Abstract
Action theory in classical antiquity undoubtedly had in mind what we in this book have called “structural rationality”: How does the single action fit into a larger context of a practice or mode of action? Aristotle claimed that each action is an expression of a certain attitude (hexis), preference (prohairesis), or virtue (arete). Contemporary Aristotelian interpretations define arete either as a form of capability or leaning toward the behavioristic tradition, as a behavioral habit or disposition. Both interpretations are a watered-down version of Aristotelian virtue ethics. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explicitly states that while arete is formed by habits it is also (an expression of) hexis and prohairesis. This characterization refutes the objection that virtue ethics has no adequate understanding of persons because what is morally essential is determined by upbringing and belonging to a community. Virtue properly understood, however, is in fact that which we are responsible for, not our parents or other factors influencing upbringing. According to our conception, this means that virtues are also guided by reasons. It is always my reasons that determine my (evaluative) attitudes. And since my reasons are a decisive factor, I am responsible for their effects.
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Notes
- 1.
In German, I use the term “punktuell,” meaning something like “restricted to a point in time and social agency,” but there seems to be no perfect English translation. Therefore, in most cases “single act” or “individual action” might suffice, to make clear, what is meant, in other cases, as here, I use “pointwise” for “punktuell.”
- 2.
What cannot be thought of cannot be desired. However, some things that can be thought of cannot be desired. The desirability criterion on which Kant himself bases the application of the Categorical Imperative is therefore an even stronger version of the categorical imperative. Of course, we can think of a society whose people commit prudential suicide. If Kant is right, however, a society in which people commit prudential suicide is not desirable. Therefore, I am morally forbidden to commit prudential suicide.
- 3.
Cf. Davidson, Donald. 1963. Actions, Reasons, and Causes. Journal of Philosophy 60: 685–700, and id. 2001. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 3–20. In Chaps. 7 and 8 of this book, we reject the first assumption (1): Reasons are not causes in a naturalist understanding; that is, they cannot be described within the conceptual frames of physics or neurophysiology. And the second assumption (2) illustrates that (1) cannot be upheld; see also Sect. 4.6.
- 4.
In the following “decision theory” means “decision theory in the narrower sense.”
- 5.
Cf. RatC.
- 6.
Cf. Appendix, Battle of the Sexes.
- 7.
Cf. LkE, Chap. 5.
- 8.
Cf. Nida-Rümelin, Julian, Thomas Schmidt, and Axel Munk. 1996. Interpersonal dependency of preferences. Theory and Decision 41: 257–280.
- 9.
Cf. Simon, Herbert A. 1955. A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics 69: 99–118, and id. 1972. Theories of Bounded Rationality. Decision and Organization 1: 161–176; Gigerenzer, Gerd. 2010. Moral Satisficing: Rethinking Moral Behavior as Bounded Rationality. Topics in Cognitive Science 2: 528–554.
- 10.
The plural of praxis.
- 11.
Anscombe, Elizabeth. 1957. Intention. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 12.
Cf. Hart, H.L.A. 1948. The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49: 171–194.
- 13.
Cf. Pitcher, George. 1960. Hart on Action and Responsibility. Philosophical Review 69: 226–235; and most prominent: Feinberg, Joel. 1970. Action and Responsibility. In Doing and Deserving. Essays in the Theory of Responsibility. Princeton: University Press.
- 14.
Cf. Nida-Rümelin, Julian. 2018. Responsibility in Philosophy and Law. Keynote on the Symposium Rights, Responsibility and Justice. 24th World Congress of Philosophy in Bei**g August 2018 (published in the Proceedings).
- 15.
For more on this, see Chap. 5.
- 16.
Davidson’s anomalous monism seems to be a version of the causal efficacy of reasons, but this is not the case. In fact, it is explaining away the causal efficacy of reasons. If the epistemic states of the agents are the causal effects of their genetic make-up and their epigenetic and sensory history, and if the respective action-guiding motives can be reduced to given desires that are themselves not the result of deliberations, the causal role of reasons vanishes in the sequence of causally determined natural events. Davidson assumes, that the respective combinations of epistemic and prohairetic states (belief/desire) are causally effective for the action that follows, but that there is no law that describes this relation. I agree that the regularity account of causality does not apply to human agency. I also agree that accepted reasons, that is, mental states, are causally relevant for what I do. But contrary to Davidson I am convinced that this speaks against monism: The efficacy of reasons cannot be described within the conceptual frames of natural science, and the fact that there are no lawful relations between propositional attitudes and acts (the anomaly) speaks against monism. The combination of anomaly and monism does not work. Either there are natural laws that causally explain how propositional attitudes result in acts, or monism has to be given up regarding the causal role of reasons. I opt for the latter. Cf. Davidson (2001).
- 17.
Cf. Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 18.
Cf. Plato. Politeia, book 10.
- 19.
Cf. Williams, Bernard. 1981. Moral Luck. In Moral Luck Philosophical Papers 1973–1980, 20–39. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 20.
Cf. Nagel, Thomas. 2013. Moral Luck. In The Philosophy of Free Will, ed. Paul Russell and Oisin Deery, 31–42. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 21.
Cf. Nida-Rümelin (2018).
- 22.
Cf. Nagel (2013).
- 23.
Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- 24.
Jonas, Hans. 1984. The Imperative of Responsibility. In Search for an Ethics of the Technological Age. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- 25.
Cf. Libet, Benjamin. 1999. Do we have free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies 6: 47–57; Libet, Benjamin. 2005. Mind Time. The Temporal Factor in Consciousness. Cambridge/Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- 26.
I’m alluding here to Sophia Thomalla’s marriage in Georgia, USA: “I don’t really remember that anymore,” said Thomalla, asked how it happened that she got married to Andy La Plegua, “Sometimes you do things in life without thinking them through.” Cf. Gala, June 11, 2016.
- 27.
It is not entirely clear whether the time of the decision really corresponds to the point in time the test person indicates. There might still be a difference between the time a person decided to move their hand and what they say about the position of the flying spot while they were making the decision.
- 28.
Libet’s experiment has numerous follow-up experiments, which either make the same mistake with regard to action theory or contradict Libet’s original findings. Cf. Henz, Sonja, Julian Nida-Rümelin et al. 2015. Stimulus-dependent deliberation process leading to a specific motor action demonstrated via a multi-channel EEG analysis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9: 1–14: A plausible explanation for the anomaly in Libet’s findings is that the negative potentiality that can be observed in the run-up to the hand movement actually represents a kind of readiness, just as Kornhuber originally assumed. The negative potential would then be the neurophysiological correlate to the readiness to move the hand and not the beginning of the causal process that determines the hand movement. Libet’s findings on a person’s veto option support this assumption. However, such anomalies no longer exist in normal scenarios where the choice of action is controlled by prior deliberations and decisions; that is, the neurophysiological correlates occur after the perception that determines a specific decision.
- 29.
I am alluding to a 1950s Catholic relic presented in a large modern building in Syracuse, Sicily, whose authenticity has been confirmed by a scientific commission of the Vatican.
- 30.
I use the term “structural rationality” in the sense exposed in this book. But there are different usages, too. For an overview see HandBook.
- 31.
An example that shows that the sequence of rational individual optimization may have detrimental results for a person is presented in the Appendix, The Smoking Example.
- 32.
Cf. Appendix, The Smoking Example.
- 33.
Cf. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Part 2, XI: “If a lion could talk, we would not understand him.”
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Nida-Rümelin, J. (2023). Structural Agency. In: A Theory of Practical Reason. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-17319-6_4
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