that “not one in a hundred of them when he buys a piece of land is able to read the deed of sale when it is written.” See Clarke [26].

  198. 234.

    In fact, literacy was only one of many important criteria necessary to become a qualified scribe. Other abilities include relevant knowledge of contracts, understanding of local customs, and familiarity with the contractual background. The failure of the previous forged contract of the homonymous forest land was largely due to the counterfeiter’s unfamiliarity with the number of shares allocation concerning the property.

  199. 235.

    It is suggested that literacy can be distinguished as moderately literate, fully literate, and highly literate. See Idema [68].

  200. 236.

    For a contract which especially states that the parties involved were completely illiterate, see Zhang and Wang [203].

  201. 237.

    At the same time, the anti-counterfeiting technology of the contract was also a requisite for scribes. See Feng Xuewei, Ming Qing qiyue de jiegou gongneng ji yiyi, 109.

  202. 238.

    See Zhao [209].

  203. 239.

    See Du and Wu [34].

  204. 240.

    See Du [33].

  205. 241.

    See Pan Zhicheng, Wu Dahua, and Liang Cong, Qingjiang si an yanjiu, vol. 3, 121.

  206. 242.

    One of them was only partially written by Jiang Shaoya. See Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 204.

  207. 243.

    See ibid., 202. Regarding the time period of this contract, special attention given in a study came to the conclusion that the manuscript “should be established in the period of Jiaqing.” See Lin [89].

  208. 244.

    See Zhang and Wang [207].

  209. 245.

    See Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Qigui jiacang qiyue wenshu, 263.

  210. 246.

    Among the above-mentioned 85 contracts, Jiang Shaoya assumed the roles of both middleman and scribe in 36 of them; here, only those he joined solely as a middleman are counted.

  211. 247.

    See Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 203. The conclusion of a study investigating the time of the contract is that it would be in the reign of either Jiaqing or Daoguang. See Lin Dongjie, “Qing zhi Minguo nianjian Qingshuijiang qiyue wenshu liqi shijian jiaobu,” 66–67.

  212. 248.

    See Zhang Yingqiang and Wang Zongxun, Qingshuijiang wenshu, vol. 1 (12), 337.

  213. 249.

    See Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 348.

  214. 250.

    The lighter-color parts of “Smi” in the bar chart refer to Jiang solely as a middleman, while the darker parts of “Scr” refer to Jiang as a scribe as well as when he assumed both roles.

  215. 251.

    For a list of thirteen contracts related to Jiang Shaoya, see Lin Dongjie, “Qing zhi Minguo nianjian Qingshuijiang qiyue wenshu liqi shijian jiaobu,” 66.

  216. 252.

    See Zhang Yingqiang and Wang Zongxun, Qingshuijiang wenshu, vol. 1 (12), 43, 336; Zhang Yingqiang and Wang Zongxun, Qingshuijiang wenshu, vol. 3 (7), 370; Zhang and Wang [204]; Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 80, 83; Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Qigui jiacang qiyue wenshu, 33, 60, 70.

  217. 253.

    Two interpretations of his life’s state seem possible here: on the one hand, his life was in such distress that he had to sell his properties; on the other hand, the fact of selling properties also shows that he originally owned a considerable number of properties, and they could be realized once necessary.

  218. 254.

    See Daniels et al. [30].

  219. 255.

    See Pan Zhicheng and Wu Dahua, Tudi guanxi ji qita shiwu wenshu, vol. 1, 221.

  220. 256.

    Ibid.

  221. 257.

    See **** xian Hekou xiang renmin zhengfu [75].

  222. 258.

    See Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Qigui jiacang qiyue wenshu, 263.

  223. 259.

    Otherwise, the dispute involving him is somewhat unnecessary, and one might have expected that his death would be reflected in the dispute document.

  224. 260.

    See Christian Daniels, Yang Yougeng, and Takeuchi Fusaji, Kishū Myaozoku ringyō keiyaku monjo kaihen (1736–1950-nen), vol. 2, C-0050.

  225. 261.

    There are still many possibilities that cannot be ruled out. It is still possible that, for example, there are relevant manuscripts that have not yet been found or survived until today, or that he could no longer act as a scribe for others due to his age or health condition.

  226. 262.

    Hamilton and Zheng [49]. For the original Chinese text, see Fei [38].

  227. 263.

    See Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 134.

  228. 264.

    See Zhang [198].

  229. 265.

    For the long list of disputes, see Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 131–133. See also Pan Zhicheng, Qing dai Qingshuijiang liuyu xiangcun shehui de jiufen yu zhixu yanjiu, Chap. 3.

  230. 266.

    See Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 146.

  231. 267.

    See ibid., 132.

  232. 268.

    See Pan [119].

  233. 269.

    See Deng Jianpeng and Qiu Kai, “Cong heyi dao qiangzhi,” 26–27.

  234. 270.

    For the previously discussed case, see Christian Daniels, Yang Yougeng, and Takeuchi Fusaji, Kishū Myaozoku ringyō keiyaku monjo kaihen (1736–1950-nen), vol. 1, A-0098.

  235. 271.

    For a discussion on this point, see Pan Zhicheng, Qing dai Qingshuijiang liuyu xiangcun shehui de jiufen yu zhixu yanjiu, Chap. 3.

  236. 272.

    See Chen **quan and Guo Liang, Yi Zunfa Jiang Qicheng deng jiacang susong wenshu, 234–235.

  237. 273.

    For a discussion of this case, see Pan Zhicheng, Qing dai Qingshuijiang liuyu xiangcun shehui de jiufen yu zhixu yanjiu, Chap. 3.

  238. 274.

    For studies of zhaotie, see, e.g., Huang [64], Buoye [11], Isett [69], Fan [36].

  239. 275.

    See Qu Jian, “Qing zhonghouqi Qiandongnan Wendou zhai Miaozu dianzhi yanjiu,” 207–209.

  240. 276.

    See Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 69.

  241. 277.

    See ibid., 70. Also, at a conference in Paris (October 16th to 18th, 2019) titled “New perspectives on Chinese history: The use of archives from the middle and lower course of the Yangzi River and related regions (16th century–1949),” Professor Zheng Zhenman from **amen University speculated about this phenomenon to the author saying that the “good nature” of the people in the region might be the reason.

  242. 278.

    See Pan Zhicheng, Wu Dahua, and Liang Cong, Qingjiang si an yanjiu, vol. 3, 121.

  243. 279.

    See Liang Cong, Qing dai Qingshuijiang xiayou cunzhai shehui de qiyue guifan yu zhixu, 130.

  244. 280.

    See H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 11, 84.

  245. 281.

    For a concise introduction of the dichotomy between private and public, see Chen [16].

  246. 282.

    This division can also be found in the basic ideas of the important and influential “Lü’s Clan’s Village Pact” formulated in the Song dynasty. See Pan [115].

  247. 283.

    For a study concerning the role of contract in self-governance, see Jiang Ming, Guizhou Cengong qiyue wenshu yanjiu, 156 ff. See also Jiang Ming et al. [82].

  248. 289.

    See Christian Daniels, Yang Yougeng, and Takeuchi Fusaji, Kishū Myaozoku ringyō keiyaku monjo kaihen (1736–1950-nen), vol. 3, F-0045.

  249. 290.

    See Chen **quan and Du Wanhua, Jiang Yuanze jiacang qiyue wenshu, 549.

  250. 291.

    For the relations between the two villages, see Zhang Yingqiang, Mucai zhi liudong, 218–245.

  251. 292.

    See Zhang Yingqiang and Wang Zongxun, Qingshuijiang wenshu, vol. 1 (8), 205.

  252. 293.

    The unfolding of this point can partially be seen in the contract practice in the salt industry in Zigong, see Zelin [186]. For a history of the Chinese shareholding practices, especially in late imperial times, see Zelin [187].

  253. 294.

    See Zhang [197].

  254. 295.

    Buxbaum [12].

  255. 296.

    For the concept of “super-large-scale stranger society” and its application in the modern Chinese context, see Pan [112,113,114].

  256. 297.

    See, e.g., Chen [14].

  257. 298.

    See Parsons [120], Luhmann [100].

  258. 299.

    Radin [129].

  259. 300.

    This can be noticed in the related customs survey, see, e.g., Wu [173].

  260. 301.

    For a study of contracts in urban areas of Bei**g during the Qing era, see Zhang [196].

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Qu, J. (2021). The Functioning Mechanism of Contracts in the Society. In: Social Order through Contracts. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-4947-6_5

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