Keywords

1 Introduction

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Asia, and especially in South Asia, has had a different reception in the various countries of the region. While India has not officially signed up for the BRI owing to security implications, Pakistan has been one of the biggest recipients of Chinese investment under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Other South Asian countries, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka, have also joined China’s BRI, whereas only India and Bhutan are not BRI members. Overall, South Asia has been a priority zone for the “Early Harvest Projects” of the BRI (Singh, 2019). The BRI projects in Pakistan fall within the comprehensive economic cooperation of the CPEC, initiated in 2013 and formally launched in 2015, with an initial investment amounting to US$46 billion (Shah, 2015).

The first phase of CPEC under then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of the Punjab-based Pakistan Muslim League–N, or (PML-N) political party,Footnote 1 focused primarily on energy and infrastructure development projects. The second phase of CPEC corresponded with a change in government in 2018 to Prime Minister Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) political party. This led to a shift in dynamics for the corridor cooperation as Khan’s new government renegotiated the CPEC terms and conditions and focused more on socioeconomic projects. While CPEC energy projects were at the core of the PML-N’s development plans and re-election agenda, the new government revised the projects and budget allocations to fit its new political priorities. The second phase of CPEC has also allowed more space for military involvement, and further institutional build-up has strengthened its influence on the decision-making process, especially with the establishment of the CPEC Authority, initially chaired by a retired Army general, in 2019 (Baabar, 2019). More military control typically worsens the quality of democracy in Pakistan (Boni, 2019; Wolf, 2020).

As Pakistan’s democracy has had a tumultuous history of governance, with multiple military takeovers since its independence in 1947, democracy has never fully consolidated in the country. However, over the last decade, two successive democratic governments successfully completed five-year terms, with relatively free and fair elections in 2008 and 2013 (Afzal, 2019). Moreover, the 18th Constitutional Amendment under the PPP-led government in 2010 marked a shift towards increased federalism and decentralization (Waseem, 2010). In 2013, the launch of CPEC, under Sharif’s leadership, was welcomed by both federal and provincial governments. However, in the early years of CPEC, provincial grievances emerged, especially as the selection of CPEC road network “routes” and the allocation of funds prioritized Punjab and Sindh provinces (Boni & Adeney, 2020). With less space initially given to provincial perspectives, we have witnessed a shift towards more centralized decision-making. In 2018, under Khan’s government, centralization continued along with an enhanced and institutionalized role for the military with the CPEC Authority and new military-led coordinating bodies for CPEC management. Pakistan has been moving towards a weak-civilian and strong military-state hybrid regime type (Siddiqa, 2020) which hinders the prospects of democracy in the country (Boni, 2019).

Is this centralization and increased military involvement in CPEC decision-making due to increased Chinese engagement, or is it due to domestic political dynamics in Pakistan? To understand the impact of Chinese engagement under CPEC on the level of democracy in Pakistan, I use a multidimensional concept and framework of “linkage” to grasp various levels of engagement with China. The “international linkages” are the cross-border connections that countries develop across various socioeconomic and political aspects (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Given this, I analyse Pakistan’s linkage with China under CPEC vis-à-vis the democratic decline in Pakistan and argue that the centralization under CPEC and the prominent role of the military in the CPEC decision-making can be understood to be one of the main factors for democratic decline in the CPEC period.

This chapter proceeds in the following manner. First, it carves out the CPEC portfolio in the light of the BRI, including its projects, financing and investment, sectoral allocation, and geographical distribution within Pakistan since 2013. Second, it discusses the Chinese Linkage under CPEC, its conceptualization, and patterns in the handling and implementation of projects. Third, the chapter examines the level of (de)democratization with increased Chinese engagement and traces the domestic political changes and mechanisms under the CPEC. Finally, the conclusion presents some key implications and the way forward.

2 What is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor?

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC, or **-巴基斯坦经济走廊 in Chinese) was initiated in 2013 when Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Pakistan and both countries agreed on “Deepening Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, 2020). Later, during President **’s state visit to Pakistan in April 2015, a series of memorandums of understanding were signed regarding an estimated investment of US$46 billion for several energy and infrastructure projects which were later projected to be around US$62 billion. In 2017, the Long-Term Plan for the CPEC (2017–2030) was signed elaborating on the CPEC concept and its financing and investment mechanisms, among other things. The CPEC is a 3000-km-long network and regional connectivity framework linking Kashgar in ** countries (see Liu & Dunford, 2016; Ruwitch & Blanchard, 2017). However, others have criticized China for its neo-realist agenda, for asserting its power and resha** the international order (see Ferdinand, 2016; Callahan, 2016; Allison, 2017). Moreover, China’s growing engagement and increased ties have been described as “debt-trap diplomacy,” a threat to “liberal” order, and an impediment to democracy and peace in the countries involved in the BRI (Davidson, 2018; Spatafora, 2019; Tower, 2017). What is lacking in the literature, however, is a multidimensional concept and framework for understanding the various dimensions and levels of engagement with China. In the seminal work of Levitsky and Way, they consider “Western Linkage” to be a major explanatory factor for variation in democratization patterns. Could the “Chinese Linkage” under CPEC explain part of the variation in Pakistan’s democracy levels? I assume that linkage to China, among other factors, partly explains some important aspects of regime development in Pakistan, and it might allow us to observe some variation in the de-democratization patterns. Therefore, based on the theoretical framework of Levitsky and Way’s Linkage concept, I conceptualize the Chinese Linkage under CPEC along five dimensions. Such linkage thus involves intensifying or deepening economic ties, social ties, cultural ties, communication ties, and/or intergovernmental ties in terms of diplomatic and military cooperation between Pakistan and China along with participation in China-led regional or multilateral institutions such as the AIIB and SCO.

With several CPEC projects underway across Pakistan, closer ties with China have also manifested impacts on the ground. The CPEC stands to be an essential test case to map the impact of Chinese involvement under its flagship BRI project (Rafiq, 2019). Pakistan and China have had close bilateral ties in the past, but these ties were further strengthened under the BRI as both countries expanded their cooperation on a variety of energy and infrastructure projects. CPEC investment is not only the largest infrastructure package for Pakistan but also the biggest Chinese investment in any BRI country thus far (Shah, 2015). The first phase of CPEC reportedly created 51,000 direct jobs in the road infrastructure sector, out of which 48,000 jobs involved local Pakistanis (Tang, 2019). With the increased mobility of workers and engineers under CPEC, there has been a huge influx of Chinese expatriates in Pakistan. There were 20,000 Chinese nationals residing in Pakistan before the CPEC launch in 2013. With more ongoing projects under the CPEC, this number has risen to about 60,000 (Subohi, 2018). Cross-border mobility has also increased dramatically as many Pakistani students are currently studying in China under the Chinese government’s scholarship scheme (Dawn, 2017).

Additionally, numerous Chinese students are learning Urdu and participating in cultural exchange activities as part of the educational collaboration of the Confucius Institutes (CIs) in Pakistan. Before the CPEC, Pakistan had one CI which was founded in 2005 at the National University of Modern Languages (NUML) in Islamabad. However, after the launch of CPEC, four new CIs were established. Through these institutes, China and Pakistan have strengthened cultural collaboration, cultural exchanges, and language learning programmes.

Under the BRI, Sino-Pakistani media cooperation has also strengthened. The four CPEC Media Forums, and the meeting of media leaders, journalists, and a delegation of the Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors to discuss further media collaboration demonstrate Sino-Pakistani efforts to enhance media partnerships (The Express Tribune, 2018). The major news outlets in Pakistan such as The Dawn, The Tribune, and The News have increased the coverage of China. In 2017, the media partnership between the Chinese ZTE Corporation and the Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) was formalized to enhance digital television technologies and services, staff training, and content (ZTE, 2017). This agreement later came under the CPEC. The strengthening of such media cooperation and partnership indicates increased communication ties between the two countries in the CPEC phase.

With regard to intergovernmental ties, the number of official and high-level state visits between China and Pakistan has also increased tremendously, including high-level provincial or ministerial-level visits. Moreover, during the CPEC period, we have witnessed more military and defence cooperation, such as high-level military exchanges, joint exercises, training of military personnel, joint ventures for defence production, and trade of military equipment, aircraft, and submarines (MOFA, 2020). Additionally, Pakistan is part of the China-led institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), indicating close partnership and association.

All these factors, individually as well as collectively, have contributed to high Chinese Linkage in Pakistan. This high level of Chinese Linkage, however, does not seem to explain Pakistan’s low levels of democracy directly. Nevertheless, these linkages do overlap with the domestic politics and centralization patterns visible in the handling of the CPEC in Pakistan. To understand to what extent these linkages can explain the influences on varying levels of democracy in Pakistan, I examine the state of democracy in Pakistan vis-à-vis Chinese engagement under the CPEC to assess their interplay with the (de)democratic shift in the country.

4 CPEC and Democracy

In Pakistan’s political history, democracy has never fully been consolidated as the civilian governments were replaced by military governments thrice in the last 74 years (1958–1969, 1977–1988, and 1999–2008). This has weakened democratic structures and practices in Pakistan as the military has been pivotal in determining key policy areas even under civilian leadership (Boni, 2019). The democratic quality, hence, has remained low in terms of the level of transparency and accountability.

To examine the trajectory of democracy in Pakistan, I use Lührmann and Lindberg’s definition of democratization as “the process of moving towards democracy” (Lührmann & Lindberg, 2019), no matter how small that shift is. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data set covers different dimensions of democracy such as electoral, deliberative, participatory, egalitarian, and liberal democracy (Coppedge et al., 2020). I focus on the Liberal Democracy Index for the years 2000–2020 and the contemporary trend of both the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI) and Liberal Component Index (LCI). The EDI, based on Robert Dahl’s “polyarchy” (Dahl, 1971), captures essential electoral components such as clean elections, suffrage, elected officials, freedom of expression, and freedom of association, while the LCI captures liberal aspects such as protection of civil liberties, rule of law, and sufficient constraints on the executive by the judiciary and legislature (Coppedge et al., 2020).

Developed using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) data, Fig. 23.1 displays the range of democracy scores for Pakistan from 2000 to 2020. The PPP-led civilian government under President Zardari in 2008 paved a path toward more federalism and decentralization in Pakistan. Specifically, the 18th Amendment in Pakistan’s Constitution and the 7th National Financial Commission Award allowed for more autonomy to the provinces (Waseem, 2010). These changes enhanced equitable distribution and revenue collection for the provinces. 2013, with the PML-N government, marked the first time that a democratically elected government successfully transferred power to the next democratic government (Afzal, 2019). This allowed civilian rule to flourish in the country. Following the launch of CPEC in 2013, we see increased centralization and a decline in democracy levels from 2015 onwards (Fig. 23.1). In 2018, with Khan in power, democracy scores declined further along with the increased role of the military under CPEC, especially with the military taking leadership in key positions for CPEC project management.

Fig. 23.1
From 2000 to 2020, a line graph with three curves represents the liberal, electoral democracy, and liberal component indexes, with the liberal component index with the greatest values.

V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index—Pakistan (2000–2020)

Full size image

The scale ranges from 0 to 1, where 1 represents a higher score for democracy. Examining the LDI scores for Pakistan, the lowest score, of 0.1, was observed in 2000–01. From 2008 to 2013, democracy scores increased markedly from 0.24 to 0.29. However, in 2015, the democracy score declined to 0.27 and then to 0.26 in 2018. The democratic decline continued to an even lower score of 0.23 in 2019. This is partly due to the global decline in democracy (Repucci & Slipowitz, 2021) and partly due to domestic centralizing trends observed in the CPEC period. However, the LDI score of 2020 shows a relatively increased value of 0.25.

As Pakistan’s democracy levels have declined over recent years, specifically in the CPEC period (2013–2020), we see a corresponding decline in civil liberties scores from 0.54 to 0.43, freedom of association scores from 0.79 to 0.61, and freedom of expression and alternate sources of information index scores from 0.82 to 0.61 (V-Dem, 2020). This highlights domestically driven changes contributing to Pakistan’s decline in democracy. However, to what extent have Chinese Linkage and engagement under CPEC affected these democracy levels? This is indeed a complex question to answer. In the following section, I attempt to analyse two distinct phases: the first phase focuses on the PML-N Sharif government and centralization tendencies, and the second phase on the PTI-led government under Khan with increased military involvement related to CPEC. These two phases allow us to unpack the domestic political developments vis-à-vis Chinese “influence” under CPEC.

4.1 Phase 1: PML-N and Centralization (2013–2018)

Under PML-N, the first development which reflects centralized decision-making during the early years of CPEC was the selection of CPEC routes. Out of the four proposed CPEC routes, the emphasis on the Eastern route passing through well-developed Punjab (which is also home to PML-N’s voter base) was criticized by other provinces (Rizvi, 2015). By contrast, the Western route passing through underdeveloped Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, was not on the government’s priority list (Rafiq, 2017). The provincial parties and the opposition party led by Imran Khan demanded the routes be realigned in favour of the neglected regions (Hussain, 2019). This is evidence of partisan politics, asymmetric centre-province relations, and the Punjab-centric development policies of the Sharif government.

The second development related to centralization was the lack of discussion on CPEC in the Council of Common Interests (CCI). The CCI, being a constitutional body, deals with inter-provincial coordination for policymaking related to railways, electricity, mineral oil and natural gas, ports, and the development of industries (Zahid, 2013). As these come under the CPEC portfolio, the CCI was expected to play a visible role, however, the minutes of the CCI meeting in 2016 and 2017 indicated no major focus on CPEC (Boni & Adeney, 2020). The provinces insisted that the CCI should be given a deciding role in addressing the provincial disparities (Yousafzai, 2016). Moreover, the Senate Special Committee on CPEC also suggested granting the CCI the task of handling the provincial concerns of CPEC implementation (Ghumman, 2016). Despite the availability of the CCI, the Sharif government kept CPEC agreements and projects visibly centralized. Additionally, the provincial Chief Ministers were included in the meetings of the JCC in 2016 only. Although this step brought provincial representation to CPEC decision-making, it does not compensate for the side-lining of the CCI.

4.2 Phase 2: PTI and the Role of the Military (2018–2020)

With the change of government to Khan in 2018, the centralization trend continued, with an additional institutional role for the military in CPEC decision-making. The year 2018 was an “inflection point” for the democratic trajectory of the country (Afzal, 2019). As Khan’s electoral victory was a positive development for the Pakistani military (Afzal, 2018), it tilted Sino-Pakistani relations back to the pre-CPEC period where the military played a central role in the relationship between the two countries. As Pakistan’s internal security and foreign policy have historically relied on the military, even during civilian rule, the military continues to play a vital role in Sino-Pakistan relations (Boni, 2019). While a reliable civilian-led partnership with Bei**g developed under the Sharif government in 2013, the post-2018 period reverted to the earlier dynamics (Small, 2020).

Under PTI, the first development indicating a growing role of the military under CPEC was the establishment of the CPEC Authority by a Presidential Ordinance in October 2019. The CPEC Authority was initially chaired by a retired Army general—Asim Saleem Bajwa (Baabar, 2019). The second development was the formation by the government of the National Development Council, which consists of the Army Chief of Staff and other members of the federal and provincial governments (Khan, 2019). As this council is responsible for formulating policies for development and providing guidelines for regional connectivity, it crafts more space for the military in the policymaking related to CPEC. The establishment of the Pak-China Relations Steering Committee, which consists of 15 members including government representatives, armed forces, and intelligence agencies, marks the third development. This steering committee aims to streamline and expedite coordination for the execution of CPEC projects (Rana, 2021). These three developments demonstrate how new institutions with visible military leadership have been created that further centralized the CPEC decision-making process under Khan’s leadership.

The common denominator in both phases has been centralization. The difference between the two phases, however, is that the Sharif government kept centralized control over the CPEC matters more under civilian-led authorities, as exemplified by the coordinating body of JCC. In turn, the Khan government centralized with a stronger military presence in key decision-making on CPEC implementation. Although Pakistan’s military has always carried great weight in major policy areas, be it in a direct or indirect capacity, CPEC affairs have allowed the tilting of the scale towards more direct, top-down involvement of the military. Therefore, we can categorize the first phase of CPEC as more civilian-led governance with an “indirect” military influence, and the second phase as civilian rule along with more visible military involvement, particularly with Army officials in charge of CPEC management. As the notion of civilian control over the military is a prerequisite for democratic rule (Dahl, 1989), it becomes crucial to understand the extent of civil-military control under CPEC and its impact on democracy in Pakistan. As Wolf highlights, more military control constrains the civilian authority in its decision-making, and this is deemed antithetical to the prospects of democracy (Wolf, 2020). Thus, for Pakistan’s fragile democratic structure, such a centralization shift with more military-led institutions related to CPEC management could greatly influence de-democratization processes in the country.

This centralization and increased military involvement under CPEC may not be indicative of active Chinese influence but rather a passive “influence.” As China prefers centralized and effective implementation when it comes to CPEC matters, there is “pressure” on its Pakistani counterparts to deliver efficiently (Boni & Adeney, 2020, p. 450). Indisputably, Pakistan has accommodated Chinese concerns by providing more security for the CPEC projects and centralizing processes to ensure effective project implementation. Nevertheless, these “influences” are not strong enough to infer causation for de-democratization and specify cause-effect relations, at least not with the limited data and time frame at hand. These centralizing tendencies may occur in parallel with the handling of the CPEC, but these dynamics seem to be more strongly influenced by the politicization of the CPEC and domestically driven political changes and partisan politics in Pakistan, rather than being China-driven. Therefore, I find that domestic influences on Pakistan’s de-democratization are stronger than China’s influences.

5 Conclusion

This chapter provided an in-depth assessment of CPEC investment, projects, and sectoral allocation since the BRI’s official launch in 2013, and the impact of these on Pakistan’s democracy. Tracing the Pakistan-China dynamics in the early stages of CPEC implementation, one can say that all the aspects and events—the PML-N’s energy-focused project selection, the CPEC controversies, the partisan politics, the non-inclusion of Chief Ministers in the JCC until 2016, and the emergence of the provincial grievances—have helped to shape and reshape the trajectory of the CPEC and indicate a strong shift towards centralization. The first phase of CPEC showed patterns of centralized decision-making under the civilian-led government of Sharif. However, centralization further deepened with the 2018 change of government. The PTI-led second phase of CPEC was not devoid of partisan dynamics as the terms and conditions of the projects were renegotiated and budget allocations were revised. Centralization continued despite these changes, in addition to more visible and institutionalized military involvement in CPEC policymaking and implementation. Pakistan’s change in government, shifting political priorities, and efforts to maintain the CPEC successfully have taken a toll on the country’s democratic processes. The enhanced role of the military in CPEC related decision-making, as well as the above domestic developments implying centralization under CPEC, are considered to be the main factors, among others, contributing to the decline in the level of democracy in Pakistan during the CPEC period.

In putting forth the concept of Chinese Linkage under the CPEC, this chapter has argued that ties in all five dimensions—economic ties, social ties, cultural ties, communication ties, and intergovernmental ties—have increased in the CPEC period. However, this high degree of linkage in all five dimensions of Sino-Pakistani cooperation does not provide sufficient evidence to explain the declining trend in Pakistan’s democracy. More trade and investment, in fact, indicate the openness of the economy and increasing liberalization which, in turn, may contribute to processes of democratization rather than de-democratization. With the limited time frame and data, the analysis did not find a strong or substantial mechanism to show a de-democratizing effect of Chinese Linkage under the CPEC. Nevertheless, including the measurement of civil-military control as part of the linkage indicators might allow us to understand the varying patterns of de-democratization in Pakistan vis-à-vis its relations with China.