Abstract
A language doing justice to the classical problems of ontologyl must feature i.a. the following predicates:
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(i)
object
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(ii)
identity (of objects), and
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(iii)
residing (of properties in an object).
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Notes
I agree with Leon Chwistek’s opinion that ontological language requires not explanation or rearrangement but total reconstruction. This postulate is the essense of Chwistek’s constructive method, being congenial to Kazimierz Twardowski’s method of analytical description. ci: my papers. This postulate is the essense of Chwistek’s constructive method, being congenial to Kazimierz Twardowski’s method of analytical description. ci: my papers: “On Leon Chwistek’s semiotic views”, in J. Pelc et al. (Eds.), Sign, System and Function, Mouton Publishers, Berlin, 1984, pp. 77–87;
Kazimierz Twardowski’s descriptive semiotics”, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities (in press). Such a reconstruction of ontological language has a long tradition in Poland. Cf. my paper “On the sources of contemporary Polish logic”, Dialectics and Humanism 4, 1990, 163–83. Cf. also my paper “Definition, explication, and paraphrase in Ajdukiewiczian tradition”, in Ajdukiewicz on Language and Meaning. Proceedings of the International Symposium in the Centenary of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Birth (in press).
I deny existence (but not being!) of mental objects. Cf my papers: “Being and existence. On the being of what seems not to be”, Dialectics and Humanism 4, 1981, 131–139; “De la soi-disant théorie des descriptions”, Kwartalnik Neofilologiczny 1, 1987, 81–91.
The ontological structure of mental (sc. purely intentional) objects is very precisely arranged by Roman Ingarden. Cf my paper “On Roman Ingarden’s semiotic views”, Analecta Husserliana,27, 1989, 523–540.
The term “individual object” is understood in this way i.a. by Kazimierz Twardowski. Cf my work “The metaphysical basis of Kazimierz Twardowski’s descriptive semiotics”, in F. Coniglione, R. Poli and J. Woleriski (Eds.), Polish Scientific Philosophy,Editions Rodopi, Atlanta, 1993, pp. 191–206.
I analyze different versions of this controversy in my paper “Controversy about universals”, in T. A. Sebeok (Gen. Ed.), Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics,Mouton; De Gruyter, Berlin, 1986, pp. 1138–1141.
This paper is the introductory chapter of a larger work Ontological Mininum,prepared for Editions Rodopi, Atlanta.
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Jadacki, J.J. (1994). Objects and Properties. In: Woleński, J. (eds) Philosophical Logic in Poland. Synthese Library, vol 228. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8273-5_5
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