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Accountability in the Climate Funds

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Climate Funds and Sustainable Development

Part of the book series: Sustainable Development Goals Series ((SDGS))

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Abstract

This chapter evaluates the extent to which the Climate Funds can be deemed accountable to individuals based in recipient countries for the impacts of their funding decisions. First, the chapter examines the content and scope of the standard of accountability as defined in the existing literature on global institutions. It then applies this standard to the context of the Climate Funds to identify the types of accountability mechanisms and their characteristics that are essential for fostering accountability adequately. Finally, the chapter conducts a comprehensive analysis of the Funds’ mechanisms and critically evaluates their impact on the rights and interests of local communities in light of the standard outlined in the literature.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    D. Curtin and A. Nollkaemper, ‘Conceptualizing Accountability in International and European Law’ (2005) 36 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, 5; R.W. Grant & R.O. Keohane, ‘Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics’ (2005) 99 American Political Science Review, 29; R. Mulgan, “‘Accountability”: An-Ever-Expanding Concept? (2000) 78 Public Administration Review, 555; Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 3), 244–246.

  2. 2.

    See in general, M. Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework’ (2007) 13 European Law Journal; See also, R. Mulgan, Holding Power to Account: Accountability in Modern Democracy (2003) Palgrave Macmillan; J.L. Mashaw, ‘Structuring a “Dense Complexity”: Accountability and the Project of Administrative Law’ (2005) 5(1) Issues in Legal Scholarship.

  3. 3.

    Grant and Keohane (n 1), 30.

  4. 4.

    Curtin and Nollkaemper (n 1), 83.

  5. 5.

    C. Scott, ‘Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory State’ in J. Jordana & D. Levi-Faur (eds.) The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the Age of Governance (2004) Edward Elgar, 145.

  6. 6.

    Stewart (2014) 245–246; Keohane similarly distils from a literature review that the concept is generally employed in a relational manner. See, R.O. Keohane, ‘The Concept of Accountability in World Politics and the Use of Force’ (2003) 24(4) Michigan Journal of International Law, 1124.

  7. 7.

    According to Stewart, there is wide consensus on the fact that accountability mechanisms include at least these three key elements: (1) an account giver who is called to provide an account; (2) an account holder who is empowered to require an account giver to justify his prior conduct and (3) the availability of some sort of remedy in the case of deficient performance which entails negative consequences for an account giver. See, Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 3); Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane argue that another key element of accountability consists of a set of standards according to which the conduct of the account giver can be evaluated. See, Grant and Keohane (n 1), 29.

  8. 8.

    Some of these are electoral, hierarchical, supervisory, fiscal, legal, market and participatory accountability. For more on these mechanisms see e.g., ibid., 246–248; See also, Keohane (n 6), 1131–1134.

  9. 9.

    Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 3).

  10. 10.

    Ibid., 246.

  11. 11.

    Ibid.

  12. 12.

    Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 39–40.

  13. 13.

    Stewart (see Chapter 4, n 1), 234, 246, 248.

  14. 14.

    Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 37.

  15. 15.

    Ibid., 267.

  16. 16.

    See, Chapter 5; See also, B. Kingsbury and L. Casini ‘Global Administrative Law Dimensions of International Organizations Law’ (2009) 6(2) International Organizations Law Review, 337.

  17. 17.

    Moreover, while they perform a relevant oversight function, the PAs are not the primary focus of the analysis in this book as they are rather oriented at ensuring that develo** countries implement their projects. As this book focuses on the implementation of SDG 13 through the Funds and the impacts of their decisions within the overall resource allocation process,—and not just the implementation of projects or programs—it studies whether the Funds have established review mechanisms within their own governance architecture.

  18. 18.

    The clearest example of these two procedures is offered by the Independent Redress Mechanism of the GCF, further analyzed below. See, GCF Board, ‘Procedures and Guidelines of the Independent Redress Mechanism’ (2019) GCF/B.22/11, para. 36.

  19. 19.

    Ibid., para. 50.

  20. 20.

    Ibid., para. 38.

  21. 21.

    Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 34.

  22. 22.

    Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 3), 224.

  23. 23.

    E.g., the investor protection provisions of North American Free Trade Agreement’s Chapter 11, or the European Court on Human Rights.

  24. 24.

    Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 104–105; Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 3), 251, 267; Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 40.

  25. 25.

    Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 34.

  26. 26.

    Ibid., 34 and 55.

  27. 27.

    Kingsbury (see Chapter 4, n 1), 38.

  28. 28.

    Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 89.

  29. 29.

    Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 34; Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 3), 220.

  30. 30.

    Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 50.

  31. 31.

    For an analysis of human rights review mechanisms, see Kingsbury (see Chapter 4, n 1), 45–46.

  32. 32.

    Transparency International (see Chapter 2, n 105), 49.

  33. 33.

    E.g., at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,aggrieved individuals must first apply to the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which can then bring claims before the Court. See, Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 94.

  34. 34.

    Kingsbury, Krisch and Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 17.

  35. 35.

    Ibid., 34; Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 1), 90.

  36. 36.

    Kingsbury and Casini (n 16), 356; Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 3), 266.

  37. 37.

    Nakhooda (see Chapter 2, n 82) 21.

  38. 38.

    GEF, ‘Conflict Resolution Commissioner’ (2021) GEF, https://www.thegef.org/conflict-resolution, accessed 25 May 2021.

  39. 39.

    K. Orenstein, J. Redman and N. Tangri, ‘The Green Climate Fund’s No-Objection Procedure and Private Finance: Lessons Learned from Existing Institutions’ (2012) Gaia, IPS and Friends of the Earth.

  40. 40.

    GEF (see Chapter 3, n 30).

  41. 41.

    GEF, ‘Conflict Resolution—Voice and Right of Recourse for Affected People’ (2018) GEF.

  42. 42.

    Ibid.

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    GEF (n 41).

  45. 45.

    AFB, ‘Ad Hoc Complaint Handling Mechanism’ (ACHM) (Approved in October 2016)’ (2016) AF, para. 2.

  46. 46.

    Ibid., paras. 29–30; AF, ‘Complaints and Reports’ (2019) AF, https://www.adaptation-fund.org/projects-programmes/accountability-complaints/complaints-reports/, accessed 1 January 2021.

  47. 47.

    AFB (n 45).

  48. 48.

    Ibid., para. 9.

  49. 49.

    Adaptation Fund, ‘Board’ (2021) Adaptation Fund, https://www.adaptation-fund.org/about/governance/board/, accessed 15 October 2021.

  50. 50.

    Ibid., paras. 9–11.

  51. 51.

    Ibid., para. 10.

  52. 52.

    Ibid., para. 13.

  53. 53.

    Ibid., paras. 12–14.

  54. 54.

    Ibid.

  55. 55.

    Ibid., para. 2.

  56. 56.

    Ibid., para. 20.

  57. 57.

    Ibid., para. 3; AF, ‘Ad Hoc Complaint Handling Mechanism’ (ACHM)’ (2019) AF, https://www.adaptation-fund.org/projects-programmes/accountability-complaints/ad-hoc-complaint-handling-mechanism-achm/, accessed 26 January 2021.

  58. 58.

    AFB (n 45).

  59. 59.

    Ibid., para. 21.

  60. 60.

    Ibid., para. 22.

  61. 61.

    Ibid., paras. 23 and 24.

  62. 62.

    Ibid., para. 26.

  63. 63.

    Ibid., paras. 8 and 9.

  64. 64.

    Ibid., para. 2.

  65. 65.

    AF (n 57).

  66. 66.

    Governing Instrument, para. 69.

  67. 67.

    GCF Board, ‘Updated Terms of Reference of the Independent Redress Mechanism (Revised)’ (2017) GCF Doc B.BM-2017/10, para. 1.

  68. 68.

    GCF Board (n 18), para. 36.

  69. 69.

    Ibid., para. 38.

  70. 70.

    Ibid., para. 50.

  71. 71.

    Ibid., para. 61 and 63.

  72. 72.

    GCF, ‘About the IRM’ (2020) GCF, https://irm.greenclimate.fund/about/functions-processes, accessed 29 January 2021.

  73. 73.

    GCF Board (n 67), Annex II, para. 14.

  74. 74.

    Ibid., paras. 61 and 63.

  75. 75.

    Ibid., para. 65.

  76. 76.

    Ibid., paras. 63, 66 and 67.

  77. 77.

    Ibid., para. 68.

  78. 78.

    Ibid., para. 2.

  79. 79.

    Ibid., para. 20.

  80. 80.

    Ibid., para. 21.

  81. 81.

    Ibid., para. 11.

  82. 82.

    GCF, ‘GCF Independent Redress Mechanism. Opening Accountability Doors to Accountability and Redress’ (2019) GCF.

  83. 83.

    GCF Board (n 67), paras. 27 and 28.

  84. 84.

    Ibid., para. 97.

  85. 85.

    Ibid., paras. 25–26.

  86. 86.

    Ibid., paras. 30–33 and 36ff.

  87. 87.

    Ibid., para. 71.

  88. 88.

    Ibid., para. 72.

  89. 89.

    Ibid., para. 20.

  90. 90.

    Ibid., para. 38.

  91. 91.

    Ibid., para. 47.

  92. 92.

    Ibid., 50.

  93. 93.

    Ibid., 6.

  94. 94.

    D. Honig et al., ‘When Does Transparency Improve Performance? Evidence from 23,000 Aid Projects in 148 Countries’ (2020) AidData Working Paper.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    For a similar argument, see, A. Johl and Y. Lador, ‘A Human Rights-Based Approach to Climate Finance’ (2012) Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 8–9.

  97. 97.

    The category of public reputational accountability has been suggested by Keohane, who argues that while this category can be involved in other forms of accountability, it is present even when these are lacking. See, Keohane (n 6), 1133–1134.

  98. 98.

    Keohane (n 6), 1133–1134.

  99. 99.

    Stewart (see Chapter 3, n 3), 252–253; Others have opposed this argument, as reputation does not reflect the interests of all, may not succeed in promoting change, or may be considered a substitute for formal oversight. See, e.g., Newell (see Chapter 2, n 87); M.E. Keck and K. Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (1998) Cornell University Press; Woods and Narlikar (see Chapter 2, n 87) 569–583; Smythe and Smith (see Chapter 2, n 104), 31–53; Birdsall and de Nevers (see Chapter 2, n 105); R.C. Briggs, ‘Does Foreign Aid Target the Poorest?’ (2017) 71(1) International Organization, 187–206.

  100. 100.

    GCF, ‘FP098. DBSA Climate Finance Facility’ (2021) GCF, https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp098, accessed 29 June 2021.

  101. 101.

    IRM, ‘Case Register. C0005 South Africa. FP098: DBSA Climate Finance Facility’ (2020) GCF, https://irm.greenclimate.fund/case/c0005, accessed 18 May 2021.

  102. 102.

    GCF, ‘FP018. Scaling-up Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) Risk Reduction in Northern Pakistan’ (2021) GCF, https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp018, accessed 17 October 2021.

  103. 103.

    IRM, ‘Case Register. C0007 Pakistan. FP018. Scaling-Up Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF) Risk Reduction in Northern Pakistan’ (2021) GCF, https://irm.greenclimate.fund/case/c0007, accessed 17 October 2021.

  104. 104.

    GCF (see Chapter 3, n 148).

  105. 105.

    IRM, ‘Case Register. C0006 Nicaragua’ (2023) GCF, https://irm.greenclimate.fund/case/c0006, accessed on 17 October 2021.

  106. 106.

    GCF (see Chapter 4, n 130).

  107. 107.

    IRM, ‘Case Register. C0008 Paraguay’ (2023) GCF, https://irm.greenclimate.fund/case/c0008, accessed on 26 August 2023.

  108. 108.

    IRM, ‘Case Register. C0009 Egypt’ (2023) GCF, https://irm.greenclimate.fund/case/c0009-egypt, accessed on 17 October 2021.

  109. 109.

    Independent Redress Mechanism of the GCF, ‘Compliance Review Report. Case C-0006-Nicaragua’ (2023) GCF.

  110. 110.

    GCF Board, ‘Decision B.36/17: Consideration of Independent Redress Mechanism compliance report C-0006’ (2023) GCF; GCF Board, ‘Reasons of the Board Relating to Its Decision on the Compliance Review Report for Case C-0006’ (2023) GCF.

  111. 111.

    I.F.I. Shihata, The World Bank Inspection Panel: In Practice (2000) Oxford University Press, 104–108; See also, R.E. Bissel, ‘Recent Practice of the Inspection Panel of the World Bank’ (1997) 91(4) The American Journal of International Law, 741–744; Buntaine (see Chapter 2, n 100); Woods and Narlikar (see Chapter 2, n 87), 576–577.

  112. 112.

    Inspection Panel, ‘Operating Procedures’ (2014) World Bank Group, para. 4.

  113. 113.

    Ibid., para. 71.

  114. 114.

    Shihata (n 111), 89–90; E.R. Carrasco and A. Guernsey, ‘The World Bank’s Inspection Panel: Promoting True Accountability Through Arbitration’ (2008) 41(3) Cornell International Law Journal; J. Zalcberg, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel: A Tool for Ensuring the World Bank’s Compliance with International Law’ (2012) 8(2) Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law, 83.

  115. 115.

    Y. Wong and B. Mayer, ‘The World Bank’s Inspection Panel: A Tool for Accountability’ (2015) 6 World Bank Legal Review, 511; D. Hunter, ‘Contextual Accountability, the World Bank Inspection Panel, and the Transformation of International Law in Edith Brown Weiss’s Kaleidoscopic World’ (2020) 32(3) Georgetown Environmental Law Review, 460–461.

  116. 116.

    Inspection Panel, ‘Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel at 15 Years’ (2009) World Bank, 44.

  117. 117.

    E.g., for a critique on the lack of commitment of the Bank to the Panel’s decision, see, Sharma (see Chapter 2, n 59), 32; For a critique on the extent of the Panel’s powers and their lack of commandment upon the Board, see Wong and Meyer (n 115), 514; For a criticism of the lack of adherence of states to the decisions of the Panel, see, N. Bridgeman and D. Hunter, ‘Narrowing the Accountability Gap: Toward a New Foreign Investor Accountability Mechanism’ (2007) 20 Georgetown Environmental Law Review, 187–236; For a criticism of the interests of the Board, see B.K. Sovacool et al., ‘Disequilibrium in Development Finance: The Contested Politics of Institutional Accountability and Transparency at the World Bank Inspection Panel’ (2018) 50(4) Development and Change; See also, D.D. Bradlow, ‘The Reform of the Governance of the IFIs: A Critical Assessment’ in H. Cissé, D.D. Bradlow and B. Kingsbury (eds.) The World Bank Legal Review: International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance (2011) World Bank, 37–58.

  118. 118.

    Inspection Panel, ‘Request for inspection’ (1994) World Bank Group, 4–5.

  119. 119.

    Inspection Panel, ‘The Inspection Panel Report on Request for Inspection. Nepal: Proposed Arun III Hydroelectric Project and Restructuring of the Arun III Access Road Project (Credit 2029-NEP)’ (2009) World Bank Group, para. 45.

  120. 120.

    Wong and Mayer (n 115), 515.

  121. 121.

    Independent Evaluation Group, ‘Safeguards and Sustainability Policies in a Changing World. An Independent Evaluation of World Bank Group Experience’ (2010) World Bank, xvii.

  122. 122.

    D. Clark and K. Treakle, ‘The China Western Poverty Reduction Project’ in D. Clark, J. Fox and K. Treakle (eds), Demanding Accountability: Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (2003) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 218.

  123. 123.

    See, J. MacNeill, E.S. Ayensu & M. van Putten, ‘The Inspection Panel Investigation Report. The Qinghai Project’ (2000) World Bank Group; See also, World Bank, ‘Environmental and Social Framework’ (2017) World Bank Group.

  124. 124.

    J.D. Wolfensohn, ‘Management Report and Recommendation in Response to the Inspection Panel Investigation Report. China: Western Poverty Reduction Project. Qinghai Component’ (1999) World Bank Group.

  125. 125.

    See, World Bank, ‘World Bank Press Release on China Western Poverty Reduction Project’ (2000) World Bank Group, https://www.inspectionpanel.org/news/world-bank-press-release-china-western-poverty-reduction-project, accessed 13 May 2021; See also, Zalcberg (n 114), 83.

  126. 126.

    For instance, in the case of Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project in Argentina/Paraguay, the Panel identified violations of policies, and the Board did not intervene. In the Mumbai Transport Project, the Panel found various errors including flaws in the environmental and social assessment, and while the Board approved the action plan of Management, a number of issues remained unresolved and target dates were not met. See, Zalcberg (n 114), 90–91.

  127. 127.

    Inspection Panel (n 116), paras. 42–43.

  128. 128.

    N. Matz, ‘Financial Institutions between Effectiveness and Legitimacy—A Legal Analysis of the World Bank, Global Environment Facility and Prototype Carbon Fund’ (2005) 5 International Environmental Agreements, 265–302; D. Hunter, ‘Using the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the Interests of Project-affected People’ (2003) 4 Chicago Journal of International Law, 207; Buntaine (see Chapter 2, n 100), 103.

  129. 129.

    Wong and Mayer (n 115), 515.

  130. 130.

    See, ibid.; See also, Buntaine (see Chapter 2, n 100), 103.

  131. 131.

    Ibid.

  132. 132.

    Ibid.

  133. 133.

    World Bank, ‘Nepal: Enhanced Vocational Education and Training’ (2021) World Bank Group, https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P104015, accessed 19 May 2021.

  134. 134.

    Inspection Panel, ‘Panel Cases. Nepal: Enhanced Vocational Education and Training Project (Not Registered)’ (2013) World Bank Group, https://www.inspectionpanel.org/panel-cases/enhanced-vocational-education-and-training-project-not-registered, accessed 19 May 2021.

  135. 135.

    Inspection Panel, ‘Report and Recommendation. Case 74, Kazakhstan: South-West Roads Western Europe-Western China International Transit Corridor (CAREC 1b & 6b) (IBRD Loan No. 7681-KZ)’ (2011) World Bank, para. 66.

  136. 136.

    Wong and Mayer (n 115), 516–517.

  137. 137.

    M. Circi, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel: Is it Really Effective’ (2006) 6(3) Global Jurist, 1–29.

  138. 138.

    D. Barlas and T. Tassoni, ‘Improving Service Delivery Through Voice and Accountability: The Experience of the World Bank Inspection Panel’ (2015) 6 World Bank Legal Review, 477–494.

  139. 139.

    GCF, ‘Projects & Programmes. FP084. Enhancing Climate Resilience of India’s Coastal Communities’ (2021) GCF, https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp084, accessed 13 May 2021.

  140. 140.

    GCF IRM, ‘Grievances and Complaints. Eligibility Determination. GCF Project FP084: Enhancing Climate Resilience of India’s Coastal Communities. IRM Case: C-0004-India’ (2020) GCF.

  141. 141.

    GCF, ‘Projects & Programmes. FP004. Climate Resilient Infrastructure Mainstreaming’ (2021) GCF, https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp004, accessed 13 May 2021.

  142. 142.

    GCF, ‘Independent Redress Mechanism. Eligibility Determination: Case 17/C001—Bangladesh’ (2017) GCF.

  143. 143.

    See, Chapter 4, Sect. 4.2; See also, TANGO International & ODI (see Chapter 2, n 82), para. 135.

  144. 144.

    GCF (see Chapter 3, n 148).

  145. 145.

    IRM, ‘IRM Initiated Proceedings: C-0002-Peru’ (2019) GCF, para. 22.

  146. 146.

    For a similar argument on fear of retaliation of individuals, see, Grimm, Weischer and Eckstein (see Chapter 3, n 15), 33; For the reluctance of recipient countries to have their proposals reviewed, see, D. Clark, ‘Understanding the World Bank Inspection Panel’ in D. Clark et al. (eds), Demanding Accountability: Civil Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel (2003) Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 15–17.

  147. 147.

    Inspection Panel (n 112), para. 10.

  148. 148.

    Ibid., paras. 12, 14, 17 and 19.

  149. 149.

    Ibid., para. 15.

  150. 150.

    Ibid., para. 11.

  151. 151.

    See in general the requirements for submitting a request, ibid., para. 10.

  152. 152.

    Quoted in S.R. Roos, ‘The World Bank Inspection Panel in its Seventh Year: An Analysis of Its Process, Mandate, and Desirability with Special Reference to the China (Tibet) Case’ (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 479.

  153. 153.

    Wong and Mayer (n 115), 509.

  154. 154.

    World Bank, ‘China-Western Poverty Reduction Project #CNPE46564’ (1999) World Bank, para. G, https://archive.globalpolicy.org/socecon/develop/cnpov.htm, accessed 14 May 2021.

  155. 155.

    Clark (n 146), 15–17.

  156. 156.

    Buntaine (see Chapter 2, n 100).

  157. 157.

    GCF IRM (see Chapter 4, n 133).

  158. 158.

    The IRM policies establish that in this case it submits its report to the GCF Board and takes no further action. See, GCF (n 72).

  159. 159.

    In relation to the GEF, see GEF (see Chapter 3, n 55), paras. 11–13; In relation to the AF, see AFB (see Chapter 3, n 64), para. 8; In relation to the GCF, see GCF Board (see Chapter 3, n 90), para. 11.

  160. 160.

    In relation to the GEF, see, GEF Council (see Chapter 3, n 26), para. 10; In relation to the AF, see, AFB (see Chapter 3, n 71), Annex 5, 10; In relation to the GCF, see, GCF Board (see Chapter 3, n 90), paras. 13, 14(a)(i) and 15; See also, GCF (see Chapter 3, n 93), paras. 27 and 31ff.

  161. 161.

    See, Chapter 3, Sect. 4.1, above.

  162. 162.

    See, Chapter 4, Sect. 4.1, above.

  163. 163.

    Inspection Panel (n 112), para. 1.

  164. 164.

    World Bank, ‘Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project: overview (English)’ (2021) World Bank Group, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/821131468224690538/chad-cameroon-petroleum-development-and-pipeline-project-overview, accessed 30 June 2021.

  165. 165.

    Inspection Panel, ‘Investigation Report. Chad-Cameroon Petroleum and Pipeline Project (Loan No. 4558-CD); Petroleum Sector Management Capacity Building Project (Credit No. 3373-CD); And Management of the Petroleum Economy (Credit No. 3316-CD)’ (2002) World Bank, paras. 2–4.

  166. 166.

    Ibid., paras. 9–13.

  167. 167.

    Ibid., paras. 19–21.

  168. 168.

    Ibid., paras. 22–25.

  169. 169.

    Wong and Mayer (n 115), 507–508.

  170. 170.

    See, C. Passoni, A. Rosenbaum and E. Vermunt, ‘Empowering the Inspection Panel: The Impact of the World Bank’s New Environmental and Social Safeguards’ (2017) 49 New York University Journal of International Law and Policy; See also, Barlas and Tassoni (n 138).

  171. 171.

    World Bank, ‘OP. 4.00-Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems to Address Environmental and Social Safeguard Issues in Bank-Supported Projects’ (2005) World Bank, para. 33.

  172. 172.

    Ibid., para. 19.

  173. 173.

    Barlas and Tassoni (n 138), 493; Passoni, Rosenbaum and Vermunt (n 170).

  174. 174.

    Inspection Panel, ‘Bangladesh: Jute Sector Adjustment Credit Project (Credit 2567-BD) Eligibility Report’ (1997) World Bank, 4.

  175. 175.

    Inspection Panel, ‘Albania: Power Sector Generation and Restructuring Project (Credit No. 3872 ALB), Investigation Report’ (2009) World Bank.

  176. 176.

    Passoni, Rosenbaum and Vermunt (n 170), 947.

  177. 177.

    Inspection Panel, ‘Request for Inspection: Lesotho/South Africa: Phase 1B of Lesotho Highlands Water Project. Report and Recommendation’ (1998) World Bank, 13.

  178. 178.

    Inspection Panel, ‘The Quinghai Project: A Component of the China: Western Poverty Reduction Project (Credit No. 3255-CHA and Loan No. 4501-CHA). Investigation Report (1999)’ World Bank, xiv-v.

  179. 179.

    Passoni, Rosenbaum and Vermunt (n 170), 941.

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Larrea, G. (2024). Accountability in the Climate Funds. In: Climate Funds and Sustainable Development. Sustainable Development Goals Series. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-50218-7_5

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