Conclusion: Phenomenological Intentionality and Looking-Glass Sociality

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Resilience and Responsiveness

Part of the book series: Contributions to Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 129))

Abstract

This conclusion explains the connectedness of various provinces of meaning with each other and the way in which the non-social features of various provinces affect the social relationships within those provinces. While for Schutz phenomenology provides a theoretical framework (eidetic intuition, intentionality, and fulfilment) that pragmatism cannot, he develops a holistic understanding of philosophical anthropology that includes dimensions that pragmatism might have emphasized—unplanned spontaneity, bodily movement, affect, and phantasy—in addition to rationality and theorizing. Phenomenological intentionality underpins the notion of resilience developed in this book insofar as imposed relevances do not causally determine our responses. Rather we bestow meaning on these relevances by acting toward them, and endowing them with actional significance. Similarly, Schutz develops a dynamic spontaneous understanding of sociality, epitomized by the concept of the “looking-glass,” an interpersonal entwinement contrasting with the Sartrean idea that one person acting alone objectifies another who also acting alone objectifies the first in response. Resilience and responsiveness reflect the basic themes of Schutz’s phenomenology: consciousness/intentionality and social relationships.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Our meaning-giving, resilience in the face of imposed relevances, need not only be the result of an absolute self-consciousness, in which we have somehow lifted ourselves out of any pregiven interpretative system of typification, socially shared with others. Frederick Olafson, too, objects to Sartre’s viewpoint insofar as “the illusion is created that all choices are made from the vantage point of an absolute self-consciousness that has surrounded its entire natural condition with the halo of evaluative indeterminacy that frees for action” (Olafson 1980, 483). Rather, for Schutz, we often “give meaning” through passive syntheses on the basis of habitualized typifications, though it is always possible that we can reflectively recover these typifications and seek to determine rationally what would be an adequate way to respond to or show resilience in the face of imposed relevances. Schutz’s awareness of the importance of our biographical situation would no doubt have inclined him to agree with Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s in his debate with Jean-Paul Sartre about freedom. Merleau-Ponty opines that we exist as working class and middle class before we reflectively become conscious of our class status and act freely, or resiliently, with regard to that status.

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Barber, M. (2024). Conclusion: Phenomenological Intentionality and Looking-Glass Sociality. In: Resilience and Responsiveness. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 129. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-53781-3_9

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