Abstract
This first empirical chapter documents stagnation as a crisis outcome category. Stagnation is characterized by an initially formulated and already well-advanced political project that is largely considered important for European integration. Despite this, it is not ultimately realized. As the initial plan is new and never established, there is no (formal) change to the EU system. The two cases representing stagnation are the crisis of the European Defence Community (1952–1954) and the Constitutional Treaty crisis (2004–2007). In both cases, the crisis origin was endogenous to the European integration process, while the level of member-state interdependence was rather low and Franco-German leadership was absent. A key consequence of the failure was that in both cases, the EU returned to solutions that originally had been considered second best.
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Notes
- 1.
Lerner and Aron (1957b: x).
- 2.
Statement by René Pleven on the establishment of a European army (24 October 1950). https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/statement_by_rene_pleven_on_the_establishment_of_a_european_army_24_october_1950-en-4a3f4499-daf1-44c1-b313-212b31cad878.html.
- 3.
Denmark, Norway, Portugal, the US, and the UK sent official observers. The Netherlands, initially also only an observer, became a full participant from October 1951 onwards. The UK, by contrast, soon made clear that British troops would not join a European army.
- 4.
Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense (Paris, 27 mai 1952). https://www.cvce.eu/obj/traite_instituant_la_communaute_europeenne_de_defense_paris_27_mai_1952-fr-2af9ea94-7798-4434-867a-36c4a256d0af.html.
- 5.
Already the Pleven Plan had suggested a “fusion complète” of military forces. However, with respect to Germany, it only foresaw battalions, no divisions.
- 6.
Its first paragraph empowered the EDC “Ad hoc” Assembly to examine the constitution and competences of a permanent, democratically elected assembly. It further specified that the EDC Assembly should produce a “federal or confederal structure”, founded on the principles of a separation of powers and on the basis of a two-chamber system. On the European Political Community and the EDC’s “Ad hoc” Assembly, see Griffiths (2000).
- 7.
Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Community (Strasbourg, 10 March 1953). https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/draft_treaty_embodying_the_statute_of_the_european_community_strasbourg_10_march_1953-en-807979a3-4147-427e-86b9-565a0b917d4f.html.
- 8.
On the political dynamics in France from 1950 to 1954, notably see the collection of essays in Lerner and Aron (1957a). While Aron (1957) stresses the international context for France’s eventual rejection of the EDC Treaty, Fauvet (1957) traces internal political developments including a growing number of EDC opponents in government and in the parliamentary groups supporting the government. Moreover, Milner (1997: 179–202) highlights the role of two domestic variables in explaining the EDC’s failure in France. These include the degree of “divided government” and the (lacking) support from “important domestic groups”. Irrespective of the role played by domestic politics, Milner also notes that the preferences of any French government during the crisis shifted against EDC ratification due to changes in the international context, such as easing Cold War tensions.
- 9.
Due to its military activities in the independence war in French-Indochina, French resources were stretched so that it would be difficult to keep the intended and symbolically important parity with German troops inside the EDC. The already problematic “German question” thus gained yet another dimension (Aimaq 2000).
- 10.
Scholarly accounts (e.g., Görtemaker 2009; Noack 1977) are often unclear about when they consider the EDC crisis to have started. In view of the widespread uncertainty about the EDC’s fate and the search for alternatives during the French parliamentary ratification problems, it appears reasonable to locate the start of the crisis in this period already and not only when the EDC Treaty eventually was removed from the agenda. Ratification problems in France already became visible in 1952 and then fully materialized during the Mayer government in 1953.
- 11.
Italy was waiting for France to ratify first. On the role of Italy during the EDC crisis, see Varsori (1991).
- 12.
The new prime minister’s priority concerned the war in French-Indochina, not EDC ratification. Once elected, Mendès-France promised to end the war within his first 32 days in office. He was also determined, however, to put an end to the EDC ratification crisis (Fursdon 1980: 266).
- 13.
On the “Protocole d’application du Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de Défense”, see the notes of the Belgian Foreign Minister and Chairman of the Brussels conference, Paul-Henri Spaak: PHS-308 CED—Documents de la Conférence de Bruxelles des 19 au 22 août 1954, Historical Archives of the European Union, https://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/188280. See also Spaak’s remarks on the Brussels conference in his memoirs (Spaak 1971: 166–175).
- 14.
Following similar arguments, the UK had previously promoted the intergovernmental Council of Europe and refrained from participating in the supranational ECSC.
- 15.
Modified Brussels Treaty (Paris, 23 October 1954) establishing the Western European Union. https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/modified_brussels_treaty_paris_23_october_1954-en-7d182408-0ff6-432e-b793-0d1065ebe695.html.
- 16.
On his own account of the events surrounding the London conference, see Eden (1960: 150–174).
- 17.
On 5 May 1955, the occupation in West Germany ended. On 9 May, the Federal Republic of Germany became a member of NATO.
- 18.
It is telling that when the Assemblée nationale in December 1954 at first rejected those parts of the Paris accords which established the WEU and approved Germany’s entry into NATO, opponents to any form of German armament and advocates of the EDC joined forces.
- 19.
Similarly, Harold Macmillan, a member of parliament and a later prime minister of the UK, commented: “This was a proud moment for Britain. The federal solution of European unity, of which EDC was the supreme example, was dead, the confederal concept represented by Western European Union, was very much alive” (as cited in Ruane 2000: 196).
- 20.
Brussels European Council, 21/22 June 2007. Presidency Conclusions, 20 July 2007, Annex I, Point I.1. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf.
- 21.
The Charter uniting the most important personal freedoms and rights enjoyed by EU citizens, was adopted in 2000 following a European convention. Legally speaking, from the beginning it had the same value as the EU treaties. From a normative-democratic perspective, however, as it stood outside EU primary law, it seemed that the Charter was not devoting the same significance to fundamental rights on the EU level compared to most national constitutions (Eriksen et al. 2004: 8–10).
- 22.
Treaty of Nice amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts (26 February 2001): Declaration on the future of the Union (Declaration 23). https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12001C/TXT&from=EN.
- 23.
Speech by Joschka Fischer on the ultimate objective of European integration. Berlin, 12 May 2000. https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/speech_by_joschka_fischer_on_the_ultimate_objective_of_european_integration_berlin_12_may_2000-en-4cd02fa7-d9d0-4cd2-91c9-2746a3297773.html.
- 24.
The debate following Fischer’s speech revealed different visions on the future of the EU, namely a federal, intergovernmental, and confederal one. For these visions and the respective political representatives of each, see Crum (2012: 62–67).
- 25.
Presidency Conclusions: European Council Meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, Annex I: Laeken Declaration on the Future of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/20950/68827.pdf.
- 26.
Opening address given by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing at the final session of the European Convention (Brussels, 13 June 2003). https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/opening_address_given_by_valery_giscard_d_estaing_at_the_final_session_of_the_european_convention_brussels_13_june_2003-en-fa15d35a-544f-4d59-b3a4-202600db390a.html.
- 27.
Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (CONV 850/03), Brussels, 18 July 2003. http://constitution-europeenne.info/an/conventionan.pdf. For a detailed examination of the Draft Treaty, see Church and Phinnemore (2006).
- 28.
Formally speaking, the EU only adopts legal acts in the form of regulations, directives, and decisions, which must then be transferred into national laws by national administrations.
- 29.
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Official Journal of the European Union (C 310/1), 16.12.2004. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2004:310:FULL&from=en.
- 30.
For a similar argument to locate the start of the Constitutional Treaty crisis to this point already and not just when voters in national referenda opposed the Treaty, see David Cross (2017: 108–159). This author holds that the crisis materialized mostly due to the media and their negative predictions. The argument of this book, by contrast, relates more to the uncertainty involved in national referenda and the way political elites deal with their results.
- 31.
When opinion polls were suggesting broad domestic support for the Constitutional Treaty, Chirac preponed the date of the referendum to 29 May 2005.
- 32.
- 33.
“Friends of EU constitution defend treaty’s ‘fundamental content’”. EUobserver, 26 January 2007. https://euobserver.com/eu-political/23357.
- 34.
For instance, in a speech in Berlin on 16 February 2006. See “Sarkozy at Merkel’s home lays out his plan for Europe.” Le Figaro, 21 February 2006. https://www.lefigaro.fr/debats/2006/02/21/01005-20060221ARTWWW90881-sarkozy_at_merkel_s_home_lays_out_his_plan_for_europe.php.
- 35.
In a similar respect, Norman (2005: 312), writing before the national referenda happened, argued that a rejection of the Constitution in a referendum in the UK at the end of the European ratification process in 2006 and “following approval by all or nearly all other member states”, would cause a crisis for Britain rather than for the EU. By contrast, a rejection in France, especially in the early stages of European ratification, “would be a crisis for the Union as a whole and could kill off the constitutional treaty”.
- 36.
Council of the European Union: Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Signature of the Treaties of Rome (“Berlin Declaration”), 25 March 2007. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/93282.pdf.
- 37.
Brussels European Council 21/22 June 2007: Presidency Conclusions. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/94932.pdf.
- 38.
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Schramm, L. (2024). Stagnation. In: Crises of European Integration. Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-54748-5_4
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