The European Union in the Doha Round: The Specific Case of Services Trade

  • Chapter
  • First Online:
International Trade Relations of the European Union
  • 256 Accesses

Abstract

This chapter analyzes the legal implications that the WTO services negotiations have for the European Union (EU) in the world trading system, as well as the legal consequences of the Nice Treaty reform of Article 133 EC (which then became Article 207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU]) in relation to trade in services. We shall explore the position of the EU in the Doha Development Agenda, as well as the trade position adopted by the EU and its Member States in the new services negotiations. From an EU law viewpoint, if the Doha Round had led to an international trade agreement, would it have been (1) a mixed agreement, signed by all EU Member States and the EU or (2) a pure Union agreement, signed only by the EU? The answer depends on the interpretation of the Nice and Lisbon Treaties with respect to services trade, as well as on whether there would be a separate General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) revision or just one global WTO Trade Agreement. What repercussion would this have for EU citizens in terms of accountability? An exploration of this issue as a mixed agreement and as a pure Union agreement is presented. The chapter concludes with several proposals and recommendations to reform the EU’s common commercial policy that could have generated optimal results for the EU in the Doha Round, specifically with respect to services trade, and in the world trading system more generally.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Subscribe and save

Springer+ Basic
EUR 32.99 /Month
  • Get 10 units per month
  • Download Article/Chapter or Ebook
  • 1 Unit = 1 Article or 1 Chapter
  • Cancel anytime
Subscribe now

Buy Now

Chapter
EUR 29.95
Price includes VAT (Germany)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
EUR 85.59
Price includes VAT (Germany)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
EUR 106.99
Price includes VAT (Germany)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free ship** worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
EUR 106.99
Price includes VAT (Germany)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free ship** worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Notes

  1. 1.

    Kerremans, B. “What Went Wrong in Cancun? A Principal-Agent View on the EU’s Rationale Towards the Doha Development Agenda,” European Foreign Affairs Review 9: 363–393 at 364 (2004).

  2. 2.

    The phenomenon of a pure Union agreement, whereby only the European Union (EU) without its Member States signs an international trade agreement, is accepted by paragraphs 2 & 3 of Article 133 EC, which was the legal basis for the EU’s common commercial policy prior to the Lisbon Treaty.

  3. 3.

    The biannual WTO Review of the EU’s trade policy released in February 2007 positively evaluated the EC’s contribution to the multilateral system and the ongoing Doha Round negotiations. The Report also noted the EC’s efforts to assist the integration of develo** countries into the world trading system. The report recognized the major steps taken over the last two years in consolidating EU enlargement and the EU’s internal market, and noted the emerging benefits of the EU’s reform of its common agricultural policy. See European Commission, “WTO acknowledges crucial EU role in the multilateral trading system,” 26 February 2007, available at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/newround/pr260207_en.htm (last visited March 5, 2007).

  4. 4.

    See Article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture and Article XIX of GATS. See also Tangermann, S. “Europe’s Agricultural Policies and the Millennium Round,” (1999) The World Economy, pp. 1155–1176; Patterson, L.A. “Agricultural Policy Reform in the European Community: A Three-Level Game Analysis,” (1997) 51 International Organization, pp. 135–165.

  5. 5.

    For an evolution of the services negotiations in the WTO, see World Trade Organization, “The New Negotiations,” available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/s_negs_e.htm (last visited February 28, 2006).

  6. 6.

    European Commission, “Cancun Special: Advancing the Doha Development Agenda,” available at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/newround/doha_da/cancun/index_en.htm (last visited 18 July 2003).

  7. 7.

    Mandelson, P. “The European Union in the Global Age,” Policy Network, 2007, pp. 1–33.

  8. 8.

    There was a proposal by Enterprise and Industry Commissioner Günter Verheugen, who suggested that EU Member States should be allowed to impose a green tax on imports from countries that are not part of the Kyoto Protocol. According to Verheugen, this would cancel the competitive advantage that foreign companies are gaining over the EU from not implementing costly emission-reduction schemes. EU Trade commissioner Peter Mandelson, however, called for a 0%-tariff deal on environmentally friendly technologies as part of the Doha Round, saying that such an agreement could help provide a global solution to climate change. Scrap** tariffs on green products would foster their development by making them more easily available to all nations. Such a pact would also create opportunities for European industries. The concern was, however, that, if tariffs are fully eliminated on relatively green products, such as natural gas, even cleaner technologies that are already available (or will become so in the future) will lose the possibility of enjoying any special trade advantages. Recently, there have been discussions for the international trading system to help hydrogen by providing special trade advantages for exporters and importers in order to enhance climate ambitions.

  9. 9.

    Van Dijck, P. & Faber, G. “Preparing for the Future,” in Van Dijck, P. & Faber, G. (eds.) The External Economic Dimension of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 2000, pp. 353–372, at 364.

  10. 10.

    Bulletin EU 11-2001, Common commercial policy (2/16), “Council conclusions on the results of the fourth ministerial conference of the WTO (9–14 November 2001, Doha, Qatar),” available at http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200111/p106028.htm (last visited October 31, 2006).

  11. 11.

    See EU Official Documents, European Commission, “General Report 2001—Chapter VI: Role of the Union in the world, Section 3: Common commercial policy (2/42),” available at http://europa.eu/generalreport/en/2001/pt0876.htm#fn2 (last visited October 31, 2006).

  12. 12.

    As mentioned in the previous Chapter, there was no such thing as “a” Doha mandate, but rather a series of EU Council conclusions adopted in various phases of the negotiations which, together, constituted the Doha mandate. Although a negotiating mandate is not easy to find, since mandates do not tend to be published for obvious negotiating strategies reasons, these are as follows: Council of the European Union, “Preparation of the Third WTO Ministerial Conference—Draft Council conclusions,” 22 October 1999, 12092/99; General Affairs Council on the WTO, SN 73/01, 29 October 2001; Council of the European Union, “Special Session of the Council, held in Doha (Qatar) from 10 to 14 November 2001,” 21 November 2001 (26.11), 14018/01, PV/CONS 66; Council of the European Union, “WTO negotiations on agriculture: outline of the EC comprehensive negotiating proposal—Conclusions of the Agriculture Council (20 and 21 November 2000), 22 November 2000 (29.11), 13656/00; Council of the European Union, Press Release, Special Council meeting, General Affairs and External Relations, Geneva 30 July 2004, 11764/04 (Presse 237); Council of the European Union, “Council Conclusions on the WTO Doha Development Agenda,” 18 October 2005, 13445/05; Council of the European Union, General Affairs and External Relations Council, “Council Conclusions on WTO—DDA,” 21 November 2005.

  13. 13.

    See the views of Peter Carl in a report from the seminar on “Which Priorities for the New Commission in the WTO?”, in Stockholm, on Thursday 16 December 2004, available at http://www.sieps.se/_pdf/programoreferat/041216_referat.pdf (last visited February 19, 2005).

  14. 14.

    For an empirical study on negotiating over trade with develo** countries, see Odell, J.S. & Ortiz Mena, A. “How to Negotiate Over Trade: A Summary of New Research for Develo** Countries,” February 2004, available at http://www.usc.edu/enn (last visited June 21, 2005).

  15. 15.

    The concept of sustainable development refers to a form of economic growth, which satisfies society’s needs in terms of well-being in the short, medium and—above all—long terms. It is founded on the assumption that development must enable us to meet today’s needs without jeopardizing the ability of future generations to meet their needs. It involves both the industrialized and the develo** nations, and it has economic, environmental, and social aspects. In practical terms, it means creating the conditions for long-term economic development with due respect for the environment. The Treaty of Amsterdam makes explicit reference to sustainable development in the recitals of the EU Treaty.

  16. 16.

    See the joint initiative by the EU and the United States presented on August 13, 2003, to trade partners in Geneva (WTO) with a view to advancing the negotiations in the Doha Round toward a successful conclusion in Cancun, as requested by other trading partners, available at http://www.europa.eu.int/geninfo/query/engine/search/query.pl (last visited February 17, 2005); see also European Commission, “The Doha Development Agenda,” available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/newround/doha_da/index_en.htm (last visited December 27, 2004).

  17. 17.

    For an overview on the relationship between the EU and the GATS, see Eeckhout, P. “Constitutional Concepts for Free Trade in Services,” in de Burca, G. & Scott, J. (eds.) The EU and the WTO. Legal and Constitutional Issues, Hart Publishing, 2001, pp. 211–235.

  18. 18.

    https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/single-market-services_en.

  19. 19.

    https://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/your-service-develo**-economies-bet-service-industries-growth (last visited February 20, 2022).

  20. 20.

    Mildner, S. & Werner, W. “Progress or Stagnation? Services Negotiations in the WTO Doha Development Round,” Intereconomics, Vol. 40, No. 3, May/June 2005, pp. 158–168.

  21. 21.

    Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001, available at http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm#top (last visited November 7, 2006).

  22. 22.

    For an explanation of the commitments under the GATS in the Doha Round, see Adlung, R. & Roy, M. “Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Commitments under the GATS and Prospects for Change,” Economic Research and Statistics Division Staff Working Paper ERSD-2005-01, March 2005, World Trade Organization.

  23. 23.

    See “TNC: Lamy Outlines Doha Round Roadmap for Hong Kong and Beyond,” Bridges Weekly Trade New Digest, Vol. 9, No. 35, October 19, 2005, p. C-3.

  24. 24.

    Bernabe, J. & Cheng, S. “The Doha Round Negotiations on Services: An Overview,” p. 2. Paper prepared for a seminar entitled Realizing the Doha Development Agenda as if the Future Mattered, at the Salzburg Seminar, Salzburg, Austria, February 16–21, 2007.

  25. 25.

    See “TNC: Lamy Outlines Doha Round Roadmap for Hong Kong and Beyond,” Bridges Weekly Trade New Digest, Vol. 9, No. 35, October 19, 2005, p. C-4.

  26. 26.

    See speech by Lamy, P. “Why services are crucial for concluding the WTO Doha Round,” European Services Forum and the London School of Economics conference, 15 October 2007.

  27. 27.

    European Commission, “EU tables market access requests to inject momentum into WTO services negotiations,” available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/02/1001&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited March 7, 2007).

  28. 28.

    Hardstaff, P. “Benchmarking in GATS: Exposing the EU’s aggressive services agenda,” World Development Movement, November 2005.

  29. 29.

    See the Summary of the EC’s Initial Requests to Third Countries in the GATS Negotiations, Brussels, 1 July 2002, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/april/tradoc_116821.pdf (last visited October 25, 2006).

  30. 30.

    Public services do not have a precise legal meaning per se. See in this respect, Harlow, C. “Public Services, Market Ideology, and Citizenship,” in Freedland, M. & Sciarra, S. (eds.) Public Services and Citizenship in European Law, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 50–51; Scott, C. “Services of General Interest in EC Law,” 6 European Law Journal, 312 (2000); Marlet Garcia, E. “Public Service, Public Services, Public Functions and Guarantees of the Rights of Citizens: Unchanging Needs in a Changed Context,” in Freedland, M. & Sciarra, S. (eds.) Public Services and Citizenship in European Law, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 57–59.

  31. 31.

    See article by Borak, D. “U.S. and EU Increase Service Offer,” United Press International, June 6, 2005, available at http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20050603-041557-5328r.htm (last visited May 11, 2006).

  32. 32.

    Id.

  33. 33.

    For an analysis of the impact of multilateral services trade negotiations on the intra-EU’s provisions of services, see McMahon, J. “The World Trade Organisation Dimension: The General Agreement on Trade in Services,” Mitchell Working Paper Series, 4/2007.

  34. 34.

    War on Want is a campaigning charity based in London, England, which highlights the needs of poverty-stricken areas around the world, lobbying governments and international agencies to tackle problems, as well as raising public awareness of the concerns of develo** nations while supporting organizations throughout the third world. War on Want tends to focus on the root causes of poverty rather than its effects, and places importance on enabling people in poverty to solve their own problems.

  35. 35.

    See World Trade Organization, “GATS—Fact and Fiction,” Geneva, May 1998, pp. 1–17, at 9, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e//gatsfacts1004_e.pdf (last visited October 23, 2006).

  36. 36.

    See the views of Peter Carl in a report from the seminar on “Which Priorities for the New Commission in the WTO?,” in Stockholm, on Thursday 16 December 2004, available at http://www.sieps.se/_pdf/programoreferat/041216_referat.pdf (last visited February 19, 2005).

  37. 37.

    See European Commission, “WTO-DDA: EU ready to go the extra mile in three key areas of the talks” available at http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/622&format=HTML&aged=0&language=en&guiLanguage=en (last visited 27 June 2004).

  38. 38.

    For a historical perspective of trade in services for the EU, see Timmermans, Ch. “Common Commercial Policy (Article 113 EEC) and International Trade in Services,” in Capotorti, F., Eherlmann, C.-D., Frowein, J., Jacobs, F., Joliet, R., Koopmans, T. & Kovar, R. (eds.) Du Droit International au Droit de l’Integration, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1987, pp. 675–689.

  39. 39.

    European Commission, “Trade in Services,” available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/services/index_en.htm (last visited December 29, 2004).

  40. 40.

    As we know, the EU did not have a common external policy in services trade before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.

  41. 41.

    Langhammer, R.J. “The EU Offer of Service Trade Liberalization in the Doha Round: Evidence of a Not-Yet-Perfect Customs Union,” Journal of Common Market Studies Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 311–325, 2005.

  42. 42.

    See Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, (Conditional Offer) on 29 April 2003, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/march/tradoc_113003.pdf (last visited October 23, 2006).

  43. 43.

    Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States, (Conditional Revised Offer) on 2 June 2005, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2005/june/tradoc_123488.reduced%20cells%20v2.pdf (last visited May 11, 2006).

  44. 44.

    Bridges, “Members Looking at Potential Compromises on Services,” Vol. 11, No. 9, 14 March 2007.

  45. 45.

    Low, P. & Mattoo, A. “Is there a Better Way? Alternative Approaches to Liberalization under the GATS,” in Sauvé, P. & Stern, R. (eds.) GATS 2000. New Directions in Services Trade Liberalization, Washington, DC: Brookings, 2000.

  46. 46.

    See “Thousands of Protesters March on Hong Kong WTO Meeting Venue,” in Bloomberg, December 12, 2005, available at http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wto/3651.html (last visited February 27, 2006).

  47. 47.

    The “Green Room” is a phrase taken from the informal name of the WTO director-general’s conference room. It is used to refer to meetings of 20–40 delegations. These meetings can be called by a committee chairperson as well as the WTO director-general, and can take place elsewhere, such as at Ministerial Conferences. In the past, delegations have sometimes felt that Green Room meetings could lead to compromises being struck behind their backs. So, extra efforts are made to ensure that the process is handled correctly, with regular reports back to the full membership. In the end, decisions have to be taken by all members and by consensus. No one has been able to find an alternative way of achieving consensus on difficult issues, because it is virtually impossible for members to change their positions voluntarily in meetings of the full membership.

  48. 48.

    164 Member in 2022, see https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.

  49. 49.

    Oxfam International is a confederation of 21 independent charitable organizations working together with over 3000 partners in more than 100 countries to find lasting solutions to poverty, suffering, and injustice around the world. For further details, see Oxfam International, https://www.oxfam.org/en/what-we-do/about.

  50. 50.

    The argument of free trade as the basis for trading at the WTO is very controversial. Some authors demonstrate that success or failure is strongly influenced by how governments and private sector stakeholders organize themselves at home. When the system is accessed and employed effectively, it can serve the interests of poor and rich countries alike. However, a failure to communicate among interested parties at home often contributes to negative outcomes on the international front. Furthermore, it is argued that the WTO creates a framework within which sovereign decision-making can unleash important opportunities or undermine the potential benefits flowing from a rules-based international environment that promotes open trade. See Gallagher, P., Low, P. & Stoler, A.L. (eds.) Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation—45 Case Studies, December 2005.

  51. 51.

    Very rich literature exists in this field of knowledge. Among the numerous studies are, in a non-exhaustive enumeration, Breton, P., Scott, H. & Sinclair, P. International Trade. A European Text, Oxford University Press, 1997; Feld, W. The European Common Market and the World, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967; Hoekman, B. & Kostecki, M. The Political Economy of the World Trading System, Oxford University Press, 1995; Hosli, M. O. & Saether, A. (eds.) Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions. Experiences, Challenges and Constraints, Tacis, 1997; Jackson, J. & Sykes, A. Implementing the Uruguay Round, Clarendon Press Oxford, 1997; Jackson, J. The World Trading System. Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, The MIT Press, 1997; Jackson, J., Davey, W. & Sykes, A. Legal Problems of International Economic Relations. Cases, Materials and Text on the National and International Regulation of Transnational Economic Relations, West Publishing, 1995; Kaempfer, W. H., Markusen, J. R., Maskus, K. E. & Melvin, J. R. International Trade. Theory and Evidence, McGraw-Hill, 1995; Lanjouw, G. J. International Trade Institutions, Longman, 1995; Lasok, D. The Trade and the Customs Law of the European Union, Kluwer Law International, 1998; Markusen, J., Melvin, J., Kaempfer, W., & Maskus, K. International Trade. Theory and Evidence, McGraw-Hill, 1995; Qureshi, A. The World Trade Organization. Implementing International Trade Norms, Manchester University Press, 1996; Snape, R. H. Issues in World Trade Policy. GATT at the Crossroads, Macmillan, 1986; Trebilcock, M.J. & Howse, R., The Regulation of International Trade, Routledge, 1999; Matsushita, M., Schoenbaum, T.J. & Mavroidis, P.C. The World Trade Organization. Law, Practice, and Policy, Oxford University Press, 2003; Van den Bosche, P. The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization. Text, Cases and Materials, Cambridge University Press, 2005; Cottier, T. & Oesch, M. International Trade Regulation. Law and Policy in the WTO, the European Union and Switzerland. Cases, Materials and Comments, Cameron May, 2005.

  52. 52.

    For an analysis of the trade strategy of the EU and the United States in the Doha Round, see Falke, A. “EU-USA Relations in the Doha Development Round: Market Access versus a Post-modern Trade Policy Agenda,” European Foreign Affairs Review, 10: 339–357, (2005).

  53. 53.

    Interview with Mr. Plaza, Spanish trade diplomat dealing with international services trade, on March 15, 2006, in Madrid.

  54. 54.

    Several high-level trade officials—including the U.S. Trade Representative, the EU agriculture commissioner, trade ministers from New Zealand and Senegal, the agriculture secretary of the Philippines, the Brazilian fisheries secretary, and a representative of Chile’s foreign affairs minister—joined forces with the UN Environment Program (UNEP) and environmental group WWF to call for urgent action on disciplining fisheries subsidies in the WTO at a press conference in the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference. Pointing to the dire state of global fisheries, they urged WTO Members to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the Doha mandate to promote trade liberalization that also safeguards environmental and social objectives. New Zealand, the United States, and Chile—all members of the so-called Friends of Fish group that was the driving force behind the negotiations—emphasized the environmental dimension of the Hong Kong talks. Brazil, Senegal, and the Philippines stressed the need for effective special and differential treatment to account for the particular needs of develo** countries.

  55. 55.

    Numerous studies show that trade facilitation is a win-win game. Greater transparency and procedural uniformity at country borders could generate twice as much gain to GDP than tariff liberalization, especially for develo** countries because of their comparatively less efficient customs administrations. Despite the suspension of the DDA, EU Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson had called for WTO Members to pursue negotiations on a trade facilitation agreement and on an Aid for Trade package to address develo** countries’ capacity constraints and help them deal with the costs of customs modernization.

  56. 56.

    See speech by Pascal Lamy at the Annual Conference of the Parliamentary Network of the World Bank, Interactive video conference from Paris, on 22 October, 2005, available at http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/sppl_e/sppl11_e.htm (last visited May 11, 2006).

  57. 57.

    Id.

  58. 58.

    See EU Business “Mandelson turns hopes for WTO deal from Hong Kong to 2006,” on 11 November 2005, available at http://www.eubusiness.com/Trade/051111102313.7alkxnxc (last visited May 11, 2006).

  59. 59.

    Id.

  60. 60.

    EU trade commissioner Mr. Mandelson argued in Hong Kong that a great deal of U.S. in-kind food aid was tantamount to an export subsidy to its farmers. He said that the EU would be far more open to the U.S. proposal to eliminate export subsidies by 2010 if the latter agreed to move away from “fake food aid” toward less market-distorting alternatives such as cash payments to countries that require food aid but are not in emergency situations. Former U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman described the EU as “obsessed” by food aid, and suggested that the approach it favored ran the risk of making people go hungry.

  61. 61.

    Benchmarks are also known as “common baselines” or “targets and indicators.”

  62. 62.

    It is interesting to see the difference in perception and demand between the governmental and the non-governmental sectors in the Doha Round. Regarding the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, quite a few NGOs affirm that the right to food is a basic human right and that the WTO Agreement on Agriculture subordinates this right to corporate profitability. In this vane, some NGOs argue that the WTO Agreement on Agriculture fails to recognize that farming is a way of life as well as the basis of community and culture. Thus, these policies, as well as those of other trade agreements, foster further concentration and increase of power of multinational corporations, and cause the expulsion of millions of peasants from the land and production in northern and southern countries. Therefore, measures must be taken to promote and protect genuine food sovereignty (the right of peoples and communities to define their own food and agricultural policies, as well as the right to produce their basic foods in a manner that respects cultural and productive diversity and supports peasant-based production) as well as food safety and security, both for consumers and producers. The trading system should not undermine the livelihood of peasants, small farmers, agricultural workers, artisan fishers, and indigenous peoples. Some of these issues are addressed by the Nairobi Package of 2015.

  63. 63.

    In the negotiations on NAMA, transnational companies of industrialized countries were aiming to abolish all legislation that would impede them to export their industrial products to southern countries. Further efforts were being demanded from develo** countries, blatantly ignoring the principle of special and differential treatment hat these countries are entitled to in the context of the development cycle. Thus, they were being denied the tool that has historically helped the industrial development of northern economies, that is, protection of vitally important infant industries, before opening them up to the world market.

  64. 64.

    The model schedule is based on a standardized format for schedules defined during the Uruguay Round, but includes certain modifications to help describe more precisely the specific service being committed, and illustrations of schedule entries related to market access, national treatment and additional commitments that may be particularly relevant to that specific service.

  65. 65.

    An emergency safeguard mechanism is a form of safety valve to allow a government to support a domestic industry that is facing difficulties in co** with intensified international competition in the domestic market, due to trade liberalization obligations.

  66. 66.

    There were 164 WTO Members in 2022. Available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last accessed February 14 2022).

  67. 67.

    Additional commitments are commitments under the GATS made on regulations relating to qualifications, standards, licensing or competition matters, which do not discriminate against foreigners.

  68. 68.

    The GATS consists of a horizontal and vertical commitment framework. The horizontal commitment contains basic signatory obligations across the board to the entire WTO membership, whereas the vertical commitment applies to a service or sub-sectors thereof which governments have chosen to open up (partially, fully, or not at all) for competition. Each government must provide a schedule of commitment. The most relevant Article in the horizontal commitment is the GATS Article II on Most-Favored-Nation Treatment, while GATS Article XVII on National Treatment and GATS Article XVI on Market Access stand out in vertical commitments.

  69. 69.

    European Commission, “Trade in Services, Conditional Offer from the EC and its Member States,” 29 April 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/services/wto_nego/index_en.htm (last visited February 18, 2005).

  70. 70.

    Modes of delivery is a classification related to trade in services. Services can be sold in four different ways:

    1. 1.

      The service itself can cross a border (i.e., a sale over the internet);

    2. 2.

      It can be consumed abroad (i.e., a training course, a medical operation, or a tourist visit abroad);

    3. 3.

      It can be purchased from a foreign company that is established locally; or

    4. 4.

      The personnel of a foreign firm can travel temporarily to a host country to perform services (i.e., key management for a construction project).

    In practice, mode 3 is the most important, although this may vary by sector.

  71. 71.

    On the current commitments under the GATS, see a study by Adlung, R. & Roy, M. “Turning Hills into Mountains? Current Commitments under the GATS and Prospects for Change,” World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Statistics Division, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2005-01, March 2005, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200501_e.doc (last visited November 19, 2006).

  72. 72.

    For an analysis of the negotiating position of develo** countries in services trade in the framework of the Doha Round, see Marchetti, J.A. “Develo** Countries in the WTO Services Negotiations,” World Trade Organization, Economic Research and Statistics Division, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2004-06, September 2004, available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd200406_e.doc (last visited November 19, 2006).

  73. 73.

    Bridges, “Services: Domestic Regulation Leaps Forward, Market Access Stands Still,” Vol. 10, No. 26, 19 July 2006, http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-07-19/story2.htm (last visited January 15, 2008).

  74. 74.

    The plurilateral request has been focused on a specific sector or mode of supply. These request/offer negotiations, be they bilateral or plurilateral, are a process of direct engagement between or among Members. The process starts with submission of requests and continues with private meetings between and among Members concerned. Plurilateral requests will be addressed directly from the demandeurs to other Members to whom these are made. The WTO Secretariat is not systematically informed of such requests or their content. Neither the WTO Secretariat nor the Chairman attends meetings between and among Members in the request/offer process. Exchanges in those meetings are strictly private, unless otherwise provided for by the participants.

  75. 75.

    World Trade Organization, “Plurilateral Negotiations in Services Start,” available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/serv_28feb06_e.htm (last visited February 28, 2006).

  76. 76.

    For a reading of Annex C (annex on services), see the Revision of the Draft Ministerial Declaration in the framework of the Doha Work Program, Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference, Sixth Session on 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev.2, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/draft_text5_e.doc (last visited February 27, 2006).

  77. 77.

    Information gathered in an interview with Mr. Raith, Legal Advisor to the European Commission Delegation in Geneva, on November 7, 2005.

  78. 78.

    See Draft Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of December 17, 2005, Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference, Sixth Session, WT/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev.1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/draft_text4_e.doc (last visited October 22, 2006).

  79. 79.

    Mitchell Smith had already argued that “sectoral liberalization has advanced significantly [in the European Community] during that period [1990s], even if under critical constraints. It remains unlikely that a new conception of industrial policy will supplant the hegemonic position of competition, or fundamentally alter Europe’s state of liberalization.” See Smith, M. States of Liberalization. Redefining the Public Sector in Integrated Europe, State University of New York, 2005, p. 191.

  80. 80.

    See Annex C of the Draft Ministerial Text, the Doha Work Program, Preparations for the Sixth Session of the Ministerial Conference, December 1, 2005, JOB(05)/298/Rev.1, p. C-1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/draft_text2_e.doc (last visited October 22, 2006).

  81. 81.

    See Annex C of the Draft Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of December 17, 2005, Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference, Sixth Session, WT/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev.1, p. C-1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/draft_text4_e.doc (last visited October 22, 2006).

  82. 82.

    Paragraph 25 of the Draft Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration of December 17, 2005, Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference, Sixth Session, WT/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev.1, reads:

    [W]e are determined to intensify the negotiations in accordance with the above principles [and the Objectives, Approaches and Timelines set out in Annex C to this document] with a view to expanding the sectoral and modal coverage of commitments and improving their quality. In this regard, particular attention will be given to sectors and modes of supply of export interest to develo** countries.

  83. 83.

    See the Revision of the Draft Ministerial Declaration in the framework of the Doha Work Program, Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference, Sixth Session on 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/W/3/Rev.2, para. 7(b), available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/draft_text5_e.doc (last visited February 27, 2006).

  84. 84.

    See Draft Ministerial Text of 7 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/W/3, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/draft_text3_e.htm (last visited February 27, 2006). This document is a revision of JOB(05)/298/Rev.1, incorporating three amendments agreed by the General Council, namely the addition of brackets in paragraph 21 (Services), the removal of brackets in paragraph 53 (accession of Tonga), and the addition of some wording at the end of paragraph 34 (TRIPS & Public Health).

  85. 85.

    World Trade Organization, Working Party on GATS Rules, “Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States,” 12 July 2002, S/WPGR/W/39, available at http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2004/march/tradoc_113108.pdf (last visited February 27, 2006).

  86. 86.

    Geographical indications are place names (or words associated with a place) used to identify products (e.g., “Champagne,” “Tequila,” or “Roquefort”) which have a particular quality, reputation or other characteristic because they come from that place.

  87. 87.

    See speech by commissioner Peter Mandelson at the European Parliament in Strasbourg on January 16, 2006, “Conclusions of the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong,” available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/mandelson_sptemplate.cfm?LangId=EN&temp=sppm077_en (last visited February 26, 2006).

  88. 88.

    Evenett, S.J. “The World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong: What Next?” Journal of World Trade, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 221–238, 2006.

  89. 89.

    Bridges Weekly Main Page, “Lamy To TNC: Members Must Step Up Intensity Of Negotiations,” Vol. 10, No. 15, 3 May 2006, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-05-03/story2.htm (last visited May 11, 2006).

  90. 90.

    Id.

  91. 91.

    Id.

  92. 92.

    Id.

  93. 93.

    Mehta, P.S., Kumar, P. & Lodha, R. “Suspension of Doha Round Talks. Reasons and the Possible After effects,” CUTS International, SAFIT 2/2006.

  94. 94.

    Pascal Lamy, “What now, trade ministers?” International Herald Tribune, July 27, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/27/opinion/edlamy.php (last visited March 6, 2007).

  95. 95.

    Bridges, “Doha Round: Lamy Gives Green Light to ‘de facto’ Resumption of Geneva Talks,” available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-11-22/story1.htm (last visited February 4, 2007).

  96. 96.

    European Commission, “Research shows big potential gains from new EU FTAs.” Memo, 23 April 2007.

  97. 97.

    On the dilemma of bilateralism versus multilateralism, see Glania, G. & Matthes, J. Multilateralism or Regionalism? Trade Policy Options for the European Union, Centre for European Policy Studies, 2005.

  98. 98.

    Trakman, however, claims that bilateralism can actually help develo** countries in the world trading system. See Trakman, L. “The Proliferation of Free Trade Agreements: Bane or Beauty?” University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Paper 54, 2007.

  99. 99.

    After five years of troubled negotiations, the Doha Development Round, aimed at freeing global trade and at extending the benefits of globalization to develo** countries, was suspended following the failure of negotiators to reach a compromise about reducing farming subsidies and lowering import tariffs. The resumption of the Doha talks took place in February 2007.

  100. 100.

    Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that this proliferation of bilateral trade agreements outside the WTO process is perceived as betraying the multilateral ideals that underlay the WTO and its forerunner, the GATT.

  101. 101.

    European Commission, “European Commission welcomes adoption of negotiating mandates for new Free Trade Agreements with India, Korea and ASEAN,” IP/07/540, 23 April 2007, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/540&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (last visited April 24, 2007).

  102. 102.

    Council of the European Union, “Conclusions on the Recommendations to open Negotiations with Countries of ASEAN, India and South Korea,” 2795 General Affairs Council meeting, 23 April 2007.

  103. 103.

    Joint Ministerial Statement of the ASEAN Economic Ministers and the European Union Trade Commissioner on the Launch of Negotiations for the ASEAN-EU Free Trade Agreement (FTA), 4 May 2007; See also EurActiv, “EU launches free-trade talks with ASEAN,” 4 May 2007, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-launches-free-trade-talks-asean/article-163559 (last visited May 7, 2007).

  104. 104.

    EurActiv, “EU to start free trade talks with India, South Korea and Asean,” 24 April 2007, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-start-free-trade-talks-india-south-korea-asean/article-163321 (last visited April 24, 2007).

  105. 105.

    World Trade Organization, “Trade Policy Review of the European Communities,” WT/TPR/S/177, 22 January 2007, p. xii.

  106. 106.

    Euractiv, “EU, ASEAN to push for trade deal despite Myanmar,” 23 November 2007, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-asean-push-trade-deal-despite-myanmar-discord/article-168629 (last visited November 23, 2007).

  107. 107.

    UNCTAD, “Investment Policy Hub,” available at https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org/international-investment-agreements/grou**s/28/eu-european-union-.

  108. 108.

    Lloyd, P.J. & MacLaren, D. “The EU’s New Trade Strategy and Regionalisation in the World Economy,” Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 61, Issue 4, pp. 423–436, December 2006.

  109. 109.

    See speech given by Pascal Lamy to the European Parliament’s International Trade Committee, where he warned that the Doha failure will seriously weaken the trading system. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl44_e.htm (last visited October 24, 2006).

  110. 110.

    For an analysis of the main trends and characteristics of regional tradeagreements, in force and under negotiation, see Fiorentino, R., Verdeja, L. & Toqueboeuf, C. “The Changing Landscape of Regional Trade Agreements: 2006 Update,” WTO Discussion Paper No. 12, 2007.

  111. 111.

    The same argument was made by a WTO report, which claims that the EC’s decision to seek bilateral free-trade agreements, as well as its rising agricultural tariffs, could be detrimental to the Doha negotiations on a global trade pact. See World Trade Organization, “Trade Policy Review. Report by the European Communities,” WT/TPR/G/177, 22 January 2007.

  112. 112.

    Lamy, P. “US leadership will be key to the fate of the Round,” 23 April 2007, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl61_e.htm (last visited April 24, 2007).

  113. 113.

    EurActiv, “Assessing EU trade policy in goods,” 5 June 2007, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/assessing-eu-trade-policy-goods/article-164278 (last visited June 15, 2007).

  114. 114.

    Woolcock, S. “European Union policy towards Free Trade Agreements,” ECIPE Working Paper, No. 03/2007, p. 11.

  115. 115.

    A region’s gross domestic product, or GDP, is one of several measures of the size of its economy. The GDP of a country is defined as the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given period of time; European Commission, Trade in Services, available at https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/goods-and-services/services/ (last visited February 14, 2022).

  116. 116.

    EurActiv, “US business call for ‘transatlantic single market,’” 21 November 2006, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/us-businesses-call-transatlantic-single-market/article-159894 (last visited November 22, 2006).

  117. 117.

    European Commission, Trade in Services, available at https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/goods-and-services/services/ (last visited February 14, 2022).

  118. 118.

    Decreux, Y. & Fontagne, L. “A Quantitative Assessment of the Outcome of the Doha Development Agenda,” Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales Working Paper No. 2006-10, May 2006.

  119. 119.

    See Anderson, K., Martin, W. & van der Mensbrugghe, D. “Doha Merchandise Trade Reform: What’s at Stake for Develo** Countries?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3848, February 2006.

  120. 120.

    See speech by Lord Vallance of Tummel at the Seventh EU-India Business Summit in Helsinki on 12 October 2006.

  121. 121.

    For an explanation of the reasons for failure of the Doha Round talks, see Bridges, “Doha Round Suspended Indefinitely after G-6 Talks Collapse,” July 26, 2006, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-07-26/story1.htm (last visited September 15, 2006).

  122. 122.

    See WTO News—DDA June/July 2006 Modalities, “Talks suspended. ‘Today there are only losers,’” Summary 24 July 2006, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/mod06_summary_24july_e.htm (last visited September 13, 2006).

  123. 123.

    Id.

  124. 124.

    Id.

  125. 125.

    The International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC) was founded in 1987 with institutional support from the Rockefeller Foundation. Its first chairman was Lord Henry Plumb, former president of the European Parliament and a highly respected international farm leader. The organization started as a gathering of twenty-one volunteer members in Oxford, England, with a stated purpose of serving as a balanced, non-governmental group of leaders in agriculture that could enhance the policy dialogue by providing advice and counsel to governments and the interested public. IPC promotes a more open and equitable global food system by pursuing pragmatic trade and development policies in food and agriculture to meet the world’s growing needs. IPC convenes influential policymakers, agribusiness executives, farm leaders, and academics from developed and develo** countries to clarify complex issues, build consensus, and to advocate policies to decision-makers. See International Food & Agricultural Trade Policy Council, available at http://www.agritrade.org/about/ (last visited March 6, 2007).

  126. 126.

    International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council (IPC), “Doha Suspension: Today, we are all losers,” 24 July 2006.

  127. 127.

    See “U.S. chides EU on trade as WTO chief calls for big picture approach,” EU business, 29 September 2006, available at http://www.eubusiness.com/Trade/060920111214.gx969d35 (last visited November 6, 2006).

  128. 128.

    Lamy, P. “US leadership will be key to the fate of the Round,” 23 April 2007, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl61_e.htm (last visited April 24, 2007).

  129. 129.

    For an economic overview and analysis of the Doha Round until its suspension, see Ismail, F. “From the Hong Kong WTO Ministerial Conference to the Suspension of the Negotiations,” World Economics, Vol. 7, No. 3, 2006.

  130. 130.

    See press release of Finland’s EU Presidency on General Affairs and External Relations, Competitiveness (Internal market, Industry and Research), available at http://www.eu2006.fi/news_and_documents/press_releases/vko30/en_GB/164286/ (last visited November 6, 2006).

  131. 131.

    See Wolfowitz, P. “Path to Prosperity,” speech delivered on September 19, 2006 in Singapore, Press release No. 3.

  132. 132.

    The technical barriers to trade (TBT) are related to product standards and conformance. The aim of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement) is to ensure that mandatory technical regulations, voluntary standards, as well as procedures for assessing conformity with technical regulations and standards do not generate avoidable obstacles.

  133. 133.

    For an insight on the costs of EC’s protectionism, see Messerlin, P.A. “The EC Trade Policy and the Doha Round,” Aussenwirtschaft, 57 Jahrgang, Heft III, Verlag Ruegger, September 2002, pp. 271–298.

  134. 134.

    House of Lords, “The World Trade Organization: the role of the EU post-Cancun,” 16th Report of Session 2003–2004, European Union Committee, p. 13, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200304/ldselect/ldeucom/104/10403.htm (last visited March 25, 2005).

  135. 135.

    Friends of the Earth is an international network of environmental organizations in 70 countries. It is structured as a confederation, each member organization being autonomous. In turn, the national groups are composed of grassroots local groups working in their own areas. The groups which make up Friends of the Earth conduct their own campaigns and coordinate their activities through the umbrella body Friends of the Earth International (FOEI). Friends of the Earth considers environmental issues in their social, political, and human rights contexts. Their campaigns stretch beyond the traditional arena of the conservation movement and seek to address the economic and development aspects of sustainability. Originally based largely in North America and Europe, its membership is now heavily weighted toward groups in the develo** world.

  136. 136.

    Friends of the Earth, “WTO Deadlock: Good News for the Poor and the Environment,” 24 July 2006, available at http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/Friends%20of%20the%20Earth%20Europe_tcm29-156915.doc (last visited March 6, 2007).

  137. 137.

    On the relationship between environmental agreements and WTO rules, see a background paper by Ecologic, “The Relationship between MEAs and WTO Rules and EU Trade Policy Making,” Szentendre, 10 May 2004.

  138. 138.

    Friends of the Earth, “WTO Deadlock: Good News for the Poor and the Environment,” 24 July 2006, available at http://www.euractiv.com/29/images/Friends%20of%20the%20Earth%20Europe_tcm29-156915.doc (last visited March 6, 2007).

  139. 139.

    Oxfam International, “Suspending WTO talks resolves nothing,” Oxfam Press Release, July 24, 2006, available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060724_wto (last visited September 14, 2006).

  140. 140.

    Id.

  141. 141.

    See Oxfam Press Release, “Suspending WTO talks resolves nothing,” 24 July 2006, available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060724_wto (last visited November 21, 2006).

  142. 142.

    Oxfam Press Release, Oxfam International, Suspending WTO Talks Resolve Nothing, July 24, 2006, http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/pressreleases2006/pr060724_wto (last visited April 1, 2007).

  143. 143.

    See Greenpeace International, “’Face it, Doha is dead’: Time to look at alternatives to WTO,” Greenpeace Press Releases, 24 July 2006, available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/releases/doha-is-dead (last visited September 14, 2006).

  144. 144.

    Trade liberalization and environmental policies can and should be mutually supportive of sustainable development. Some aspects of the relationship between multilateral trade rules and instruments of environmental policy would benefit from clarification and from greater policy coherence. The DDA was meant to clarify the relationship between WTO rules and Multilateral Environmental Agreements. Another important aspect of the environmental issue in the DDA was the emphasis on liberalization of trade in environmental goods and services in the context of the market-access negotiations.

  145. 145.

    Greenpeace, “Is the WTO the only way?” 2 December 2005, available at http://www.greenpeace.org/international/press/reports/is-the-wto-the-only-way (last visited April 1, 2007).

  146. 146.

    See the Trade Promotion Act, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/tradeact/act1.asp (last visited November 6, 2006).

  147. 147.

    Bridges, “US Trade Policy Stuck in Neutral as TPA Mandate Winds Down,” Vol. 11, No. 21, 13 June 2007.

  148. 148.

    See the op-ed by U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab, “U.S. elections will not change trade talks prospects,” originally published in the Wall Street Journal on November 9, 2006, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2006&m=November&x=20061109115012SAikceinawz0.314953 (last visited November 16, 2006).

  149. 149.

    Ibid.

  150. 150.

    Ibid.

  151. 151.

    See the John Whitehead Lecture given by Peter Sutherland, “EU/U.S. trade relations—Is a free trade area an alternative to Doha?,” Chatham House, 14 November 2006, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/meeting_transcripts/141106sutherland.pdf at p. 3.

  152. 152.

    A similar view is shared by van Dijck, P. & Faber, G. “How to Save the Doha Round: A European Perspective,” European Foreign Affairs Review, 11: 291–309, (2006).

  153. 153.

    See the John Whitehead Lecture given by Peter Sutherland, “EU/U.S. trade relations—Is a free trade area an alternative to Doha?,” Chatham House, 14 November 2006, available at http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/meeting_transcripts/141106sutherland.pdf at p. 4.

  154. 154.

    Ibid.

  155. 155.

    See “Providing Leadership in the Doha Round,” speech given by Peter Mandelson at the Hindustan Times Leadership Summit, Delhi, 18 November 2006, available at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/mandelson/speeches_articles/sppm131_en.htm (last visited November 20, 2006).

  156. 156.

    Ibid.

  157. 157.

    See speech by Pascal Lamy, “We can stay on track to successfully conclude the Round next year,” available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/tnc_chair_report_14dec06_e.htm (last visited December 18, 2006).

  158. 158.

    The precedent for this comes from 1991, when the then Director-General of the GATT, Arthur Dunkel, drafted a comprehensive agreement text in an eventually successful attempt to break a deadlock in the Uruguay Round negotiations. Though roundly pilloried at the time, especially in develo** countries, the Dunkel draft eventually provided much of the basis for the final agreement concluded three years later.

  159. 159.

    EurActiv, “EU, US attempt Doha revival,” 9 January 2007, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/eu-us-attempt-doha-revival/article-160722 (last visited January 17, 2007).

  160. 160.

    Ibid.

  161. 161.

    Ibid.

  162. 162.

    Davos is a town in eastern Switzerland, in the canton of Graubünden, on the Landwasser River. Davos is famous as the host to the Annual Meetings of the World Economic Forum (WEF), an annual meeting of global political and business elites, which is often referred to as simply Davos. According to its supporters, the WEF is an ideal place for dialogue and debate regarding the major social and economic problems of the planet, since representatives of both the most powerful economic organizations and the most powerful political organizations are present, since intellectuals also participate, and since there is a generally informal atmosphere encouraging wide-ranging debate. Journalists have access to every session at the Annual Meeting in Davos and the majority of sessions are webcast live so that the debates can be open to a wider public. Whilst business and political leaders make up the majority of participants, NGO leaders from groups such as Amnesty International, Transparency International, Oxfam, and various UN organizations attend, as well as trade union leaders and religious leaders.

  163. 163.

    Let us remember that Article VI of the GATS mandated WTO Members to negotiate possible disciplines on domestic regulation. The December 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration specified that new disciplines should be developed before the end of the Doha Round. See Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN/(05)/DEC, 22 December 2005.

  164. 164.

    Elliot, L. “Bush seeks to renew authority to fast track trade deal,” The Guardian, 29 January 2007, available at http://business.guardian.co.uk/davos2007/story/0,,2001022,00.html (last visited February 12, 2007).

  165. 165.

    On liberalizing agricultural markets, the G-33 argued that liberalizing develo** country agricultural markets was never one of the objectives of the Doha Round. “This round is a development round, it’s all focused on market access from the develo** countries into the developed countries, not the other way around,” Indian commerce minister Kamal Nath said in Jakarta in the framework of a summit on 20–21 March 2007 whose aim was to call on industrialized nations to take the lead in breaking the deadlock in the Doha Round trade negotiations.

  166. 166.

    The World Social Forum (WSF) is an annual meeting, held by members of the anti-globalization movement to coordinate world campaigns, share and refine organizing strategies, and inform each other about movements from around the world and their issues. It tends to meet in January when its great capitalist rival, the World Economic Forum, is meeting in Davos, Switzerland. This is not a coincidence. The date was chosen because of the logistical difficulty of organizing a mass protest in Davos and to try to overshadow the coverage of the World Economic Forum in the news media.

  167. 167.

    In January 2007, around 30 trade ministers from the world’s largest economies breathed new life into global trade negotiations by agreeing to restart multilateral trade talks in Geneva. See EurActiv, “Davos brings global trade deal ‘in sight’,” 29 January 2007, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/davos-brings-global-trade-deal-sight/article-161252 (last visited April 21, 2007).

  168. 168.

    On the pros and cons of the revival of the Doha Round, see EurActiv, “Pros and cons of reviving Doha,” 11 April 2007, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/pros-cons-reviving-doha/article-158665 (last visited April 21, 2007).

  169. 169.

    Oxfam Press Release, “Davos meeting must signal change of direction in trade talks,” 23 January 2007, available at http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/2007/pr070123_davos (last visited February 12, 2007).

  170. 170.

    Action Aid International, “Poor will gain nothing from last ditch attempts to kick-start Doha deal,” 23 January 2007, available at http://www.actionaid.org/index.asp?page_id=1545 (last visited February 12, 2007).

  171. 171.

    Mercurio argues that systemic institutional impediments still exist, which not only hindered the successful conclusion of the Doha Round, but also prevent effective long-term institutional governance and vision. See, Mercurio, B. “The WTO and its Institutional Impediments,” (July 2007) University of New South Wales Faculty of Law Research Series, Working Paper 46, available at http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps/art46/ (last visited July 14, 2007).

  172. 172.

    Cabinet Office and Foreign & Commonwealth Office, “Global Europe—Meeting the Economic and Security Challenges,” October 2007, p. 9.

  173. 173.

    Bernabe, J. & Cheng, S. “The Doha Round Negotiations on Services: An Overview,” p. 6. Paper prepared for a seminar entitled Realizing the Doha Development Agenda as if the Future Mattered, at the Salzburg Seminar, Salzburg, Austria, February 16–21, 2007.

  174. 174.

    Lamy, P. “We have resumed negotiations fully across the board,” available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news07_e/gc_dg_stat_7feb07_e.htm (last visited February 10, 2007).

  175. 175.

    Id.

  176. 176.

    Id.

  177. 177.

    Id.

  178. 178.

    World Economic Forum, “Merkel Urges New Dialogue and Closer Atlantic Partnership,” available at http://www.weforum.org//en/media/Latest%20Press%20Releases/AM07_Angela_Merkel (last visited February 12, 2007).

  179. 179.

    European Business for Doha, “Save the Doha Round Now,” 25 January 2007.

  180. 180.

    The Global Services Coalition is a coalition of services industries such as the European Services Forum, the Australian Services Roundtable or the Coalition of Service Industries (CSI). As for the CSI, it is the leading business organization dedicated to the reduction of barriers to U.S. services exports, and to the development of constructive domestic U.S. policies, including tax policies that enhance the global competitiveness of its members. CSI was formed in 1982 to ensure that U.S. trade in services, once considered outside the scope of U.S. trade negotiations, would become a central goal of future trade liberalization initiatives. It played a major role in sha** the GATS and in the advocacy effort leading to the 1997 WTO Basic Telecommunications and Financial Services Agreements. CSI actively engaged in services negotiations in the WTO, the Free Trade Area of the Americas, and free trade agreements that the U.S. signed with Chile and Singapore. See http://www.uscsi.org/about/ (last visited March 7, 2007).

  181. 181.

    Global Services Coalition, “Progress in Services Negotiations Needed to Secure Business Support for Doha Round,” 21 February 2007.

  182. 182.

    Id. at p. 1.

  183. 183.

    Id.

  184. 184.

    Rodier, A. “Les negociations de Doha butent toujours sur le dossier agricole,” Le Figaro, 13 April 2007, available at http://www.lefigaro.fr/economie/20070413.FIG000000099_les_negociations_de_doha_butent_toujours_sur_le_dossier_agricole.html (last visited April 21, 2007).

  185. 185.

    EurActiv, “Trade powers agree to finish Doha by end 20007,” 13 April 2007, available at http://www.euractiv.com/en/trade/trade-powers-agree-finish-doha-2007/article-163122 (last visited April 21, 2007).

  186. 186.

    Congressional Research Service, (2012) “World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda,” CRS Report for Congress, p. 6, available at https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20121115_RL32060_c58ed63ea290bf8893f514e3e4173ef077754366.pdf.

  187. 187.

    Bridges, “G-6 Ministers Agree to Work to Conclude Doha Round by End of 2007,” Vol. 11, No. 13, 18 April 2007.

  188. 188.

    Remarks by Indian commerce minister, Kamal Nath. See Goyal, K. & Bhattacharjee, A. “U.S., EU, India Aim to Finish Doha Round by 20007 End (Update 3),” Bloomberg, 12 April 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601081&sid=aJxCyIlB.F9w&refer=australia (last visited April 21, 2007).

  189. 189.

    Bridges, “Divisions Unresolved, WTO Members Gear Up for Another Push Towards Doha Deal,” Vol. 11, No. 14, 25 April 2007.

  190. 190.

    Lamy, P. “US leadership will be key to the fate of the Round,” 23 April 2007, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl61_e.htm (last visited April 24, 2007).

  191. 191.

    The Cairns Group is an interest group of 19 agricultural exporting countries, composed of Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay.

    The Group takes its name from the Australian city of Cairns, where its inaugural meeting took place in 1986. The Australian Government led the formation of the group, though some of the South East Asian countries had been working together on agricultural trade through ASEAN. The move to form the group was largely a response to the spiraling trade subsidies of the European Union’s common agricultural policy and the United States’ export enhancement program. Particularly, the objection came to the double standards between the GATT forcing countries to liberalize their economies, while the United States was granted a waiver for agricultural protection in the 1950s.

    The Cairns Group’s objective is to bring about liberalization of global trade in agricultural produce. The coalition attempts to present a common front in multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO, tabling joint proposals and occasionally working with like-minded groups such as the G-20 group of develo** nations. The Cairns Group successfully forced agriculture onto the agenda of the Uruguay Round. This eventually led to the Agreement on Agriculture.

  192. 192.

    See the position of the Cairns Group reported by Sajid Chaudhry, “Removal of global agriculture trade distortions: U.S., EU and Japan need to do much more: communiqué,” Daily Times, April 19, 2007, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C04%5C19%5Cstory_19-4-2007_pg5_6 (last visited, April 21, 2007).

  193. 193.

    Id.

  194. 194.

    Id.

  195. 195.

    International Financial Services London, “Ongoing discussions in WTO Round: raising the profile on services,” Trade Policy News, available at http://www.ifsl.org.uk/tradepolicy/news_index.cfm?NewsItem=274 (last visited May 6, 2007).

  196. 196.

    Bridges, “Services Cluster Finishes with new Focus on ‘Breakthrough Sectors’,” Vol. 11, No. 15, 3 May 2007.

  197. 197.

    In the past, it had proved easier for countries facing requests to take a defensive approach when they wanted to, by asking the different sponsors a series of technical questions about precisely what they were seeking. See BRIDGES, “Services: Demandeurs, Requested Members both Content with Initial Plurilaterals,” Vol. 10, No. 13, 12 April 2006, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/06-04-12/story1.htm (last visited May 7, 2007).

  198. 198.

    Bridges, “Services Cluster Finishes with new Focus on ‘Breakthrough Sectors’,” Vol. 11, No. 15, 3 May 2007.

  199. 199.

    For some time, it has been obvious that the old Quad (composed of Canada, the United States, the EC, and Japan) could no longer play a leading role in providing direction for international negotiations and then securing support for their position from other delegations. This was due to the fact that WTO membership has become very large and unwieldy, and because new blocs of WTO members have formed to represent regional interests (such as the G-20). In this context, the “Really Good Friends of Services” was conceived to try to fill this void. However, its membership grew too large—about 20 members—and included members that did not share similar interests.

  200. 200.

    Bridges, “Services Cluster Finishes with new Focus on ‘Breakthrough Sectors’,” Vol. 11, No. 15, 3 May 2007.

  201. 201.

    Bridges, “Services Cluster Underway with Plurilateral Market Access Talks,” Vol. 11, No. 13, 18 April 2007.

  202. 202.

    Congressional Research Service, (2012) “World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha Development Agenda,” CRS Report for Congress, p. 6, available at https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20121115_RL32060_c58ed63ea290bf8893f514e3e4173ef077754366.pdf.

  203. 203.

    Article 133 (6.2) EC reads:

    In this regard, by way of derogation from the first subparagraph of paragraph 5, agreements relating to trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services, shall fall within the shared competence of the Community and its Member States. Consequently, in addition to a Community decision taken in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 300, the negotiation of such agreements shall require the common accord of the Member States. Agreements thus negotiated shall be concluded jointly by the Community and the Member States.

  204. 204.

    On the international protection of culture, see Posner, E.A. “The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical Observations,” Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 141, November 2006, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=946778.

  205. 205.

    Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has supporting competence in the fields of health, culture, and education according to Art. 6 TFEU.

  206. 206.

    Interview with Mr. Plaza, Spanish trade diplomat dealing with international services trade, on March 15, 2006, in Madrid.

  207. 207.

    Reiko Karatani highlights immigration policy as an area of failed responsibility of the EU. She notes that a clear reduction in migration rights has taken place in recent years, and the EU has significantly contributed to this development. By taking the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) as an example, she argues that it is a new institutional mechanism that justifies and intensifies a more restrictive drive in the EU’s immigration policy. Since the ASEM framework does not allow for NGO representation, this lack of advocacy on behalf of migrants by civil rights groups clearly shifts the balance toward restrictive measures and governmental interests in ASEM, and in the international migration regime more generally. See Karatani, R. “A ‘Responsible EU’, Multinational Migration Control and the Case of ASEM,” in Mayer, H. & Vogt, H. (eds.) A Responsible Europe? Ethical Foundations of EU External Affairs, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 140–158.

  208. 208.

    Interview with Mr. Plaza, Spanish trade diplomat dealing with international services trade, on March 15, 2006, in Madrid.

  209. 209.

    Id.

  210. 210.

    See Art. 6 TFEU.

  211. 211.

    See Article 133 (5) of the Nice Treaty.

  212. 212.

    Article 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which is one of the two treaties of the Lisbon Treaty.

  213. 213.

    Interview with Mr. Plaza, Spanish trade diplomat dealing with international services trade, on March 15, 2006, in Madrid.

  214. 214.

    Krajewski seems to have the same perception of the results of the Doha Round. See Krajewski, M. “External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a Federal and More Democratic Common Commercial Policy?,” Common Market Law Review, 42: 91–127, at 97, 2005.

  215. 215.

    That said, some of the controversial issues of the Uruguay Round such as audiovisual services are still on the negotiating trade agenda. See, in this respect, de Witte, B. “Trade in Culture: International Legal Regimes and EU Constitutional Values,” in de Burca, G. & Scott, J. (eds.) The EU and the WTO. Legal and Constitutional Issues, Hart Publishing, 2001, pp. 237–255.

  216. 216.

    W.B. Yeats, The Second Coming, Norton Anthology of English Literature 1880–1881 (M.H. Abrams, et al. eds., Norton, 6th Ed. 1993).

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Leal-Arcas, R. (2022). The European Union in the Doha Round: The Specific Case of Services Trade. In: International Trade Relations of the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14076-1_9

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-14076-1_9

  • Published:

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, Cham

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-031-14075-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-031-14076-1

  • eBook Packages: Economics and FinanceEconomics and Finance (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Navigation