Abstract
This chapter addresses the phenomenal experience of the I that is at the foundation of the realistic phenomenology of Hedwig Conrad-Martius (hereafter: HCM) (1966–1888). Focusing on HCM’s early book On the Ontology and Doctrine of Appearance of the Real External from 1916, the discussion strives to interpret the modes of the involvement of the I in the appearances of the real external world. It also extricates from HCM’s analysis of the external world two dispositions of the I: “passive and resting self-inclusiveness” (passive und ruhender Ichhaltung) and “active consciousness”. These two real dispositions correspond to two kinds of consciousness: as “saturated” (inprägniertheit), in itself the I illuminates itself by itself and as such that “objectively absorbs” (gegenständlich aufnehmende) the reality external to it. Moreover, these two dispositions correspond to two spheres of objects in the external world discerned by HCM: that of sensory manifest (sinnfällige) objects, regarding which the I conducts itself as a passive and self-including being vis-à-vis the phenomenality of objects. However, regarding the sphere of covert objects, the I is active and directed beyond itself, to the concealed essence that is covered over by the phenomenal layer of things.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes
- 1.
It used to be a prevalent criticism of the realistic orientation regarding the phenomenological school that it lacks an explicit discussion about the I and the issue of transcendentalism. For example, see Brecht’s criticism of the Munich Circle: Brecht (1948, 42 n. 2).
- 2.
Schmücker (1956, 39).
- 3.
The early phenomenologists understood Husserl’s appeal “go back to the ‘things themselves’” (Husserl, 1970a, 168/1984a, 10) as indifference toward epistemological questions. See: U. Avé-Lallemant (1965/1966, 207). For the relations between phenomenology and epistemology, see: Spiegelberg (1975, 130–131). Like HCM, who characterized the epistemological approach as dogmatic (HCM, 1916, 347) and incapable of co** with phenomenological questions (HCM, 1916, 351), Spiegelberg too criticized epistemology, which in its highly speculative accounts of how knowledge works omits its first and paramount obligation to be itself critical (Spiegelberg, 1975, 152).
- 4.
Doctrine of Appearance’s first chapter is an exploration of her first essay (HCM, 1920a, 10–24), which received an award from the department of philosophy at the University of Gӧttingen. Its subtitle “associated with a critique of positivistic theories”, as well as the debate with positivism throughout the text (HCM, 1916, 345–347, 352, 357–358, 361–365, 378, 382–386, 390–391, 398–400, 423, 425), clearly indicates its roots in the first essay. In 1912, Alexander Pfänder accepted Doctrine of Appearance as a Ph.D. thesis at the University of Munich (U. Avé-Lallemant, 1965/1966, 212). In 1913, the expanded chapter of the award-winning essay was printed and submitted as a dissertation, in a version almost identical to Doctrine of Appearance. In the epilogue that she added to the special print edition in 1920, HCM established her shift to ontology-oriented studies and seems to know that her original plan to develop the rest of the chapters in her essay on positivism will not be realized (HCM, 1920b, 130. See here also: Avé-Lallemant, 1971, 213).
- 5.
- 6.
Bringing a phenomenal-realist orientation to the I is a genuine achievement of HCM, which took place already in 1916 (!) long before Heidegger’s fundamental ontological investigation of the I in Being and Time (1927). A comparison between HCM and the early Heideggerian thinking is essential for coming to terms with the novelty of HCM’s approach to transcendentalism in Doctrine of Appearance and her later writings. Yet this exceeds the scope of this chapter. HCM criticized Heidegger in several contexts. See: HCM (1930 N, 1–42; 1954, 13–11; 1963c). For further reading, see: Behler (1956).
- 7.
In her entire oeuvre, HCM was committed to “essence intuition” (Wesensfassung), which she shared with the early phenomenologists of the Munich Circle who, apart from her, included a group of intellectuals and philosophers from Munich, the first generation of the phenomenologists, whose prominent members included: Alexander Pfänder, Johannes Daubert, Moritz Geiger, Theodor Conrad, Adolf Reinach, Dietrich von Hildebrand, Maximilian Beck, Max Scheler, Jean Hering, Alexander Koyré, Roman Ingarden, and Edith Stein. HCM referred to this method in many contexts, see: HCM (1916, 346–348; 1965a, 377; 1965b, 347). For further reading about the method of “essence intuition”, especially in the realistic school of phenomenology, see: Reinach (1921), Pfänder (1913, 325–404), Pfeiffer (2005, 1–13), Schmücker (1956, 1–33), Ebel (1965, 1–25).
- 8.
Similarly to HCM, Fritz Heinemann also wrote about the affinity of phenomenology to concrete being. He mentioned another essay by HCM (1965a), but not Doctrine of Appearance, in which she establishes this theme.
- 9.
The widespread use of the word “believe” (glauben) in Doctrine of Appearance (HCM, 1916) clearly indicates the adoption of the typical certainty that stands at the foundation of the Husserlian phenomenology, see in particular, HCM (1916, 355, 370, 398, 407, 413, 418, 423, 446, 496, 500, 513). Husserl regarded skepticism as a denial of apodicticity, i.e., necessary and universal truths that are essential for any theory to make sense. He distinguished between three forms of skepticism: “logical”, “noetic”, and “metaphysical”. See: Husserl (1975, §57–§61 214–226/1970a, §57–§61 134–141). As for Husserl, so also for HCM in Doctrine of Appearance, the metaphysical skepticism that denies objective knowledge of the real world is the most problematic. For further discussion, see: Wachterhauser (1996, 1–62, 227–238). Regarding Husserl’s certitude, see: Kołakowski (1975).
- 10.
- 11.
For the “semblance of reality (Aussehen einer Realität)” typical of perceptual objects, see also: HCM (1916, 356, 441 n. 1).
- 12.
- 13.
Herman Krings, who is admittedly influenced by HCM, explains that the focus on the object as a real existing being is not simply equivalent to the inversion of the Kantian beginning in which the I directs itself to consciousness. Here we assume that there is a real relation between the existent and the essence referring to it. Yet the possibility of knowing this existent is not implied therein, see: Krings (1960, 193–195).
- 14.
In her later writings, HCM continued to deal with affinity between the suchness of the object and its substantial being, see: HCM (1957, 57). See Gerhard Ebel’s criticism of the realistic direction in phenomenology, including HCM’s, for not being able to produce a genuine realism, which instead turns reality into a sheer “phenomenon” of reality that is therefore especially not real (Ebel, 1965, 2). Ebel admits that HCM brought to the fore aspects unnoticed by the realistic school. Yet in his opinion these are insufficient (Ebel, 1965, 42). For a supportive evaluation of this school for suggesting the suchness-experience alternative, see: Seifert (1995, 97–98). Like Seifert, Heinemann also speaks for the value of phenomenology’s focus on appearance; see: Heinemann (1960).
- 15.
Husserl explored his view of perception throughout his entire work. The often-discussed milestones are the following: the Dingvorlesung (Lecture on the Thing) from 1907 (Husserl, 1973, 105–139/1997, 89–115; 2002, 171–230) (“The Texts of July and August 1913”). See here: (Bernet, 2004; Melle, 1983, 101f; Russell, 2007, 92–97).
- 16.
In the literature, the “quale” denotes the contents of the subjective experience of mental states, usually excludes any intersubjective aspect. Thomas Nagel characterized the quale as “feeling itself in a certain way” (Nagel, 1974). Unlike HCM, some philosophers deprived the qualia of existence (Dennett, 1993), but most philosophers and natural scientists believe that the existence of the contents of the subjective experience is undoubted (see: Beckermann, 2001, 358). For further reading see: Lewis (1991).
- 17.
Spiegelberg presents the probe-resistance of objects to our will as an indication, sometimes even a strong one, of their reality; see: Spiegelberg (1975, 148).
- 18.
Spiegelberg characterized the peripheral field of our perception as “marginal openness”, meaning that this field is never cut as sharply as its borders. However, he emphasized that peripherality does not designate non-reality. What we perceive at the periphery of the field of perception are not only vague configurations, but mostly well-defined structures that are presented in decreased clarity. More importantly, we can still see via these modifications the phenomenon itself in its unaffected structure, rather than the structural openness of what is given in our perception’s field. This implies that reality does not culminate at the borders of our perception, but continues beyond that. Openness teaches that the phenomena of reality stand on their own feet. See: Spiegelberg (1975, 147).
- 19.
It is typical of the realistic approach in phenomenology to emphasize the difference between Being and being perceived. See: Geiger (1930, 170). Spiegelberg contended that “in principle, the situation is the same in all cases of sense-perception […which] can never give what is present, but only what has just passed. And since the past no longer exists, we can never see the original object itself but only its ‘trace’ which means its cast or likeness” (Spiegelberg, 1975, 156–157).
- 20.
Allegedly, the achievement of organ transplants contradicts HCM’s argument. Yet, it seems that the difficulties in implementing them, and the development of personal medicine, testify to the unsurpassable particular possession of the living body to the I. In this spirit, Pfeiffer noted that although HCM was not familiar with recent developments in medicine, one might draw lines between her basic intuitions and our time. See Pfeiffer (2005, 15).
- 21.
Husserl’s texts until 1907 refer to “anonymous” consciousness and regard it as a condition of its absoluteness. These texts strongly evoke the problem of the solipsism of the ego in Husserl’s early phenomenology. For further reading, see: Marbach (1974).
- 22.
- 23.
Spiegelberg noted, “Ultimately, all these organs are themselves phenomena of reality and so are the causal links between them”. This statement illuminates the problem with which HCM deals here as follows: “Is there a way back […] from the retina via the cortex and the mental processes to the original object outside which supposedly started the whole chain of physical and physiological processes?” This problem “makes sense only on the assumption that the physical objects, as the “stimuli” for our sense perception, our sense organs, and the physiological process within, are ascertained realities (…and) as long as it is possible to know some real objects themselves” (Spiegelberg, 1975, 150–151).
- 24.
HCM determines that our accidental perception of the external world cannot define it, and the possibility of looking into the reality of space as such “exists also in any directions and in any dimensions as well as above and beyond any ‘obstacles’” (HCM, 1916, 393). Like HCM, Spiegelberg also argues that genuine phenomena are not influenced by theoretical or other interpretations, while untrue phenomena collapse as soon as their falsification is uncovered. See: Spiegelberg (1975, 164). Spiegelberg’s ideas in this essay closely resemble those of HCM in Doctrine of Appearance. Obviously, he was familiar with her work, but surprisingly neither Doctrine of Appearance nor any of HCM’s later writings are not even mentioned in his essay. However, Spiegelberg provides the lacking but important background and explanation of HCM’s principles of realism.
- 25.
One should distinguish between the term “play” here, which does not express a diminishing in the reality of the appearance and the “play on the reality of objects”, which is typical of the perceptive attitude that indicates the weakness of its dimension of reality. See: HCM (1916, 379).
References
Avé-Lallemant, E. (1971). Phänomenologie und Realität, Vergleichende Untersuchungen zur ‘München-Göttinger’ und ‘Freiburger’ Phänomenologie (Habilitationsschrift). München.
Avé-Lallemant, U. (1965/1966). Hedwig Conrad Martius: Eine Groβe Philosophin unserer Zeit 1988–1966. Jahrbuch der Evangelischen Akademie Tutzing, XV, 203–212.
Beckermann, A. (2001). Analytische Einführung in die Philosophie des Geistes (2nd ed.). Berlin: De Gruyter.
Behler, W. (1956). Realität und Ek-Sistenz, Auseinandersetzung mit der Konzeption Martin Heidegger in Konfrontation mit der ontologischen Schriften von Hedwig Conrad–Martius (Dissertation). München.
Bernet, R. (2004). Husserl’s Transcendental Idealism Revised, The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy (NYPPP), IV (pp. 1–20). Abingdon: Routledge.
Brecht, F. J. (1948). Bewußtsein und Existenz: Wesen und Weg der Phänomenologie. Bremen: J. Storm.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1916). Zur Ontologie und Erscheinungslehre der realen Auβenwelt: Verbunden mit einer Kritik positivistischer Theorien. Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und philosophische Forschung III (pp. 345–542). Halle: Max Niemeyer.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1920a [1912]). Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus. Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (private print).
Conrad-Martius, H. (1920b [1912]). Nachwort. In H. Conrad-Martius, Die erkenntnisstheoretischen Grundlagen des Positivismus (pp. 130–131). Bergzabern: Heinrich Müller (private print).
Conrad-Martius, H. (1923). Realontologie, Buch I. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung VI (pp. 159–333). Halle: Max Niemeyer.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1930 N). Heidegger ‘Sein und Zeit’, Metaphysische Quellpunkte, Conrad-Martiusiana, A.III 6, 42 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1932bN). Die Problematik des Subjekts, Auseinandersetzung mit Eugen Herrigel ‘Urstoff und Urform’. Conrad-Martiusiana, A.III 8, 35 p. [Nachlass]. Bavarian State Archive (BSM) in Munich.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1954). Die Zeit. München: Kӧsel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1957). Das Sein. München: Kӧsel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1963a [1932]). Dasein, Substantialität, Seele. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 194–227). München: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1963b [1934]). Existentialle Tiefe und Untiefe von Dasein und Ich. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, pp. 228–244). München: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1963c [1932]). Heideggers ‘Sein und Zeit’. In Schriften zur Philosophie (Vol. I, 185–193). München: Kösel.
Conrad-Martius, H. (1965a [1956]). Phänomenologie und Spekulation. In Schriften zur Philosophie, III (pp. 370–384). München: Kösel (English translation: HCM 1959b).
Conrad-Martius, H. (1965b [1956]). Über das Wesen des Wesens. In Schriften zur Philosophie, III (pp. 335–356). München: Kösel.
Dennett, D. (1993). Quining Qualia. In A. Marcel & E. Bisiach (Eds.), Consciousness in contemporary science (pp. 42–77). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Ebel, G. (1965). Untersuchungen zu einer Realistischen Grundlegung der Phänomenologischen Wesensschau (Dissertation). München.
Geiger, Moritz. (1930). Die Wirklichkeit der Wissenschaften und die Mataphysik. Bonn: F. Cohen.
Heinemann, F. (1960). Erscheinen und Sein: Prologmena zu einer Konkreten Phänomenologie. In R. Wisser (Ed.), Sinn und Sein, Ein philosophisches Symposion (pp. 183–192). Max Niemeyer: Tübingen.
Hering, J. (1921). Bemerkung über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee. In Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, VI (pp. 495–543). Halle: Max Niemeyer.
Husserl, E. (1913). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie, Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, I (1) (pp. 1–323). Halle: Max Niemeyer (Reprinted in: Husserl 1952; English translation: Husserl 2012).
Husserl, E. (1952 [1913]). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, E. Buch, ed. K. Schuhmann, Husserliana III (1). Haag: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 2012).
Husserl, E. (1970a [1900]). Logical Investigations (Vol. I, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1975).
Husserl, E. (1970b [1901]). Logical Investigations (Vol. II, J. Findlay, Trans.). London and New York: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1984a and Husserl 1984b).
Husserl, E. (1973). Ding und Raum, Vorlesungen 1907 (U. Claesges, Ed.), Husserliana XVI. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1975 [1900]). Logische Untersuchungen, Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, Husserliana XVIII. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff (English translation: Husserl 1970a).
Husserl, E. (1984a [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (1). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b).
Husserl, E. (1984b [1901]). Logische Untersuchungen, Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, Husserliana XIX (2). The Hague, Boston, Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (English translation: Husserl 1970b).
Husserl, E. (1997). Thing and Space, Lecture of 1907. Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media, B.V.
Husserl, E. (2002). Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Erster Teil. Entwürfe zur Umarbeitung der VI. Untersuchung und zur Vorrede für die Neuafulage der Logischen Untersuchungen (Sommer 1913) Husserliana XX (1) (U. Melle, Ed.). Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Husserl, E. (2012 [1913]). Ideas, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology (W. R. Boyce Gibson, Trans.). London: Routledge (Translation of: Husserl 1952).
Kołakowski, L. (1975). Husserl and the Search for Certitude. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Krings, H. (1958). Das Experiment der Vernunft. In Philosophisches Jahrbuch der Görrres-Gesellschaft, Festschrift für Hedwig Conrad-Martius, 66 (pp. 48–62). Freiburg-München: Karl Alber.
Krings, H. (1960). Studie über Vorstellung und Sein. In Sinn und Sein, Ein philosophisches Symposion (R. Wisser, Ed.) (pp. 193–208). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer.
Kuhn, H. (1969). Phänomenologie und Realität. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 23(3), 397–402.
Lewis, C. I. (1991 [1929]). Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (3rd ed.). New York: Dover.
Marbach, E. (1974). Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Melle, U. (1983). Das Wahrnehmungsproblem und seine Verwandlung in phänomenologischer Einstellung. Untersuchungen zu den phänomenologischen Wahrnehmungstheorien von Husserl, Gurwitsch und Merleau-Ponty. Den Haag/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff.
Nagel, T. (1974). What is it Like to be a Bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4), 435–450.
Pfänder, A. (1913). Zur Psychologie der Gesinnung. Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung, I (1) (pp. 325–404). Halle: Max Niemeyer.
Pfeiffer, A. E. (2005). Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Eine Phänomenologische Sicht auf Natur und Welt. Würzburg: Orbis Phenomenologicus, Königshausen and Neumann.
Reinach, A. (1921 [1914]). Vortrag über Phänomenologie. In A. Reinach, Gesammelte Schriften. Halle: Max Niemeyer, 379–405 (reprint of: Reinach 1951; English trans.: Reinach 1968; Reinach 1969).
Reinach, A. (1951 [1914]). Was ist Phänomenologie? Mit einem Vorwort von Hedwig Conrad-Martius (pp. 21–72). München: Kösel (Reprint of: Reinach 1921b; English trans.: Reinach 1968/Reinach 1969).
Reinach, A. (1968). What is Phenomenology? (D. Kelly, Trans.). Philosophical Forum 1 (2) (New Series), 231–256 (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/Reinach, 1951).
Reinach, A. (1969 [1914]). Concerning Phenomenology (W. Dallas, Trans.). The Personalist, 50(2), 194–221 (Translation of: Reinach, 1921b/Reinach 1951).
Russell, M. (2007). Husserl, a Guide for the Perplexed. London: Continuum.
Schmücker, F. G. (1956). Die Phänomenologie als Methode der Wesenerkenntnis, unter besondere Berücksichtigung der Auffassung der München-Göttinger Phänomenologenschule (Dissertation). München.
Seifert, J. (1995). Was ist Philosophie? Die Antwort der realistische Phänomenologie. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung, 49(3), 92–103.
Spiegelberg, H. (1975). Doing Phenomenology, Essays on and in Phenomenology (Phaenomenologica 63). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Wachterhauser, B. R. (1996). Introduction: The Shipwreck of Apodicticity? In J. M. Edie & B. R. Wachterhauser (Eds.), Phenomenology and skepticism: Essays in honor of James M. Edie. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Miron, R. (2023). The Phenomenal Experience of the I: The Idea of the I in Hedwig Conrad-Martius’ Early Phenomenology. In: Hedwig Conrad-Martius. Women in the History of Philosophy and Sciences, vol 8. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25416-1_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-25416-1_8
Published:
Publisher Name: Springer, Cham
Print ISBN: 978-3-031-25415-4
Online ISBN: 978-3-031-25416-1
eBook Packages: Religion and PhilosophyPhilosophy and Religion (R0)