The Institutions of Mosquito Control and Malaria Prevention

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
Challenging Malaria
  • 76 Accesses

Abstract

Standard public health tools and markets might be ineffective to overcome collective action problems related to malaria, but individuals often face incentives to discover novel solutions. Such incentives and discoveries form emergent public health institutions, which help improve public health in voluntary ways tailored to the myriad subjective goals people have. In the context of malaria, these institutions turn mosquito control from a good that emits positive externalities into private, club, and common goods, whereby individuals face additional incentives to produce. The extent of this discovery process depends on the many inputs of mosquito control, in addition to local disease environments, and various economic, political, and social institutions. Endogenous public health institutions suggest we revise standard models of malaria, common notions of externalities and collective action problems related to disease, and standard public health tools. Overall, the voluntary responses people can take to provide mosquito control and resolve collective action problems suggest a greater appreciation for liberal institutions that encourage innovation and opportunities to advance civil society and self-governance. There is much more that can be done to lessen the burden of malaria and much more that is obtainable once people have greater opportunities to resolve collective action problems on their own.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
EUR 32.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or Ebook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 109.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free ship** worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    There is a growing literature on such institutions that aligns with our notions of self-governance. For example, see industrial sickness funds and healthcare associations (Murray 2007; Ford Chapin 2015) and related privately provided public health goods (Fishback, 1992; Galiani et al. 2005; Carson 2016). Recently, Anderson (2017) develops a similar appreciation for private institutions related to medical tourism and lodge doctors, for example, which facilitate market activities despite lingering imperfections.

  2. 2.

    On the development of markets throughout history, Vernon Smith (2009: 3) makes an important point about ecological systems and the provision of public goods: “Although as economists we have articulated rational models of public goods problems such ways of thinking were not necessary in the past for societies to create emergent solutions out of human interactions uninformed by formal economic analysis.”

  3. 3.

    The 2022 World Malaria Report begins by invoking “a need to maximize the efficient, effective, and equitable use of malaria and other health system resources”. Given growing urban populations throughout the world, the report also discusses the goal of preventing malaria in urban areas.

  4. 4.

    Similarly, Cowen (1985) recognizes that the marginal unit of production influences when and where people might provide public goods in private ways.

  5. 5.

    On the efficiency of behaviors given a set of constraints and institutions, see Stigler (1992) and Leeson (2020).

References

  • Anderson, Jerrod. 2017. “The Market Process in Health Care.” In Interdisciplinary Studies of the Market Order, edited by Peter Boettke, Christopher Coyne, and Virgil Storr, 221–40. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bauer, Peter T. 2000. From Subsistence to Exchange and Other Essays. Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/books/paperback/9780691117829/from-subsistence-to-exchange-and-other-essays.

  • Carson, Byron. 2016. “Firm-led Malaria Prevention in the United States, 1910-1920.” American Journal of Law and Medicine 42: 310–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2022. “Individuals and Externalities in Economic Epidemiology: A Tension and Synthesis.” Journal of Private Enterprise 37 (3): 1–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cowen, Tyler. 1985. “Public Goods Definitions and Their Institutional Context: A Critique of Public Goods Theory.” Review of Social Economy 43 (1): 53–63. https://www.jstor.org/stable/29769265.

  • Fishback, Price. 1992. Soft Coal, Hard Choices: The Economic Welfare of Bituminous Coal Miners, 1890-1930. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ford Chapin, Christy. 2015. Ensuring America’s Health: The Public Creation of the Corporate Health Care System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Galiani, Sebastian, Paul Gertler, and Ernesto Schargrodsky. 2005. “Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality.” Journal of Political Economy 113 (1): 83–120.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geloso, Vincent, and Rosolino Candela. 2021. “Economic Freedom, Pandemics, and Robust Political Economy.” Southern Economic Journal 87 (4): 1250–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geloso, Vincent, and Jamie Bologna Pavlik. 2021. “Economic Freedom and the Economic Consequences of the 1918 Pandemic.” Contemporary Economic Policy 39 (2): 255–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Geloso, Vincent, Kelly Hyde, and Ilia Murtazashvili. 2022. “Pandemics, Economic Freedom, and Institutional Trade-offs.” European Journal of Law and Economics 54: 37–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Guidelines for Malaria. 2022. Accessed December 19, 2022. https://www.who.int/publications-detail-redirect/guidelines-for-malaria.

  • Leeson, Peter. 2020. “Logic Is a Harsh Mistress: Welfare Economics for Economists.” Journal of Institutional Economics 16 (2): 145–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murray, John. 2007. Origins of American Health Insurance: A History of Industrial Sickness Funds. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Paniagua, Pablo, and Veeshan Rayamajhee. 2022. “A Polycentric Approach for Pandemic Governance: Nest Externalities and Co-Production Challenges.” Journal of Institutional Economics 18: 537–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Smith, Vernon L. . 2009. Rationality in Economics: Constructivist and Ecological Forms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stigler, George. 1992. “Law or Economics?” Journal of Law and Economics 35 (2): 455–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Troesken, Werner. 2015. The Pox of Liberty: How the Constitution Left Americans Rich, Free, and Prone to Infection. 1st ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Carson, III, B.B. (2023). The Institutions of Mosquito Control and Malaria Prevention. In: Challenging Malaria. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39510-9_11

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39510-9_11

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-39509-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-39510-9

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Navigation