Abstract
This chapter covers the rise of Hezbollah and its political and ideological development since the 1980s. The discussion examines the movement’s success in creating a synthesis of the social, political and religious components of the previous decades. The chapter opens with an analysis of the foundations of the Islamic Movement in the wake of Ṣadr’s disappearance, the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. It examines its early ideology within both the political context and the doctrinal framework of Hezbollah’s first leaders. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on Ḥasan Naṣrallah and his ideological and strategic leadership, and how he succeeded in adapting the movement to the post-war Lebanese environment. The propagandistic use of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 plays a decisive role, just as the lead-up to the 2006 War and its consequences. Finally, the chapter analyses how Naṣrallah has continuously used a blend of ideological radicalism and political pragmatism to rescue his movement from political oblivion. It concludes with his involvement in the Syrian civil war and how it has granted him additional leverage in his consolidation and expansion of political and military power.
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Notes
- 1.
Telhamy 2008.
- 2.
Shanahan 2005: 162.
- 3.
Aḥmad 2006: 18, 22.
- 4.
Ibid: 19–21.
- 5.
Quoted by Blanford in Noe 2007a, b: 4.
- 6.
- 7.
Rieck 1989: 335.
- 8.
- 9.
Nizām az-Zayn in al-‘Irfān, Vol. LXVII, February 1979, editorial, pp. 131–138, here: 137.
- 10.
See Norton 1987: 96–99.
- 11.
- 12.
Their number was later increased to 1500. Rieck 1989: 415. Besides Iran, Syria played an active role in the establishment of Hezbollah. As a new paramilitary force, the Shi‘i movement enabled the Assad regime to increase its influence in Lebanon, to preserve close ties with Iran and to strike indirectly both Israel and the U.S. Nevertheless, Syria’s relations with Hezbollah were at times unstable and its ties with Amal were much closer. See Norton 1987: 68f; 2007: 34f. For details on early operational relations between Iran and Hezbollah see Ranstorp 1997: 78–86; Shapira 2000: 77–94.
- 13.
According to Norton (1987: 101), the first Hezbollah cells were founded as early as 1978 and the new cells created in 1982 were merely a “reemergence”. Norton also describes – based on Mūsāwī – an initial distinction between Islamic Amal, the Da‘wa and Hezbollah and mentions their merging in 1980. Ibid: 101f.
- 14.
- 15.
- 16.
Ranstorp 1997: 62–68. See also Kramer 1987: 5; Shapira 2000: 261–264. See Kramer 1987: 16–19; 1989: 48f; Ranstorp (1997: 60–109) analyzes the political complexity of the abductions and points to the special role of Iran. He divides the period of the kidnap**s (July 1982 – December 1992) into nine sections with diverse motives, such as the arrest of Lebanese Da‘wa members in Kuwait (1984), the Iran-Contra Affair (1986) and the arrest of Hezbollah members in Germany (1987). For details see ibid.
- 17.
Aḥmad 2006: 23. Ibrahīm Amīn is a member of the Hezbollah Politburo and former spokesman of the organization.
- 18.
See Alagha 2006: 141f.
- 19.
As quoted in Qāsim 2005: 76. A similar verse is Qur’an 58:22. The idea for this name came from the Iranian Hezbollah, an anti-leftist movement which emerged in 1979 and, controlled by Iranian scholars, was used to suppress anti-Islamic groups within the course of the Revolution. Today, the Iranian Hezbollah operates within the frame of the “Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps” (IRGC). See Rieck 1989: 418; Shanahan 2005: 114.
- 20.
Interview with Nidā’ al-Waṭan, August 31, 1993; Noe 2007: 127f. According to another interview with Ḥasan Naṣrallah, Hezbollah’s founding committee included nine members, i.e. three from Amal, three from Da‘wa and three independent scholars (in: Middle East Insight, 1996, Vol. II, p. 38).
- 21.
The “Open Letter” (Nass ar-risāla al-maftūḥa allatī wajahahā Ḥizbullāh ilā ‘l-mustad‘afin fī Lubnān wa’l-‘ālam) was published in as-Safīr, February 16, 1985. Reprinted in Aḥmad 2006: 35–51.
- 22.
Interview with Ḥusayn Mūsāwī, Kayhān, July 27, 1986, quoted in Kramer 1989: 26.
- 23.
Speech held by Ṣubḥī aṭ-Ṭufayli, al-‘Ahd, April 10, 1987, quoted in ibid.
- 24.
al-‘Ahd, March 7, 1986, quoted in Kramer 1990: 117.
- 25.
See ibid.: 27f. See also Hezbollah’s official website www.moqawama.org. Accessed 04 July 2020.
- 26.
al-‘Ahd, April 10, 1987, quoted in Alagha 2006: 99.
- 27.
Speech by Naṣrallah, al-‘Ahd, April 24, 1987, quoted in Kramer 1989: 11.
- 28.
al-‘Ahd, January 23, 1987, quoted in Kramer 1990: 116.
- 29.
Quoted in Alagha 2006: 92.
- 30.
Speech by Sheikh ‘Alī Yasīn, al-‘Ahd, February 28, 1986, quoted in Kramer 1990: 106.
- 31.
Shanahan 2005: 162f.
- 32.
Alagha 2006: 174.
- 33.
Televised speech aired on al-Manār TV on February 7, 2012.
- 34.
In 1997, Ṭufaylī left the Party and formed a radical splinter group. Hamzeh 2004: 110f.
- 35.
Aḥmad 2006: 25. Hezbollah’s members used to say that Naṣrallah and Mūsāwī were like “the two sides of the same coin”. Ibid.
- 36.
- 37.
Blanford in Naṣrallah: 2007: 8.
- 38.
Nicholas Blanford in 60 Minutes, February 20, 2003, transcript printed in Noe 2007a, b: 287–293, here: p. 289.
- 39.
- 40.
Sayigh 1997: 524.
- 41.
Schiff and Ya’ari 1984: 211. Israel mobilized 75,000 troops (later increased to 100,000), over a thousand tanks, ca. 1500 armored personal carriers supported by massive airborne attacks using napalm and phosphorous bombs.
- 42.
Ibid: 42–44. See also Jansen 1983.
- 43.
Schulze 2001: 131.
- 44.
Robert Fisk has called the fact that Israeli fire severely hit Wādī Abū Jamīl “one of the cruelest ironies of the war”. The roof of the Magen Avraham synagogue was destroyed and 50 elderly Jews who were still living in the quarter fled to other parts of the town. Fisk 2002: 324f. Lately, efforts to renovate the synagogue have been undertaken as a symbol of a tolerant, multi-confessional Lebanon. See “The Jewish Revival”, Levant, July 2009, pp. 42–45.
- 45.
Sayigh 1997: 539f. Syria supported Amal in its armed campaign to eliminate Palestinian power in the camps. Hezbollah supported the Palestinians and the power struggle between the Shi‘i factions materialized in the “war of the camps” (1984–87). al-Gharīb 1988: 67–142. See also “The War of the Camps”, (unnamed author), Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XVI, no. 1 (Autumn 1986), pp. 191–194. For more details see Qāsim 2005: 100–103; Rieck 1989: 631–644; 716–759; Bailey 1986: 219–234; Khalaf 2006: 133–138; El-Solh 2004: 348.
- 46.
Schulze 1998: 137f.
- 47.
- 48.
- 49.
Quoted in Norton 2007: 33. See also Fisk 2002: 236f.
- 50.
- 51.
Schiff and Ya’ari 1984: 134.
- 52.
- 53.
On Israeli policies in South Lebanon between 1982 and 1985 see Norton 1987: 107–112, on SLA activities in South Lebanon see ibid.: 113–117. For a detailed report on the conditions in the Ansar, Khiam and Atalit prison camps see Faḍlallah 1998: 205–228.
- 54.
Rieck 1989: 573f.
- 55.
Schiff and Ya’ari 1984: 287–300.
- 56.
Shapira 2000: 162f.
- 57.
Norton 1987:113.
- 58.
Bailey 1986: 232.
- 59.
- 60.
Schiff and Ya’ari 1984: 280–285.
- 61.
Ibid: 118–120.
- 62.
Rieck 1989: 572–582.
- 63.
Interview with Naṣrallah in Middle East Insight, 1996, Vol. II, p. 38.
- 64.
Ḥarb was killed by Israeli collaborators on February 16, 1984. See Qāsim 2005: 94.
- 65.
Qāsim 2005: 98.
- 66.
Translation by Norton, 1987: 167ff.
- 67.
Ibid: 170f.
- 68.
Ibid: 171–173.
- 69.
Speech of February 18, 1992; Noe 2007a, b: 52.
- 70.
Norton 1987: 179–186.
- 71.
Interview with al-Khalīj, March 11, 1986, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 23–33.
- 72.
Ibid: 23. See also Joseph Matar: “Tracing Ron Arad” in The Jerusalem Report, December 17, 1992.
- 73.
Interview with al-Khalīj, March 11, 1986, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 26–29.
- 74.
Sermon held on Muḥarram 10, 1999, printed in Naṣrallah 2000: 271–277, here: p. 275f.
- 75.
Ibid: 31. In a speech held a month earlier, Naṣrallah declared that “the divine state of justice on part of this earth will not remain confined within its geographic borders and is the dawn that will lead to the appearance of the Mahdī, who will create the state of Islam on earth”. al-‘Ahd, February 7, 1986, quoted in Kramer 1989: 28.
- 76.
Ibid: 31–33.
- 77.
Speech by Naṣrallah, al-‘Ahd, February 12, 1988, quoted in Kramer 1989: 56.
- 78.
al-‘Ahd, Deccember 5, 1986, quoted in Kramer 1990: 119f.
- 79.
Alagha 2006: 45, 49.
- 80.
Qāsim 2005: 31. Qāsim (b. 1953) was appointed deputy-president of Hezbollah’s executive council in 1989. When ‘Abbās Mūsāwī acquired the office of secretary-general, Qāsim became his deputy. After Mūsāwī’s assassination in February 1992, he became the deputy secretary-general.
- 81.
- 82.
Qāsim 2005: 21–26.
- 83.
Ibid: 35, taken from aṭ-Ṭabāṭabā’ī, Tafsīr al-mizān, vol. XIV, p. 114. According to Qāsim, the jihādī nature of the movement is based on Qur’an 22:78 (“And strive for Allah with the endeavour which is His right…”) and correspondingly, Hezbollah has adopted the name al-muqāwama al-islāmiyya fī Lubnān (“The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon”). Ibid: 76ff.
- 84.
Ibid: 36.
- 85.
Ibid: 37f.
- 86.
Khomeinī in Taḥrīr al-wāsila, vol. I, p. 485, quoted in Qāsim 2005: 39.
- 87.
Imām ‘Alī, Nahj al-balagha, sermon no. 15, 27, quoted in Qāsim 2005: 42f.
- 88.
Qur’an 9:52, see also Qur’an 3:164f. See also Ḥamāda’s views on jihād (Ḥamāda 2002: 39–124).
- 89.
Qāsim 2005: 45.
- 90.
Ibid: 72f.
- 91.
Ibid: 44–46. See also Ḥasan Faḍlallah 1998: 129–133.
- 92.
Qāsim 2005: 50–58.
- 93.
See Sermon held on Muḥarram 7, 1997, printed in Naṣrallah 2000: 47–65, esp. pp. 60–65.
- 94.
Sermon held on Muḥarram 1, 1998, printed in Naṣrallah 2000: 99–116, here: pp. 106–108.
- 95.
Ibid: 115.
- 96.
Interview with al-Waḥda al-Islāmiyya, February 3, 1989; Noe 2007a, b: 50.
- 97.
Sermon held on Muḥarram 5, 1998, printed in Naṣrallah 2000: 135–154, here: pp. 150f. Naṣrallah further points out that the example of the Kufans shows that “the Muslims have become like the People of the Book”, killing their own prophets. Sermon held on Muḥarram 2, 1997, printed in Naṣrallah 2000: 13–27, here: p. 16.
- 98.
Sermon of Muḥarram 5, 1998; Naṣrallah 2000: 151f.
- 99.
Ibid; Sermon of Muḥarram 10, 1999; Naṣrallah 2000: 274.
- 100.
Sermon of Muḥarram 5, 1998; Naṣrallah 2000: 152.
- 101.
Sermon of Muḥarram 1, 1998; Naṣrallah 2000: 112.
- 102.
Sermon of Muḥarram 5, 1998; Naṣrallah 2000: 152f.
- 103.
Sermon held on Muḥarram 4, 1997, printed in Naṣrallah 2000: 29–45.
- 104.
Ibid: 31f. Hamada describes Ḥusayn’s martyrdom as the model of the divine victory, valid from the creation of the world to the Day of Judgment; in his view, the events of Karbala are the pattern to Hezbollah’s victory. He claims that the Resistance fighters were “not surprised” about their “triumph” in 2000, but rather had expected it. Ḥamāda 2002: 28–36.
- 105.
Interview with al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī, September 11, 1992, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 84–99.
- 106.
Ibid: 32–34, based on Qur’an 2:154; 3:169; 3:195; 9:111; 47:4f.
- 107.
Ibid: 35. Aḥmad Qaṣīr was a 15 year old mujāhid from a village close to Tyre. His identity was first revealed in al-‘Ahd, 24 May 1985; he was praised for the 1982 attack in Tyre. See Kramer 1991. ‘Alī Ashmar blew himself up in an Israeli military convoy on March 20, 1996, killing one and wounding seven.
- 108.
Ibid: 35f. Qur’an 79: 24.
- 109.
Ibid: 36, based on Imām ‘Alī, Nahj al-balāgha, #123. Naṣrallah also quotes from Kanz al-a‘māl, vol. IV, # 11126 and Biḥār al-anwār, vol. XCVII, p. 40 to underline his point.
- 110.
Speech held on September 13, 1997, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 169–178, here: p. 172f.
- 111.
- 112.
Ibid: 37.
- 113.
Sermon of Muḥarram 4, 1997; Naṣrallah 2000: 38, based on al-Azdī: Maqtal al-Ḥusayn, p. 194.
- 114.
Sermon of Muḥarram 2, 1999; Naṣrallah 2000: 206.
- 115.
Naṣrallah 2000: 38, based on Biḥār al-anwār, vol. XLIV, p. 366.
- 116.
Ibid: 39. This tradition is taken from Biḥār al-anwār, vol. XLIV, p. 366, based on the account in Sūra 12:68 (see also Gen 37).
- 117.
Ibid: 39f.
- 118.
Ibid: 43.
- 119.
According to Sami Moubayed, Naṣrallah would meet with every single mujāhid before he or she carried out a “martyr operation” against Israel. To raise their morale, he would remind them that Jihad was an obligation in Islam and that they were “going to Paradise”. As a fare-well he would tell them: “Give my regards to the Prophet Muḥammad”. See Moubayed 2005.
- 120.
Naṣrallah emphasizes the need of a believer to “renounce” the pleasures of this world in order to receive happiness in the next. In an Apostle Paul-like severity and exclusiveness he portrays Jihad as the only way to “salvation” from hell. See especially sermon of Muḥarram 2, 1999; Naṣrallah 2000: 211–213 and of Muḥarram 9, 1999; Naṣrallah 2000: 243–248. The concept of ḥūrīs as a reward for male martyrs is based on Qur’an 2:25, 4:57, 37:40–48, 38:52, 44:54, 52:20, 55:56, 56:17–23, 36f, 76:19, 78:33.
- 121.
Mūsāwī speaks about the “Jewish call for settling South Lebanon”. “Open Letter” as printed in Norton 1987: 179.
- 122.
See al-‘Ahd 18/1, December 15, 1989 as quoted in Alagha 2006: 130.
- 123.
Interview with al-Muḥarrir, March 29, 1998; Noe 2007a, b: 186.
- 124.
Interview with as-Safīr, August 27, 1993; Noe 2007a, b: 111.
- 125.
Sermon of Muḥarram 5, 1998; Naṣrallah 2000: 151.
- 126.
Undated speech aired on al-Manār TV, quoted by Alagha 2006: 176.
- 127.
Interview with Tishrīn, June 21, 1999; Noe 2007a, b: 206f.
- 128.
- 129.
- 130.
Ibid: 143–146. Most famous among the victims was Dr. Eli Hallak, a physician who was the vice-president of the Higher Council of Lebanon’s Jewish community. He was apparently executed on February 18, 1986.
See also David Jacobson: Hostage – My Nightmare in Beirut, New York 1991, pp. 53–57, 136–139.
- 131.
Schulze 2001: 145.
- 132.
Interview with Nidā’ al-Waṭan, August 31, 1993; Noe 2007a, b: 140. L’Orient Le Jour, January 4, 1987, quoted in ibid.: 146.
- 133.
Ibid: 145f. In a similar way, the Buenos Aires attacks in March 1992 and July 1994 were suspected acts of revenge for Israel’s assassination of ‘Abbās Mūsāwī in February 1992 and the bombing raid in June 1994, which killed 50 Hezbollah recruits. The attacks were ascribed to the Hezbollah-affiliated “Islamic Jihad” under ‘Imād Mughniyya. According to Sobelman, Hezbollah’s revenge outside of Lebanon was meant to avoid direct Israeli retaliation in Lebanon. Naṣrallah claimed the attcks were Mossad operations to discredit Hezbollah. Sobelman 2004: 88.
- 134.
Speech held on March 13, 2003; Noe 2007a, b: 286.
- 135.
Ibid.
- 136.
Ibid.
- 137.
Speech held on May 7, 1998, broadcast live on al-Manār, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 188–193, here: 188.
- 138.
Ibid.
- 139.
Ibid.
- 140.
Ibid: 190.
- 141.
Speech printed in an-Nahar, October 29, 2005.
- 142.
Observed by the author during the military parade of “Jerusalem Day” in South Beirut on October 28, 2005.
- 143.
- 144.
Speech of May 7, 1998; Noe 2007a, b: 189.
- 145.
Speech held on September 13, 1997; Noe 2007a, b: 170f.
- 146.
Interview with Tishrīn, June 21, 1999; Noe 2007a, b: 206.
- 147.
Speech on September 22, 2006, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 148.
Noe 2007a, b: 187f.
- 149.
See Qur’an 2:65, 5:60, 7:166. A remarkable example of the use of traditions of Jews who were transformed into animals is al-Manār’s broadcasting of a children’s claymotion by Egyptian filmmaker Dr. Zaynab Zamzam. The clip narrates the tale of the inhabitants of Eilat who are tested through a large number of fish which is sent to the seashore every Shabbat. Two inhabitants of the town attempt to “trick” God by building a trap to catch the fish without performing work on the holy day. The Prophet Habakkuk uncovers their plot and when his curses upon them remain unanswered, he decides to turn away from God and to sell his goods in the market on Shabbat. As a punishment, the transgressing Jews are transformed into apes and pigs and are eventually cast into the sea. “Stories from the Qur’an”, aired on al-Manār, December 7, 2005. Based on Q 2:65 and 7:163. See also Alagha 2006: 58. According to al-‘Ayyāshī’s exegesis of Q 2:65, the transgressing Jews were also transformed mice, lizards and even fish. The scholar connects the tradition to Imām ‘Alī who talks to a fish at the seashore; the fish explains to him that he is one of the cursed Jews. In al-‘Ayyāshī’s commentary, the Jews were punished for neglecting the walāya and not for transgressing the Shabbat. See Bar-Asher 1999: 200f.
- 150.
- 151.
Norton 2007: 37.
- 152.
Alagha distinguishes between “religious ideology” (1978–85), “political ideology” (1985–90) and “political program” (1990–2005). See Alagha 2006. See also Norton 2007: 97–112; Zisser 1996: 205–213. An exception to this thesis is Shimon Shapira (2000) who sees in this phenomenon mainly a strategic move and not a real process of normalization.
- 153.
The participation in the elections required the approval of Ayatollah Khamene’ī as well as of a Hezbollah delegation which voted in favor (10:2) after a long debate. The electoral program elaborated by Naṣrallah was based on the “Open Letter” of 1985 and focused on the resistance against Israel, the formation of a non-confessionalist political system and the stimulation of socio-economic development. See Hamzeh 2004: 111f.
- 154.
Alagha 2006: 157–159.
- 155.
Interview with as-Safīr, February 27, 1992, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 56–76, here: p. 57. Ṭufaylī rejected participation in the elections and wanted to continue the Party’s early course of confrontation with the government. When the Hezbollah leaders turned against his strategy, he accused them of “abandoning Islam”, betraying their ideals and of “recognizing the Zionist entity”. Syria and Iran on the other hand accepted the Resistance’s new course. See Sobelman 2004: 21–24.
- 156.
Interview with Nidā’ al-Waṭan, August 31, 1993; Noe 2007a, b: 128.
- 157.
Interview with as-Safīr, April 30, 1996, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 144–168, here: pp. 159f.
- 158.
Interview with al-Waḥda al-Islāmiyya, February 3, 1989; Noe 2007a, b: 42.
- 159.
Interview with as-Safīr, February 27, 1992; Noe 2007a, b: 59.
- 160.
Interview with al-Aḥrām, February 16, 2000, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 213–231, here: p. 231.
- 161.
Ibid: 63. Rabin is often quoted as stating that “the Shi’i genie was released from the bottle”. See Haaretz, January 17, 1985.
- 162.
Ibid: 69.
- 163.
Speech held on December 14, 2001 (“Jerusalem Day”), aired on al-Manār TV. On the topic of killing civilians see also Qāsim 2005: 175–177.
- 164.
Naṣrallah as quoted in Alagha 2006: 214.
- 165.
See Saad-Ghorayeb 2001: 142–151. In general, Hezbollah rejects attacks against civilians. Like Faḍlallah, Naṣrallah condemned the attacks of 9/11 as well as the London and Madrid attacks usually ascribed to al-Qā‘ida as “terrorist suicide attacks”. as-Safīr, July 8, 2005. See also Joseph Alagha: “Hizbullah and Martyrdom”, Orient, vol. XLV, March 2004, issue 1, pp. 47–74.
- 166.
See Qāsim 2005: 109f.
- 167.
Ibid: 111; Marcus 2018: 55–57. 140 Lebanese were killed, among them 13 members of the Resistance. 5000 homes in 80 villages were destroyed, and 250,000 Southerners fled to Beirut.
- 168.
In Israel, two civilians were killed and 24 injured by the rocket fire and hundreds left their houses in Upper Galilee. Noe 2007a, b: 100f.
- 169.
- 170.
Interview with as-Safīr, August 27, 1993; Noe 2007a, b: 102.
- 171.
Qāsim 2005: 111.
- 172.
Interview with as-Safīr, August 27, 1993; Noe 2007a, b: 102.
- 173.
Ibid: 104.
- 174.
Ibid: 105.
- 175.
Harik 2005: 177.
- 176.
Interview with as-Safīr, August 27, 1993; Noe 2007a, b: 107.
- 177.
- 178.
- 179.
- 180.
- 181.
Interview with Tishrīn, June 21, 1999, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 194–209, here: p. 202f.
- 182.
Interview with al-Aḥrām, February 16, 2000; Noe 2007a, b: 218.
- 183.
See Interview with as-Safīr, April 30, 1996; Noe 2007a, b: 151–157.
- 184.
Qāsim 2005: 118.
- 185.
- 186.
Ibid: 121–124.
- 187.
Alagha 2006: 47; 169.
- 188.
Norton 2007: 81.
- 189.
- 190.
Interview with Tishrīn, June 21, 1999; Noe 2007a, b: 196f. See also Qāsim 2005: 125–128. Sobelman argues that a unilateral withdrawal was in the interest of neither Syria nor Hezbollah, since both feared that it would open an opportunity for a comprehensive peace agreement in the region, which would delegitimize the Resistance. Sobelman 2004: 27.
- 191.
Qāsim describes how Hezbollah fighters who stormed SLA posts found set dinner tables which Lahd’s fleeing militiamen had left behind together with artillery, weapons, computer systems and classified information. Qāsim 2005: 129.
- 192.
Qāsim 2005: 128.
- 193.
Speech held on May 26, 2000, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 233–243, here: p. 234f.
- 194.
Speech of May 26, 2000; Noe 2007a, b: 235.
- 195.
Qāsim 2005: 131.
- 196.
Ross 2004: 626.
- 197.
- 198.
Speech of May 26, 2000; Noe 2007a, b: 238.
- 199.
Speech held on May 26, 2000; Noe 2007a, b: 240.
- 200.
Norton 2007: 90.
- 201.
The UN does not consider the Shib‘a Farms part of the territory mentioned in Resolution 425. Both Syria and Lebanon have been ambiguous on the question of ownership. Only in recent years, Lebanese governments have always maintained that the territory is Lebanese, a stance that Hezbollah has used to justify its armed struggle after May 2000. See Kaufman 2002; Qāsim 2005: 131–136; Sobelman 2004: 68–70.
- 202.
See Interview with Tishrīn, June 21, 1999; Noe 2007a, b: 203–205.
- 203.
Interview with al-Rā’ī al-‘Āmm, November 16, 2001, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 256–262, here: p. 261.
- 204.
Hezbollah had been on the list since 1999, but in the wake of 9/11, the State Department decided to remove 11 organizations (including Hezbollah and some Syrian-backed Palestinian groups), in order to ensure Arab support for the “war on terrorism”. Yet, only a few weeks later, 39 individuals, among them ‘Imād Mughniyya, Ḥasan ‘Izz ad-Dīn, Ṣubḥī Ṭufaylī and apparently Ḥasan Naṣrallah were included once more in the list. Hamzeh 2004: 135f; Harik 2005: 169–175.
- 205.
Alagha observes that after the withdrawal, Hezbollah changed the logo on its flag from the strongly Iranian-colored “The Islamic Revolution (thawra) in Lebanon” to “The Islamic Resistance (muqāwama) in Lebanon”, which emphasizes the Party’s Lebanese character of resisting the Israeli occupation. Further, in 2001, Hezbollah’s newspaper al-‘Ahd changed its name to al-Intiqād and obtained a more secular character – the pictures of Khomeinī and Khamene’ī as well as Qur’an 5:56 were removed. See Alagha 2006: 171.
- 206.
Interview with Tishrīn, June 21, 1999; Noe 2007a, b: 206f.
- 207.
Interview with al-Aḥrām, February 16, 2000; Noe 2007a, b: 221.
- 208.
Speech held on May 26, 2000; Noe 2007a, b: 242.
- 209.
Ibid.
- 210.
Ibid. See also interview with al-Rā’ī al-‘Āmm, October 5, 2000, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 244–255.
- 211.
Speech of June 4, 2002, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 267–277, here: p. 270f.
- 212.
Ibid: 272.
- 213.
Ibid: 273–276.
- 214.
Sobelman 2004: 62f.
- 215.
For instance, in April 1996, Ḥusayn Miqdād entered Israel under the alias of a British, smuggling explosives in a radio. He was killed when the equipment exploded prematurely. Another case was Stefan Smyrek, a German convert to Islam who was arrested in January 1998 upon entering Israel and was convicted of spying for Hezbollah. Sobelman 2004: 61f, 84–88.
- 216.
Speech held on March 13, 2003, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 282–286, here: p. 284. In July 2004, Naṣrallah sent a frustrated letter to the Arabic and Islamic nations, almost desperately recycling the theme of a “possible destruction” of al-Aqṣā Mosque by “Zionist extremists”. The least the enemy should expect, he pledged, was “an intifada throughout the entire Arab and Muslim nation”. Letter of July 30, 2004, printed ibid.: 314–316.
- 217.
Speech held on March 8, 2005, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 319–327, here: p. 324.
- 218.
See Sobelman 2004: 85.
- 219.
Ibid: 44.
- 220.
Ibid: 13.
- 221.
Ibid: 46–56. Sobelman analyzes Hezbollah’s “an eye for an eye” policy, according to which the Resistance was careful to retaliate with the same measure by which it was attacked. The frequent Israeli violations of Lebanese air space (993 between April 16, 2002 and February 26, 2003, according to al-Intiqād) have provoked a much smaller amount of anti-aircraft fire. See Sobelman 2004: 70–82. The violations and the frequent sonic booms over Beirut and other cities have broadened Lebanese acceptance of Hezbollah’s activities beyond the occupied Shib‘a Farms. al-Mustaqbal, August 21, 2003.
- 222.
Qunṭār, a young Druze Lebanese member of the PFLP, was accused of kidnap** two and killing three Israelis. See Haaretz, April 18, 2009.
- 223.
Norton 2007: 92. The exchange included Elhanan Tennenbaum, an Israeli businessman captured in the Emirates in 2000, and the bodies of three soldiers, in exchange for 423 mainly Palestinian prisoners. Israel also released Sheikh ‘Abdul Karīm ‘Ubayd, a Hezbollah member captured in 1989 and Muṣṭafā Dīrānī, former head of Amal security, captured in 1994. The latter was believed to be involved in the kidnap** of Israeli pilot Ron Arad. Stefan Smyrek, who had been convicted of spying for Hezbollah, was also freed. After the exchange, only three detainees remained in Israeli prisons, among them Samīr Qunṭār, whom Israel intended to release only in exchange for information about Ron Arad. Fisher 2004. See also Qāsim 2005: 140–149.
- 224.
Qāsim 2005: 244
- 225.
The first prisoner exchange between Israel and Hezbollah had taken place under the auspices of the Red Cross in June 1998, in which Israel had exchanged 60 detainees for the body of an Israeli naval commando fighter. Interview with al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī, September 11, 1992, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 84–99, here: p. 96. Whereas the Israeli army transferred some of its prisoners into Israel, most of them were held in the SLA-controlled “buffer zone” until May 2000. The Khiam Detention Center was – together with the two Ansar and the Atlit Camps – considered one of the most notorious prisons in South Lebanon and was frequently mentioned by human rights organizations in the context of abuse and torture. In May 2000, Hezbollah issued live broadcasts of the emotional scenes of prisoners stumbling out of their cells. The Party turned the prison into a museum, until Israel leveled it during the first days of the July 2006 War.
- 226.
Fisher 2004.
- 227.
Qāsim 2005: 147.
- 228.
Ibid: 143–149. In May 2003, Gibran Tuéni, the publisher of Lebanon’s leading newspaper an-Nahār criticized Naṣrallah for claiming to “represent all Lebanese”. See Norton 2007: 117f.
- 229.
Speech held on January 29, 2004, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 229–309, here: pp. 301f.
- 230.
Ibid. See also Qāsim 2005: 142f.
- 231.
Speech held on January 29, 2004; Noe 2007a, b: 302.
- 232.
At this point, Hezbollah claimed that Israel held three more Lebanese prisoners: Samīr Qunṭār, Nasīm Nisr and Yaḥyā Skāf. Israel claimed that Skāf died in a Palestinian attack in 1978, which killed 35 Israelis. See Noe 2007a, b: 305.
- 233.
Noe 2007a, b: 328–334. Between May 2000 and July 2006, nine Israeli soldiers were killed in the Shib‘a Farms area, and eight at the “Blue Line”, i.e. the UN demarcation of the border after the Israeli withdrawal. Some of them were killed inside Lebanon, others died on the Israeli side of the border. Norton 2007: 117.
- 234.
Noe 2007b.
- 235.
Speech held on May 25, 2005; al-Intiqād, 1111, May 25, 2005.
- 236.
Noe 2007a, b: 355.
- 237.
Speech held on May 25, 2005; al-Intiqād, 1111, May 25, 2005.
- 238.
Ibid.
- 239.
Ibid.
- 240.
See the discussion below and Blanford 2009: vii-x; xviif. After Hezbollah’s assassination of the alleged collaborator Aql Hāshim, Naṣrallah pointed out that the Resistance was in the position to “just go and destroy the collaborators’ houses”. It was only refraining from doing so due to the innocent women and children. At the same time, Naṣrallah explained that Hezbollah’s objective was to “rescue” the collaborators: “Even when we used to make threats of killing them, we wanted them to repent, escape, get scared, leave their positions, and not to continue to serve as human shields for the Zionists.” “Victory speech” of May 25, 2007, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 241.
Alagha 2006: 59–62; Norton 2007: 124–132.
- 242.
- 243.
The speech was printed in an-Nahar, October 29, 2005. The number of guerrilla fighters is an estimation by the author who witnessed the parade. Like in other rallies, huge posters of Khomeinī, Khamene’ī, Mūsā aṣ-Ṣadr and Mūsāwī were carried by the Hezbollah fighters, emphasizing their ideological orientation.
- 244.
Naṣrallah emphasized that the courageous Jihad of the Palestinians and their “choice of resistance” had liberated Gaza. See al-Intiqād 1123, August 19, 2005.
- 245.
Speech in an-Nahar, October 29, 2005.
- 246.
Norton 2007: 135; Marcus 2018: 97f.
- 247.
Acording to former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, the Bush administration re-considered a strike against Iran after Israel’s failure in the Lebanon war. Israeli intelligence had previously told the U.S. that a war on Iran would be “cheap” and have “many benefits”. Hersh 2006.
- 248.
David Siegel, the spokesman at the Israeli Embassy in Washington denied Israeli plans to attack Hezbollah, claiming that the “decision was forced on us”. There had been attacks in the previous months, and “the kidnap** of the soldiers raised the stakes” of a war. Ibid. Haaretz analyst Yossi Melman on the other hand claimed that Israel had waited for an opportunity to attack. Melman 2006. The claim that Israel launched its offensive earlier than planned would also be supported by the fact that the army was very poorly equipped and prepared. See Limor and Shelah 2007: 293–344.
- 249.
Lebanese criticism against Hezbollah and its refusal to disarm reached the stage of mockery, most notably on a liberal comedy TV show on June 1, 2006, which satirized Naṣrallah and his discourse. Within hours, tens of thousands of Hezbollah supporters went to the streets to demonstrate their unyielding allegiance to their leader. Norton sees this incident as a prelude to the ambush that Hezbollah fighters prepared at the Israeli-Lebanese border to prove their relevance when it comes to the defense of the country. Norton 2007: 133.
- 250.
Quoted in Hersh 2006.
- 251.
Norton 2007: 138.
- 252.
Haaretz. 2006: Israel Admits Using Phosphorus Bombs During War in Lebanon. October 22.
- 253.
Mazzetti and Shanker 2006. According to Vali Nasr, also Iran had beforehand information about the war and equipped Hezbollah with its latest weapons. Not only Tel Aviv and Washington, but also to the regime in Tehran considered the war in Lebanon a test-run for a possible attack on its country. See The New Yorker, August 21, 2006.
- 254.
Norton 2007: 139.
- 255.
Marcus 2018: 99.
- 256.
Speech on al-Manār TV, August 3, 2006.
- 257.
Bilqazīz 2006: 97–103.
- 258.
Quoted in Hersh 2006.
- 259.
1109 Lebanese and 43 Israeli civilians, as well as 118 Israeli and 28 Lebanese soldiers had been killed, in addition to about 200 Hezbollah fighters. Almost one million civilians had been evacuated from South Lebanon and 500,000 from northern Israel. Israel had a material loss of about 500 million USD, and Lebanon had to face the damage of about 4 billion USD, i.e. the amount of the devastation of the post-civil war reconstruction work of fifteen years On the events the war from a pro-Hezbollah perspective see Ḥākima 2007; for an Israeli point of view see Limor and Shelah 2007 A critical analysis of Israel’s policy is also given in Achcar and Warschawsky 2007.
- 260.
Interview with New TV on August 27, 2006, printed in Noe 2007a, b: 378–410, here: pp. 389–391.
- 261.
Ibid: 390–392.
- 262.
Ibid: 385.
- 263.
Ibid: 397.
- 264.
Ibid: 393.
- 265.
Ibid: 394.
- 266.
Ibid: 395f.
- 267.
Speech on September 22, 2006, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 268.
Ibid.
- 269.
According to the survey, only 6% of Israelis considered Olmert a capable leader. Yediot Ahronot, September 21, 2006.
- 270.
Speech on February 14, 2008, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 271.
Speech on September 22, 2006, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 272.
Ibid.
- 273.
Ibid.
- 274.
Ibid.
- 275.
Ibid.
- 276.
Norton 2007: 148–151.
- 277.
Achcar and Warschawsky 2007: 51f.
- 278.
Naṣrallah repeatedly pointed out that Hezbollah could have taken control over Lebanon by violent means (e.g. on August 27, 2006 in Noe 2007a, b: 402). His words may have reminded the Lebanese Christians of Mūsāwī’s statements in the 1980s, when he declared that Hezbollah was not attacking the Phalanges only because Israel was a priority: “The struggle against Israel takes precedence, because Israel is the largest and most dangerous enemy for us. Unfortunately, we do not have the means to struggle simultaneously against Israel and the Phalange regime. … We could deploy our fighters along the separation line or on Jabal Sannin [overlooking the Christian enclave of the East]. We did not because we are convinced that Israel is the head of the viper, and it is Israel that we must strike.” Interview with Ḥusayn Mūsāwī, Nouveau Magazine, July 23, 1988, quoted in Kramer 1989: 35.
- 279.
“Victory speech” of May 26, 2008, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 280.
Interview with New TV on August 27, 2006; Noe 2007a, b: 400–410. See also Norton 2007: 152–155.
- 281.
Norton 2007: 154–157.
- 282.
“Victory speech” of May 25, 2007, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 283.
Until the attacks of 9/11, Mughniyya was at the top of the FBI’s “Most Wanted Terrorists” list. See Haaretz February 24, 2008.
- 284.
Ibid. See also special section dedicated to Mughniyya on the Moqawama website. www.moqawama.org. Accessed 10 Jan 2019.
- 285.
Funeral speech on February 14, 2008, aired on al-Manār TV. Also the MNF attacks of 1983 were described as a “punishment” in Hezbollah’s “Open Letter”.
- 286.
Ibid.
- 287.
Ibid.
- 288.
Qāsim 2005: 109f.
- 289.
Quoted in The Times, January 16, 2009.
- 290.
Funeral speech on February 14, 2008, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 291.
For instance, in New Delhi and Tiflis, (February 2012), Burgas (July 2012), and in Azerbaijan (January 2009, thwarted), in Baku (January 2012, thwarted) and Bangkok (February 2012, thwarted). The attacks in India and Georgia were carried out on the fourth anniversary of Mughniyya’s death. The suicide attack in in Burgas, Bulgaria was the first incident in Europe and contributed to the European Union’s decision to declare Hezbollah a terrorist organization. See Norton 2018: 173.
- 292.
Funeral speech on February 14, 2008, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 293.
- 294.
“Victory speech” of May 26, 2008, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 295.
Ibid.
- 296.
Marcus 2018: 106–108.
- 297.
The bodies of Ehud Goldwasser and Zvi Regev were handed over to Israel on July 16, 2008 in exchange for Samīr Qunṭār and the bodies of 199 Palestinian and Lebanese fighters. Haaretz, July 17, 2008. The prisoner exchange – dubbed after Mughniyya’s birth name “Operation Redwan” – was celebrated as another victory for the Resistance.
- 298.
Hezbollah “victory” rally on August 14, 2009, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 299.
See speech of Muḥarram 10, 2011 (December 5, 2011), delivered in a rare live appearance in Southern Beirut, aired on al-Manār TV. See also speech delivered on March 4, 2012, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 300.
Printed in Alagha 2011: 124f.
- 301.
Ibid.
- 302.
Ibid: 130f.
- 303.
Ibid: 135f.
- 304.
Naṣrallah on August 26, 2011, aired on al-Manār TV.
- 305.
Lavie 2010.
- 306.
Levitt 2013: 16.
- 307.
Wright and Hidler 2012.
- 308.
Crily 2011.
- 309.
Alami 2017b.
- 310.
The Daily Star. 2013. March 14, PSP slam Hezbollah activities in Syria. February 19 (no author).
- 311.
YaLibnan. 2013. Hezbollah fighters dying in Syria will go to hell, Tufaili. February 23 (no author).
- 312.
Barnard 2013.
- 313.
Sullivan 2014.
- 314.
Speech on May 25, 2013, aired on al-Manār TV; Barnard 2013.
- 315.
Sullivan 2014.
- 316.
Samaha 2015.
- 317.
Perry and Bassam 2016.
- 318.
Interview with as-Safīr, November 16, 2016.
- 319.
Reuters. 2016. Lebanon central bank says must comply with U.S. Hezbollah law, May 17, (no author).
- 320.
Al-Monitor. 2017. Aoun sees role for Hezbollah until threats to Lebanon cease. September 21, (no author); Reuters 2017. Aoun, Hariri’s Hezbollah comments lay bare Lebanon’s political divide, February 14, (no author).
- 321.
Wright 2018.
- 322.
Alami 2017b.
- 323.
Dubin 2017.
- 324.
Jones and Markusen 2018.
- 325.
Landau 2018.
- 326.
Halbfinger 2018.
- 327.
Bennett 2017.
- 328.
Kershner and Barnard 2018.
- 329.
Speech aired on al-Manār TV, February 11, 2018.
- 330.
Dagher 2018.
- 331.
Kershner 2018.
- 332.
Kershner and Halbfinger 2018.
- 333.
Naṣrallah’s speech aired on al-Manār TV, May 14, 2018.
- 334.
Hubbard and Saad 2018.
- 335.
Naṣrallah’s speech aired on al-Manār TV, June 8, 2018.
- 336.
Toumaj 2018.
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Windecker, G. (2023). Naṣrallah and the Power of Martyrdom. In: Between Jabal ʿAmil, Karbala and Jerusalem. Muslims in Global Societies Series, vol 11. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38450-9_5
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