Equivalence Thesis: Stage A

Abstract

This chapter presents the first stage (A) of the Equivalence Thesis in relation to s. 76(2)(b) (the impersonation provision) of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. It critically analyses the concept of identity in this provision against that employed in this first stage of the thesis. In doing so, it connects the theoretical work in Part II of the book with positive law. The argument proceeds in several stages towards the conclusion that the impersonation provision can accommodate past selves as objects of impersonation. In making this argument, the psychological criterion of personal identity set out in Chap. 5 is employed. This operates primarily as a fulcrum to place pressure on our intuitions about persons and selves. Thus, it necessarily skips over fundamental questions in the debate, such as the ‘too many thinkers’ or ‘too many minds’ objection to Neo-Lockeanism. It then addresses a major challenge posed by the ‘known personally’ requirement of the impersonation provision. It draws upon the best account of second-person epistemology to do so, showing that a past self is relevantly similar to a past (deceased) person. By linking the arguments of the Equivalence Thesis with the concepts of identity that appear in law, this chapter is the lynchpin for the book.

Appendices

Cases

• R v Elbekkay 1994 EWCA Crim 1, [1995] Crim LR 163

Legislation

• Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76(2)(b)