Abstract
The construct “theory of mind” stems from animal psychology research but has been extremely influential in theories of autism. This chapter explains the history and contemporary uses of the construct. It argues that while once the construct played a role in hypotheses about autism, it has come to serve only as a harmful characterization of autism. It then traces various kinds of harm caused by the use of the construct in characterizations of autism, including the dehumanization of autistic people, stigmatization of autism, the dismissal of first-person accounts of autism, and the false idea that autistic people lack empathy. It suggests that the continued use of the construct partly reflects a marketing strategy for autism researchers, whom it enables to illicitly link their theories to general theories of what makes humans special. Four different approaches to the characterization and understanding of autism are then considered, including neurodivergence framework and approaches based on the double-empathy problem, both approaches tied to a social model of disability, as well as approaches based on sensory symptoms of autism and interoception.
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Gough, J. (2024). Theory of Mind and Its Role in Theories of Autism. In: Bennett, G., Goodall, E. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Disability. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-40858-8_15-1
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