Abstract
This chapter examines existing interpretations of the most widely commented-upon aspect of Michael Polanyi’s metaphysics, his metaphysical realism. I argue that his position ought to be taken as a form of Copernicanism and then put his distinctive Copernican realism into conversation with contemporary approaches to metaphysical realism including Ontic Structural Realism, Object-Oriented Ontology, and neo-Aristotelian hylomorphism. This chapter thus begins to make clear the relevance of debates within Polanyi studies for the broader sphere of contemporary metaphysical exploration.
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Notes
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Esther Meek, email message to the author, October 27, 2020.
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Similarly, Jha notes that Polanyi “drew on a Platonic-Aristotelian kind of formism relying on the general notion of similarity. His numerous analogies are built on the notion of similarity of some features, where to explain conceptions outside of or straddling frameworks, he relies on either a series of free-standing or of overlap** analogies” (1999–2000, 20). She does not seem entirely comfortable with this aspect of his thought. With regard to the analogical element of Polanyi, Phil Mullins (email message to the author, September 1, 2020, article forthcoming) has argued that Dorothy Emmett’s work on analogy in metaphysics likely played an influential role in Polanyi’s philosophical development.
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See Ladyman (1998) on whether structural realism should be taken as a metaphysical or merely epistemological proposal.
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Ladyman and Ross might respond that their view of science is based on a sort of Peircean pragmatism or instrumentalism, yet Peirce is much more insightful and honest when looking at the workings of science in terms of the concrete operations of scientists. Much of this work of Peirce’s would, I believe, violate the PNC, though such an argument lies beyond the scope of this work.
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I say “quasi-positivist” because given that OSR affirms the mathematical structure retained through the evolution of scientific theory as real (often treating it as interchangeable with nomological structure), and not merely a useful calculating tool, it is not positivist in a strict sense.
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Scale relativity is “…the idea that which terms of description and principles of individuation we use to track the world vary with the scale at which the world is measured…Here are some […examples]: at the quantum scale there are no cats; at scales appropriate for astrophysics there are no mountains; and there are no cross-elasticities of demand in a two-person economy” (Ladyman et al. 2007, Location 3317).
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This anti-reductionist stance could theoretically change with future science – it is not an a priori matter, as anti-reductionism is for Polanyi).
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“The idea of structure that I have in mind is that of modal structure – nomological structure – rather than mathematical structure. However, it might be that the necessity of mathematics and the physical necessity of laws coincide, and the history of physics has progressively undermined the distinction between mathematical and physical necessity. We do not advocate Pythagoreanism or Platonism, because they contrast mathematical or formal existence with material being. Our metaphysics is directly motivated, just as we say all metaphysics should be, by the actual content of physics, and our review of the latter significantly undermines the distinction between mathematical and physical-nomological structure. However, if mathematical structure does not coincide with physical structure then the relationship between them is surely that of isomorphism (or something similar but weaker such as homomorphism).” (James Ladyman, quoted in Veal 2012, 165)
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Quentin Meillasoux states “By ‘correlation’ we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other. We will henceforth call correlationism any current of thought which maintains the unsurpassable character of the correlation so defined. Consequently, it becomes possible to say that every philosophy which disavows naïve realism has become a variant of correlationism” (2006, 5).
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“The affirmation of a scientific theory was seen to convey an appreciation of its beauty and all the statements of mathematics were seen to carry a whole gamut of delicate aesthetic appreciations” (PK 204).
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At this point I must introduce a somewhat unfortunate terminological binary that will be necessary for clarity off and on throughout the remainder of this book. The terms I refer to here are “Anti-Platonist Aristotelianism” (including references to the Aristotle of Anti-Platonist Aristotelianism) vs. a Platonist Aristotle (which gestures toward a harmonization of Plato and Aristotle similar to the Neoplatonist synthesis and which therefore, in my view, is a subspecies of Platonism). The need for this terminological hack arises due to the fact that the most prominent expositions of Aristotelianism generally take Aristotle to be in conflict with Plato, especially with respect to the question of universals and Forms, as seen in point 5, cited in the main text above. The Anti-Platonist Aristotelian position, glossed in more depth later, holds that there are no transcendent, uninstantiated universals (i.e. Platonic Forms) but is realist with respect to immanent universals which are instantiated in particular sensibles. Such an Aristotelianism will also often show a sort of ontological favoritism toward particulars (primary substance) over universals (secondary substance) which is based on Aristotle’s Categories (see also Norio Fujisawa 1974, 38–40 on such an “Aristotelian thought framework”).
There is, of course, plenty of variety in viewpoint among those who consider themselves Aristotelians, however this is, in my estimation, a more or less fair summation of what is taken to be the Aristotelian position on universals in most mainstream debates, philosophy classes, etc. When I critique Aristotelian positions in what follows, I am generally critiquing this Anti-Platonist Aristotelianism. Interspersed throughout the book, however, (and coming more into focus in the final chapter) are references to a Platonist reading of Aristotle which takes Aristotle himself to be a Platonist interested in develo** a more rigorous understanding of matter in harmony with the central doctrines of Platonism (see Gerson 2005). On this reading, his theory of universals is taken to be an explanation of our conceptual tracking mechanism and not a rival metaphysical theory to the Forms.
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While most neo-Aristotelians are realists with respect to immanent, Aristotelian universals, there are exceptions. William Jaworsky (2016), for example, is a trope theorist, and thinkers such as Koons and Simpson are moving in that direction as well (email message from W.M.R. Simpson, May 7, 2023).
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Charles Lowney has also noted Polanyi’s Platonist stance on universals, especially in “The Tacit in Frege” (2008), and holds that there need be no real conflict between Aristotle and Plato on this point. I agree with him on both counts, as will be made clear in subsequent chapters.
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The common understanding of “universal” either as a rough synonym for “Form” (or as a rival term for describing the metaphysical ground of entities’ natures) will be called into question in subsequent chapters. For now, however, we will stick to the standard terminology as it appears in neo-Aristotelian scholarship.
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See, for instance, “Faith and Reason” 239–240, where Polanyi uses the words “thing” and “whole” interchangeably in reference to the object of our knowledge conceived of as the gestalt comprised of subsidiary details before introducing the term “comprehensive entity.” In Meaning (34–35) parallel passages use the terms “focal target” and “object of focal attention” before stating that
The subsidiaries of from-to knowing bear on a focal target, and whatever a thing bears on may be called its meaning. Thus the focal target on which they bear is the meaning of the subsidiaries. (Ibid.)
He goes on to equate the “complex entity” made up of subsidiaries with the “joint meaning” of those subsidiaries (M 53–54). Elsewhere (e.g. TD 13 or SOM 29), he uses “joint meaning” in nearly identical formulations.
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I recognize that this claim may seem premature and unsupported to some interpreters of Polanyi. I shall argue my case soon enough.
- 19.
Marmodoro has also written perceptively on certain aspects of Plato’s metaphysics (2021).
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Turkis II, M.E. (2024). Polanyi’s Copernican Realism: Content, Reception, and Relation to Three Contemporary Realisms. In: The Metaphysics of Michael Polanyi. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41211-0_3
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