Abstract
As a new type of corporate management, corporate compliance aims to avoid compliance risks and prevent, monitor and remedy illegal and criminal activities. However, it is meaningless for a company to establish a compliance system on paper merely. The effectiveness of this management relies on its associated administrative and criminal incentive mechanism. Setting the rules of leniency for compliance in criminal law can urge enterprises suspected of committing crimes to implement compliance programs. For enterprises that have promised to establish or improve a compliance management system, the procuratorates set a supervision period and decide whether to prosecute them based on the effectiveness of their compliance system. More and more countries have established this rule. So far, the United States has established deferred prosecution and non-prosecution systems, while the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Canada, Singapore and other countries have imitated the United States and established the deferred prosecution system.
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Notes
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Chen, R. (2022). Compliance Incentive Models in Criminal Procedure. In: Models of Criminal Procedure System. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3651-7_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3651-7_11
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