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Intersubjectivity and Second-Person Perspective

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Phenomenology

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Abstract

Phenomenologists have developed theories of empathy, intersubjective understanding, and communication. Notions of transcendental intersubjectivity (Husserl) and ‘being-with’ (Heidegger) help to explain how human subjects are social in their very being and in ways that impact not only their relations with others but also their experience of the objective world. Phenomenological explanations of how we understand others appeal to embodied notions of pairing and interaction. Together with studies in developmental psychology, and behavioral and cognitive science, phenomenology provides evidence for the importance of situated interaction starting early in infancy and continuing throughout the life span. The basic embodied interaction of primary intersubjectivity, together with the pragmatic and cultural/normative contexts of joint action, and communicative and narrative practices provide an alternative to standard theory of mind accounts.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Mirror neurons are neurons that activate both when (1) I engage in intentional action, such as reaching for a drink, and (2) when I see you engage in that action. For a good analysis of how Husserl’s phenomenology relates to the neuroscience of mirror neurons, see Zahavi (2012).

  2. 2.

    Heidegger goes on to further emphasize that this particular way of being-in-the-world co-determines all other modes of Dasein: ‘By reasons of this with-like [mithaften] Being-in-the-world, the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with [Mitdasein]’ (1962, 155 /118).

  3. 3.

    This is a controversial claim, but Gadamer is not alone. Heidegger’s student, Löwith (1928), for example, a year after Being and Time was published, suggested that Heidegger ignored the role of direct interpersonal contact in his account. Binswanger (1962) made similar criticisms and claimed that the idea that Dasein is being-with left him with ‘a knot of unresolved questions’ (1962, 6). Heidegger’s (1988, 236–42) response was that Binswanger worked with an ontic, psychological interpretation, whereas Heidegger had been concerned with an ontological analysis. This motivated another Heidegger scholar, Otto Pöggeler to comment that ‘it is certainly beyond doubt that Heidegger’s inquiry into social being is some of the most unsatisfying questioning of his work. This must be said even if one considers that Heidegger never concretely worked out this question; that he dealt with it at all only with the intention of doing “fundamental ontology”’ (1988, 251). For further discussion, and another critical perspective, see Gallagher and Jacobson (2012).

  4. 4.

    These are the terms of art in the TT and ST literature: ‘mindreading’, ‘mentalizing’, ‘explaining’, and ‘predicting’, rather than ‘understanding’. Gaining the ability to use folk psychology, or the ability to employ explicit or habitual simulation routines has been standardly thought to occur around the age of 4 years. Prior to that children are thought to lack a full theory of mind, but may be capable of precursor abilities that allow them to understand actions or intentions (see, e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995).

  5. 5.

    I refer to phenomenological approaches in the plural to include those that draw not only from phenomenological philosophy, but also from enactive theories of perception, developmental studies of social interaction, and/or narrative theory. There are a number of authors who take such approaches to social cognition, but who give different weight to these different aspects. They are in general agreement in their criticism of ToM approaches, but are not in full agreement in their positive accounts. See, for example, De Jaegher et al. (2010); Fuchs and De Jaegher (2009); Gallagher (2001, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2020a, b); Gallagher and Hutto (2008); Gallagher and Zahavi (2021); Hobson (1993); Hutto (2008); Ratcliffe (2007); Reddy (2008); Trevarthen (1979).

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  1. Philosophy, University of Memphis, Memphis, TN, USA

    Shaun Gallagher

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Gallagher, S. (2022). Intersubjectivity and Second-Person Perspective. In: Phenomenology. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-11586-8_9

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