Abstract
This chapter answers the question ‘What are the dimensions of law, policy, and institutions of state aid?’ This chapter focuses on the examination of EU state aid law and policy to provide an insight into how EU state aid law affects the future of EU investment policy in a global context. It clarifies the law and its evolution through the EU court’s and Commission’s practice of it, and examines how it has developed into such a complex legal framework and potent policy tool. Not only does state aid law enable the EU to influence the behaviour of its Member States’ policy choices, but countries outside of the EU are also not necessarily immune to the effect of EU state aid rules. This is due to the complex interactions between intra-European effects and global developments. This chapter also explains the reason for the unique features of state aid control, which places the state aid norms in the context of the WTO’s global subsidies control. Further, after providing the reader with an insight into the internal and extraterritorial dimension of state aid, some essential procedural aspects of state aid control—such as the notification obligation and enforcement—are introduced.
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Notes
- 1.
State aid law is part of the EU’s public policy.
- 2.
Thus preventing discrimination against undertakings that are in a comparable factual and legal situation: see C-20/15 P – Commission v World Duty Free Group (2016).
- 3.
In a similar situation in law or in fact.
- 4.
- 5.
See Article 3.1 stating that ‘The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas’. Para 3.1(b) of the TFEU declares competition rules to be one of these: ‘the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market’. Title VII, Chapter 1 ‘Rules on Competition’ can be found both rules applicable to undertakings (Section 1) and ‘Aids granted by States’ (Section 2).
- 6.
Article 207 of TFEU.
- 7.
- 8.
Bacon (2017), p. 3.
- 9.
- 10.
For more on these authors, see Sect. 3.4.2 in this chapter. Some of these authors, like Blauberger (2008) and Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009) have addressed the different ways and conditions under which regulatory export of state aid control has been successful. Most legal literature on this area, such as Hoekman and Holmes (1999), Rubini (2010) and Goyette (2006), discuss the similarities of the definitions of subsidy and state aid in the WTO and EU law from a comparative perspective. Others analyse the influence the EU (and American) policies have had on the WTO (Damro and Guay 2016; Hoekman and Holmes 1999). Some legal practitioners, like Papadopoulos (2010), provide a global overview from an EU standpoint, which covers the whole competition policy, including state aid control by particularly discussing multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral agreements that contain competition policy provisions.
- 11.
Subject to notification obligation and a balancing test. A balancing test weights the negative effects v the positive effects of the intervention. On one side is the possible damage it can cause to the internal market trade and competition, and on the other side are the positive effects of common interest (Coppi 2011).
- 12.
Commission Regulation No. 651/2014 (EC 2014a) Ch. 1 p. (5).
- 13.
See Article 108 TFEU 1st section. See also C-78/76 - Steinike & Weinlig (1977) para 9, confirming the Commission’s powers. See also C-119/05 – Lucchini (2007) for a decision made by national court being res judicata within the context of recovery of state aid granted.
- 14.
Article 108 TFEU 2nd section.
- 15.
Especially block exemptions.
- 16.
As can be seen in C-280/00 – Altmark (2003) para. 75. In this case, the CJEU analysis of the concept of the aid conferring an advantage on the recipient undertaking. C-280/00 – Altmark (2003) concerned compensation for public service in Germany. The CJEU analysed whether licences and public subsidies received by a private transport company—Altmark Trans GmbH—to enable the operation of scheduled transport services for public interest were state aid.
- 17.
For an example of how state aid cases repeat this requirement, see C-20/15 P – Commission v World Duty Free Group (2016), para 53 and C-280/00 – Altmark (2003), paras 74 and 75.
- 18.
- 19.
For details on the notification and standstill obligations, see Sect. 3.5.1. The Commission Notice on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016/C 262/01) OJ C 262/1, 19 July 2016 (Notice on the Notion of State Aid) (EC 2016), provides an extensive clarification ‘of the Commission’s understanding of Article 107(1) of the Treaty.
- 20.
See C-78/76 – Steinike & Weinlig (1977). Paragraph 21 on fiscal advantages found that a crucial element for this concept was that the aid was the consequence of action taken by public authority: C-345/02 – Pearle and Others (2004) para 34 referring to C-379/98 – PreussenElektra (2001) para 58.
- 21.
C-482/99 – France v Commission (Stardust Marine) (2002) paras 32–43; Joined Cases 67, 68 and 70/85 – Van der Kooy and others v Commission (1988) and C-150/16 – Fondul Proprietatea (2017) paras 19–20.
- 22.
C-482/99 – France v Commission(Stardust Marine) (2002) para. 23.
- 23.
T-351/02 – Deutsche Bahn v Commission (2006) para 101 and C-413/15 Farrel (2017) for a private body as an emanation of the state. For further details on imputability, see Clayton and Segura Catalan (2015).
- 24.
- 25.
T-351/02 – Deutsche Bahn v Commission (2006) para 102; see also Tietje and Wackernagel (2014), p. 6.
- 26.
C-280/00 – Altmark (2003). These two are criteria are inextricably linked: see T-298/97 – Alzetta and Others v Commission (2000) and Biondi (2013), p. 1720.
- 27.
Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, case C-41/90 (1991) (GmbH, 1991).
- 28.
Notice on the Notion of State Aid (EC 2016) p. 3 referring to Joined Cases C-180/98 to C-184/98 – Pavlov and Others (2000), para 74 and C-222/04 – Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze and Others (2006), para 107.
- 29.
- 30.
EC (2016), p. 5 referring to C-173/73 – Italy v Commission (1974), para 13.
- 31.
C-399/08 P – Commission v Deutsche Post (2010) para 40 and C-74/16 – Congregación de Escuelas Pías Provincia Betania (2017), para 65. The concept of selectivity was stretched substantially in C-20/15 P – Commission v World Duty Free Group (2016), which was about amortisation of financial goodwill resulting from acquisitions by Spanish firms of shareholdings in foreign firms for tax purposes. According to the CJEU, all types of derogations that result in firms being treated differently are selective. It makes no difference that the derogation is not available to all undertakings.
- 32.
T-298/97 – Alzetta and Others v Commission (2000), para. 81.
- 33.
See the CJEU case (T-298/97 – Alzetta and Others v Commission (2000), para. 80: ‘A measure granted by the State is considered to distort or threaten to distort competition when it is liable to improve the competitive position of the recipient compared to other undertakings with which it competes.’
- 34.
T-298/97 – Alzetta and Others v Commission (2000), paras 141–147. See also C-280/00 – Altmark (2003).
- 35.
According to C-197/11 – Libert and Others (2013) and T-50/06 RENV II – Ireland v Commission (2016), there is no threshold below which trade between Member States can be said not to be affected.
- 36.
C-142/87 – Tubemeuse (1990) and C-280/00 – Altmark (2003). See also the (de minimis) regulation (EU) no 1407/2013 (EC 2013a).
- 37.
Notice on the Notion of State Aid (EC 2016).
- 38.
However, the Notice does not bind the EU courts, nor can the Commission deviate from the case law of the EU courts (EC 2016), Ch 1.3.
- 39.
Blauberger (2008).
- 40.
Biondi and Stefan (2018), p. 3.
- 41.
Biondi and Stefan (2018), p. 4.
- 42.
C-189/02 P – Dansk Rørindustri and Others v Commission (2005), para. 211; C-526/14 – Kotnik and Others (Case C-526/14), para 40; C-431/14 P – Greece v Commission (2016), paras 69 and 70.
- 43.
Szyszczak (2011), p. 38. A great example of this is the energy policy. After the Commission published soft law instruments regarding ‘softer approach’ on subsidies for green energy, several Member States—for instance, Denmark, Italy, Spain and the Czech Republic—implemented subsidy schemes that supported renewable energy.
- 44.
- 45.
Biondi and Stefan (2018), p. 3.
- 46.
Cini (2001), pp. 192, 200.
- 47.
Snyder (1994).
- 48.
- 49.
Biondi and Stefan (2018), p. 4.
- 50.
Eurostat, Renewable energy statistics: see https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Renewable_energy_statistics#Renewable_energy_produced_in_the_EU_increased_by_two_thirds_in_2007-2017.
- 51.
Community Guidelines on State Aid for Environmental Protection and Energy 2014–20 (EC 2014b); European Commission Impact Assessment on State aid for Environmental Protection and Energy for 2014–20 (EC 2014c). Boasson (2019, p. 70) notes that these guidelines requesting the Member States to implement subsidys schemes favouring investments in renewables was uncommon in the EU at that time. She argues (p. 76) that the Member States were not likely to ‘have endorsed this shift in the strength and direction of EU steering if it had been up for decision in an ordinary legislative procedure’.
- 52.
- 53.
Friederiszick et al. (2006), p. 1.
- 54.
OECD (2011), Ch 2.
- 55.
OECD (2011), Ch 2.
- 56.
See C-280/00 – Altmark (2003). See also Blauberger and Krämer (2010).
- 57.
Rosenthal and Nicolaides (1997), p. 362.
- 58.
Rosenthal and Nicolaides (1997), p. 362.
- 59.
Blauberger (2008).
- 60.
According to Rubini (2010), p. 5, ‘State aid [systems] used in the WTO and EU are the most developed systems of control of this type of policy instrument in the world.’
- 61.
For more on the history of the WTO and the development of international subsidisation and efforts to establish a mechanism to control governments to implement subsidies see Chap. 2.
- 62.
After the establishment of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
- 63.
Paemen (2016), p. 52.
- 64.
Damro and Guay (2016).
- 65.
Damro and Guay’s (2016) two-level game theory on the state aid/subsidies policy effects on the global political economy, although created for multilateral trade, is also applicable on a bilateral level.
- 66.
The main complaint about policies that support domestic prices, or subsidise production in some other way, is that they encourage over-production. This squeezes out imports or leads to export subsidies and low-priced dum** on world markets: see WTO (2015), p. 28.
- 67.
Multilaterally, the WTO, by plurilateral regional agreements (such as the EU Treaties) and bilateral trade agreements between nations.
- 68.
To protect state aid policy in the internal market from erosion of external distortions and actors, the export of state aid has taken place in diverse forms. In addition to being one of the driving forces behind the introduction of the Subsidies Agreement in 1995, the EU has negotiated state aid provisions into its international agreements, such as the EU’s Accession, Associate, and Free Trade agreements.
- 69.
In the same way as other regional and national subsidy regulation does. For example, many states that lack domestic rules on subsidies have rules that provide competition neutrality, which aims to maintain a level playing field between public and private business. Competitive neutrality aims to maintain a level playing field between public and private business (OECD 2012). Some of the countries with which the EU has Association Agreements (AA), as well as other regional trade blocs such as the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU, also called UEMOA), have also implemented state aid rules as part of their competition policies: see OECD (2011), p. 10; UNCTAD (2007), p. 11.
- 70.
OECD (2011), p. 9.
- 71.
- 72.
The EU does not have a trade agreement with the United States. Therefore, the trade relations between the United States and the EU fall under the WTO rules. See WTO case on subsidies for large aircraft (WTOAP 2018).
- 73.
GATT Article XIV contains rules for export subsidies by providing countervailing measures. The Subsidies Agreement is an evolution of GATT Article XIV.
- 74.
For exemptions, see Sect. 3.2 above. Therefore, the WTO rules catch only a narrow category of investment incentives. For example, see United States and EUs disputes on measures affecting trade in large civil aircraft (WTOAP 2018; WTO Panel 2011). In 1996, in the Certain Pasta from Italy US countervailing duty case, the United States held that several Italian pasta-makers had been subsidised by Italy and the EU (USDoC 2017). Many of these subsidies were investment aids (Thomas 2007), p. 43.
- 75.
Sykes (2010), pp. 14–15. While repayment of illegal aid is a typical remedy in the EU, this is not the case in the WTO. According to Thomas (2007), a repayment of prohibited subsidies has occurred only once in the WTO, when the United States raised a complaint against Australia: see Australia – Automotive Leather-Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU (2000); Australia – Automotive Leather I (1998); Australia – Automotive Leather II (1999). For repayment (Australia – Automotive Leather – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU, 2000), the panel held that Article 4.7 of the Subsidies Agreement covered repayments under certain circumstances. This ruling has been strongly criticized.
- 76.
Also, as noted in Sect. 2.4.1, unlike in the EU, where the Commission can take the initiative, the WTO cannot act unless a WTO member state raises a complaint against another nation’s subsidising practices.
- 77.
Annex 2 of the Subsidies Agreement.
- 78.
Schön (2004), p. 284.
- 79.
C-27/76 – United Brands v Commission’ (1978); C-377/02 – Van Parys (2005); C-120/06 P – FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission (2008).
- 80.
Goyette (2006), p. 717.
- 81.
Article 3.1(a) and (b) of the Subsidies Agreement.
- 82.
OECD (2011), p. 21. With the consequence of that dispute outcomes are more unpredictable than the EU’s.
- 83.
Rubini shows how, (very) frequently, the legal definition of aid or subsidy is combined with the justifications given for granting them in both the EU and the WTO (Rubini 2010).
- 84.
- 85.
- 86.
Biondi and Righini (2014), p. 1.
- 87.
López (2015), pp. 3, 7.
- 88.
Blauberger (2008).
- 89.
- 90.
Paemen (2016), p. 49.
- 91.
- 92.
For details, see Chap. 4.
- 93.
The EU implements separation of powers in accordance to teachings of De Montesquieu (1989).
- 94.
European Commission (2020b).
- 95.
See Commissions website Commission adopts white paper on foreign subsidies in the single market at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1070. On 5 May 2021 the Commission released the Commission’s proposal a Regulation on foreign subsidies distorting the internal market, Brussels 5 May 2021 COM(2021) 223 final (Draft Regulation on foreign subsidies EC 2021); European Commission (EC) (2020a).
- 96.
- 97.
Due to the primacy and direct effect of EU law, established by the CJEU in the early 1960s in Case 26-62 – van Gend & Loos (1963) and Case 6-64 – Costa v ENEL (1964).
- 98.
Stone Sweet (2010) p. 7. This influence of the CJEU on the EU’s policy-makers has, in turn, also widely affected all EU policy.
- 99.
- 100.
- 101.
- 102.
- 103.
Kroes (2007), p. 4.
- 104.
- 105.
See Sect. 3.2 above.
- 106.
- 107.
Lavenex and Uçarer (2004).
- 108.
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009).
- 109.
Otherwise, the Commission risks facing possible action from the European Parliament (Article 234 TFEU) or becoming a subject for complaint to the CJEU by an EU citizen, legal or natural alike, under Article 265 TFEU.
- 110.
- 111.
- 112.
See Sect. 3.2.2 above for the four cumulative criteria.
- 113.
- 114.
- 115.
- 116.
- 117.
In the late 1990s, by publication of the Code of Conduct 1998 (European Council 1998) and European Commission notice on business taxation (European Commission 1998). Another major push took place in 2013, when the Commission initiated in-depth probes into the tax ruling practices of Member States. This led to several rulings on the breach of state aid rules, by schemes allowing for tax avoidance by multinational corporations—for example, SA.38373 $ Apple (2016); SA.38374 Starbucks (2015).
- 118.
- 119.
- 120.
State aid action plan (EC 2005).
- 121.
Communication on EU State Aid Modernization (SAM) (EC 2012).
- 122.
Biondi and Stefan (2018), p. 3.
- 123.
- 124.
State aid action plan (EC 2005), paras 6–7.
- 125.
Two main groups stand out in this debate. Those in the first group, including authors such as Buendia-Sierra (2006), argue that state aid provisions are more closely related to those of the internal market (e.g. free movement of capital and establishment) than to other competition law. As a result, similarly to the internal market field, economics has a limited role in the field of state aid. Group two includes scholars such as Friederiszick et al. (2006). These authors promote the adoption of a more effects-based approach to the EU’s competition law (including state aid rules) by increasing the role of economics when analyzing the potential distortion on competition of state aid measures.
- 126.
This means that ‘the compatibility of state aid is fundamentally about balancing the negative effects of aid on competition with its positive effects in terms of common interest’. State aid action plan (EC 2005), para 11.
- 127.
- 128.
López (2015).
- 129.
EC (2021).
- 130.
- 131.
For more on this subject, see Sect. 3.5.5.
- 132.
See Andersen and Hindelang (2016); Dimopoulos (2011); Hindelang (2012a, b); Kende (2015); Gubrynowicz and Wierzbowski (2009); Gallo and Nicola (2015); Ortolani (2015); Happ and Tietje (2013); Tietje (2013); Tietje et al. (2012); Tietje and Wackernagel (2014, 2015); Matei (2015, 2016); Matei and Ciurtin (2016); Saavedra Pinto (2016).
- 133.
- 134.
- 135.
Van de Casteele (2006).
- 136.
- 137.
Some competition practitioners in the United States (A.B. Association 2010) have expressed the appeal and usefulness of expanding ICNs to cover subsidies control.
- 138.
Lavenex and Schimmelfennig (2009). Usually legal authors study the Europeanisation of the EU’s Member States (Eliantonio 2013; Jans et al. 2007) and countries in the accession process, as well as countries that are possible future accession countries. Some authors, such as Featherstone and Radaelli (2003) have shown that the scope of Europeanisation can go beyond Europe. See also Schimmelfennig (2012a, b); Radaelli (1997); Grabbe (2003).
- 139.
- 140.
- 141.
Blauberger (2008) discusses the adoption of these policies through ‘negative integration’—that is, the abolition of national barriers—and ‘positive integration’—that is, the formal harmonisation of national rules.
- 142.
Even though the notion of global governance was introduced in 2001 by the Commissions White Paper (EC 2004), p. 5.
- 143.
- 144.
Szepesi (2004).
- 145.
Geradin (2004).
- 146.
Fornalczyk (2004).
- 147.
- 148.
- 149.
- 150.
Popović and Caka (2017).
- 151.
Dimitrova and Dragneva (2013).
- 152.
Hoekman and Holmes (1999).
- 153.
Rubini (2004).
- 154.
Goyette (2006).
- 155.
- 156.
- 157.
Blauberger and Krämer (2010), p. 19; de Madrid (2007), p. 87. The United States has not adopted subsidies disciplines. The Shearman Antitrust Act (1890) Sec. 1. was worded ambiguously enough to potentially cover subsidies prohibition. The Congress, empowered by Article I of the US Constitution, and the High Court can regulate subsidies, but have mostly chosen not to use it: see Sykes (2010).
- 158.
Blauberger and Krämer (2010), p. 19.
- 159.
- 160.
- 161.
The EU is the party in disputes even though the infringing measure would be an act of a Member State. See WTO, EC sugar case (WTOAB 2005). However, on competition law in an extra-EU BIT, see C-126/97 – Eco Swiss (1999).
- 162.
For Switzerland, see Hoffet (2016).
- 163.
- 164.
Jarosz-Friis et al. (2010).
- 165.
EU–South Korea FTA, Art. 7.1(4); see also the preamble and Articles 13.3, 13.4.3, 13.5.2 and 13.7.
- 166.
See, for example, JEEPA, EU–Singapore FTA and EU–Mexico FTA.
- 167.
- 168.
- 169.
House of Lords (2018); Davis, May and Union (2017). See introduction by the Secretary of State for Exiting the EU in the fourth paragraph, ensuring that laws and regulations deemed ‘practical and sensible’ will apply post Brexit. See also Letter by MP Andrew Griffits to Lord Witty, Chair, EU Internal Market Sub-Committee House of Lords on 28 March 2018 (Griffits 2018).
- 170.
Hettne (2011) p. 6.
- 171.
Buendia Sierra (2016), p. 124.
- 172.
Buendia Sierra (2016), p. 124.
- 173.
Blauberger (2009).
- 174.
T-542/11 RENV – Alouminion tis Ellados v Commission (2018) paras 51–54.
- 175.
T-542/11 RENV – Alouminion tis Ellados v Commission (2018) paras 51–54 referring to C-78/76 – Steinike & Weinlig (1977) and C 120/73 – Lorenz v Germany (1973) para 8.
- 176.
Meaning, as stated in Article 7 of the Procedural Regulation, that the Commission will open an in-depth investigation. The implementation of the measure will be frozen until the Commission has completed its investigation. The measure may become acceptable after certain amendments in line with Article 9.3 of the Procedural Regulation. For example, see 2005/346/EC – MobilCom (2004).
- 177.
EC (2013b), p. 1.
- 178.
Article 4 of the Procedural Regulation.
- 179.
Like measures deemed too small to distort the competition within the internal market covered by the de minimis (EC 2013a) or block exemption (giving automatic approval for a range of aid measures defined by the Commission), the GBER.
- 180.
The Procedural Regulation Article 1(b)(i). The Procedural Regulation replaced the former Regulation (EC) No. 659/1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 93 of the EC Treaty Text with EEA relevance (European Council 1999).
- 181.
The Procedural Regulation Articles 1(b)(iv) and 17, unless interrupted by an action by the Commission or the Member State. See also C-276/03 – P Scott v Commission (2005), para 26.
- 182.
The Procedural Regulation Article 1(b)(ii), (iii) and (v).
- 183.
The Procedural Regulation Articles 2.1, 4.3 and 4.6.
- 184.
The Procedural Regulation Article 1(f) defines new aid put into effect in breach of Article 108(3) 3 TFEU as illegal. New aid is defined as either non-existing aid or altered existing aid.
- 185.
See Article 108(3) TFEU and the Procedural Regulation; Articles 1(f) and (c).
- 186.
See Matei and Curtin (2016) p. 54, referring to the judgment in C-74/76 – Ianelli v Meroni (1977) paras 14–17. According to Matei and Curtin, the examination of the compatibility under Article 108(2) TFEU takes into consideration compliance with other supranational norms, especially the respect due to economic freedoms within the EU.
- 187.
The Procedural Regulation Articles 10(2), 11(2) and 16. See also C-278/92 – Spain v Commission (Hytasa) (1994), para 75; Micula II (EU) (2014), paras 103 and 154 et seq; C-301/87 – France v Commission (Boussac) (1990), paras 9–24; C 120/73 – Lorenz v Germany (1973) para 8 for direct effect of Article 108(3) and Micula I (EU) (2014), paras 6, 22 and 74 for suspension injunction.
- 188.
Article 14(3) of the Procedural Regulation; see also C-142/87 – Tubemeuse (1990), para 66.
- 189.
The Procedural Regulation, Article 14(2).
- 190.
The 24th Report on Competition Policy 1999 (EC 2001), point 314.
- 191.
The Procedural Regulation, Article 15.
- 192.
See, for example, C-404/97 – Commission v Portugal (2000).
- 193.
See C-24/95 – Alcan Deutschland (1997) para 25; C-5/89 BUG – Alutechnik (1990), para 16.
- 194.
See, for example, C-119/05 – Lucchini (2007) and C-505/14 – Klausner Holz Niedersachsen (2015).
- 195.
See C-173/03 – Traghetti del Mediterraneo (2006) paras 41 and 45 (referring to C-224/01 – Köbler (2003) para 51; Francovich Joined Cases C-6 & 9/90 (1991) para 40; Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur (1996) para 51. Case C-173/03 – Traghetti del Mediterraneo concerned state liability in situations where illegal state aid granted by Italy had caused damage to individuals. According to the CJEU, there is a ‘right to obtain redress … where it has been established that the rule of law infringed is intended to confer rights on individuals and there is a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation incumbent on the State and the loss or damage sustained by the injured parties.’
- 196.
- 197.
- 198.
Article 14 of the Procedural Regulation. See also C-142/87 – Tubemeuse (1990) para 66; C-37/14 – Commission v France (2015); Case C-204/21 R Commission v Poland. Further disciplinary methods are laid down by the Article 7 TEU procedures enabling the EU cutting off EU funding or suspending specific rights from to the rebellious Member State. See C-157/21 - Poland v Parliament and Council; C-156/21 Hungary v European Parliament and Council on breaching the rule of law.
- 199.
See C-120/73 – Lorenz v Germany (1973) para 8 for direct effect of Article 108(3). See also the Procedural Regulation, Articles 10(2), 11(2) and C-301/87 – France v Commission (Boussac) (1990), paras 9–24.
- 200.
European Commission (2013b), p. 2.
- 201.
European Commission (2013b), p. 2.
- 202.
European Commission (2013b) p. 2.
- 203.
See tax rulings—for example, SA.38373 $ Apple (2016); SA.38375 Fiat (2015) and SA.38374 Starbucks (2015).
- 204.
- 205.
For example, see the latest modernisation of trade defences at the Commission’s web page at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-defence. See also Commission’s ‘Europe’s trade defence instruments now stronger and more effective’ trade instrument fact sheet (EC 2018). In April 2016, Trade Commissioner Malmstrom’s speech, ‘Way ahead for the global steel industry’, identified subsidies as one of the issues behind the Chinese steel dum** (Malmström 2016).
- 206.
These WTO-based rules are implemented into EU law by Regulation (EU) 2016/1037 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016 on protection against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Union, OJ L 176, 30.6.2016, p. 55–91 (European Parliament & Council 2016).
- 207.
These WTO-based rules are implemented into EU law by Regulation (EU) 2015/476 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on the measures that the Union may take following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dum** and anti-subsidy matters OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, p. 6–10 (Parliament & Council 2015). See also Regulation (EU) 2015/476 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 on the measures that the Union may take following a report adopted by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerning anti-dum** and anti-subsidy matters OJ L 83, 27.3.2015, pp. 6–10 (Parliament & Council 2015).
- 208.
Kroes (2007) p. 4.
- 209.
See SA.38373 $ Apple (2016); SA.38375 Fiat (2015); SA.38374 Starbucks (2015).
- 210.
For example, the United States from subsidising American companies that export to the EU, thus competing within the internal market with the European undertakings.
- 211.
Articles 109 and 110 of the EEA Agreement authorise the Commission to apply EEA competition rules within the EEA territory.
- 212.
See the Commission’s website: ‘Commission adopts white paper on foreign subsidies in the single market | Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs’ (europa.eu).
- 213.
EC (2021).
- 214.
See Chapter 1 Articles 3-6 Draft Regulation on foreign subsidies.
- 215.
Draft Regulation on foreign subsidies Chapters 2-4.
- 216.
The Summary of the responses to the public consultation on the White Paper on levelling the playing field as regards foreign subsidies is available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12452-White-Paper-on-Foreign-Subsidies/public-consultation.
- 217.
See Ch 6 of this thesis for the Switzerland cantonal banking case (Obrist 2013) and Ukraine’s Antimonopoly Committee’s (UMC) state aid decisions.
- 218.
- 219.
For example, EFTA, Cariforum.
- 220.
For example, EU–Ukraine FTA.
- 221.
- 222.
- 223.
Some literature addresses ‘the EU as a conflicted power’ (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006), which by use of its market power (e.g. by offering access to the EU’s internal market or customs union) pressures weaker powers, such as other trading blocs or countries, into accepting trade arrangements that are aligned with EU law (Farrell 2005; Grabbe 2003; Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009) such as the EEA Agreement.
- 224.
The EU’s trade defence mechanism is based on WTO rules, but the EU ‘applies a number of extra conditions to the WTO rules to make sure their use is measured’. European Commission home page at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/trade-defence.
- 225.
Which are, according to the Commission, established in a Member State only as letterbox companies. See SA.38373 $ Apple (2016).
- 226.
See US Treasury White Paper (Treasury, 2016) and US Senate finance committee press release including letter.
- 227.
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Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Cases
Cases
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Aid to Apple SA.38373 $, IP/16/2923 (Alouminion tis Ellados VEAE, formerly Alouminion AE v European Commission case T-542/11 RENV (General Court, 2018)
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Alzetta Mauro and others v Commission of the European Communities, joined cases T-298/97, T-312/97, T-313/97, T-315/97, T-600/97 to 607/97, T-1/98, T-3/98 to T-6/98 and T-23/98, ECLI:EU:T:2000:151 (European Court of Justice, 2000)
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Amministrazione delle finanze dello Stato v Denkavit italiana Srl, case 61/79, ECLI:EU:C:1980:100 (European Court of Justice, 1980).
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Asteris AE and others and Hellenic Republic v Commission of the European Communities, joined cases 97, 193, 99 and 215/86, ECLI:EU:C:1988:199 (European Court of Justice, 1988)
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Finckenberg-Broman, P. (2022). The EU State Aid Regime. In: Weaponizing EU State Aid Law to Impact the Future of EU Investment Policy in the Global Context. Studies in European Economic Law and Regulation, vol 23. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-10108-3_3
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