Rationalistic Philosophizing

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Essays in Philosophical Synthesis

Abstract

The difference between judgments grounded on taste and inclination and those rooted in variable situational and circumstantial factors is crucial throughout the sphere of philosophical concern. It exerts its impact on every front and pervasively explains why the absence of consensus is pervasively unable to impede the impetus of rationality.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Wolfram Sieman, Metternich (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019), p. 172.

  2. 2.

    William James, “The Sentiment of Rationality,” in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), p. 109.

  3. 3.

    Michael Dummett, “Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59 (1956–1959): 159–170 (see, p. 160); reptd. in Truth and Other Enigmas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978). C. S. Peirce sometimes asserted a similar view.

  4. 4.

    This aspect of objectivity was justly stressed in the “Second Analogy” of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, though his discussion rests on ideas already contemplated by Leibniz. See the Philosophische Schriften, edited by C. I. Gerhardt, Vol. VII (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1890), pp. 319–20.

  5. 5.

    Further aspects of the systemic nature of truth is explored in the author’s The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

  6. 6.

    John Kekes, The Nature of Philosophy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1980), p. 196.

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Rescher, N. (2023). Rationalistic Philosophizing. In: Essays in Philosophical Synthesis. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-34287-5_11

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