Non-State Armed Groups in the International System

Wright, Will Jamison

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-45914-6_4

Will Jamison Wright²

67 Accesses

Abstract

As seen through the study, the goal is to use norms to examine the behavioural limitations of non-state armed groups. This chapter scrutinises whether norms, which are usually examined in the context of states, can also be explored within the context of non-state armed groups. Using the concepts of norms and norm diffusions discussed in Chap. 2, the status of non-state armed groups as actors within and affected international relations is explored in greater detail. Furthermore, the concept of non-state armed groups as pseudo-states, which have political and economic structures which interact with the international community, is established to underpin the examination of such actors as norm creators and followers.

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Notes

1.
Price (1998).
2.
Risse and Sikkink (1999).
3.
Krause and Milliken (2009), pp. 202–206.
4.
Wendt (1994), p. 387.
5.
Podder (2013), p. 17.
6.
Depending on one’s understanding of an armed group, examples of this would be urban gangs, as well as political dissident groups like the Irish Republican Army and its offshoots like the Continuity Irish Republican Army, the Irish National Liberation Army both during and after the Troubles.
7.
Examples of this would be, amongst others, FARC-EP and the LTTE during the height of their power.
8.
Fazal and Konaev (2019) examine differences between secessionist groups and non-secessionist groups while Vinci (2010, p. 3) drew the line between “terrorists, warlords, and insurgents”.
9.
This is particularly true in the case of “terrorist” groups, which are given this title by rival actors rather than by themselves. Not all groups that use typical “terrorist” tactics are labeled as such.
10.
For definitions of this concept, see: International Committee of the Red Cross (2021).
11.
As discussed throughout Vinci (2010).
12.
Ibid. pp. 25–26.
13.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (1977a).
14.
A process summarised in von Bernstorff (2019).
15.
The dichotomy between the PLO and Israel is a key example. While the PLO has formal recognition, they remain a non-state armed group in a political sense to those states that do not recognise them.
16.
Prosecutor v. Limaj et al. (2008).
17.
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al. (2012).
18.
The Official Irish Republican Army, the Provisional Irish Republican Army, the Real Irish Republican Army, the Continuity Irish Republican Army, and the Irish National Liberation Front all stemmed from the same armed group. Which split due to differences that emerged amongst political and military leaders, particularly around the peace process and the conduct of the conflict.
19.
The documents collected from the TheirVoices database show the ability of the Free Syrian Army to speak with a unified voice at times, while also pointing to divisions between the brigades of the army. This extends beyond the ability to “speak with one voice” and also shows a division in the political and military command structure.
20.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2019), p. 50.
21.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2018), p. 13.
22.
McQuinn (2012), p. 13; Nikolic et al. (2020).
23.
Uppsala University - Uppsala Conflict Data Program. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia.
24.
San-Akca (2016).
25.
Nikolic et al. (2020).
26.
Ibid.
27.
McQuinn (2012), p. 13.
28.
This is reflected in the documents from Geneva Call which points to only particular Brigades signing deeds of commitment and different brigades signing at different points in time.
29.
FSA (2012).
30.
Hamblin (2006), pp. 78–81.
31.
Some of the better-known examples historically would be the Serville Revolt in Rome and the Jewish Revolts in Ancient Israel against Roman rule.
32.
Neff (2005), p. 74.
33.
Similar criminal organisations are not categorised as non-state armed groups within the context of this study. Such actors, like cartels or pirates, are conceptually quite different from non-state armed groups.
34.
As seen in countless conflicts of European expansion in Africa, the Americas, Asia, and Oceania.
35.
As seen in the 7 Years War and American Revolution.
36.
This will be touched upon in greater detail in Chap. 5.
37.
As will be discussed in Chap. 5, historically, irregular troops were not well respected and actions by these groups, especially since the eighteenth century, have led to heavy-handed reprisals from state armed forces, as exemplified against guerrillas in Spain during the Napoleonic wars and franc-tireurs in France in the Franco-Prussian war.
38.
It should be noted that, within the context of anti-colonial armed conflicts, the “armed groups” were, where recognised, not non-state actors, but rather representatives of a state that did not yet exist. While in legal hindsight, this is clear, the contemporary political reality for such actors did not reflect this legal status.
39.
In the case of decolonisation, these wars are classified as international armed conflicts according to Article 1(4) of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. However, this Protocol entered into force in 1977, after many of the decolonial wars were already over and has not played a major role in most armed conflicts since 1977. (Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 1977a). The issues in actual application of this article are discussed thoroughly in Vité (2009), pp. 69–94.
40.
As reflected in the quantative findings of Harbom and Wallensteen (2005), pp. 623–635; Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015), pp. 536–550.
41.
As examined in Collier and Hoeffler (2000).
42.
Krause and Milliken (2009), pp. 213–214; Schlichte and Schneckener (2015), pp. 411–412.
43.
Jentzsch et al. (2015), pp. 756–757.
44.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977b).
45.
Daboné (2011), p. 424
46.
Vinci (2008), p. 302; Vinci (2010), pp. 27–31.
47.
Vinci (2008), p. 295; Vinci (2010), p. 10.
48.
Vinci (2008), p. 297.
49.
Vinci (2010), p. 7.
50.
Ibid. pp. 27–29.
51.
Duyvesteyn (2017), p. 673.
52.
Schlichte and Schneckener (2015), pp. 413–415; Weber (1947), pp. 130–131.
53.
Krieger (2018), pp. 563–583; Podder (2013), p. 18.
54.
Grävingholt et al. (2007).
55.
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 26 December 1933.
56.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977b).
57.
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al. (2012).
58.
Felbab-Brown (2021).
59.
Weber (1919), p. 7.
60.
Saul (2021).
61.
Eddy and Gibbons-Neff (2021).
62.
As seen in the reaction of the international community to the Islamic State in the context of the Syrian Civil War; see Urs (2017), pp. 31–32.
63.
One example of this would be the Northern Irish context, in which the state could fulfill practices such as law enforce, but only with the support of the armed forces to secure the area beforehand.
64.
De La Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2015), pp. 795–813.
65.
Ibid. pp. 810–811.
66.
Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca define armed groups from amongst a dataset on political violence for groups active for at least a year that killed at least 10 people with their violent activities. While they do control for the number of members of the armed groups as well as other potential factors that may impact the results, the existence of an armed conflict seems to be untouched, equating groups like the Rote Armee Fraktion to armed groups within an armed conflict. This unexamined distinction could both have a significant effect on the ability of armed groups to control territory as well as their use of less asymmetric tactics.
67.
Urs (2017), pp. 31–32.
68.
Ibid.
69.
Ibid.
70.
Ibid.
71.
Often guerrilla “hit-and-run” tactics are exemplary of such thinking.
72.
Grävingholt et al. (2007), pp. 55–56.
73.
Weinstein (2005), pp. 598–624.
74.
Ibid. pp. 599–600.
75.
Examples cited throughout Weinstein (2005).
76.
Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), p. 189.
77.
Weinstein (2005), pp. 612–613.
78.
Bruderlein (2000), pp. 2–3; Vinci, 2010, 14–16. Salehyan et al. (2011), pp. 719–720.
79.
Ibid.
80.
As was the case in areas of Northern Ireland even long after the Good Friday Agreement.
81.
Weinstein (2005), p. 617. Salehyan et al. (2011), p. 718.
82.
Ibid. pp. 599, 601, 603.
83.
Which pitted Irish-Catholics against Loyalist Protestants and the Loyalist state forces.
84.
Which saw battle lines drawn between Christians, Sunnis, Shia, and Palestinian armed groups.
85.
The wars in the former Yugoslavia, armed conflicts in Nigeria, Central African Republic, Sudan, and Yemen, amongst others.
86.
Weinstein (2005), pp. 610–611.
87.
Eisenstadt and White (2005), p. 4; Kaválek (2015), p. 14.
88.
Stein (2017), p. 9.
89.
Krieger (2018), pp. 566–567.
90.
Salehyan et al. (2011), pp. 717–718.
91.
Grävingholt et al. (2007), p. 58.
92.
Ibid.
93.
Ibid.
94.
Policzer (2005).
95.
Schlichte and Schneckener (2015), p. 415.
96.
The Palestinian Liberation Organisation had observer status at the UN General Assembly from 1974 until 1988, at which time the observer status was changed to Palestine. This status continues until this day. The Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic has been recognised by the African Union since 1984. In both cases, these recognised political bodies are attached to non-state armed groups.
97.
Harbom and Wallensteen (2005), pp. 627–628. The implications of this on what are often labelled “civil wars” was discussed in Salehyan et al. (2011), pp. 709–710.
98.
Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), pp. 415–429.
99.
Ibid.
100.
Maoz and San-Akca (2012), pp. 1–15.
101.
US support for the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan.
102.
Blannin (2017), p. 17; Cook (2011), pp. 19–36; Grävingholt et al. (2007), p. 36.
103.
Blannin (2017), pp. 14–15.
104.
Ibid. p. 21.
105.
Blannin (2017), pp. 17–19; Cook (2011), pp. 22–25; Grävingholt et al. (2007), pp. 360–367.
106.
As discussed in Salehyan et al. (2011); Maoz and San-Akca (2012).
107.
US weapons supply to these groups discussed in Conflict Armament Research (2017).
108.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2021).
109.
See Heffes (2020).
110.
This is reflected in the documents examined in this study,
111.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (1977b).
112.
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al. (2012).
113.
Lind et al. (1989); Term used extensively in Hammes (2006).
114.
Ibid.
115.
Dingley (2012), p. 10.
116.
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al. (2012).
117.
Wennmann (2007), pp. 431–436. Wennmann gives a more comprehensive list of means of financing, though all fit into one or more of the three avenues mentioned here.
118.
Ibid. pp. 432–434.
119.
MacFarlane (1999), p. 544.
120.
See Orogun (2004), pp. 151–61; Wennmann (2011), p. 338.
121.
Blannin (2017), pp. 14–17.
122.
See Holmes et al. (2006), pp. 157–84; Cornell (2005), pp. 756–757.
123.
Cornell (2005), p. 755.
124.
Ruys (2014), p. 15.
125.
Guelke (1996), pp. 522–526.
126.
Wennmann (2011), p. 339.
127.
Joint (2018), p. 4.
128.
See United States Army (2014).
129.
Ibid.
130.
Ibid.
131.
Winston (2016), p. 16; Winston (2018), pp. 640–641.
132.
This is reflected in the documents of the FSA and YPG/YPJ.
133.
Krieger (2018), p. 568.
134.
The norm theories reviewed in Chap. 2 are all state-centric and focus on states as the units of analysis that interact with norms.
135.
International Committee of the Red Cross (2021).
136.
As the steps that non-state armed groups take to combat such condemnation, as will be seen in the results, point to.
137.
One such study is Maoz and San-Akca (2012). Also see the Dangerous Companions project (San-Akca 2009, pp. 589–613).
138.
As mentioned in Thayer (2018), p. 430; Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), pp. 420–421.
139.
As mentioned in Powelson (2003), pp. 298–299; Kalyvas and Balcells (2010), pp. 420–421.
140.
Stein (2017), p. 9.
141.
Conflict Armament Research (2017).
142.
US Congress (2014).
143.
See: Doctor and Willingham (2020), pp. 1–19; Moore (2019), pp. 279–94.
144.
Doctor (2020), p. 72.
145.
Mehrl (2020), pp. 12–13.
146.
Fazal and Konaev (2019).
147.
Geiß (2006), pp. 775–777.
148.
As examined in Bruderlein (2000); Grävingholt et al. (2007); Hofmann (2012).
149.
Discussed throughout Fazal and Konaev (2019).
150.
Grävingholt et al. (2007), p. 58.
151.
Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), p. 189.

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Intl. Law of Peace and Armed Conflict, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Will Jamison Wright

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Will Jamison Wright
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Wright, W.J. (2023). Non-State Armed Groups in the International System. In: Norm Clusters of Non-State Armed Groups. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45914-6_4

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45914-6_4
Published: 02 December 2023
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-45913-9
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-45914-6
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