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Distributed Oblivious RAM

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Encyclopedia of Cryptography, Security and Privacy

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Synonyms

Multi-server Oblivious RAM

Definition

Distributed Oblivious RAM (Distributed ORAM) is a cryptographic primitive that allows a client to securely execute RAM programs over data that is distributed in two or more untrusted non-colluding servers. It is essentially an extension of Oblivious RAM to the multi-server setting.

Background

Consider a setting where a client with small storage outsources his data to a remote untrusted server. The client, acting as a CPU, may perform RAM computation over the data using read and write queries. While symmetric encryption is useful to keep the data private, the client may wish to hide the access pattern to the data which may leak sensitive information. Oblivious RAM (Goldreich, 1987) allows the client in such a setting to simulate the execution of any RAM program over the data using an access pattern that does not leak any information about the data or program.

Besides its straightforward application to private computation over outsourced...

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel

    Tamer Mour

Authors
  1. Tamer Mour
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Tamer Mour .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Secure Information Systems, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, VA, USA

    Sushil Jajodia

  2. University of Milan, Milan, Italy

    Pierangela Samarati

  3. Google Inc, New York, NY, USA

    Moti Yung

Section Editor information

  1. Department of Electronics, Information and Bioengineering (DEIB), Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy

    Gerardo Pelosi

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Mour, T. (2023). Distributed Oblivious RAM. In: Jajodia, S., Samarati, P., Yung, M. (eds) Encyclopedia of Cryptography, Security and Privacy. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27739-9_1547-1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27739-9_1547-1

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-27739-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-27739-9

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