Abstract
While competition may provide feasible incentives for management efficiency in electricity generation, transmission and distribution have properties of a natural monopoly; entry has been restricted and rates have been regulated. In Chapter 5, Hunt and Shuttleworth explored inefficiencies in the regulation of Britain’s National Grid Company. This chapter considers regulation of the twelve regional electric companies (RECs).
Views are personal and not those of the U.S. Department of Justice. I thank David Hawkins, Martin Hall, Ingo Vogelsang, Andrew Walker, and Greg Werden for assistance. Errors are my own.
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Einhorn, M.A. (1994). Regulation of Regional Electric Companies in the British Electricity Experiment. In: Einhorn, M.A. (eds) From Regulation to Competition: New frontiers in electricity markets. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1368-7_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-1368-7_6
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