Reconstruction, EU Accession, and Reform of Ukraine

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Abstract

Anders Åslund’s chapter on Ukraine’s reconstruction, EU accession, and completion of structural reforms, discusses what to do when Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine finally ends. Preferably these three tasks would be combined. Hopefully, Ukraine and the collective West will combine and cooperate in these three processes. The driving force for Western support has become the informal G-7. Ukraine’s reconstruction requires substantial financing. Ideally, Russia should be forced to pay war reparations for all the damage it has caused in Ukraine. Preferably, the $300 billion of currency reserves of the Central Bank of Russia that Western countries have frozen should be confiscated to Ukraine’s benefit, but the West and international financial institutions also need to make substantial contributions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Åslund, Anders, How Ukraine Became a Market Economy and Democracy, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC, 2009.

  2. 2.

    Putin, Vladimir V. 2014b. Direct Line with Vladimir Putin, April 17, www.kremlin.ru

  3. 3.

    Levada Center, Approval of Institutions, Ratings of Politicians, September 14, 2022. https://www.levada.ru/en/2022/09/14/approval-of-institutions-ratings-of-politicians/

  4. 4.

    Anders Åslund, Anders, “Kremlin Aggression in Ukraine: The Price Tag,” Report, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, March 2018.

  5. 5.

    World Bank, “Ukraine: Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment,” Washington, DC: World Bank, August 2022, p. 14.

  6. 6.

    European Union, “ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT between the European Union and its member states, of the one part, and Ukraine,” Official Journal of the European Union, May 29, 2014.

  7. 7.

    European Commission, “Opinion on the EU membership application by Ukraine,” Brussels, June 17, 2022, p. 2.

  8. 8.

    European Commission, “Opinion on the EU membership application by Ukraine,” Brussels, June 17, 2022, p. 2.

  9. 9.

    Torbjörn Becker et al. “A Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine,” Centre for European Policy Research (CEPR), April 6, 2022.

  10. 10.

    Torbjörn Becker et al. “A Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine,” Centre for European Policy Research (CEPR), April 6, 2022.

  11. 11.

    Ukraine’s National Recovery Council, Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan, Lugano July 2022, https://www.urc2022.com/urc2022-recovery-plan

  12. 12.

    Dragon Capital, The Dragon Daily, Kyiv, October 3, 2022. Cf Antezza, Arianna, et al. “The Ukrainian Support Tracker,” Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Working Paper, August 2022.

  13. 13.

    EU Neighbors East, “EU Releases its First Tranche of $1 billion Macro-Financial Assistance for Ukraine,” August 1, 2022, https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/eu-releases-first-tranche-of-new-e1-billion-macro-financial-assistance-for-ukraine/

  14. 14.

    Dragon Capital, The Dragon Daily, Kyiv, October 3, 2022.

  15. 15.

    Dragon Capital, The Dragon Daily, Kyiv, October 3, 2022.

  16. 16.

    Becker, T. B. Eichengreen, Y. Gorodnichenko, S. Guriev, S. Johnson, T. Mylovanov, K. Rogoff, and B. Weder di Mauro, Macroeconomic policies for wartime Ukraine, Centre for European Policy Research (CEPR), 12 August 2022.

  17. 17.

    Hufbauer, Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J. Schott, “The United States Should Seize Russian Assets for Ukraine’s Reconstruction,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 21, 2022; Robert B. Zoellick, “Russian Cash Can Keep Ukraine Alive This Winter,” Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2022.

  18. 18.

    Kubilius, Andrius, “Ukraine: Our Next Steps,” Vilnius, July 6, 2022. https://elpnariai.lt/en/a-kubilius-ukraine-our-next-steps/

  19. 19.

    Becker, T, B Eichengreen, Y Gorodnichenko, S Guriev, S Johnson, T Mylovanov, K Rogoff and B Weder di Mauro. A Blueprint for the Reconstruction of Ukraine, Centre for European Policy Research (CEPR), April 6, 2022; Philip Zelikow, Philip and Simon Johnson, “How Ukraine Can Build Back Better,” Foreign Affairs, April 19, 2022; Ronja Ganster, Jacob Kirkegaard, Thomas Kleine Brockhoff, and Bruce Stokes, Designing Ukraine’s Recovery in the Spirit of the Marshall Plan, Washington, DC: German Marshall Fund, September 2022.

  20. 20.

    This section draws on European Commission, “Commission Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union,” Brussels, June 17, 2022; My view: Anders Åslund, Anders, Ukraine: What Went Wrong and How to Fix It, Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2015.

  21. 21.

    Julija Svyrydenko, “Kakuyu ekonomiku my stroim? (Vad för slags ekonomi bygger vi)?” Ukrainskaya pravda, July 8, 2022.

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Åslund, A. (2023). Reconstruction, EU Accession, and Reform of Ukraine. In: Aliber, R.Z., Gudmundsson, M., Zoega, G. (eds) Fault Lines After COVID-19. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26482-5_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-26482-5_9

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