Abstract
In Chap. 2 I upheld Price’s argument that ARTL has negative repercussions for the metaphysical programme that seeks to understand how various different common sense categories can be placed in the natural world. But is there room for other forms of metaphysics within the parameters of ARTL? This chapter focuses on Amie Thomasson’s view that there is no defensible substantively epistemic metaphysical project once one embraces ARTL, especially the aspect of her view that seemingly intractable and inexorably contentious metaphysical disputes – about, say, what a person is, or a work of art – involve metalinguistic negotiation about the use of certain concepts with pragmatic aims in mind. Thomasson’s picture can seem attractive for a supporter of ARTL insofar as it paints a picture of philosophers, in particular metaphysicians, as engaged in meaningful and important work in spite of not being in the business of ‘map** out the fundamental structure of reality’. My aim in this chapter is however to question Thomasson’s picture of what metaphysics amounts to for ARTL, and to offer my own account of this. I will be arguing that her understanding of metaphysics as metalinguistic negotiation is problematic both because it fails to demarcate appropriately between those debates that plausibly are and those that aren’t contentious, and, more seriously, because it does not afford the input philosophers might provide to these debates any special significance beyond that which politicians, lawyers or other professional (or for that matter, non-professional) people or groups might provide. Moreover, I will suggest that her view that there are clearly demarcated analytic claims on the one hand, and clearly demarcated empirical claims on the other, which is central to her case, is problematic both in itself, and in running counter to the spirit of ARTL. In place of Thomasson’s view, and more in line with ARTL, I will suggest a view of metaphysics as something perpetually ongoing – though probably also never-ending – through our very use and reflection on language and concepts in relation to the goal of expressing our beliefs, i.e. what we hold to be true. Finally, and more speculatively, I draw on ideas defended earlier in the book to provide a kind of subject naturalistic account of a more principled divide between metaphysics and science.
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Notes
- 1.
Indeed, much of the substantive philosophy Price engages in is hardly scientific nor purely conceptual, so presumably should be understood as a form of ‘naturalised metaphysics’. See also Sect. 7.4 below.
- 2.
- 3.
Another theme in her (Thomasson 2007) was the threat traditional metaphysics seems to pose to the existence of everyday categories like ‘chair’, ‘table’, ‘human being’ etc., which can seem a prima facie undesirable consequence.
- 4.
- 5.
I am not thereby endorsing exactly that project, as Thomasson conceives of it – as I have already noted, I have reservations about this that coincide to a large extent with those Button adumbrates. However, I also think that we can still see philosophers’ competence as consisting in part in an ability for linguistic analysis that impacts metaphysical issues (see Sect. 7.4).
- 6.
Thomasson might point out that even if this were right, we still need philosophers to draw out the analytic truths underlying our talk. But, again, though this may gesture at one important role for philosophers, she clearly also sees a special role for philosophers in doing normative conceptual work, not just descriptive; and that is what I am questioning she can make sense of.
- 7.
Having said that, her sympathies with Carnap and Price suggest strongly that she would also oppose ‘placement metaphysics’ and insofar she may also have semantic objections to serious metaphysics. But the kind of metaphysics I am considering here goes beyond placement issues.
- 8.
Thomasson herself seems to accept this in saying that in addition to application conditions, one has to establish co-application conditions for a substantival phrase in order that it be seen as something we want to acknowledge as existing (Thomasson 2015: 264 ff.). Button himself is not hostile to this conclusion but thinks further considerations are also relevant. In any case the idea that analyticity itself can do much real (albeit trivial!) ontological work seems questionable.
- 9.
It can be instructive at this juncture to take up an objection to traditional metaphysics of Thomasson’s makes that I mentioned above but that I have not so far discussed, namely that traditional metaphysics is problematic in that competes with science as an account of fundamental reality. I am not totally sure what she intends to say by this, not least because it is not clear how many claims of metaphysics do so compete. It might allude to some of the critiques of naturalized metaphysics, which I will take up in Sect. 7.4. However, in referring to the idea of ‘reality’ she also arguably again reveals tendency at odds with the spirit of ARTL, as I understand it.
- 10.
‘The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term’ (Sellars 1963, 1).
- 11.
Price also suggests this is quite legitimate. This runs contrary to Ladyman & Ross’s ‘principle of naturalistic closure’ for naturalized metaphysics, roughly an idea to the effect that genuine metaphysical questions should be ones that can at least in principle might be answered by science. I have never seen a coherent justification for this principle, assuming metaphysics is possible at all.
- 12.
The phrase is due to David Wiggins.
- 13.
A further possible area of scientific research where my idea of a ‘subject naturalistic’ explanation of convergence in science might apply is theoretical linguistics: if we have, as Chomsky avers, something like an innate linguistic capacity, then theorizing about language and linguistic meaning might be expected to converge in virtue of being constrained to do so by our having this capacity. Following Price, I have mentioned Chomsky’s view as a possible approach to meaning a supporter of ARTL might develop instead of more usual communitarian accounts like Brandom’s (see Chap. 1), though have not said much about how we should conceive of such theories or what adopting them might have for how ARTL is conceived or my own development of ARTL in this book. One might worry (indeed, I do personally worry) about whether seeing a theory of meaning as constrained in this way is compatible with seeing metaphysical theorizing as unconstrained, and that is at least one reason I have relegated this discussion to a footnote. In spite of that, the general idea seems worth registering.
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Knowles, J. (2023). Metaphysics for Anti-Representationalists?. In: Representation, Experience, and Metaphysics. Synthese Library, vol 473. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26924-0_7
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