Abstract
The fall of Muhammad Riza Shah Pahlavi’s monarchy in Iran in February 1979 was one of the major political events of modern history. The Islamic Revolution (or the 1978–1979 Revolution), which overthrew the Shah, was led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who had been exiled from Iran in 1964 due to his opposition to Shah’s reforms and to the grant of capitulations to US personnel serving in Iran. Said Amir Arjomand has assessed that most observers and participants in the demonstrations against the Shah (January 1978–January 1979) “did not make much headway in comprehending the unfolding revolution,” which was neither “bourgeois” nor “proletarian,” and “whose slogans emphasized neither democracy nor progress.” Instead, it was led by Shi‘a clergymen in attempt to turn the nation into an authoritarian, theocratic Islamic Republic.
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Notes
- 1.
Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988, 4.
- 2.
Several books have been written about the collapse of Iran’s political order. For instance, the following books provide highly important historical perspective, which can help to understand both the causes and the consequences of this revolution: Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown; Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America’s Tragic Encounter with Iran, New York, NY: Random House, 1985; Marvin Zonis, Majestic Failure: The fall of the Shah, Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1991; Gary Sick, October Surprise: America’s Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan, London: I.B. Tauris, 1991; Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1980; William Shawcross, The Shah’s Last Ride: The Fate of an Ally, New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1988; Amir Taheri, The Persian Night: Iran under the Khomeinist Revolution, New York, NY: Encounter Books, 2010; Shaul Bakhash, The Politics of Oil and Revolution in Iran, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1982; Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution, New York, NY: Basic Books, 1984, Nikki Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.
- 3.
The early members of the Tudeh Party were from a group of 53 leading members of the Iranian Communist Party, who were arrested in 1937. They were released in two waves, the first one being at the end of September 1941, and the second in February 1942, after which the Hizb-is Tudah-yi Iran was formally established.
- 4.
Behrooz quoted Donald N. Wilber’s report Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran: November 1952–August 1953. Wilber served as a CIA analyst. See: Maziar Behrooz, “The 1953 Coup in Iran and the Legacy of the Tudeh,” in Mark Gasiorowski and Malcolm Byrne, eds. Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004, 102. See also: Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
- 5.
The UK Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) was also closely involved in the planning of the operation. The British were eager to replace Musaddiq following the decision of the Iranian parliament in March 1951 to nationalize the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), a decision which was initiated and pushed forward by Muṣaddiq.
- 6.
“Country Assessment Paper: Saudi Arabia” (confidential report), Christopher M.J. Segar (MED, FCO, London) to FCO (London), August 31, 1979, no. 4, FCO 8/3417.
- 7.
Interestingly, the seriousness of the Islamic Revolution, and its repercussions on the Saudi monarchy can be observed when the Jeddah daily newspaper Ukaz stopped publishing any pictures of women in its news stories right at the beginning of January 1979. In fact, it appears that almost every issue of Ukaz throughout 1978 had a page dedicated for women readers. As such, nearly every issue of the newspaper had fashion photos and advertisement, in which women posed in Western clothes (and without any head covering). The decision to stop publishing photos of women could indicate that the Saudis had calculated that they needed to portray themselves as more religious to prolong their monarchy.
- 8.
The Qatar News Agency (QNA) quoted Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal’s interview with the Saudi newspaper Al-Madīnah Al-Munawwarah, November 20, 1978. For the English translation, see: “Interview of Prince Saud al-Faisal,” FBIS, November 20, 1978, C3.
- 9.
“Kalimat ‘Ukāẓ” [Editorial of Ukaz], Ukaz, January 7, 1979, 1.
- 10.
“Kalimat ‘Ukāẓ” [Editorial of Ukaz], Ukaz, January 3, 1979, 1; “Kalimat ‘Ukāẓ” [Editorial of Ukaz], February 3, 1979, 1; “Ukaz Blames Soviet Union for Violence in Area,” FBIS, January 12, 1979, C2; Ukaz Scores Communist Encroachment in Iran,” FBIS, February 8, 1979, C5-C6.
- 11.
Fahd’s interview was aired on Saudi radio news (SPA) on January 6, 1979. He gave the interview to the Saudi newspaper Al-Jazirah on the same day: “Crown Prince Expresses Support for Shah,” FBIS, January 8, 1979, C1.
- 12.
Carter’s comments were printed on page A14 of The New York Times on December 8, 1978; Zonis, Majestic Failure, 257.
- 13.
Sick, All Fall Down, 110.
- 14.
“Kalimat ‘Ukāẓ” [Editorial of Ukaz], Ukaz, February 1, 1979, 1.
- 15.
As a senior religious Shi‘ite figure, Ayatollah Khomeini had followers not only in Iran, but throughout the Persian Gulf, mainly among the Shi‘a population. Furthermore, it is likely that the Saudis were concerned about the rapid spread of Khomeini’s cassette tapes, which contained his teachings. Since these cassette tapes had spread fast in Iran, the Al Saud might have been concerned that those tapes could also spread into Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, the Saudis might have also been concerned that Khomeini’s revolution could spread not only among the Shi‘a population of the Eastern Province but also among some of the Saudi Sunnis. For instance, the Egyptian Muslim Brothers had been supportive of Khomeini.
- 16.
Unlike Crown Prince Fahd, President Carter had avoided making public statements on Iran; see: “US/Saudi Relations” (report) (restricted telegram), Peter Jay (Ambassador, British Embassy, Washington) to FCO (London), January 16, 1979, FCO 8/3420.
- 17.
Bernard Gwertzman, “Stresses a Trip Would Be Temporary, but Return Is Viewed as Difficult,” The New York Times, January 9, 1979, 1. However, the American intelligence analysts were concerned that “Iranian military officers were positioning themselves to seize power if Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiyar fails to form a government friendly to the military establishment.” Jim Hoagland, “Prospect of Coup by Iran Military Concerns Experts,” The Washington Post, January 11, 1979, A1.
- 18.
“US/Saudi Relations,” January 16, 1979.
- 19.
“US Foreign Policy” (confidential report), John Wilton (Ambassador, British Embassy, Jeddah) to John Leahy (FCO, London), April 21, 1979, no. 22A, FCO 8/3420.
- 20.
The name of the newspaper is not specified.
- 21.
“The Impact of Iran on Saudi Arabia: Security Concerns and Internal Reaction” (secret report), CIA, January 26, 1979, no. 181, FRUS, vol. XXXVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, 591.
- 22.
Arnaud de Borchgrave, “The Saudis Play their Hand,” Newsweek, April 7, 1979, 37.
- 23.
In addition to Carter’s Iran policy, there were several other instances, which contributed to the impression that President Carter’s foreign policy was ineffective and indecisive. Perhaps one of Carter’s most significant failures was his inability to free the hostages taken from the US Embassy in Tehran (November 1979). As the hostage crisis prolonged, the American public grew impatient with the ostensibly indecisive president who could not win the hostages’ release. Another example of Carter’s weak policies was related to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (December 1979). In retaliation to the Soviet invasion, Carter cut off grain sales to the Soviet Union and issued a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics by the US athletes. Robert A. Strong has argued that “because much of the public considered this to be more punitive towards American swimmers and runners than Soviet leaders, Carter’s response only reinforced his weak image.” Robert A. Strong, “Jimmy Carter: Foreign Affairs,” Miller Center, University of Virginia. https://millercenter.org/president/carter/foreign-affairs. Accessed April 22, 2020.
- 24.
At the time, Adham still served as the head of the General Intelligence Directorate.
- 25.
Kamal Adham had had a discussion with the British diplomats in Jeddah on January 10, 1979. “Saudi Arabia/Iran” (confidential report), Tim P. Hollaway (British Embassy, Jeddah) to Anthony Layden (MED, FCO, London), January 23, 1979, no. 2A, FCO 8/3421.
- 26.
“The Impact of Iran on Saudi Arabia,” 588–589.
- 27.
The report only mentions his first name Abd Allah.
- 28.
“Saudi/American Relations” (confidential telegram), Wilton to FCO (London), January 16, 1979, no. 4, FCO 8/3420.
- 29.
It is possible that Carter had naively envisioned that the demonstrations could bring an end to the Shah’s undemocratic monarchy, and, instead, establish a democratic republic. However, the reality turned different, and the authoritarian and theocratic republic of Ayatollah Khomeini emerged. Furthermore, there exists a belief that the United States enabled the Shah’s fall as a revenge for the Shah’s quadrupling of oil prices (1973–1974) and for his growing involvement in world politics to the level of criticizing the world’s main leaders and countries quite harshly. As such, it is possible that the United States might have hinted the Saudis that if they would join another oil embargo against the US interests, then the case of the Shah should be a warning to it. Although it is difficult to contribute this kind of conspiratorial theory to Carter Administration, it could have well fitted into the period of Nixon Administration (and to the mindset of Henry Kissinger). Nevertheless, no evidence exists that could help to elaborate such conspiratorial theories.
- 30.
“US Foreign Policy,” April 21, 1979.
- 31.
Furthermore, it is useful to note that the People’s Republic of China has claimed sovereignty over Taiwan ever since its communist revolution in 1949 (especially because the overthrown government had exiled to Taiwan).
- 32.
“US Foreign Policy,” April 21, 1979.
- 33.
Strong, “Jimmy Carter: Foreign Affairs.”
- 34.
“Saudi Arabia: Annual Review for 1978” (confidential report), Wilton to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (FCO, London), January 15, 1979, no. 1, FCO 8/3416.
- 35.
“US Foreign Policy,” April 21, 1979.
- 36.
“The Impact of Iran on Saudi Arabia: Security Concerns and Internal Reaction,” 588–589.
- 37.
“US Foreign Policy,” April 21, 1979.
- 38.
Bailey, A Culture of Desert Survival, 187.
- 39.
See for instance: Jim Hoagland, “U.S. Moving to Repair Saudi Ties,” The Washington Post, June 12, 1979, A1.
- 40.
“Meeting with Crown Prince Fahd: Oil Matters” (confidential letter), Cyrus Vance (US Secretary of State, Washington) to John West (Ambassador, US Embassy, Jeddah), February 9, 1979, no. 188, FRUS, vol. XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 601–602.
- 41.
“Crown Prince Fahd” (confidential telegram), Wilton to MED (FCO, London), February 27, 1979, no. 17B, FCO 8/3420.
- 42.
Abir, Saudi Arabia: Government, Society, 75.
- 43.
For instance, Jim Hoagland wrote that “the Saudis indicated the visit […] was canceled for political reasons, while the White House insisted that Fahd was ill; see Jim Hoagland, “U.S. Gives Saudi Leaders Reassurances of Support,” The Washington Post, April 27, 1979, A2.
- 44.
“Prince Fahd” (confidential report), David Tatham (MED, FCO, London) to Alan Munro (FCO, London), February 27, 1979, no. 19, FCO 8/3420.
- 45.
Jim Hoagland, “US Uneasy that Saudi Crown Prince’s Power is Slip**,” The Guardian, April 17, 1979, FCO 8/3414.
- 46.
Hoagland, “US Uneasy that Saudi Crown Prince’s Power is Slip**.”
- 47.
Ibid.
- 48.
For instance, Prince Abd Allah told the Gulf Press Agency on April 23, 1979, that he utterly denies such rumors. (“Saudi Arabia,” MEES, April 30, 1979, 1–5) Similarly, in an interview published in the London newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, ‘Abdū Yamani, the Saudi Minister of Information (1975–1982), reiterated, that “we attach no importance to such matters.” “Interview Granted by Saudi Minister of Information Dr. Muhammad Abdu Yamani to Abd Allah Jafari in Jeddah,” Asharq Al-Awsat, August 6, 1979, 3, 7; “Minister Discusses Threats to Oil Fields, Energy Issues,” FBIS, August 10, 1979, C4-C6.
- 49.
“Cracks in Saudi Façade” (secret report), Gary Sick (Member, US National Security Council Staff for MENA) to Zbigniew Brzezinski (President’s National Security Advisor, Washington), December 22, 1978, no. 175, FRUS, vol. XXVIII, Middle East Region; Arabian Peninsula, 560.
- 50.
“Prince Fahd’s Visit to the US” (confidential telegram), Richard J.S. Muir (Staff Member, British Embassy, Washington) to David C. Beaumont (Staff Member, MED, FCO, London), February 27, 1979, no. 18, FCO 8/3420.
- 51.
Ibid.
- 52.
‘Flannelling’ refers to “meaningless talk intended to hide one’s ignorance or true intentions.” Robert Allen, ed., Chambers Encyclopedic English Dictionary, Edinburgh: Chambers, 1994, 468.
- 53.
“Prince Fahd” (confidential report), Tatham to Munro, February 27, 1979, no. 19, FCO 8/3420.
- 54.
Saudi Arabia and its allies—including the United States, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt—supported the YAR while the PDRY was supported by the Soviet Union, Libya, and Syria.
- 55.
Don Oberdorfer and Thomas W. Lippman, “Yemeni Border War Prompts U.S. to Speed Weapon Deliveries,” The Washington Post, March 1, 1979, A14.
- 56.
Christopher S. Wren, “Saudis Alert Their Army in Response to Yemeni War,” The New York Times, March 1, 1979, 3.
- 57.
“US/Jordan/Saudi Arabia” (secret report), Adrian Fortescue (British Embassy, Washington) to Roger Tomkys (Head, Near East and North Africa Department, FCO, London), February 12, 1980, FCO 8/3745.
- 58.
Ibid.
- 59.
Jordanian commando forces had also been present in Oman, and they left after the insurrection was put down.
- 60.
Richard Burt, “U.S. Sends Ships to Arabian Sea in Yemen Crisis,” The New York Times, March 7, 1979, 1.
- 61.
Yodfat, The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula, 106–107; Steven V. Roberts, Stephen Engelberg and Jeff Gerth, “Prop for U.S. Policy: Secret Saudi Funds,” The New York Times, June 21, 1987, 1; Arthur Schlesinger Jr., “Arms for Yemen. Qualms for Us,” The New York Times, April 9, 1979, 19.
- 62.
Jonathan C. Randal, “The Yemens: A Legacy of Hostility and Division,” The Washington Post, March 28, 1979, A25.
- 63.
The details of the failed CIA operation were leaked to the press more than six years after the events had occurred. Bob Woodward, “Carlucci Launched CIA Operation in Yemen That Collapsed,” The Washington Post, December 4, 1986, A1.
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Willner, S.E. (2023). The 1978–1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. In: Preserving the Saudi Monarchy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-30006-6_11
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