Abolishing the Executive and the Mind-Body Problem

Abstract

Cognition is not separate from sensorimotor control; there is no duality between motor and “cognitive” functions. This was clearly implied in the examples of the automobile mechanic, the brain dissection workshop, and the interior decorator. Duality between these functions and processes is an artificial construct based upon philosophical assumption and/or the construction of artificial “domains.” This dichotomy generates confusion, constraining our investigations for understanding the concept of cognitive control. Very simply put, there is no philosophical mind-body problem. It is well accepted within current neuroscience that all functioning, whether it is cognitive, emotional, or social, etc., is based upon the control, or lack thereof, provided by anticipation, and in particular, the anticipation of reward outcomes (see [203] for a comprehensive review). These reward outcomes, which are at the essence of adaptation, are at the heart of behavioral control. For the vertebrate brain, the primary substantive difference between planning an activity and executing its motor counterpart is the actual execution of that behavior [42, 110, 204–206]. In fact, imagery and actual movement share a common neural substrate. Mental rehearsal or imagining an activity improves performance [207]. Similar if not the same brain regions are recruited and activated during the performance of an activity and when imagining doing it [208]. The specific, multiple inhibitory processes that are involved in the difference between imagining an activity and the actual execution of that behavior have been investigated as well [209]. These critical issues will be revisited in discussing the cognition of people who are unable to move and the “thinking” of those who are either congenitally blind or deaf. In any event, the reality of constant environmental interaction, movement, and “thinking” is evident throughout the phylogenetic scale with reference to the vertebrate brain; it is biologically consistent for every vertebrate species. Human cognition might be different from animal cognition, primarily because we possess enhanced sensory capacities and can communicate through language, but human cognition and thinking are certainly not “special.” The “bottom line” is the anticipation inherent in movement control and interaction. This anticipation is always associated with some type of reward outcome. Philosophical thinking which contemplates solutions to problems such as reasons for existence can never reach conclusions because the human brain was not designed for that type of thought capacity. Philosophical thinking lies beyond the parameters of the cognitive control system because once again, cognition was derived from the motor system in order to control it. Philosophical thinking has no motor outcome. We only engage in this type of thinking because anticipation is inherent in the fundamental design of vertically organized brain systems. Thinking becomes increasingly abstract in philosophical contemplation, but it never generates a concrete result because it has no identifiable reward outcome based upon sensorimotor activity. That conclusion might sound too simple, so simple that it is unbelievable. That is exactly why Winston Churchill was quoted in the opening of this volume—“Out of intense complexities intense simplicities emerge.” With these types of complicated problems that seem too formidable to solve, it can make good sense to ask questions that lead to stimulus-based controls.