Escrowed Deniable Identification Schemes

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Security Technology (SecTech 2009)

Part of the book series: Communications in Computer and Information Science ((CCIS,volume 58))

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Abstract

Generally, the goal of identification schemes is to provide security assurance against impersonation attacks. Identification schemes based on zero knowledge protocols have more advantages, for example, deniability, which enables the prover to deny an identification proof so that the verifier couldn’t persuade others that it is indeed the prover who identified itself to him. However, in some applications we require the existence of a (trusted) party being able to find out an evidence that a party did identify itself to a verifier is required, in order to prevent parties from misbehavior. So in this case ‘undeniability’ is needed. To the best of our knowledge, an identification scheme that provides both deniability and undeniability does not exist in the literature. In this work we propose the notion of escrowed deniable identification schemes, which integrates both ‘escrowed deniability’ (undeniability) and ‘deniability’ properties.

This work is partially supported by ARC Linkage Project Grant LP0667899.

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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Thorncharoensri, P., Huang, Q., Susilo, W., Au, M.H., Mu, Y., Wong, D. (2009). Escrowed Deniable Identification Schemes. In: Ślęzak, D., Kim, Th., Fang, WC., Arnett, K.P. (eds) Security Technology. SecTech 2009. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 58. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10847-1_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10847-1_29

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10846-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10847-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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