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The Contribution of the International Criminal Court Towards Conflict Classification from Lubanga to Ongwen: Demystifying or Muddying the Notion of ‘protracted armed conflict’ Under Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute?

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ICC Jurisprudence and the Development of International Humanitarian Law

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Abstract

This chapter presents an examination of the intensity threshold of Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute and the consequences of the introduction of the notion of ‘protracted armed conflict’ in the second part of this provision. Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute determines the scope of application, that is, the arena in which the types of war crimes listed in Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute must be committed in order for the International Criminal Court (ICC) to exercise jurisdiction over such violations. With regard to the broader theme of this volume, which relates to child soldiers, it should be noted that the type of war crimes listed in Article 8(2)(e) of the Rome Statute includes the conscripting or enlisting of children under the age of 15 years into an armed force or group or using them to actively participate in hostilities. The inclusion of the phrase ‘protracted armed conflict’ in the second sentence of Article 8(2)(f) possibly creates a requirement for a threshold of violence higher than the minimum intensity of violence associated with protracted armed violence and could, in fact, institute a new category of non-international armed conflicts in the context of the Rome Statute.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002), 2187 UNTS 90 (hereafter Statute).

  2. 2.

    Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 8(2)(e)(vii).

  3. 3.

    Cf. Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 8(2)(d) which reads: ‘Paragraph 2(c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.’ Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(f) provides as follows: ‘Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a state when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups’ (emphasis added). See also C. Gray, ‘The Meaning of Armed Conflict: Non-International Armed Conflict’, in M.E. O’Connell (ed.), What is War: An Investigation in the Wake of 9/11 (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2012) at 72.

  4. 4.

    These scholars include C. Kress, ‘War Crimes Committed in Non-International Armed Conflict and the Emerging System of International Criminal Justice’, 30 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights (2001) 104, at 118; N Quenivet, ‘Applicability Test of Additional Protocol II and Common Article 3 for Crimes in Internal Armed Conflict’, in D. **ks et al. (eds), Applying International Humanitarian Law in Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Bodies (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2014); A. Cullen, ‘The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Interpreting the Threshold Contained in Article 8(2)(f): Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court’, in A. Cullen, The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 69, 82, 174–185, 206; see J. Pejic, ‘The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More Than Meets the Eye’, 93 IRRC (2011) at 202; S. Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012) 192–194; see Y. Dinstein, Non-International Armed Conflicts in International Law (United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 190; K. Ambos, Treatise on International Criminal Law: Volume II: The Crimes and Sentencing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) 543; M. Cortier, ‘War Crimes’, in R. O’Keefe, International Criminal Law (1st edn., New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) 312–314; O Triffterer and K Ambos Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (3rd edn, Oxford: C.H. Beck, 2016) 441; K. Dörmann et al. (eds), International Committee of the Red Cross: Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) paras 424–437 of the Commentaries on Common Article 3, at 160–161, paras 443–444; M.M. Bradley, ‘The “Intensity” Threshold in Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute: The Conundrum Created by the Term “Protracted Armed Conflict” and the Possibility of a New Category of Non-International Armed Conflict’ 42 South African Yearbook of International Law (2017) 79.

  5. 5.

    For an in-depth examination of Art. 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute through the law of treaty interpretation, see A. Cullen, ‘The Definition of Non-International Armed Conflict in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: An Analysis of the Threshold of Application Contained in Article 8(2)(f)’ 212 Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2008) 419–445; Bradley, supra note 4, at 49–68; and S. Sivakumaran, ‘Identifying an Armed Conflict Not of an International Character’, in S. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009) at 373–377.

  6. 6.

    S. Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations’, 91 Review of the Red Cross (2009) 82; Bradley, supra note 4, at 42; Dinstein, supra note 4, at para. 610.

  7. 7.

    Sivakumaran, supra note 4, at 192–195; Cullen, supra note 5, at 419–445.

  8. 8.

    See Dinstein, supra note 4, at para. 610 explaining the consequence of a higher threshold test unique to art 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute.

  9. 9.

    The case law of the International Criminal Court, as judicial decisions, classifies as sources of persuasive value as per Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) TS No 993 (hereafter ICJ Statute). For an overview of the rules of interpretation applicable to the Rome Statute itself, see A. de Beer and M. Bradley, ‘Appellate Deference De Novo Analysis of Evidence: The Decision of the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo ’22 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law (2019) 153, at 156–161.

  10. 10.

    For an overview of the importance of conflict classification in respect of war crime adjudication, see M. Bradley, ‘“Protracted Armed Conflict”: A Conundrum. Does Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute Require an Organized Armed Group to Meet the Organisational Criteria of Additional Protocol II?’ 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice (2019), 291 at 299–300.

  11. 11.

    In Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda, decided on 8 July 2019, Trial Chamber VI confirmed that the existence of an armed conflict was vital in the context of war crime prosecution as two requirements must be met in determining each war crime confirmed in a particular case: first, that the conduct in question (the alleged commission of a war crime) took place ‘in the context of and was associated with’ the relevant category of armed conflict; second, that the alleged perpetrator of a war crime indeed was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict. Judgment, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v Bosco Ntaganda (01/04-02/06), Trial Chamber VI, 8 July 2019, § 698.

  12. 12.

    M. Sassoli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare (Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2019) at para. 9.5.4.

  13. 13.

    Ibid.

  14. 14.

    Sassoli, supra note 12, at para. 9.5.5.

  15. 15.

    Rome Statute, supra note 1, at Art. 8(2)(f).

  16. 16.

    See Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic aka ‘Dule’ (IT-94-1-A), Appeals Chamber, 19 July 1998, § 70 and Opinion and Judgment, Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘Dule’ (IT-94-1-T 7), Trial Chamber I, 7 May 1997, § 561. As per the Tadic formulation for a situation to transform into the realm of non-international armed conflict, the non-state party or parties to such situation have to be sufficiently organized and the fighting between the parties has to equate protracted armed violence.

  17. 17.

    Judgment Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Judgment, The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/00), Trial Chamber, 14 March 2012.

  18. 18.

    Trial Judgment, Situation in Uganda in the Case of The Prosecutor v Dominic Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15), Trial Chamber IX, 4 February 2021.

  19. 19.

    Common Article 3 is common to all four Geneva Conventions. Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 31 (First Geneva Convention); Geneva Convention II for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 85 (Second Geneva Convention); Geneva Convention III Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 135 (Third Geneva Convention); Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 (Fourth Geneva Convention). The customary international law status of Common Article 3 was confirmed by the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua case. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (NicaraguaUnited States), Merits, (Judgment) of 27 June 1986 [1986] ICJ Rep 14, 103, at para. 218.

  20. 20.

    See Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), supra note 16, para. 70.

  21. 21.

    Ibid (emphasis added).

  22. 22.

    The instructive part of Art. 8(2)(d) of the Rome Statute, supra note 1, reads: ‘applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature’. Similarly, the first sentence of Art. 8(2)(f) determines: ‘applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature’.

  23. 23.

    Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 8(2)(f).

  24. 24.

    See Cullen, supra note 4, 128, where he cites Sonja Boelaert-Suominen’s comments on the meaning of the term ‘protracted’.

  25. 25.

    See note 4.

  26. 26.

    Ibid.

  27. 27.

    Ibid.

  28. 28.

    Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), supra note 16.

  29. 29.

    For an overview of the notion of intensity under Tadic, see M.M. Bradley ‘Additional Protocol II: Elevating the minimum threshold of intensity?’ International Review of the Red Cross (2021) 1, at 9–14.

  30. 30.

    Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), supra note 16, para. 70. For a discussion of the role of the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the development of the notion of ‘protracted armed violence’, see M. Hrnjaz and J. Simentić Popović, ‘Protracted Armed Violence as a Criterion for the Existence of Non-International Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law, International Criminal Law and Beyond’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2020) 7–11.

  31. 31.

    Dörmann et al., supra note 4, para. 435. The 2016 Commentary on the First Geneva Convention has been consulted to aid in the interpretation of the construct ‘protracted armed violence’. Commentaries are important analytical tools, constituting ‘[a] teaching that explores the meaning of the provision—looking at its object and purpose, situating it in context, considering its drafting history, analysing subsequent practice, and canvassing relevant literature—can prove influential’. The ICRC Commentaries constitute an especially invaluable subsidiary source. Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘The Influence of Teachings of Publicists on the Development of International Law’, 66 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2017) 1–32, at 15. These commentaries fill the role of publicist within the ambit of Art. 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945), TS No. 993 (hereafter ICJ Statute).

  32. 32.

    Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), supra note 16, para. 70. For a general overview of the notion of intensity, see Sivakumaran, supra note 4, 167–170; International Law Association, ‘The Hague Conference (2010): Use of Force: Final Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in International Law’, in O’Connell, supra note 3, at 15 and 20; Dörmann et al., supra note 4, paras 423–428; Bradley, supra note 28, at 10–11.

  33. 33.

    Dörmann et al., supra note 4, para. 427.

  34. 34.

    A. Cullen, ‘Article 3 Common to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Threshold of Non-International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law’, in Cullen, supra note 4, at 27–29.

  35. 35.

    Judgment, Prosecutor v. Boškoski and Tarculovski (IT-04-82-T), Trial Chamber, 10 July 2008, §§ 199–203; Lubanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute), supra note 17, para. 538; Judgment, Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj Idriz Balaj Lahi Brahimaj (IT-04-84-T), Trial Chamber, 3 April 2008, § 52, § 49; Dörmann et al., supra note 4, para. 432.

  36. 36.

    Haradinaj, supra note 35, para. 49.

  37. 37.

    Trial Chamber I did so by examining the cases of Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), supra note 16; Judgment, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic Zdravko Mucic, also known as ‘Pavo’, Hazim Delic Esad Landzo also known as ‘Zenga’ (IT-96-21-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 1998, §§ 183–192; Milosevic, supra note 23; Judgment, Prosecutor Kordic and Cerkez (IT-95-14/2-A), Appeals Chamber, 17 December 2004, § 341; Judgment, Prosecutor v Sefer Halilovic (IT 01-48-T), Trial Chamber, 16 November 2005; Judgment, Prosecutor v Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, Isak Musliu (IT-03-66-T), 30 November 2005, Trial Chamber II, 171–173; The ProsecutorEnver Hadzihasanovic Amir Kubara Case No. IT-01-47-T Trial Chamber 15 March 2006; Judgment, Prosecutor v. Martic (IT-95-1+R61), Trial Chamber, 8 March 1996, at 41; and Trial Judgment, Prosecutor v. Mile Mrksic, Miroslav Radic, Veselin Sljivancanin (IT-95-13/1-T), Trial Chamber, 27 September 2007.

  38. 38.

    Haradinaj, supra note 35, para. 49.

  39. 39.

    Ibid.

  40. 40.

    Haradinaj, supra note 35, para 49. See Bradley who provides examples of international courts and tribunals employing this threshold test: ‘Other international tribunals and courts, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), have confirmed the indicative factors developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in relation to “protracted violence”. For instance, in the Lubanga case, the ICC contributed to the jurisprudence by explaining its understanding of “protracted violence” in relation to Common Article 3. The ICC utilized the indicative factors used by Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in the Mrksic case to determine whether the violence was sufficiently protracted. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda referred to these indicative factors as forming part of an “evaluation test” which it employed to determine whether situations were mere internal disturbances and tensions or whether they constituted armed conflicts in the legal sense. In the Akayesu case, Chamber I of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda concluded in its assessment of the intensity requirement that the evaluation of this threshold requirement was not dependent on a subjective judgment by the parties to the conflict but that it was an objective test.’ M. Bradley, ‘Revisiting the Notion of “Intensity” Inherent in Common Article 3: An Examination of the Minimum Threshold Which Satisfies the Notion of “Intensity” and a Discussion of the Possibility of Applying a Method of Cumulative Assessment’, 17 International Comparative Law Review (2017) 7–38, at 21–22, referring to Lubanga, supra note 17, para. 538; Judgment, Prosecutor v. Akayesu (ICTR-96-4-T), Chamber I, 2 September 1998, § 627; Judgment and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Georges Anderson Nderubumwe Rutanganda (ICTR-96-3-T, 26), Trial Chamber I, 6 December 1999, § 93; Judgment and Sentence, Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema (ICTR-96-13-A), Trial Chamber, 27 January 2000, §§ 248–251.

  41. 41.

    Ibid. See also Bradley, supra note 40, at 19.

  42. 42.

    For a discussion of the relationship between ‘duration’ and ‘intensity’, see Dörmann et al., supra note 4, paras 438–444; Sivakumaran, supra note 4, at 167–168, paras 88–97; Bradley, supra note 28, at 9–14.

  43. 43.

    Ibid.

  44. 44.

    Bradley, supra note 28, at 9–14; Moir interprets the case law of the ICTY to suggest that, in an assessment of protracted armed violence, indicative factors concerned with the method of fighting should bear more weight than duration, and confirms that he also considers duration to be only one factor. L. Moir, ‘The Concept of Non-International Armed Conflict’, in A. Clapham, P. Gaeta and M. Sassòli (eds), The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 410, para. 53; Sivakumaran, supra note 4, at 167–169.

  45. 45.

    D. A. Lewis, ‘The Notion of “Protracted Armed Conflict” in the Rome Statute and the Termination of Armed Conflicts Under International Law: An Analysis of Select Issues’, 101 International Review of the Red Cross (2019) 1091, at 1099.

  46. 46.

    Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (ICC-01/04-01/06), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2007, §§ 7 and 8.

  47. 47.

    Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) supra note 46, para. 7.

  48. 48.

    Ibid, paras 9 and 227–237.

  49. 49.

    Ibid, para. 9; Rome Statute, supra note 1.

  50. 50.

    Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) supra note 46, paras 9 and 227–237.

  51. 51.

    Ibid.

  52. 52.

    Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) supra note 46, paras 227–229, read together with Rome Statute Arts 8(2)(e) and 8(2)(f).

  53. 53.

    Ibid.

  54. 54.

    Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) supra note 46, para. 234.

  55. 55.

    Ibid.

  56. 56.

    See note 40.

  57. 57.

    Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) supra note 46, para. 235.

  58. 58.

    M. O’Neill and E. Summers, Collins English Thesaurus (7th edn., Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2015) at 36.

  59. 59.

    Sivakumaran, supra note 4, at 195.

  60. 60.

    Ibid.

  61. 61.

    Ibid.

  62. 62.

    Ibid.

  63. 63.

    Ibid.

  64. 64.

    Hrnjaz and Popović, supra note 30, at 15–17.

  65. 65.

    Vite, supra note 6 at, 82.

  66. 66.

    Ibid.

  67. 67.

    Ibid.

  68. 68.

    Bradley, supra note 4, at 69–73.

  69. 69.

    Lubanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) supra note 17, paras 503 and 504.

  70. 70.

    Ibid, para. 506.

  71. 71.

    O’Neill and Summers, supra note 58, at 15.

  72. 72.

    This author makes a similar argument in her article; Bradley, supra note 4, at 70–71.

  73. 73.

    Vite, supra note 6, at 83.

  74. 74.

    Ibid.

  75. 75.

    Lubanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) supra note 17, para. 536.

  76. 76.

    Ibid.

  77. 77.

    Vite, supra note 6, at 82; Bradley, supra note 4, at 73; Dinstein, supra note 4, at 191; Sivakumaran, supra note 4, at 195; Sivakaumaran, supra note 5, at 378–379; Hrnjaz and Popović, supra note 30, at 16–17.

  78. 78.

    Vite, supra note 6, at 82; Bradley, supra note 4, at 73.

  79. 79.

    Dinstein, supra note 4, at 191; Sivakumaran, supra note 4, at 195; Sivakaumaran, supra note 5, at 378–379.

  80. 80.

    Hrnjaz and Popović, supra note 30, at 16–17.

  81. 81.

    Ibid, 17.

  82. 82.

    Ibid.

  83. 83.

    Trial Judgment, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga (ICC-01/04-01/07), Trial Chamber II, 7 March 2014, § 6.

  84. 84.

    Ibid.

  85. 85.

    Ibid, para. 12.

  86. 86.

    Ibid, para. 33.

  87. 87.

    Ibid, paras. 10, 24, 28, 30, 31 and 32. Germain Katanga was accused of various war crimes which included his facilitation of the use of children to actively participate in hostilities. This is a war crime under the Rome Statute in the context of international armed conflict (Art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi)) and armed conflict not of an international nature (Art. (8)(2)(e)(vii)). Germain Katanga was also charged with the commission of sexual slavery through others (Art. 25(3)(a)), which constitutes a war crime if committed during armed conflict, whether international (Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)) or non-international in nature (Art. 8(2)(e)(vi). Further, the charges against him included the commission of rape through others (Art. 25(3)(a)) which is criminalized by the Rome Statute, whether this crime is committed during an armed conflict characterized as international (Art. 8(2)(b)(xxii)) or non-international (Art. 8(2)(e)(vi)). He also allegedly directed attacks against civilians, which constitutes a war crime when committed either during an international armed conflict (as codified in Art. 8(2)(b)(i) of the Rome Statute) or during a non-international armed conflict as stipulated in Art. 8(2)(e)(i) of the Rome Statute. Additionally, Germain Katanga was charged with pillage as well as the destruction of property, which are war crimes in the context of both international armed conflict (Arts 8(2)(b)(xvi) and 8(2)(b)(xiii)) and non-international armed conflict (Arts 8(2)(e)(v) and 8(2)(e)(xii)).

  88. 88.

    Katanga (Trial Chamber) supra note 83, para. 1184.

  89. 89.

    Ibid.

  90. 90.

    Ibid.

  91. 91.

    Ibid.

  92. 92.

    See Lubanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) supra note 17, para. 536, as cited in Katanga (Trial Chamber) supra note 83, para. 1185.

  93. 93.

    Ibid.

  94. 94.

    Katanga (Trial Chamber) supra note 83, para. 203.

  95. 95.

    Ibid.

  96. 96.

    Ibid.

  97. 97.

    Ibid.

  98. 98.

    Ibid.

  99. 99.

    Katanga (Trial Chamber) supra note 83, para. 1187.

  100. 100.

    Ibid.

  101. 101.

    Ibid.

  102. 102.

    Rome Statute, supra note 1.

  103. 103.

    See Katanga (Trial Chamber) supra note 83, paras 1209, 1217 and 1218.

  104. 104.

    Ibid.

  105. 105.

    Ibid.

  106. 106.

    Ibid.

  107. 107.

    See Hrnjaz and Popović, supra note 30, who agree that Katanga is confusing. Hrnjaz and Popvic observe: ‘The Trial Chamber in the Katanga case followed the approach of Lubanga Trial Chamber. It quoted Article 8(2)(F) and paragraph 70 of the Tadic judgment, and then the Mrskic and Lubanga cases, making the duration of the conflict part of the intensity criterion. It is interesting to note, however, that in the part of the Decision that dealt with the intensity of the conflict the Trial Chamber stated: “With specific reference to its foregoing review of the attacks that followed assault on Bogor, the Chamber finds that the armed conflict was both protracted and intense owing, inter alia, to its duration and the volume of attacks perpetrated throughout the territory of Ituri from January 2002 to May 2003.” The statement that the conflict was both protracted and intense could prima facie suggest that the Trial Chamber considered the term “protracted” not as the part of the intensity criterion, but as an independent criterion for the existence of NIAC. Yet, the very next sentence of the Decision declares that in the Chamber’s view, the evidence before it suffices to fulfil the intensity of the conflict requirement in the scope of intensity criterion.’

  108. 108.

    Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Situation in the Central African Republic In the Case of the Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 15 June 2009, § 2. These charges were brought in respect of the facilitation of the crimes against humanity of murder (Art. 7(1)(a)) and rape (Art. 7(1)(g)), and the war crimes of murder (Art. 8(2)(c)(i)), rape (Art. 8(2)(e)(vi)) and pillaging (Art.i (8)(2)(e)(v)) under the Rome Statute.

  109. 109.

    Ibid.

  110. 110.

    Ibid.

  111. 111.

    Ibid, para. 127.

  112. 112.

    Ibid, paras. 137–140.

  113. 113.

    Ibid, paras. 225 and 226.

  114. 114.

    Collins English Thesaurus, supra note 58.

  115. 115.

    Bemba (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) supra note 108, para. 235.

  116. 116.

    Ibid; O’Neill and Summers, supra note 71, at 482.

  117. 117.

    Bemba (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) supra note 108, para. 235.

  118. 118.

    Ibid.

  119. 119.

    Ibid.

  120. 120.

    Ibid.

  121. 121.

    Ibid.

  122. 122.

    Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Situation in the Central African Republic in the Case of The Prosecutor v Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (ICC-01/05-01/08), Trial Chamber III, 21 March 2016, § 139.

  123. 123.

    Ibid.

  124. 124.

    Ibid.

  125. 125.

    Ibid.

  126. 126.

    Ibid.

  127. 127.

    Ibid.

  128. 128.

    Ibid.

  129. 129.

    Ibid.

  130. 130.

    Ibid.

  131. 131.

    Haradinaj, supra note 35, para. 49.

  132. 132.

    Bemba (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) supra note 122, para. 139.

  133. 133.

    Bemba, supra note 122, para. 139; Haradinaj, supra note 35, para. 49.

  134. 134.

    Haradinaj, supra note 35, para. 49.

  135. 135.

    Bemba (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) supra note 122.

  136. 136.

    Ibid, para. 329.

  137. 137.

    Ibid, para. 662.

  138. 138.

    Ibid.

  139. 139.

    Ibid, para. 663.

  140. 140.

    Ibid.

  141. 141.

    Ibid, para. 235.

  142. 142.

    Ibid, para. 663.

  143. 143.

    Lewis, supra note 45.

  144. 144.

    Ibid.

  145. 145.

    Judgment and Sentence, Situation in the Republic of Mali in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (ICC-01/12-01/15), Trial Chamber VIII, 27 September 2016, § 9.

  146. 146.

    Ibid, para. 2.

  147. 147.

    Ibid, paras. 3 and 7.

  148. 148.

    Ibid, para. 45.

  149. 149.

    Ibid.

  150. 150.

    Ibid, para. 11.

  151. 151.

    Lubanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Judgment) supra note 17; Lubanga (Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I) supra note 46.

  152. 152.

    Katanga (Trial Chamber) supra note 83.

  153. 153.

    Bemba (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) supra note 108; Bemba (Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) supra note 122.

  154. 154.

    Warrant of Arrest, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06-2), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 24 August 2006; Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the Case of the Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda (ICC-01/04-02/06), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 9 June 2014; Ntaganda (Judgment) supra note 11.

  155. 155.

    Ongwen (Trial Judgment) supra note 18.

  156. 156.

    Al Mahdi (Judgment and Sentence) supra note 145.

  157. 157.

    Ibid, para. 49.

  158. 158.

    Ibid.

  159. 159.

    Ibid.

  160. 160.

    Ibid.

  161. 161.

    Para. 49 (emphasis added).

  162. 162.

    Ibid.

  163. 163.

    Ibid.

  164. 164.

    Ibid.

  165. 165.

    Geneva Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflict (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (Additional Protocol II), Art. 1(1).

  166. 166.

    Ibid. For an examination of the duration requirement inherent in Art. 1(1) of Additional Protocol II, see Bradley, supra note 28, at 14–26.

  167. 167.

    Al Mahdi (Judgment and Sentence) supra note 145, para. 49.

  168. 168.

    Ibid.

  169. 169.

    Ibid.

  170. 170.

    Ibid.

  171. 171.

    Ntaganda (Warrant of Arrest) supra note 154, at 2.

  172. 172.

    Ibid, at 5.

  173. 173.

    Rome Statute, supra note, Arts 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vii).

  174. 174.

    Ibid, Arts 8(2)(b)(xxvi) and 8(2)(e)(vi).

  175. 175.

    Ibid.

  176. 176.

    Ntaganda (Warrant of Arrest) supra note 154, at 5.

  177. 177.

    Ibid, at 2.

  178. 178.

    Ibid.

  179. 179.

    Ibid.

  180. 180.

    Ibid.

  181. 181.

    Ibid.

  182. 182.

    Ibid.

  183. 183.

    Ibid.

  184. 184.

    Lubanga (Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute) supra note 17, paras 563 and 567; Katanga (Trial Judgment) supra note 83, paras 1209, 1217 and 1218.

  185. 185.

    Ntaganda (Warrant of Arrest) supra note 154, at 5.

  186. 186.

    Ntaganda (Pre-Trial) supra note154, para. 17.

  187. 187.

    Ibid.

  188. 188.

    Ibid.

  189. 189.

    Ibid.

  190. 190.

    Ibid, at 24–30.

  191. 191.

    Ibid.

  192. 192.

    Ibid; Rome Statute, supra note 1, Art. 8(2)(f).

  193. 193.

    Ntaganda (Judgment) supra note 11, paras 701–703.

  194. 194.

    Ibid.

  195. 195.

    Ibid, para. 701.

  196. 196.

    Ibid.

  197. 197.

    Ibid.

  198. 198.

    Ibid, para. 703.

  199. 199.

    Ibid, paras 720–722.

  200. 200.

    Ibid.

  201. 201.

    Ibid, paras 720–724.

  202. 202.

    Ongwen (Judgment) supra note 18.

  203. 203.

    Ibid, para. 32; Confirmation Decision at 71–104.

  204. 204.

    Ibid, para. 1.

  205. 205.

    Ibid, para. 36.

  206. 206.

    Ibid, para. 27.

  207. 207.

    Ibid, para. 31.

  208. 208.

    Ibid, paras 2807–2809.

  209. 209.

    Ibid.

  210. 210.

    Ibid, para. 2810.

  211. 211.

    Ibid.

  212. 212.

    Collins English Thesaurus, supra note 58, at 31.

  213. 213.

    Ibid.

  214. 214.

    Ongwen, supra note18, para. 2810.

  215. 215.

    Ongwen, supra note 18.

  216. 216.

    Ibid.

  217. 217.

    Ibid.

  218. 218.

    Ibid.

Acknowledgement

Author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable input on this chapter. She would also like to thank Ondřej Svaček, Martin Faix and Jessie Phyffer for comments on earlier drafts.

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  1. Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, and South African Research Chair for International Law, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

    Martha M. Bradley

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  1. Faculty of Law, Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic

    Martin Faix

  2. Faculty of Law, Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic

    Ondřej Svaček

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Bradley, M.M. (2024). The Contribution of the International Criminal Court Towards Conflict Classification from Lubanga to Ongwen: Demystifying or Muddying the Notion of ‘protracted armed conflict’ Under Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute?. In: Faix, M., Svaček, O. (eds) ICC Jurisprudence and the Development of International Humanitarian Law. Global Issues. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45994-8_6

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