Abstract
The economic trends and the political balance in the international context have always had a fundamental impact not only on the state’s approach to the market but also on the way of conceiving the enterprise. Therefore, the relationship between state and enterprise has traditionally been influenced by the international economic and political context, moving from a state of conflict to a state of support or even of identity. In the first decades after the end of World War II, the relevant enterprises from the perspective of transnational economic relations were the big multinationals from industrialized countries. Two different attitudes emerged regarding the state-business relationship: supportive (industrialized countries promoted trade and investment of domestic companies abroad) and conflicting (develo** countries adopted measures in order to close their economies to Western multinational multinationals). During that period, the state increasingly asserted its role in the economy up to the crise of the 1970s. At the beginning of the 1980s, neoliberalism approach became widespread not only in the Western countries, as massive state intervention was deemed a ‘disease’, against which a less government action and a dominant market were proposed.In the early years of the 21st century, following a number of economic and financial crises, the neoliberal economic approach collapsed and the state again expanded its role in strategic sectors. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, a major state intervention in the market has been deemed necessary, leading to the need to recognize and regulate SOEs and SWFs as new international economic actors. The recent involvement of states in the global economy (also stimulated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict) is changing further this assumption: the boundary between public institutions and private business has become less clearly traceable, due the overlap** roles of the state in the market and of enterprises pursuing purposes of collective interest.
M.R. Mauro is the author of §§ 1, 3, 6, 8; F. Pernazza is the author of §§ 2, 4, 5, 7.
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Notes
- 1.
From this model of cooperation, international development law has originated, which recognizes the particular position of certain states, generally referred to as “develo** countries,” in consideration of their economic condition. Sometimes, international economic law envisages specific legal rules for these countries, based on the principle of “non-reciprocity”—such as, for example, the possibility of granting them special commercial treatment by derogating from the principles of the WTO.
- 2.
The United Kingdom and many other states decided not to ratify too.
- 3.
The Agreement entered into force quickly, on January 1, 1948, thanks to the Protocol of Provisional Application, to which numerous states subsequently joined.
- 4.
Some authors define these countries as “social rights states,” see, for instance: Block (1994), pp. 691–710.
- 5.
See Ruggie (1982), pp. 379–415.
- 6.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) was established by the General Assembly with the Resolution 2205 (XXI) of 17 December 1966. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is an independent intergovernmental organization set up in 1926 as an auxiliary organ of the League of Nations; following the demise of the League, the Institute was re-established in 1940 based on a multilateral agreement: its purpose is to study needs and methods for modernizing, harmonizing, and coordinating private, particularly commercial law as between states and groups of states and to formulate uniform law instruments, principles, and rules to achieve those objectives.
- 7.
Among the most relevant contributions are the OECD (2015) Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises. Available via DIALOG. https://www-oecd.org/corporate/guidelines-corporate-governance-soes.htm Other recent contributions include: OECD (2019) Guidelines on Anti-Corruption and Integrity in Soes. Available via DIALOG. http://www.oecd.org/corporate/Anti-Corruption-Integrity-Guidelines-for-SOEs.htm; OECD (2018a) Ownership and Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Compendium of National Practises. Available via DIALOG. http://www.oecd.org/corporate/Ownership-and-Governance-of-State-Owned-Enterprises-A-Compendium-of-National-Practises.pdf; OECD (2018b) Professionalising Boards of Directors of State-Owned Enterprises: Stocktaking of National Practises. Available via DIALOG. https://www.oecd.org/corporate/Professionalising-boards-of-directors-of-SOES.pdf; OECD (2016) Risk Management by State-Owned Enterprises and their Ownership. Available via DIALOG. https://www.oecd.org/corporate/risk-management-by-state-owned-enterprises-and-their-ownership-9789264262249-en.htm; OECD (2014) Financing state-owned enterprises: an overview of national practices. Available via DIALOG. https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/financing-state-owned-enterprises_9789264209091-en.
- 8.
GATT, Article VI “Anti-dum** and Countervailing Duties 1. The contracting parties recognize that dum**, by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another country at less than the normal value of the products, is to be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry in the territory of a contracting party or materially retards the establishment of a domestic industry.”
- 9.
To develop rules, codes of conduct and shared practices, the major international companies have been associated since the end of the 19th century in the maritime sector in the Comité Maritime International (CMI) based in Paris, and then in the International Ship** Federation (ISF) based in London and in the Intertanko based in Oslo. A similar phenomenon occurred in the air transport sector with the International Air Transport Association (IATA) based in Montreal and then the International Air Charter association (IACA).
- 10.
The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and since 2001 the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB) have played a very important role in international finance by drawing up International Accounting Standards (IAS). International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) is an independent, non-governmental international organization with a membership of 165 national standard bodies. The International Federation of Consulting Engineers (FIDIC) is the global representative body of national associations of consulting engineers. The International Chamber of Commerce is an organization founded in 1919 that presently represents more than 45 Millions companies in over 100 countries.
- 11.
- 12.
United Nations Conventions for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, signed in New York on July 10, 1958.
- 13.
The more interventionist role of the state in the economy was based on some specific theories, such as the “Big Push” (see Rosenstein-Rodan 1943, pp. 210–211); “Balanced Growth” (see Nurkse 1953); “Take-off into sustained growth” (see Rostow 1956, pp. 25–48); and ‘Critical Minimum Effort theory’ (see Leibenstein 1957).
- 14.
See Declaration for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (May 1, 1974) United Nations General Assembly document A/RES/S-6/3201; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (December 12, 1974) United Nations General Assembly document A/RES/29/3281.
- 15.
See Vernon (1971), p. 15.
- 16.
See Williamson (1993), pp. 1329–1336. This expression was proposed by Williamson to indicate the existence of a common position in developed countries and international institutions on the relevance of the neoliberal tenets for economic development, such as trade and investment liberalization, the role of the free market, and limited participation of the state in the economy.
- 17.
See Sornarajah (2010).
- 18.
China became Member on December 11, 2001, while the Russian Federation became Member on August 22, 2012.
- 19.
- 20.
Art. 83 of the ECSC Treaty, Art. 222 of the EEC Treaty, and Art. 91 of the Euratom Treaty, with different formulations, all excluded the possibility that the treaties might prejudice national choices regarding the system of property ownership.
- 21.
See Art. 90 of the EEC Treaty (now Art. 106 TFEU): 1) Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in respect of public undertakings and undertakings to which they grant special or exclusive rights, any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to those laid down in Articles 7 and 85 to 94 inclusive. (2) Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest or having the character of a revenue-producing monopoly shall be subject to the rules contained in this Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them. The development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as would be contrary to the interests of the Community.
- 22.
- 23.
Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of June 25, 1980, on the transparency of financial relations between Member States and their public undertakings and on financial transparency within certain undertakings, amended several times and lastly codified with the directive Commission Directive 2006/111/EC of November 16, 2006. The directive regulates a series of profiles that are essential for assessing whether and to what extent the public authorities put in place any direct or indirect financial support measures that could compromise competition in the common market.
- 24.
The “subprime crisis” occurred in the United States between 2007 and 2010, determining the US financial crisis. It was triggered by a sensitive decrease in home prices after the collapse of a housing bubble, which caused mortgage delinquencies, foreclosures, and the devaluation of housing-related securities.
- 25.
The 2008–2010 economic-financial crisis was probably determined also by the excessive deregulation of the financial sector. For example, in 1999, the United States repealed the Glass Steagall Act of 1933—the banking law which provided for a clear distinction between commercial banks and investment banks—creating a mixture between normal credit intermediation and financial investment activity. Furthermore, the surveillance activity on financial institutions proved inadequate and, in the absence of clear rules, the rating agencies operated without specific constraints and conditioned investors’ decisions with their own opinions.
- 26.
The crisis highlighted some important limits of the Economic Monetary Union (EMU), such as the lack of coordination between the fiscal policies of the European Union (EU) Members; the existence of banking systems still linked to national surveillance; a monetary policy that does not allow the ECB to act as a “lender of last resort”; the absence of an effective implementation of the “single market.” Consequently, several measures have been adopted by both the EU and its Members and new competences have been attributed to the ECB, particularly to create a banking union, to face the situation of emergency, and to avoid new possible crises.
- 27.
BRICS is the acronym that indicates the group of the five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
- 28.
This expression indicates a shareholding in the capital of a privatized company maintained by the state, aimed at preventing the acquisition of control of this company by other subjects and, thus, protecting public interests in companies operating in strategic sectors (such as defense and energy). By virtue of this shareholding, the state has special powers of intervention or veto. This regime was introduced in Italy by Decree-Law No. 332 (May 31, 1994), converted with modifications by Law No. 474 (July 30, 1994). On this topic, see San Mauro (2004).
- 29.
The occurred changes have affected the current international legal framework, for instance, in relation to the application of state immunity rules to SWFs.
- 30.
It stems from some specific objectives, particularly: the opening of new markets; the reorganization of Chinese distribution chains; the reduction of Chinese production excesses. This initiative currently affects a geographical area that generates a total of 55% of world GDP, inhabited by 70% of the world’s population and where 75% of known energy reserves are located. The BRI envisages the creation of two Eurasian infrastructural connection routes: the “belt,” which aims to revitalize the ancient overland “Silk Road” through the construction of roads, railways, and energy pipelines along six regional corridors that should start from China to branch out across Asia to Russia and Northern Europe; the “road,” which aims to create a new maritime “Silk Road,” from the Chinese coasts through the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa to the Mediterranean through the Suez canal. The first projects were launched in 2014 in Central Asia and, in 2015, Chinese companies concluded over 1400 contracts related to the realization of the BRI, for a total value of USD 37 billion. On the overland route, infrastructure projects have been approved in the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors, including: the Sino-Pakistani communication corridor between the port of Gwadar and the Chinese city of Kashgar; the connecting oil pipeline between Iran and Pakistan and the railway connection between Ukraine and China planned for the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route. There have also been important investments along the sea route for the acquisition of stakes in companies or logistic infrastructures in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Singapore, Egypt, Turkey, and Belgium. Finally, it should be remembered the acquisition of the majority stake in the port of Piraeus in Greece, as it guarantees China a fundamental logistical base for its presence in the Mediterranean. On this topic, see Acconci (2022), pp. 147-148.
- 31.
The involvement of the government in the implementation of the BRI can have important consequences on international relations. For example, following a transaction worth USD 1 billion in 2017 in Sri Lanka, in exchange for a reduction in the very high debt burden, Sri Lanka agreed to transfer control over a strategic domestic port (Hambantota) to a Chinese company for 99 years.
- 32.
Market economies are based on the market predominance in both the productive and social sectors.
- 33.
Social market economies delegate the allocation of production and consumption to the market, but the state plays a fundamental role in providing for the social welfare of citizens.
- 34.
Central planning economies are founded on the dominant role of the state in both the productive and social sectors.
- 35.
See Kwiatkowski and Augustynowicz (2015), p. 1742.
- 36.
- 37.
See OECD (2003) Privatising the State-Owned Enterprises. An Overview on Policies and Practises in OECD countries. Available via DIALOG. https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/governance/privatising-state-owned-enterprises_9789264104099-en#page11.
- 38.
- 39.
Chinese SOEs compared to the world total constitute in 2020 respectively 73% by number, 78% by revenues and 84% by Assets.
- 40.
The Milton Friedman approach is globally known due to his article in the New York Times Magazine of September 13, 1970 titled “The Milton Friedman doctrine: The Social Responsibility of Business is to increase its profits.” Friedman doctrine was already exposed in his book entitled Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago University Press, 1962.
- 41.
The foundamental idea that a business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of stockolders is radicated in the American case law since Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507, 170 N.W. 668 (1919), and is taken as a landmark by recent decisions like eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark 16 A.3d 1 Del. Ch. (2010) and by eminent scholars even in the 21st century, see Jensen (2010), p. 32 ff.; Bainbrigde (2002), §§ 1.4 (d), 9.2. and 9.3.
- 42.
Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, June 3–14, 1992) Annex I, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.
- 43.
Global Compact currently brings together 20,891 participants (October 2022), including MNEs, SMEs, business associations, as well as organizations such as public sector organizations, labor organizations, ONG, academics, and foundations. See www.unglobalcompact.org.
- 44.
European Commission, COM (2001) 366/1, Green Paper, Promoting an European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility. Among other EU initiatives, in 2006 the European Commission published a new document [COM (2006) 136] in support of the European Alliance on CSR and in 2011 the Communication from the Commission [COM (2011) 681 final] A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility.
- 45.
OECD (2011) Guidelines for multinational enterprises. Available via DIALOG. https://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/oecdguidelinesformultinationalenterprises.htm.
- 46.
A self-regulatory model now adopted by more than 10,000 companies worldwide is the one proposed by the Global Reporting Initiative aimed at enabling organizations to evaluate and take responsibility of their impacts through the Standards of Sustainability reporting. See www.globalreporting.org.
- 47.
See http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status for an updated list of State Laws on B Corporation.
- 48.
See Clark and Babson (2012), pp. 817–851.
- 49.
See Hart and Zingales (2017), pp. 247–274.
- 50.
Business Roundtable (2019) New Statement on the purpose of a Corporation, released on August 19. Available via DIALOG. https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-a-corporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
- 51.
See Blackwill and Harris (2016), where the term “geoeconomics” indicates the “use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results.”
- 52.
See Wesley (2016), p. 4.
- 53.
See ICJ (June 27, 1986) Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment. In: ICJ Reports, 1986, 14 ff., 102–103.
- 54.
See on the topic: Swaak-Goldman (1996), p. 361 ff.; Schloemann and Ohlhoff (1999), p. 424 ff.; Akande and Williams (2003), p. 365 ff.; Burke-White and von Staden (2008), p. 307 ff.; OECD (2009 May) Security-Related Terms in International Investment Law and in National Security Strategies, p. 6. Available via DIALOG. https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy-national-security.htm; Schill and Briese (2009), p. 61 ff.; Desierto (2010), p. 827 ff.; Alford (2011), p. 697 ff.; Weiß (2020), p. 255 ff.
- 55.
See on the topic, Roberts et al. (2018), pp. 655–676.
- 56.
See on the topic, Heath (2020), p. 1024 ff.
- 57.
See on the topic, Mauro (2003), p. 109 ff.
- 58.
The CFIUS is an inter-ministerial body established by President Gerald Ford in 1975. The FIRRMA, signed by President Donald J. Trump on August 13, 2018, has extended the scope of CFIUS competences to include, for example, investments that have an impact on critical infrastructure and technology sectors (including activities related to the maintenance and collection of sensitive data relating to US citizens, whose dissemination or use could compromise national security), although control over the enterprise established in the United States by a foreign entity is lacking. Furthermore, the CFIUS control activity now also includes operations, transactions, contracts or agreements that are believed to have been carried out for the purpose of circumventing the legislation on foreign investments. Finally, there is an obligation to notify for acquisitions by foreign subjects if there is a direct or indirect “substantial interest” of a foreign government and the transaction concerns critical infrastructures or technologies or sensitive data of American citizens. See on the topic: Georgiev (2008), p. 125 ff.; Connell and Huang (2014), p. 131 ff.; Guaccero (2019), p. 141 ff.; Mann (2019), p. 15 ff.
- 59.
Updated to May 10, 2022. These states are: Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, The Netherlands.
- 60.
Decree-Law No. 23 (April 8, 2020), converted with modifications by Law No. 40 (June 5, 2020).
- 61.
Italy has for a long time followed an “open door” approach towards foreign investment, the government placing minimal controls on transactions by foreign actors. This attitude underwent a partial change after the introduction of the “Golden Power” regime, according to which the government may exercise control over foreign investments in specific strategic sectors, which originally were defence, national security, energy, transport and communications. See Decree-Law No. 21 (March 15, 2012), converted with modifications by Law No. 56 (May 11, 2012). On this topic, see San Mauro (2012), pp. 1019–1053; Comino (2014), pp. 1019–1053. Scarchillo, Part I, Chapter 4 and Mauro, Part II, Chapter, 8, in this Volume.
- 62.
Decree-Law No. 21 (March 21, 2022), converted with modifications by Law No. 51 (May 20, 2022).
- 63.
Regulation (EU) 2019/452 of the European Parliament and of the Council (March 19, 2019) Establishing a Framework for the Screening of Foreign Direct Investments into the Union.
- 64.
Communication from the Commission (March 25, 2020) Guidance to the Member States Concerning Foreign Direct Investment and Free Movement of Capital from Third Countries, and the Protection of Europe’s Strategic Assets, ahead of the Application of Regulation (EU) 2019/452 (FDI Screening Regulation) (2020/C 99 I/01). According to the Commission: “today more than ever, the EU’s openness to foreign investment needs to be balanced by appropriate screening tools. In the context of the COVID-19 emergency, there could be an increased risk of attempts to acquire healthcare capacities (for example for the productions of medical or protective equipment) or related industries such as research establishments (for instance develo** vaccines) via foreign direct investment. Vigilance is required to ensure that any such FDI does not have a harmful impact on the EU’s capacity to cover the health needs of its citizens.”
- 65.
Guidance to the Member States Concerning Foreign Direct Investment from Russia and Belarus in View of the Military Aggression Against Ukraine and the Restrictive Measures Laid Down in Recent Council Regulations on Sanctions, 2022/C 151 I/01, April 6, 2022.
- 66.
Even though the Communication was adopted as an immediate response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, it also includes general principles regarding FDI screening in the EU. The Commission invites Member States to assess and prevent threats linked to Russian and Belarusian investments, asking Member States to guarantee a close cooperation both on the national and EU level as far as FDI screening activities, as well as for the enforcement of EU sanctions.
- 67.
UK Government (2018) National Security and Investment White Paper. Available via DIALOG. https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/national-security-and-investment-proposed-reforms.
- 68.
- 69.
According to the IMF: “Compared to our July forecast, the global growth projection for 2021 has been revised down marginally to 5.9 percent and is unchanged for 2022 at 4.9 percent. This modest headline revision, however, masks large downgrades for some countries. The outlook for the low-income develo** country group has darkened considerably due to worsening pandemic dynamics. The downgrade also reflects more difficult near-term prospects for the advanced economy group, in part due to supply disruptions. Partially offsetting these changes, projections for some commodity exporters have been upgraded on the back of rising commodity prices. Pandemic-related disruptions to contact-intensive sectors have caused the labor market recovery to significantly lag the output recovery in most countries. The dangerous divergence in economic prospects across countries remains a major concern. Aggregate output for the advanced economy group is expected to regain its pre-pandemic trend path in 2022 and exceed it by 0.9 percent in 2024. By contrast, aggregate output for the emerging market and develo** economy group (excluding China) is expected to remain 5.5 percent below the pre-pandemic forecast in 2024, resulting in a larger setback to improvements in their living standards. These economic divergences are a consequence of large disparities in vaccine access and in policy support.” See IMF (2021, October). See also UNCTAD (2022b), pp. 1–8. Available via Dialog. https://unctad.org/webflyer/tapering-time-conflict-trade-anddevelopment-report-update-march-2022.
- 70.
(1) See, UNCTAD (2022a), pp. 58-62.
- 71.
This is evident, for example, in the Trump administration’s attitude to manage economic integration through commercial tariffs, investment screening and export control. While in China, the phenomenon has essentially taken the form of a greater state initiative in promoting technological progress and attempts to protect cyber sovereignty through strict control over data and internet use.
- 72.
Furthermore, since 2010 the EU has also adopted a series of measures to increase international financial stability, establishing mechanisms and control bodies on banks, insurance companies and financial markets, and adopting support measures in favor of the Eurozone states. In the first category there are, for example, financial supervision bodies, such as: the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which exercises macro-prudential supervisory functions through a systemic risk assessment; the European Banking Authority (EBA), which exercises supervisory functions over the banking system; the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA); the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), for the supervision of the European financial market. These entities, operational since January 1, 2011, together with the national supervisory authorities constitute the European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS). In the second group there are: the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), set up to allow the EU to intervene, together with the IMF, in the event of a Member having “serious difficulties” due to exceptional circumstances beyond its control, attributable to the global financial crisis; the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF); and, finally, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Moreover, in the EU context the project of a banking union has also been set up to harmonize, at the European level, supervisory, resolution and financing activities, and to impose the compliance with the same rules on banks in the Euro area. The banking union is currently based on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The SSM has the task of supervising the major and larger banks present in the Euro area; the SRM, on the other hand, must ensure orderly and cost-effective resolution for failing banks. A European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) is also envisaged, which is currently under discussion.
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Appendix
Appendix
1.1 A. Value of Global Trade in Millions of US Dollars at Current Price from 1950 to 2019 (Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.2 B. Value of Global FDI in Millions of US Dollars at Current Price from 1970 to 2019 (Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.3 C. Trade: Flow of Exports 1950–1980 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.4 D. Trade: Imports 1950–1980 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.5 E. FDI: Outward 1970–1980 (US Dollars at Current Prices in Millions; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.6 F. FDI: Inward 1970–1980 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.7 G. Trade: Exports 1980–2000 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.8 H. Trade: Imports 1980–2000 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.9 I. FDI: Inward 1980–2000 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.10 J. FDI: Outward 1980–2000 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.11 K. Trade: Exports 2001–2019 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.12 L. Trade: Imports 2001–2019 (US Dollars at Current Prices in Millions; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.13 M. FDI: Inward 2001–2019 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.14 N. FDI: Outward 2001–2019 (Percentage on the World’s Total; Data Source: UNCTAD)
1.15 O. State-Owned Enterprise in the Global Economy 2005/2014
1.16 P. Share by Revenues of SOEs Included in Fortune Global 500 List
1.17 Q. Sectoral Distribution of Chinese Companies in 2020
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Mauro, M.R., Pernazza, F. (2023). General Introduction: State and Enterprise in the Global Market. In: Mauro, M.R., Pernazza, F. (eds) State and Enterprise. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10473-2_1
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