Abstract
Toward the end of the Charmides, Socrates declares the search for temperance a ‘complete failure’ (175b2-3). Despite this, commentators have suspected that the dialogue might contain an implicit answer about temperance. I propose a new interpretation: the dialogue implies that temperance is the knowledge of good and bad, when this knowledge is applied specifically to certain operations of the soul. This amounts to a kind of self-knowledge; it also involves a kind of reflexivity, for it involves knowing about the value of one’s knowledge. This positive reading, more than any other, makes sense of the dialogue’s dramatic and dialectic features.
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Notes
- 1.
For the purposes of this essay, I follow the suspicion without straightforwardly defending it. Not all commentators share this suspicion. Santas, for example, interprets the Charmides as an expression of Plato’s sincere confusion about temperance. Santas (1973: 109).
- 2.
In this respect, I will extend the line of interpretation developed by Brickhouse and Smith (1997) and (2010), which shares many features with Ferejohn (1982) and (1984). See Clark (2015). This line of interpretation claims that the virtues (in earlier Socratic dialogues) amount to a single knowledge in the soul (the knowledge of good and bad). However, this knowledge can be applied to several different domains. In this way, the interpretation is able to account for both the unity of the virtues, and their conceptual or definitional variance.
- 3.
For the only, see esp. 170a10-170c10 where monon is used four times, along with ouk alla tosouton and ouk allou tinos.
- 4.
The person who possesses the knowledge in (C), according to Socrates, may detect that she herself knows something or other, but she will not be able to grasp what it is that she knows. In other words, on this account, temperance will not enable one to know the content of the knowledge one possesses, nor will it allow one to distinguish a genuine expert from one who pretends. This type of (second-order) knowledge, according to Socrates, would be useless and without benefit (170b-d).
- 5.
The traditional interpretation (T) reaches back to Hermann Bonitz (1968: 143–253), and has been defended more recently by commentators like Terry Penner (1973: 35–68), Richard Kraut (1984: 252–258), Charles Kahn (1988: 541–549), Voula Tsouna (2000: 37–67), G.A. Press, (2002: 162–175), M. Schofield (2006: 146–150), D. Wolfsdorf (2004: 15–40, esp. section 3), and many others.
- 6.
In fact, at 174d4-9, Socrates states that the knowledge of good and bad is not what they are looking for, since it is not a knowledge of knowledge (and the lack of knowledge). If Socrates thought himself to have stumbled upon the correct answer in (T), his declaration of personal failure, that he ‘was right to blame [him]self for discerning nothing useful about temperance’ (175a9-11) would be out of place. For more on this, see Politis (2007: 232–233).
- 7.
The textual evidence is quite convincing. See 167b10-c2, 170b7-8, 170c6-7, 171c4-5 and, in the dialogue’s conclusion, 174e5-7. In each of these passages, Socrates states that if the knowledge that is temperance is only of one’s knowledge and lack of knowledge, then it is either impossible or of no benefit.
- 8.
When Socrates claims that a reflexive knowledge would prove beneficial (171d2-6 and 173a7-c8) he noticeably refrains from using the restriction ‘only’ and does nothing to indicate that he is still discussing a knowledge that is only of itself and other knowledges.
- 9.
Politis (2008: 247).
- 10.
Tuozzo also summarizes his findings saying ‘in order to make sense of the Critian formulation [C], we needed to find an account of the nature of the knowable; following out the implication at the end of the dialogue that sōphrosunē is to be identified with the knowledge of good and bad, and making use of some support from the middle books of the Republic [Books VI-VII], we have suggested that the nature of the knowable is the Good’. Tuozzo (2012: 318).
- 11.
- 12.
A proleptic reading will suggest that the early (or pre-middle) dialogues are designed to anticipate the views of the middle dialogues, so that a doctrine of the Republic can be brought in to explain the meaning of an earlier dialogue like the Charmides. For a full defense of the proleptic reading of the Charmides, see Kahn (1988).
- 13.
For instance, Politis’s answer fails to engage the analogy between medicinemedical art and temperance, the theme of self-control, and the topic of shame. For more on this, see Sect. 6.6.
- 14.
Critias is Charmides’ uncle. He was a sophist and leader of the Thirty Tyrants— the oligarchs who governed a defeated Athens shortly after the Peloponnesian War. He is described in Vitae Sophistarum (I.16) by Flavius Philostratus as the ‘most evil of all who are known for evil’. But his role in this dialogue is complex. For more on Critias, see Notomi (2000); Tsouna (1997).
- 15.
A thorough exploration of the Greek concept of sōphrosunē is provided by North (1966). The condition of self should be rather uncontroversial. North identifies three principle facets of Socratic sophrosyne—self-knowledge, self-control, and self-mastery. See North (1966: 153). Also relevant is Tuozzo, who explains that ‘the σώφρον must be concerned in a fundamental way with himself’. See Tuozzo (2012: 165).
- 16.
Hēsuchiotēs tis is often rendered ‘a sort of quietness’, but this is problematic, since ‘quietness’ is closely connected with ‘silence’ in English. This connection is entirely absent from the Greek. Thus, I follow Tuozzo in my translation ‘calmness’. See Tuozzo (2012: 57–58).
- 17.
- 18.
From the Odyssey XVII, 347. Telemachus speaking with reference to Odysseus, who is disguised as a beggar: ‘Take these things and give them to the stranger, and bid him/ go around and beg heartily from all the suitors./ αἰδῶς is not a good thing for a need man to have’. The same passage is quoted at the end of the Laches (201b) by Socrates, who says he would not be ashamed to enter school even at his age. As North explains, many later writers would make a connection between temperance and shame, since the sōphron would allegedly avoid transgressing social norms. This connection foreshadows subsequent definitions, by highlighting a social dimension of the virtue. See North (1966: 5–7).
- 19.
Ta heautou prattein, the same answer is recommended as a definition of justice in the Republic (433). For a discussion of this see Tuckey (1968: 20–23).
- 20.
Tuozzo provides a useful discussion of each of these values independently. See Tuozzo (2012: 155–188).
- 21.
There have been several attempts to explain the shift from the knowledge of self to the knowledge of itself. For a discussion, see Wellman (1964).
- 22.
Many commentators equate this with Socratic self-knowledge, the distinctly human wisdom described in the Apology. There is certainly a resemblance. If indeed Plato intends for his reader to make this connection, it is important to ask why Plato would have Socrates raise objections to his own brand of self-knowledge. See Carone (1998), Tsouna (1997), and McKim (1985: 61–62).
- 23.
For a useful discussion of the reflexive relations, see McCabe (2007: 2–8).
- 24.
In fact, he appears to insist upon it at 170a, saying ‘I am in danger of being as confused as ever, because I still don’t understand how knowing what one knows and does not know is the same thing as knowledge of the self’.
- 25.
On my view, justice can be defined as ‘knowledge of social goods and social bads’. Piety can be defined as ‘knowledge of spiritual goods and spiritual bads’. But, although the individual virtues are conceptually distinct in this way, they are nevertheless one and the same psychological state, knowledge of good and bad. See Clark (2015).
- 26.
For a complete analysis of this argument, see Clark (2012).
- 27.
There’s a difficult question here about how to understand the role of appetites within an intellectualist theory of motivation like the one Socrates endorses. Penner’s account is helpful. He explains that appetites (epithumiai) are mere ‘drives’, or ‘hankerings’. He thereby distinguishes appetite from wish (boulēsis). Unlike wishes, appetites are accompanied by physical or physiological changes. Penner provides an illustration. The thought of a chocolate bar might induce ‘hormonal changes’ in an agent. The agent may then incorporate these hormonal changes into his calculation about what is best, but such an appetite alone cannot motivate action. In the event that the agent happens to conclude that eating the chocolate bar is the best available action, only then does he form a wish (boulēsis) to eat the chocolate bar. The judgment (together with the wish) will motivate the action. An alternate account comes from Brickhouse and Smith. They argue that, although epithumiai are incapable of motivating action independently of the agent’s judgment that the action is best, epithumiai can cause the agent to make this judgment. My thesis in this paper is compatible with either interpretation. See Penner (1995), Brickhouse and Smith (2002) and (2007).
- 28.
Another controversy involves how (on the intellectualist picture of motivation) wrongdoing could possibly damage the soul, especially to the point of incurability. One explanation is provided by Brickhouse and Smith (2002), where they assume a ‘weakened’ version of intellectualism. Thus, two competing interpretations of Socratic intellectualism emerge. It is fundamental to either interpretation that an agent will φ if and only if she believes that it is best for her to φ. The central point of strong intellectualism, however, is that the motivation to φ is always initiated by cognitive factors. This is not the case for the weakened view. According to weak intellectualism, the motivation to φ will sometimes be initiated by an appetite (epithumia), specifically, an appetite that will be satisfied by φ-ing. In other words, when a certain appetite is sufficiently strong, it will cause the corresponding belief that φ-ing is best. In this way, undisciplined appetites can directly interfere with an agent’s cognitive processes to the extent that they actually cause the agent to hold (false) beliefs about what is good. In support of this interpretation, C.C.W Taylor (2008: 38) suggests that ‘in the Gorgias desire can cause the belief that the object is best for the agent, and thereby motivate the agent to choose that object’. Similarly, Brickhouse and Smith suggest that the ‘appetites and passions play a causal role in the formation of our beliefs about what’s good for us’, and that ‘the more the appetites and passions are satisfied and are allowed to attain their goals, the more potent they become in causing the soul to accept the appearances they present as truth’. On this account, psychological damage results from the appetites becoming enflamed by wrongdoing to such an extent that they actually cause certain incorrect beliefs about what is best. Furthermore, an incurable soul will not be able to recognize this error for what it is, since unruly appetites are producing an irresistible appearance of good. See Brickhouse and Smith (2007: 340) and (2002: 21–36). There are several expressions of strong intellectualism in the literature, but no detailed account (yet) of how wrongdoing can damage the soul. See Penner (1995, 1996, 1997), Nehamas (1998: 28–59), Reshotko (1992).
- 29.
This fragment is from Cydias. It has been pointed out that this line is unique in displaying the lover’s pursuit as one in which the lover figures as fawn, while the object of the lover’s desire figures as lion. As Reece notes, ‘we might expect that the image would function the other way around’. Reece discusses a reading I happen to agree with, when he claims that ‘one way of understanding Socrates’ use of this inverted image is to suppose that he means he has been snared by his lust for Charmides, so that the lion in the poem stands for carnal desire, not for an individual whose beauty incites it’. See Reece (1998: 70–71).
- 30.
It is interesting that Socrates should refer to himself as a blank ruler, or a ‘white line’ (154b-c). Socrates says he is no good at measuring the beauty of young people. When it comes to assessing the physical beauty of young people, they all register as beautiful. The phrase atechōs luekē stathmē eimi pros was colloquial for ‘I make no discriminations when it comes to…’ As far as I can tell, the passage may indicate Socrates’ preoccupation with beauty in souls, since this beauty is of considerably more value. Alternatively, we might understand this as yet another disavowal of knowledge on the part of Socrates. For more on this, see Reece (1998: 66–67).
- 31.
- 32.
For a useful discussion of this issue, see Barney (2010).
- 33.
Not all sciences. Recall the distinction between productive and theoretical sciences. Theoretical sciences might not have a productive result. Nevertheless, they will seek to discover the realities (ta onta) of things in their domain (Euthydemus 290b-c). For theoretical sciences, therefore, these discoveries play a similar role, which means that similar conclusions can be drawn. See Roochnik (1986: 297–303).
- 34.
The context of this discussion is noteworthy. Socrates compares rhetoric (the pseudo-science Callicles practices) to navigation. On occasions, both ‘sciences’ aim to save people. But Socrates argues that Callicles over-estimates the value of rhetoric and its result. On the present interpretation, such over-estimation indicates to a lack of temperance.
- 35.
That temperance involves knowing the value of other knowledges (and itself) may sound implausible, since Socrates never explicitly says so. But this hypothesis finds support in the Protagoras, where Socrates warns Hippocrates about sophists (313d-314b1), saying ‘Those who take the various subjects of knowledge from city to city, and offer them for sale retail to whoever wants them, commend everything that they have for sale. But it may be that…these men are ignorant of the beneficial or harmful effects on the soul of what they have for sale… If then you happen to be an expert in discerning which of them is good or bad, it is safe for you to buy knowledge from Protagoras or anyone else, but otherwise be careful …’ The point is clear. It takes the knowledge of good and bad to determine the effect of an organized body of knowledge on the soul. Socrates calls such an expert a ‘physician of the soul’. In the Charmides, Socrates presented as a physician of the soul, and he is also found discerning the value of a science. For as soon as Critias answers that (C) temperance is the knowledge of what one knows and what one does not know only, Socrates proceeds to investigate whether or not this knowledge would be beneficial.
- 36.
Thus, the temperate person will be able to judge that the knowledge she possess is good (for her), and the knowledge she lacks is bad (for her).
- 37.
One might argue that the declaration of ‘complete failure’ would be surprising on the present interpretation. After all, (S) can be understood as an extended version of the traditional interpretation, which means that (T) manages to get things mostly correct. I contend, however, that the declaration of ‘complete failure’ is still appropriate. Consider the following two observations. First, although (T) is openly discussed in the dialogue, it is never formally tried as a definition, nor taken seriously as an account of temperance. Second, even if (T) had been tried as a definition of temperance, on my reading, it would have failed to satisfy the condition of self. In this way, the search for temperance remains (at least) two steps removed from the correct answer.
- 38.
For more on this, see for instance, Murphy (2000).
- 39.
- 40.
In the opening scene, when Socrates arrives to the palaistra from the battle at Potidaea, he asks whether any young men were setting themselves apart with respect to wisdom or beauty. This question sets the stage for the related themes of erōs and the self-control. As Reece (1998) notes, ‘Plato has already anticipated this juxtaposition of themes by setting the Charmides in a palaistra, where Athenian males would be stimulated both physically and intellectually by one another’s presence’. See Reece (1998: 66).
- 41.
I am in agreement with an interpretation of hēsuchiotēs tis defended by Kosman (1971).
- 42.
Recall that Socrates refutes this answer by pointing out that modesty is not always a good thing—i.e. ‘modesty is not a good thing for a needy mate to have’. This quote comes from Odyssey XVII, 347. See footnote 16 above. It is noteworthy that Socrates uses this quote again in the Laches (201b), saying he would not be ashamed to spend time in school at his age.
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Clark, J.C. (2022). Knowledge and Temperance in Plato’s Charmides. In: Plato’s Dialogues of Definition. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-07849-1_6
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