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Dispute Prevention Methods in the Brazilian Agreements on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (CFIAs)

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International Investment Law and Arbitration from a Latin American Perspective

Part of the book series: International Law and the Global South ((ILGS))

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Abstract

Brazil is viscerally opposed to investor-State international arbitration. Its first generation of bilateral investment agreements signed in the 90s were never ratified by the local Congress, namely because of the specific transnational arbitration provision. It therefore comes as no surprise that the Brazilian Agreements on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (CFIA), a new bilateral investment agreement model signed with 13 States since 2015, contain no provision on investor-State arbitration. Still in 2015, an aperture took shape with the adoption of Statute no.13.129 which amended the local Brazilian arbitration law, enabling arbitration procedures against the public administration. This was however restricted to domestic private-public arbitration and did not foreshadow any trend at the international level as evidenced by the CFIAs signed between 2015 and 2020. This Brazilian traditional resistance echoes the more recent outcry against investor-State arbitration, namely in cases like Philip Morris, Vattenfall or Achmea and more generally regarding the recurrent questioning of the States’ right to regulate before arbitral tribunals. The insertion of an Investment Tribunal System in the recent investment agreements signed by the European Union—which includes an Appeals mechanism—acknowledges this backlash. A similar resistance has already been flagged by Australia. The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has joined the movement in entrusting its Working Group III to address the issue of dispute settlement reform in international investment law. The concerns discussed by the Working Group III were divided in three groups (“consistency, coherence, predictability and correctness of arbitral decisions by ISDS tribunals; arbitrators/decision makers; and costs and duration”) which commentators have categorised as “(1) excessive legal costs; (2) duration of proceedings; (3) legal consistency; (4) decisional correctness; (5) arbitral diversity; and (6) arbitral independence and impartiality”. These concerns are real and must conspicuously be addressed although it seems that they have been raised because many capital exporting countries are facing arbitration procedures wherein their right to regulate is being questioned by foreign investors.

The authors would like to thank the representatives of the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and of the Executive Secretariat of the Foreign Trade Board who kindly agreed to answer their interview queries.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Vidigal and Stevens (2018), p. 486; Kalicki and Medeiros (2008), pp. 432 et seq.

  2. 2.

    ICSID (1968), p. 306 (reprinted in 2009). See also: Morosini et al. (2020), p. 304.

  3. 3.

    The agreements were namely signed with: Angola, Mozambique, Malawi, Morocco, Ethiopia, Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Suriname, Guyana, Ecuador, India, Sao Tome and Principe and the United Arab Emirates. The CFIA signed with Chile no longer exists and its content was transferred to the Free Trade Agreement signed between Brazil and Chile in 2018. It entered into force in 2022. The CFIAs signed with Angola, Mexico and the United Arab Emirates have been ratified.

  4. 4.

    Statute no.13.129 (Brazil) (26/05/2015).

  5. 5.

    Statute no.9.307 (Brazil) (23/06/1996).

  6. 6.

    Wald and de Borja (2016), pp. 21–52; Carmona (2016), pp. 7–21.

  7. 7.

    Nolan (2015), pp. 429–445; Weghmann and Hall (2021), pp. 1–17.

  8. 8.

    Philip Morris v. Uruguay. ICSID ARB. 10/7 (08/07/2016). For a case comment, see: Zarra (2017), pp. 96–120; Voon and Mitchell (2012), pp. 137–172.

  9. 9.

    Vattenfall AB and others v. Germany. ICSID Case no. ARB/12/12. See also: Damjanovic and Quirico (2019), pp. 102 et seq.

  10. 10.

    Slowakische Republik v. Achmea BV. CJEU. Case C-284/16 (06/03/2018). Para. 60.

  11. 11.

    See generally: Titi (2014), 376 p. See also the contribution of Magdalena Bas in this book.

  12. 12.

    Kurtz (2012), pp. 65–86.

  13. 13.

    UNCITRAL (2017) Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Fiftieth Session. A/72/17: para. 264. See also: Langford et al. (2020), p. 167.

  14. 14.

    UNCITRAL (2018) Possible Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.149. para. 8.

  15. 15.

    Langford et al. (2020), p. 171.

  16. 16.

    Monebhurrun (2015), pp. 12–14.

  17. 17.

    Monebhurrun (2019), p. 71.

  18. 18.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 19; CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 20; CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 23; CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 25; CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 24; CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 25; CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 25; CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), 25; CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 25; CFIA Brazil/Mexico (2015), art. 19; CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 15 (6); CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 15 (6); CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 13 (6).

  19. 19.

    The CFIA with Angola, Mexico and the United Arab Emirates.

  20. 20.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 13, art. 14; CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 14, art. 15; CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 16, art. 17; CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 18, art. 19; CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 17, art. 18; CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 18, art. 19; CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 18, art. 19; CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 18, art. 19; CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 18, art. 19; CFIA Brazil/Mexico (2015), art. 14, art. 15; CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 4, art. 5; CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 4, art. 5; CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 3, art. 4. The CFIA with Angola and Mexico.

  21. 21.

    Nicolas et al. (2013), p. 24 [available at: https://doi.org/10.1787/5k4376zqcpf1-en].

  22. 22.

    BIT Morocco/Nigeria (03/12/2016), art. 4.

  23. 23.

    UNCTAD (2010) Investor–State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration. UNCTAD Series on International Investment Policies for Development, 28–30.

  24. 24.

    Monebhurrun (2017), pp. 84 et seq.

  25. 25.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 13; CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 14; CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 16; CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 17; CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/Mexico (2015), art. 14; CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 4; CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 4; CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 3.

  26. 26.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 13; CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 14; CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 16; CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 17; CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 18; CFIA Brazil/Mexico (2015), art. 14; CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 4; CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 4; CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 3.

  27. 27.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 13.4(e).

  28. 28.

    This will be further discussed in Sect. 3.

  29. 29.

    For instance: CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 14.4 (a).

  30. 30.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 13.4.

  31. 31.

    Beate (2000), pp. 296 et seq.

  32. 32.

    UNCITRAL (2021) Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Fifty Fourth Session. A/72/17: 2.

  33. 33.

    UNCITRAL’s working groups can be found at: https://uncitral.un.org/en/working_groups.

  34. 34.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 13.5.

  35. 35.

    See for example: Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States (30/08/2000), ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1; Waste Management Inc. v. United Mexican States, (30/04/2004) ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/00/3; MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, (25/05/2004);CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentina, Final Award, (25/05/2005) ICSID Case No. ARB/01/08; Occidental Exploration and Production Company (OEPC) v. Ecuador, (01/07/2004) UNCITRAL Rules, Final Award; Walter Bau v. Thailand, (01/09/2009) UNCITRAL, Award; Mohammad Ammar Al-Bahloul v. The Republic of Tajikistan (02/09/2009) SCC Case No. V (064/2008); Glencore International A.G. and C.I. Prodeco S.A. v. Republic of Colombia (27/08/2019), ICSDI ARB/16/6, Award. Kontinental Conseil Ingénierie v. Gabonese Republic (23/12/2016) PCA Case No. 2015-25.

  36. 36.

    It is important to note that the CFIAs make no provision for fair and equitable treatment as such, even though studies do inform that the legal guarantee, security and treatment offered by the Brazilian legal system do not fall short of the international standard. See: Achtschin (2021).

  37. 37.

    For instance: CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 8.

  38. 38.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 14.4 (b).

  39. 39.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 14.4 (e).

  40. 40.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 14.4 (c); CFIA Brazil-Angola, art. 5.4 (ii); CFIA Brazil-Mozambique, art. 5.4 (ii); CFIA Brazil-Mexico, art. 15.4 (b); CFIA Brazil-Malawi, art. 4.4 (ii); CFIA Brazil-Chile, art. 19.4 (c); ACDI Brazil-Ethiopia, art. 18.3 (c); CFIA Brazil-Colombia, art. 17.4 (b); CFIA Brazil-Guyana, art. 19.4 (c); CFIA Brazil-Suriname, art. 19.4(c).

  41. 41.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 14.4 (f).

  42. 42.

    Monebhurrun (2020), pp. 227–242.

  43. 43.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 14.4 (d).

  44. 44.

    For example, currently, another department of the Foreign Trade Board (CAMEX) also hosts the OECD National Contact Point in Brazil.

  45. 45.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 14.7.

  46. 46.

    CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 24 (3) (c) (i); CFIA Brazil/Mexico (2015), art. 18 (3) (c) (i); CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 15 (3) (iii) (a); CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 15 (3) (iii) (a); CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 13 (3) (c) (i).

  47. 47.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18 (3) (b); CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 19 (3) (a); CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 22 (3) (c) (i); CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 24 (3) (c) (i); CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 23 (3) (b); CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 24 (3) (b); CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 24 (3) (b); CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 24 (3) (b).

  48. 48.

    Lipsky and Seeber (1998), p. 142.

  49. 49.

    Masucci and Suresh (2017), pp. 664–665; Lipsky et al. (2020), pp. 431–455.

  50. 50.

    Monebhurrun (2017), pp. 83 et seq.

  51. 51.

    Purisima (2019), pp. 38–39. See also: El-Hakim (1997), p. 350.

  52. 52.

    Ho (2021), p. 14; Miles (2013), p. 48.

  53. 53.

    Alvik (2020), p. 290.

  54. 54.

    Ascensio (2001), pp. 897–930; Grisel and Vinuales (2007), pp. 380–432.

  55. 55.

    Miles (2013), pp. 133 et seq.; Perrone and Cotula (2021), pp. 78–80; Monebhurrun and De Andrade (2021), p. 263.

  56. 56.

    UNCTAD (2018). UNCTAD Reform Package for the International Investment Regime. UNCTAD Publication: 17–18.

  57. 57.

    On social movements, see: Miles (2013), pp. 100 et seq.

  58. 58.

    This initiative was taken by the Stopeumercosur coalition (see: https://stopeumercosur.org/).

  59. 59.

    This initiative was launched by the Collectifstoptafta (see: https://www.collectifstoptafta.org/). See also: Monebhurrun (2015), pp. 12–14. Generally: Sornarajah (2017), pp. 84–85.

  60. 60.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 13 (4) (d), art. 18.4; CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 14 (4) (d), art. 19.4; CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 16 (4) (d) (i), art. 22 (3) (c) (ii); CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 18 (4) (d), art. 24 (3) (c) (ii); CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 17 (4) (d), art. 24 (4); CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 18 (4) (d), art. 24 (4); CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 24 (4), art. 18 (4) (d); CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 18 (4) (d), art. 24 (4); CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 18 (4) (d) (i), art. 24 (3) (c) (ii); CFIA Brazil/Mexico (2015), art. 14 (4) (d), art. 18 (3) (c) (ii); CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 15 (3) (b), art. 4 (4) (iv); CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 4 (4) (iv), art. 15 (3) (iii) (a); CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 3 (4) (d), art. 13 (3) (c) (ii).

  61. 61.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18.4.

  62. 62.

    The authors had access to the internal regulation of the Brazil-Angola Joint Committee by the means of the Brazilian Statute on Access to Information (Statute no. 12.527 of 2011) which created an online platform on the website of all Ministries and of the Public Administration in general enabling citizens to have an active access to information. The Public Administration has a legal obligation to answer to the citizens’ request for information.

  63. 63.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 12; CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 13; CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 13; CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 15; CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 14; CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 15; CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 15; CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 15; CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 14; CFIA Brazil/Mexico (2015), art. 13; CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 10 and Annex II; CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 10 and Annex II; CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 9.

  64. 64.

    Monebhurrun and De Andrade (2021), pp. 275–276; Monebhurrun (2017), pp. 95–99.

  65. 65.

    The CFIAs’ provisions on corporate social responsibility are very detailed ones. Here is, for example, the content of article 12 of the Brazil-India CFIA (2020):

    “12.1 Investors and their investments shall strive to achieve the highest possible level of contribution to the sustainable development of the Host State and the local community, through the adoption of a high degree of socially responsible practices, based on the voluntary principles and standards set out in this Article and internal policies, such as statements of principle that have been endorsed or are supported by the Parties. 12.2 The investors and their investments shall endeavour to comply with the following voluntary principles and standards for a responsible business conduct and consistent with the laws adopted by the Host State: a) contribute to the economic, social and environmental progress, aiming at achieving sustainable development; b) respect the internationally recognized human rights of those involved in the companies’ activities; c) encourage local capacity building through close cooperation with the local community; d) encourage the creation of human capital, especially by creating employment opportunities and offering professional training to workers; e) refrain from seeking or accepting exemptions that are not established in the legal or regulatory framework relating to human rights, environment, health, security, work, tax system, financial incentives, or other issues; f) support and advocate for good corporate governance principles, and develop and apply good corporate governance practices, including anti-corruption measures; g) develop and implement effective self-regulatory practices and management systems that foster a relationship of mutual trust between the companies and the societies in which their operations are conducted; h) promote the knowledge of and the adherence, by workers, to the corporate policy, through appropriate dissemination of this policy, including professional training programs; i) refrain from discriminatory or disciplinary action against employees who submit grave reports to the board or, whenever appropriate, to the competent public authorities, about practices that violate the law or corporate policy; j) encourage, whenever possible, business associates, including service providers and outsources, to apply the principles of business conduct consistent with the principles provided for in this Article; and k) refrain from any undue interference in local political activities.

  66. 66.

    Highlighted by the authors.

  67. 67.

    CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 14 (4) (a).

  68. 68.

    Monebhurrun (2023).

  69. 69.

    Ho (2021), p. 28.

  70. 70.

    Ho (2021), p. 28. Generally: Perrone and Cotula (2021), pp. 71 et seq.

  71. 71.

    See for example: CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 22(2); CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 24(1); CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 15; CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 24(2); CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 15(2); CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 15(2); CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 13(3). See also: Badin and Morosini (2017), p. 233.

  72. 72.

    Ascensio (2020), pp. 123–124.

  73. 73.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18.1.

  74. 74.

    De Nanteuil (2017), p. 17; Lim et al. (2018), p. 5.

  75. 75.

    Monebhurrun (2019), p. 76.

  76. 76.

    For example: CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 15.3; CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 15.3; CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 22.3; CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 13.3. See also: Badin and Morosini (2017), p. 233.

  77. 77.

    For example: CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18.2; CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 19 (2) (a); CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 24 (2) (a); CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 24 (2) (a); CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 24.2.

  78. 78.

    ACFI Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 19.2.

  79. 79.

    All the CFIAs, with the exception of the Brazil/India one, provide for a 60 days meeting deadline.

  80. 80.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18.2 (a).

  81. 81.

    For instance: CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 15.3 (ii); CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 15.3 (ii); CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 13.3 (b); CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 24.2 (b); CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 24 (2) (b); CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 19 (2) (b); CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 24 (2) (b); CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18.2 (b).

  82. 82.

    CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 24 (3) (c) (i); CFIA Brazil/Mexico (2015), art. 18 (3) (c) (i); CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 15 (3) (iii) (a); CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 15 (3) (iii) (a); CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 13 (3) (c) (i); CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18 (3) (b); CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 19 (3) (a); CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 22 (3) (c) (i); CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 24 (3) (c) (i); CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 23 (3) (b); CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 24 (3) (b); CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 24 (3) (b); CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 24 (3) (b).

  83. 83.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 13 (4) (d), art. 18.4; CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 14 (4) (d), art. 19.4; CFIA Brazil/Colombia (2015), art. 16 (4) (d) (i), art. 22 (3) (c) (ii); CFIA Brazil/Chile (2015), art. 18 (4) (d), art. 24 (3) (c) (ii); CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 17 (4) (d), art. 24 (4); CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 18 (4) (d), art. 24 (4); CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 24 (4), art. 18 (4) (d); CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 18 (4) (d), art. 24 (4); CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 18 (4) (d) (i), art. 24 (3) (c) (ii); CFIA Brazil/Mexico (2015), art. 14 (4) (d), art. 18 (3) (c) (ii); CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 15 (3) (b), art. 4 (4) (iv); CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 4 (4) (iv), art. 15 (3) (iii) (a); CFIA Brazil/Malawi (2015) art. 3 (4) (d), art. 13 (3) (c) (ii).

  84. 84.

    El-Hakim (1997), p. 350.

  85. 85.

    For example: CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18.2 (c); CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 24.2 (c); CFIA Brazil/Guyana (2018), art. 24 (2) (c); CFIA Brazil/Suriname (2018), art. 24 (2) (c); CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 19 (2) (c); CFIA Brazil/Ethiopia (2018), art. 23 (2) (c).

  86. 86.

    For example: the CFIA signed with Mexico, Angola, Mozambique, Chile or Malawi.

  87. 87.

    See: CFIA with Ecuador and Colombia.

  88. 88.

    See: CFIA with Chile.

  89. 89.

    See: CFIA with Mozambique, Angola, Mexico, Guyana, Ethiopia, Morocco, Suriname, United Arab Emirates and India.

  90. 90.

    CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18.5; CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 24.5; CFIA Brazil/Mozambique (2015), art. 15(5); CFIA Brazil/Angola (2015), art. 15(5).

  91. 91.

    Schewe (2016), pp. 396–398; Calamita (2014), p. 650.

  92. 92.

    Schewe (2016), p. 399.

  93. 93.

    Calamita (2014), p. 651.

  94. 94.

    See for instance: CFIA Brazil/India (2020), art. 18.2 (d); CFIA Brazil/Ecuador (2019), art. 24 (3) (f); CFIA Brazil/Morocco (2019), art. 19 (2) (d); CFIA Brazil/United Arab Emirates (2019), art. 24 (2) (d).

  95. 95.

    The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, PCIJ, Series A, no.2, Judgement (30/08/1924), p. 12: “It is an elementary principle of international law that a State is entitled to protect its subjects, when injured by acts contrary to international law committed by another State, from whom they have been unable to obtain satisfaction through the ordinary channels. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own rights its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law”.

  96. 96.

    Monebhurrun (2019), p. 76. See also: Case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), I.C.J., Judgement (31/03/2004), para. 40.

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  1. University Center of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil

    Nitish Monebhurrun & Leonardo Vieira Arruda Achtschin

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  1. Nitish Monebhurrun
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  1. University Centre of Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil

    Nitish Monebhurrun

  2. University of Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia

    Carolina Olarte-Bácares

  3. University of Javeriana, Bogotá, Colombia

    Marco A. Velásquez-Ruiz

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Monebhurrun, N., Achtschin, L.V.A. (2024). Dispute Prevention Methods in the Brazilian Agreements on Cooperation and Facilitation of Investments (CFIAs). In: Monebhurrun, N., Olarte-Bácares, C., Velásquez-Ruiz, M.A. (eds) International Investment Law and Arbitration from a Latin American Perspective. International Law and the Global South. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-49382-9_7

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