Abstract
During the Middle Ages, Aristotle’s ἐνργ εια, which for him still guarded traces of the original experience of Being as non- concealment, is translated by the Latin actus or actualitas, sc. that which is the result of some activity (agere) or work. Thus the Aristotelian sense of ἐνργ εια is completely lost. A genuine being is that which possesses esse actu, and Being itself comes to mean primarily existence.
Correlative with this development is an evolution of the problematic of cause, wherein the Uncaused Cause is conceived as Pure Actuality, Sheer Existence, Being itself. Such a metaphysics finds strong confirmation in religious faith. Since faith, too, can not only articulate truth (understood, of course in the sense of conformity) but guarantee it, mediaeval man begins to think of this guarantee as characteristic of truth as such and thus begins to conceive truth in terms of certitude. Enter Descartes.
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Notes
“Vom Wesen und Begriff der Фύσις, Aristoteles Physik B I,” Il Pensiero, III (1958), pp. 131–156, 265–289. (Hereafter: P). See p. 289.
P, pp. 133–134 (verborgene Grundbuch). See pp. 153, 274 (Antiphon).
P, pp. 288 (Art von οὐσία), 131–133 (Natur).
P, pp. 288–289 (ϰρύπτεσϑαι φιλσεῖ). See pp. 284–286 (Anwesung-Abwesung).
P, pp. 137 (ἀρχή), 138, 140, 275 (Bewegtheit, Ruhe), 276 (ἐντελέχεια), 277 (ἀτελής).
“… Das sichentf alternde Aufgehen ist an sicfe ein In-sich-zurückgehen;…” (P, p. 143). Cf. p. 266.
P. pp. 147–149 (Anwesung). Aristotle explains οὐσία by ὑπϰείμενον, which Heidegger claims, has the same ambiguity as ὄν, hence permits interpretation as Being (here being-ness) or being.
P, pp. 149, 156, 266.
P, pp. 278 (noch zurück-und an sich haltenden), 269 (Gestellung in das Aussehen), 278 (erfüllt mehr).
P, pp. 279, 281, 283 (γέεσις), 284–285 (στέρησις), 286–287 (zwiefach).
“… Die μορφή ist das Wesen der φύρις als ἀρχή, und die ἀρχή ist das Wesen der φύρις als μορφή,…” (P, p. 287).
“Weil φύσις im Sinne der ‘Physik’ eine Art der οὐσία und weil οὐσία im Wesen selbst entstammt der anfänglich entworfenen φύσις, deshalb gehört zum Sein αλήϑεια, und deshalb enthüllt sich als einen Charakter der οὐσία die Anwesung ins Offene der ίδέα (Platon) und des εἴδος ϰατὰ τον λόγον (Aristoteles), deshalb wird für diesen das Wesen der ϰίνησις als ἐντελέχεια und ἐνέργεια sichtbar.” (P, p. 289). Heidegger’s italics.
P, p. 269. In this respect, the ϰατὰ τὸν λόγον is also significant, given Heidegger’s interpretation of λόγος (pp. 271–272), but this problem returns in the λόγος analysis of VA (1944), and we do not attempt to retain it here.
P, p. 156. Heidegger recalls here that the whole problem of seeming-to-be (Schein) is the problem of negativity of truth. Cf. p. 151.
Der Satz vom Grund (Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), pp. 112–113. (Hereafter: SG).
“… Dies liegt daran, daß unsere Augen nicht ohne weiteres zum Erblicken des Seins taugen, also keineswegs daran, daß das Sein sich entzieht….” (SG, p. 113).
EM, pp. 141–142. The term “expression” (Aussage) for Heidegger includes not only the verbal locution but the judgement that is thereby expressed.
N, II, pp. 14–15.
“… Ἐνεργείᾳ, ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄν besagt soviel wie ἐν τ#### εἴδει εἴναι….” (N, II, p, 405). See pp. 404–405.
“Daß-sein und Was-sein enthüllen sich als Weisen des Anwesens, dessen Grundzug die ἐνέργεια ist.” (N, II, p. 407). To the extent that Aristotle, even in admitting as legitimate the secondary sense of οὐσία, is always concerned with the concrete singular, he is closer to the origin-al Greek experience (griechischer denkt), Heidegger claims, than Plato. See p. 409.
“… Das Wesen des ‘Werkes’ ist nicht mehr die ‘Werkheit’ im Sinne des ausgezeichneten Anwesens in das Freie sondern die ‘Wirklichkeit’ eines Wirklichen, das im Wirken beherrscht… wird….” N, II, p. 412.
N, II, pp. 413, 415.
It remains true, however, that the translation of ἐνέργεια by existentia could have been quite legitimate if the latter had been understood more literally according to certain suggestions that Aristotle gives. See N, II, pp. 411–412, 416–417.
See N, II, pp. 413–416. For a brief discussion of Suarez’ contribution to the conception of existence in terms of cause, see N, II, pp. 418–419.
N, II, p. 414 (Glaubenshaltung). In explaining the importance of cause, Heidegger suggests a significant continuity between Plato’s conception of the Good as Source (αἰτία: Ur-Sache) and the Thomistic notion of God, the Uncaused Cause, as Summum Bonum. Cf. PW, p. 40 and N, II, pp. 413–417.
See N, II, pp. 425–426.
Mediaeval scholars may have some questions to ask and perhaps a distinction or two to make with regard to this rather summary treatment of the scholastic period as an epoch of Being-as-history (Seinsgeschichte). One thing should be clear, however: that one must be extremely cautious in seeing a correlation between what Heidegger means by Being and any sense that the scholastics, such as St. Thomas Aquinas, gave to the term.
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Richardson, W.J. (1963). Aristotle. In: Heidegger. Phaenomenologica. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-6188-8_10
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