Abstract
Once established the metaphysic nature of the economy and of the economic agent as deciding and acting subject, and also as worker, we need to elaborate on the metaphysical nature of the economic system—i.e., the macroeconomy. This chapter will serve as a prelude to this discussion, noting that the macroeconomy refers to the economic dimension of a whole composed of a great number of people interacting between them—a social collective. Thus, before delving into the topic of the nature of the macroeconomy or macroeconomic entities, we have to establish the nature of social collectives. First, the chapter surveys dictionary definitions of social collectives in order to identify their shared characteristics, using this basic notion as a starting point to ascertain the ontology of social collectives. Next, the chapter describes and analyzes Aristotle’s seminal views on social collectives. The last section introduces some views that have some similarities with Aristotle’s and that will benefit from Aristotelian notions.
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Notes
- 1.
Margaret Gilbert (2001: 109, nt. 1) uses the term “collective” because she considers it as the “genus”.
- 2.
For a review of issues and positions described by Brian Epstein (2018), see the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, entry “Social Ontology”: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-ontology/ and https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/social-ontology/history.html.
- 3.
Here I follow Aristotle’s enumeration of accidents in Categories 4, 1b 25–2a 4.
- 4.
See George Duke (2020: 88) for the translation of sympheron.
- 5.
For example, Adam Smith claims that “[t]he wise and virtuous man is at all times willing that his own private interest should be sacrificed to the public interest of his own particular order or society” (1976: 235 –VI, iii). For John Stuart Mill, a fair government must look for citizens’ common good (see Brink 2018).
- 6.
I think that the difference made by Tony Honoré between a crowd and a group illustrates this limit:
A group is more than a mere collection of individuals. A crowd is not as such a group, even if it exhibits the pattern of behavior called “crowd behavior.” On the other hand, a band of conspirators, a mountaineering expedition, and those engaged in a scientific experiment form groups. What unites them? A common purpose or activity is no doubt necessary, but hardly seems sufficient… Some shared understanding as to the means to be pursued is also needed. To constitute a group there must be an element of prescription, which limits the freedom of at least some of the group simply to go their own way. (1987: 34, my cursive)
Honoré mentions some consequences of having a common purpose or activity—I will come back to them later. At this point, I want to highlight that a mere crowd is not a social collective because its common aim is merely circumstantial. Carl Welleman (1995), following Honoré’s criterion, considers other grou**s that are not “social collectives”:
Very different from organizations are unorganized groups. Among the latter, it is important to distinguish between collections and classes, between groups of people gathered together at some place at some time and groups of people classified together on the basis of a common attribute. (1995: 169)
The togetherness of this sort of group [collections] is purely spatiotemporal. The several members of a collection belong to the same group because they are at the same place at the same time. (1995: 169)
The unity of any class consists simply of some common attribute possessed by and some general name predicated of a number of individuals—not the oneness of the ontological or linguistic subject. Hence, statements about a class must be generalizations about its members (1995: 171).
- 7.
Aristotle states: “For the city is, with regard to its nature, some multitude, and becoming more of a unity it will be a household rather than a city, and a human being rather than a household. For we would say that the household is more of a unity than the city, and the individual more than the household. So even if someone were able to do this, he should not do it; for this would destroy the city” (Politics 1261a 16–22; cf. 1263b 29–35).
- 8.
See Robert Gallagher (2011) analysis on this and related passages of Aristotle and their consequences.
- 9.
For the development of an argument applying this idea to modern society, see Charles Taylor (1985).
- 10.
Barker states: “As a whole, it [the polis] is viewed as composed of parts different in kind, which are subordinates one to another; for in all compounds which form a whole, there may be traced a ruling element and a ruled” (1959: 234). In this sense, he considers the nature of a constitution as vital element (1959: 301).
- 11.
Aristotle enumerates “all the elements necessary for the existence of the state. Our list of these elements will include what we have called the ‘parts’ of the state as well as we have termed its ‘conditions’. To make such a list we must first determine how many services a state performs; and then we shall easily see how many elements it must contain. The first thing to be provided is food. The next is arts and crafts; for life is a business which needs many tools. The third is arms: the members of a state must bear arms in person, partly in order to maintain authority and repress disobedience, and partly in order to meet any thread of external aggression. The fourth thing which has to be provided is a certain supply of property, alike for domestic use and for military purposes. The fifth (but in order of merit, the first) is an establishment for the service of the gods, or as it is called, public worship. The sixth thing, and the most vitally necessary, is a method of deciding what is demanded by the public interest and what is just in men’s private dealings. These are the services which every state may be said to need” (Politics VII, 8, 1328b 3–16).
- 12.
- 13.
It should be noted that, for Searle, “natural” means “physical” (see, for example, Searle 1995: Chapter 1).
- 14.
Tuomela notes that some elements drawn from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s, William McDougall’s, Alfred Vierkandt’s, and Ferdinand Tönnies’s views are relevant for his theory (2013: 93–94).
- 15.
- 16.
Epstein is critical of Gilbert’s and Tuomela’s theories (2015: Chapter 17) on the basis that they are only applicable to small groups. This is not, as I have mentioned, Gilbert’s and Tuomela’s intention.
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Crespo, R.F. (2022). The Metaphysics of Social Collectives. In: The Nature of the Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-02453-5_7
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