Reductionism and Holism

Abstract

The introductory chapter is devoted to the debate between the proponents of the reductionist and holistic conceptions, presenting exemplars employed by either side. The aim is to show to what extent each approach is justified and where the limits of their validity lie. There is a significant difference between the strong programme of reductionism and reductionism “in principle”, suggesting that there was excess optimism in the original expectations of a successful reduction of the various special sciences to physics as a fundamental science; a presentation is made of the reasons that have led to a greatly more sceptical view. More detailed analyses of suitable examples, such as the periodic table, quantum models of the atomic nucleus, and the history of pentaquark discovery, demonstrate that the reductionist quest to derive the universe from first principles systematically fails. Arguments ultimately lead to the conclusion that, for reasons of principle, this goal can never be achieved. In addition to examples from chemistry and physics, attention is given to metaphysical arguments raised in support of both approaches: arguments from analytic metaphysics are raised against the possibility of emergent causal forces (Jaegwon Kim), and the famous rolling wheel argument in favour of top-down causality (Roger Sperry and John Searle). The implications of these arguments in the broader context of the causality of mental phenomena in the philosophy of mind can then be outlined. Finally, as regards the possibility of deriving the universe from a few fundamental principles, the limits of classical reductionism and the legitimacy of the holistic approach are established.