Abstract
Empirical thought would be impossible without singular reference in presence, that is, when the reference is anchored by an experience through which a single object is presented to the subject. But I think Gupta has difficulty securing such reference. In this short note I highlight this difficulty by raising some problems for his treatment of an example important to him (“the Main Twin Example”). I think these problems are ultimately rooted in his sharp separation between experience and thought, but argument for this diagnosis would require a longer discussion.
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Notes
- 1.
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He also holds the converse (169). These two points together lead to a “complete rupture” between presentational complexes and appearances, as Kranti Saran rightly points out (Saran, this volume, Chap. 3 ).
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For some reason for doubt, see Saran, this volume, Chap. 3 .
Reference
Gupta, A. 2019. Conscious Experience: A Logical Inquiry. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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Tang, H. (2024). Can Gupta Secure Singular Reference?. In: Vuletić, M., Beck, O. (eds) Empirical Reason and Sensory Experience. Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science, vol 60. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-52231-4_4
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