Abstract
There is no universal substantial rationality, due to prevailing uncertainty, difficulties in coordinating individuals’ strategies and limited computational capabilities. Actors decide in accordance with the context they live in, at the firm of national level. Organizations and institutions are thus sha** behaviors and they are crucial on top of market coordination. Any market is a social construction and if some basic requisites are absent, they dramatically fail. A complete taxonomy of institutions is presented, and it helps in analyzing the intermediate level at which regulation modes and accumulation regimes are operating. Hierarchy and isomorphism are important concepts, and the conflicts of temporality are key factors in the emergence of crises. This chapter proposes macro and institutional foundations of a realistic microeconomic theory.
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Boyer, R. (2022). The Logic of Action, Organizations and Institutions. In: Political Economy of Capitalisms. Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3536-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-3536-7_6
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